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Document 1406 16th May 1994
AGENDA
of the lirst part of the fortieth ordinary session
Paris, 13th-l6th June 1994
I. Report of the Council
Thirty-ninth annual report of the Council
(secoird part)
II. Political questions
l. WEU in the prooess of European Report tabled by Mr. Ferrari on behalf of theUnion reply to the thirty-ninth Polilical Committee
annual report of the Council
2. European security: crisisprevention Report tabled by Mr. de Puig on behalf of the
and management Po[itical Committee
III. Defence questions
I . The r6le and future of nuclear weapons Report tabled by Mr. De Deckcr on behalf of the
Defence Committee
2. The WEU Planning Cell 
- 
reply to the Report tabled by Mrs. Baameld-Schlaman on
thirty-ninth annual report of the behalf of the Defence committee
Council
3. An operational org;anisation for WEU: Report tabled by Sir Keith Speed on behalf of the
naval and maritime co-operation Defence Committee
IV. Technological and aerospaoe questions
The European arrnaments agency 
- 
reply Report tabled by Mr. Borderas on behalf of the
to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee
Council
V. Budgetary questions
Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial Report tabled by Mr. Covi on behalf of the Com-
organs of Western European Union for mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administa-
the financial year 1994 tion
YI. Rules of Procrcdure and Privileges
Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Report tabled by Lord Finsberg on behalf of the
Procedure of the Assembly in view of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
creation of a status of associate member leges
YII. Parliamentary ond Public Relations
Parliamentary cooperation with the coun- Report tabled by Sir Russell Johnston on behalf
tries of the WEU Forum of Consultation of the Committee for Parliarnentary and Public
Relations
10
Document 1407 16th May 1994
ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the first part of the fortieth ordinary session
Paris, 13th-16th June 1994
MONDAY, l3rh JUNE
Morning
Meetings of political groups.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
l. Opening of the first part of the fortieth ordinary session by the Provisional President.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft order of business of the first part of the fortieth ordinary session.
7. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
8 The European armaments agency 
- 
reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Borderas on behalf of the Technological and Aero-
space Committee.
Debate.
4 p.m.
9. Address by Mr. Haekkerup, Minister of Defence of Denmark.
10. The European armaments agency 
- 
reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council:
resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
TUESDAY, l4th JUNE
Morning l0 a.m.
l. WEU in the prccess of European Union 
- 
reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the
Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Ferrari on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.
ll a.m.
2. Address by Mr. Hurd, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the
United Kingdom.
3. WEU in the prooess of European Union - reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the
Council:
resumed debate.
Vote on the drqft recommendation.
l1
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Afternoon 3 p.m.
l. European security: crisis-prevention and management:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Puig on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.
3.30 p.m.
2. Address by Mr. Olechowski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland.
3. European security: crisis-prevention and management:
resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
4. Parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the Forum of Consultation:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Russell Johnston on behalf of the Committee for
Parliamentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
WEDNESDAY, Isth JUI\IE
Morning 10 a.m.
1. The WEU Planning Cell - reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-schlaman on behalf of the Defence Com-
mittee.
Debate.
10.30 a.m.
2. Chairmanshiein-Oflice of the Council 
- 
presentation of the second part of the thirty-ninth
annual report of the Council 
- 
Address by Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Oflice of the Council.
11.30 a.m.
3. Address by General Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
l. The WEU Planning Cell 
- 
reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council:
resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
2. An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co'operation:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Keith Speed on behalf of the Defence Com-
mittee.
Debate.
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3.30 p.m.
3. Address by Mr. de Marco, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malta.
4. An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation:
resumed debate.
Vote on the drqft recommendation.
5. Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation
of a status of associate member:
presentation of the report tabled by Lord Finsberg on behalf of the Committee on Rules of
Procedure and Privileges.
Debate.
Vote on the draft decision.
6. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1994:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Covi on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the draf,t opinion.
THURSDAY l6th JUNE
Morning 10 a.m.
l. The r6le and future of nuclear weapons:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Defence Com-
mittee.
Debate.
1030 a.m.
2. Address by Mr. Kukan, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia.
3. The rOle and future of nuclear weapons:
resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE FORTIETH ORDINARY SESSION
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Document 1408 7th February 1994
Draft budget of tlrc odministative *penditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1994
Revision of Addendum 2 to Duument 1383
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Expleuronv Mruonaupuu
APPENDICES
I. Document BR (93) 714 (Draft) Decision sheet on the l57th meeting
II. Recapitulatory table of amendments to the draft budget of the Assembly
on the basis of the opinion of the WEU Budget and Organisation Com-
mittee
III. Trend of Assembly budgets from 1993 to 1994
IV. Implications of the various heads on the operating budgets for 1993 and
1994
Explanatory Memorandum
1. During the meeting held in Brussels on 28th January 1994, the WEU Budget and Organisation
Committee pointed out that the comparison between credits for the financial year L994 and credits for
the financial year 1993 had been calculated on the initial credits for 1993 adjusted to include amounts
carried over from the previous year as indicated in footnotes to the budget document.
2. Document 1383 Addendum 2 should therefore be revised to meet the request of the WEU
Budget and Organisation Committee. This revision may be considered as a technical adjustment which
does not affect the substance of the requests made by the Assembly in its operating budget for 1994.
3. To bring the budget in question down to the growth rute of 40lo in relation to the initial credits as
the Budget and Organisation Committee wishes, Document 1383 Addendum 2 mlght be adjusted in
the following manner:
(a) creation of two grade 83 posts of assistant for the Committee for Parliamentary and Public
Relations and the archives oflice with effect from lst July 1994 involving a total expenditure
of F 231 500;
(b) regading of the following posts: one grade L3 to grade L4; one grade 86 to grade A2; one
grade C6 to grade 84 involving a total expenditure of F 82 600;
(c/ withdrawal of the credits requested with a view to the accession of Greece to WEU(F 569 @0) concerning various sub-heads of the budget;
(d) reduction of credits under sub-head 6 of Head II by F 100 500. This reduction also takes into
account the estimate for the reduction of receipts due to the deficit resulting from the delay
noted in the payment of contributions by member countries.
4. For the budget of the Assembly (Document 1383 and 1383 Addendum) these measures would
include the modifications shown in Appendix II. As can be seen in Appendix III, the operating budget
thus revised compared with the financial year 1993 would show an increase of some F I 117000
corresponding to a gowth rute of 4010.
5. Account has also been taken of the fact that the deferment until lst July 1994 of recruiting to fill
the two grade 83 posts results in a reduction of F 12 000 in receipts in the pensions budget.
6. This revision of Document 1383 Addendum 2 is submitted for the approval of the Presidential
Committee in accordance with its responsibilities under Rule 14.2 of the Rules of Procedure of the
Assembly.
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APPENDIX I
Document BR (93) 7/4 (Draft)
Duision sheet on the 157th meering
m. WEU Assembly's 1994 draft budget
B (93) 36 (p.m.)
B (93) 36 Addendum (p.m.)
(93) 36 Addendum 2 dated l4th December 1993 (reported orally at the 3rd December meeting
but not screened)
The committee heard Mr. Cannizzaro, who explained that the recommendations of the Budget
and Organisation Committee to the Council had been followed and that the suggestion to limit the
budgetary gowth to 4Vo had been respected, but that the comparison had been made between the 1993
approved budget plus credit carried forward from 1992 and the figure proposed for 1994.
The committee considered that its proposal and the Council's approval of it had been misinter-
preted by the Assembly's administration and that the figures should be adjusted.
The final agreement on the Assembly's budget will be taken in the light of the overall com-
mitment.
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APPENDIX II
Recapituhtory table of amendmonts to tlu draft budget of the WEU Assembly
based on the opinion of the Council
Heads and Sub-Heads
Draft budget
for 1994
(Doc. 1383-
1383 Add.)
Amendments
resulting
from the opinion
of the Council
Revised
budget
for 1994
Hpeo I 
- 
PeRMnNnrrsterF'
Sub-Head:
I - Basic salaries ...
? 
- 
Allnwances
l 3 675 000
3 332 000
2711000
429 0W
l6 000
-947 500
- 
3s8 000
- 
190 000
- 
295 000
-3000
12727 500
2974000
2 521 0W
133 500
13 000
3 
- 
Social charges
4 
- 
Expenses relating to the recruitment
and departure of permanent oflicials .
5 
- 
Medical examination ..
Tnral 20 163 000
- 
l 794 000 l8 369 000
Henp II 
- 
TruponanY srAFF
Sub-Head:
6 
- 
Staff recruited for sessions of the
Ac.sernhlw 3 380 000
793 000
75 000
214000
- 
480 500
- 
29 000
2 899 s00
793 000
75 000
185 000
7 
- 
Interpretation staff required for Assem-
bly work between sessions
8 
- 
Temporary staff for the Office of the
Clerk
9 
- 
Social charges
Torar 4 462000
- 
509 s00 3 952 s00
Hrno III 
- 
ExprNorruRE oN PREMTsEs
AND EQUIPMENT
Sub-Head:
l0 
- 
Share. ofjoint expenditure on the Paris
premlses
I I 
- 
Hire of committee rooms
12 
- 
Technical and other installations for
Assembly sessions
13 
- 
Various services for the organisation of
585 000
l0 000
815 000
s5 000
l5 000
40 000
25 000
654 000
- 
125 000
585 000
l0 000
690 000
55 000
l5 000
40 000
25 000
654 000
14 
- 
Maintenance of the premises of the
Office of the Clerk .
15 
- 
Purchase or repair of office furniture .
16 
- 
Purchase of reproduction and other
office equipment.
17 
- 
Hire and maintenance of reproduction
and other equipment
Toral. 21990W
- 
125 000 2074000
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Heads and Sub-Heads
Draft budget
for 1994(Doc. 1383-
1383 Add.)
Amendments
resulting
from the opinion
of the Council
Revised
budget
for 1994
Hrno IV 
- 
GrNBner- ADMrNrsrRATrvE cosrs
Sub-Head:
18 
- 
Postage, telephone, telefax and
transport of documents ....
19 
- 
Duplication paper, headed writing
paper and other office supplies. . .....
- 
Printing and publication of documents .
- 
Purchase of documents ....
- 
Official cars ..
- 
Bank charges
Tornr , 
- -,,
20
2t
22
23
646 000
237 000
l 215 000
75 000
65 000
500
646 000
237 0W
I 215 000
7s 000
65 000
500
2 238 500 0 2238 s00
Hreo V 
- 
Orsrn ExpENDrruRE
Sub-Head:
24 
- 
Travelling and subsistence allowances
and insurance for the President of the
Assembly, chairmen of committees and
fennofterrfs 295 000
360 000
5 000
708 000
60 000
510 000
569 000
3 000
29 000
- 
35 000
r 000
295 000
360 000
5 000
708 000
60 000
510 000
534 000
3 000
28 000
- 
Expenses for representation
- 
Committee study missions
- 
Oflicial journeys of members of the
Oflice of the Clerk .
- 
Expenses of experts and the auditor ..
- 
Expenditure on information
- Expenses for political groups
- 
Contingencies and other expenditure
not elsewhere provided for ..
- 
Non-recoverable taxes .
Tntar
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
2 539 000
- 
36 000 2 503 000
Operating budget
Receipts
31 601 s00
95 000
- 
2 464 500 29 137 000
95 000
Nrr rornr- oPERATTNG BUDGET 31 506 s00
- 
2 464 500 29 042000
Pensions expenditure .. . ..
Peneinf c
4 756 000
958 000
- 
71 000
4 7s6 000
887 000
Ner rorel PENsxoNS BUDGET 3 798 000 71 000 3 869 000
Ner cneNo rorAl . 35 304 500
- 
2 393 s00 32 9l l 000
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APPENDIX III
Trend of the Assembly budgas ftom 1993 to 1994
1993
a
1994
b
olob-a
a
A. Operating budget
Head I. Permanent staff
Head II. Temporary staff . .
Head III. Expenditure on premises and
equipment
Head IV. General administrative costs ...
Head V. Other expenditure
t7 51200/0
4 064 500
l 967 000
2255 500
2236000
18 369 000
3 9s2 500
2074W0
2238 5W
2 503 000
+ 4.89
2.75
+ 5.44
- 
0.75
+ 11.94
Total expenditure .
Rcneinfs
28 03s 000
I l0 000
29 137 000
9s 000
+ 3.93
- 
13.63
Nrr rorar- . 27 925 0N 29 0420m + 4.00
B. Pensions budget
Pensions and leaving allowances
Ree-einf s
4 108 000
765 000
47560m
887 0m
+ 15.77
+ 15.94
Nrr rorer . 3 343 000 3 869 0m + 15.73
GneNo NEr rorAl (A + B)
Tornl oF HEADS II ro V oF oPERArrNc
BUDGET
31 268 000
l0 523 000
329lr0m
l0 768 0m
+ 5.25
2.32+
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APPENDIX IV
Implications of the various heads on the 1993 and 1994 operatiag budgas
t993 1994
Amount
%of
Amount
%of
A B A B
Operating budget
Expenditure
Head I. Permanent staJf
Head II. Temporary staff .
Head III. Premises and equipment
Head IV. General administrative
costs .
Head V. Other expenditure
t7 512000
4 064 500
l 967 000
2255 5N
2236000
62.46
r4.50
7.02
8.05
7.97
62.71
14.55
7.04
8.08
8.00
l8 369 000
3 9s2 s00
2074000
2238 s00
2 503 000
63.04
13.57
7.12
7.68
8.59
63.25
13.61
7.14
7.71
8.62
A- Torlr 28 035 000
l l0 000
100.00 100.38
0.38
29 137 0N
1 l0 000
100.00 ldo.33
0.33Receipts
B. Nsr rorAl . 27 92sW0 100.00 100.00 29027 0W 100.00 100.00
Column A - Total expenditure
Column B = Net total (expenditure less receipts)
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Document 1408 Addendum 22nd March 1994
Revised budget of the odministrative *penditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1994
Opinion of thc Council
Explanatory Note
Document 1408 
- 
comprising technical adjustments to Document 1383 Addendum 2 made at
the request of the Budget and Organisation Committee of the Council 
- 
was approved by the Presi-
dential Committee at its meeting on llth February 1994.
The budget estimates of the Assembly for the financial year 1994, thus adjusted, were submitted
to the Council by the Budget and Organisation Committee with its recommendation for their approval
(see extract from Document CB (94) 4, Appendix I).
The Council approved these estimates on l5th March 1994 (see Appendix II).
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1.
APPENDIX I
Suraary-General's Note
1994 budget estimates for the WEU SecretariatGeneral
Report by the Budget and Organisation Committee
I. Introduction
This report sets out:
the results of the Budget and Organisation Committee's review of the execution of the 1993
budget for the WEU Secretariat-General, including the Secretariat, the Secretariat pensions(AIA), the PMO pensions, the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the Long- and
Medium-term Space Studies and the Planning Cell and of the subsidiary bodies, i.e. the WEU
Assembly, the WEU Institute for Security Studies and the WEU Satellite Centre;
the Budget and Organisation Committee's recommendations and observations on the 1994
budget estimates for the WEU Secretariat-General and the subsidiary bodies;
the proposed changes to the establishment of the WEU Secretariat-General and the subsidiary
bodies in 1994;
detailed budgets and annexes with the modilied organisation charts.
II. Revised 1993 budgets
For the first time the committee proceeded to a mid-term review of the budgets.
The committee approved the revised budgets in the same amount as initially authorised.
The committee also decided to make this a yearly procedurer.
III. Budgetary recommendations for 1994
The committee recommends approval of the 1994 credits set out in total below and in detail at
4.
Annex.(t) WEU Secretariat-General
(ii) WEUSecretariat-Generalpensions
(iit) ex PMO pensions
(iv) WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments
(v) WEU Long- and Medium term Space Studies
(vil WEU Planning Cell
(vii) WEU Assembly
(viii) WEU Institute for Security Studies
(ix) WEU Satellite Centre
BF 242 157 469
BF 34 r04 710
FF tt 974 650
FF 863 536
Ecu 3 300 000
BF 62 260 100
FF 32 9lr 000
FF 15 676 050
ESP l 603 360 000
l. The WEU Assembly, having been invited to participate in the procedure, did not forward the requested document, since it
considered it not to be compatible with the Assembly's financial autonomy.
2t
2.
3.
DocUMENT l40E nopexputrr epprNptx II
APPENDIX II
l6th March 1994
I have the pleasure to inform you of the following:
The 1994 budget of the Assembly of Western European Union, as distributed under C-B (94) 4,
has been approved of by the Council during its meeting of l5th March 1994 [see CR (94) ll].
Yours sincerely,
Horst Holrnorr
Ambassador
Sir Dudley Sunn, DL, MP,
President of the Assembly
of Western European Union
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Document 1409 llth March 1994
Relations between the Europun Union,
IUEU and the Atbntic Alliance
MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION 
'
tabW by Mr. Tummers
The Assembly,
(i) Being apprised of the resolution on relations between the European Union, WEU and the
Atlantic Alliance adopted by the European Parliament on24th February 1994;(ii) Recalling Recommendations 491, 504, 517 and 526;(iiil considering that two member states of the European Union have rejected the offer of accession
to the modified Brussels Treaty made to them in the declaration of the WEU member countries
adopted at Maastricht on l0th December 1991;(iv) Noting that the countries called upon to accede to the European Union in 1994 have not applied
for membership of WEU;
(v) Noting also that the NATO summit meeting on lfth January 1994 did not admit of accession by
any of the member countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation to the 1949 Washington Treaty;
(vt) Considering that Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty cannot be extended to countries
which are not members of the Atlantic Alliance and of the European Union;
(vii) Earnestly desiring the progressive integration of all the states of Western and Central Europe in a
system of co-operation guaranteeing security, stability and peace to Europe as a whole;
(viii) Taking the view that the complementarity of WEU and the European Union's common foreign
and security policy should lead to closer cooperation between these two institutions;(ix) Considering that the devolution of WEU's responsibilities to institutions or countries which are
not members of WEU or NATO would risk paralysing any steps towards joint action on defence and
security in Europe;(x) Recalling that the WEU Assembly, created under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty and
bringing together delegations from the parliaments of member countries, is the only parliamentary
institution capable of representing the peoples of Europe in its particular areas of responsibility,
RrcoMlaeNros rHAT trre CouNcrr-
l. Carefully prepare the intergovernmental conference which, starting in 1996, is to study the
organisation of European security;
2. Retain the existing modified Brussels Treaty until such time as all the members of the European
Union are prepared to accede to its provisions;
3. Develop WEU's activities by continuing to regard it as an integral part of the development of the
European Union, in accordance with Article J.4.2 of the Maastricht Treaty;
4. Continue to accord primary responsibility for matters pertaining to the sovereignty of member
states to an Assembly constituted by delegations from the parliaments of the member countries.
Signed: Tummers
l. See meeting of the Presidential Committee, l6th March 1994 (Motion referred to the Political Committee).
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Document 1410 23rd March 1994
The evolution of NATO and its consequences for WEU
REPORT'
submitted on b ehalf of the Political Committe e'
by Mr. Baumel" Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnarr Recour,mNoenoN
on the evolution of NATO and its consequences for WEU
ExpI-aNlrony MBuonnNoutvt
submitted by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. Ensuring stability in the East
m. Implementation of a new form of co-operation between WEU and
NATO
IV. WEU facing unprecedented challenges
V. Conclusions
l. Adopted in committee by 15 votes to I with 0 abstentions.
2,. l(emb9r1 ol the committee: Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman); L9$ Finqberg, Mr. Roseta (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Agnelli, Alegre,
Andreotti (Alternate: Gottardo), Benvenuti (Alternate: Caldoro), Bowden, De Hoop Scheffer, Ehrmann, Fabia, Feldminn,
Foschi, Goerens, Homs I Ferret, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Kaspereit, Lord Kirkhilr,- MM. Kittelmann, lrers, de Lipskowski(Alternate: Baume[), Miillgy, lecriaux, Polli (Alternate: Ferrari), de Puig, Reddemann, Rodrigues, Seeuws, Seitlinger, SoellVingon, Ward (Alternate: Sir Keith Speed), Wintgens, hpatero.
N.B. Ifte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
on the evolution of NATO and ils consequences for WEU
The Assembly
(i) Emphasising the importance of the NATO summit meeting reaffirming its attachment to transatlan-
tic links on the basis of a substantial presence of United States forces in Europe and the direct engagement
of the North Atlantic allies in the security of Europe;
(ii) Endorsing the partnership for peace programme offered by NATO to the countries taking part in the
work of NACC and other interested CSCE counffies;
(iii) Noting nevertheless that the Atlantic Alliance has not yet managed to define in a coherent manner
the nature of its relations with Russia and the CIS, nor the shape of a security system including the coun-
tries of Central Europe that will satisfy the aspirations and appease the concerns of all sides; -
(iv) Emphasising consequently the importance of WEU's r6le with a view to helping to maintain stabi-
lity and security in the East;
(v) Also emphasising the importance of the greater r6le played by WEU in the framework of its co-ope-
ration with NATO with regard to peace-keeping and crisis-management missions;
(vi) Strongly welcoming the decision of the heads of state and of government of the Atlantic Alliance to
uphold the sffengthening of the European pillar of that alliance through WEU and their readiness to make
the collective assets of the alliance available to WEU;
(vii) Recalling at the same time that since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty WEU has
become an integral part of the development of the European Union and is required to work out and imple-
ment the decisions of the Union that have defence and security implications;
(viii) Consequently recalling that the Council has to take as a matter of urgency a series of important deci-
sions to make WEU a truly operational organisation and to respond to expectations and the increased res-
ponsibilities entrusted to it;
(ix) Convinced nevertheless that the WEU Council now needs special political impetus to overcome its
difficulties in reaching the necessary decisions;
(x) Considering that the intention of the ministers to reduce to six months the duration of the Chair-
ryanship-in-Qffice of WEU in order to facilitate the harmonisation of the presidencies of the European
Union and of WEU calls for new measures to ensure the continuity of WEU's political planning in order
to accelerate the process of decision-taking and to ensure a better hearing for WEU's voice in alliance and
European Union bodies;
(xi) Insisting on the need to associate the Assembly to a greater extent in the Council's thinking before
the latter takes decisions or decides not to take them in the absence of the necessary unanimity,
RscoMr\4pNDS THAr rr{E CouNCrL
1. At its next ministerial meeting, grant simultaneously to all the member countries of the Forum of
Consultation an associate status in WEU enabling them to participate to the greatest possible extent in the
work of the Council and of its subsidiary bodies without prejudice to the status of associate member accor-
ded to Iceland, Norway and Turkey as members of NATO;
2. Conclude its work on strategic mobility and inform the Assembly of its conclusions;
3. Decide before the end of this year:
- 
to establish a European system of space-based observation in accordance with the results of the
feasibility study;
- 
to move from the feasibility study phase to the conclusion of a contract with European indusfiry
for building the European military transport aircraft;
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- 
to create a European air-maritime force reinforced by ground components;
- 
to agree on the conditions for the use and command of the European corps which is to be placed
under the political direction of WEU in conformity with the agreements already concluded with
SACEUR;
- 
to make arrangements for associating with the European corps the other forces answerable to
WEU so as to allow a European rapid action force to be created;
- 
to create a European amaments agency with effective responsibilities and powers in order to
achieve true co-operation between member states and their industries on questions of mat6riel;
4. Increase the means and enlarge the field of action of the Planning Cell by giving it a true r6le of ope-
rational co-ordination between WEU and NATO based on overall guidelines, including contingency plans
and the planning of joint manoeuvres of forces answerable to WEU;
5. Harmonise with NATO the concept of combined joint task forces (CJTF) with its own concept of
forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU);
6. Harmonise its working relationship with the European Union in matters that might have repercus-
sions on its co-operation with NATO;
7. Show gteater determination in its relations with the United Nations and the CSCE with a view to
possible missions by offering them its operational capabilities in peace-keeping and crisis-management
questions;
8. Draw up political guidelines for meetings of chiefs of defence staff and specify forthwith a sftuc-
ture of relations and the sharing of responsibilities benveen:
- 
chiefs of defence staff;
- 
military delegates belonging to national delegations;
- 
the Planning Cell and
- 
the WEU Secretariat-General;
9. Ensure the continuity of its political planning by giving the WEU Secretary-General political
powers including:
- 
the right of initiative;
- 
the right to convene and to chair meetings of the Council of Ministers;
- 
primordial responsibility for making WEU's voice heard in alliance and European Union bodies;
10. Ensure in particular the participation of the Secretary-General of WEU in meetings of the common
foreign and security policy (CFSP) authorities of the European Union in the same spirit of transparency,
complementarity and reciprocity that already exists between WEU and NATO;
11. Ratify the decisions set out in paragraph 3 above and give the political impetus necessary for WEU
to take its place as the European defence organisation and as a credible player in its areas ofresponsibil-
ity by convening before the end of the year an exftaordinary meeting of heads of state and of government
of the member countries.
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Erphnatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Baumel Rapporteur)
I.Intro&rction
1. Considering the results of the NAIO sum-
mit meeting on 10th and 11th January last, which,
as will be recalled, was convened at the initiative
of the United States to reaffrrm NATO's impor-
tance as a political instrument of the United States
Government in the eyes of public opinion, it is
difficult to discern a coherent concept and a firm
direction in which the alliance might be prepared
to evolve. Nor is it possible in view of the multi-
plicity of intentions and programmes referred to
in the declaration issued after the meeting of
heads of state and of government of the North
Atlantic Council in Brussels.
2. It can be clearly deduced, however, that the
alliance is pursuing its process of transformation,
relegating increasingly to second place the
conventional military and political tasks which,
since its creation, had allowed it to ensure the
security and freedom of Western Europe under the
wing of the United States. This long period of
time was brought to a close with the end of the
East-West confrontation and, starting with the
Rome summit meeting, NATO had to work out a
new strategy and adapt the allied military posture
to the fundamental changes of the international
situation in security matters.
3. What is crystal-clear from the very outset is
that in Brussels, NATO postponed any decision
regarding the possible extension of security gua-
rantees to the East by proposing, in exchange, to
the countries of Cenffal Europe which wished tojoin NATO and also all the countries of Eastern
Europe, Russia, Ukraine and the countries of Cen-
tral Asia, a partnership for peace programme
based on individual agreements governing the
participation of interested countries in the politi-
cal and military activities of NATO and particu-
larly peace-keeping operations.
4. Furthermore, NAIO has set itself a number
of new programmes and tasks, the achievement of
which calls for a decisive reinforcement of the
r6le of the European allies. Mention is made in
particular of crisis-management and peace-keep-
ing tasks and the introduction of the combinedjoint task force concept, to be harmonised with
the procedure drawn up in WEU regarding the
designation by member states of forces answer-
able to WEU.
5. For the frst time in its history, NATO, with
the agreement of the United States, confirmed
unambiguously its support for the European secu-
rity and defence identity and stated that it was
ready to give WEU increased responsibilities as
European pillar of the alliance. In this context, the
fact that NATO is "ready to make collective assets
of the alliance available ... for WEU operations
undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of
their common foreign and security policy" is of
fundamental importance.
6. Regarding the assessment of new security
risks, the summit meeting did nothing about pre-
senting a global and coherent view but preferred
to mention a number of problems here and there
in its declaration. Thus the heads of state and of
govemment started by noting that "other causes of
instability, tension and conflict have emerged",
without specifying their origins, background or
importance. In another context, they expressed
their concern about the situation in the Southern
Caucasus and security in the Mediterranean and
deplored the continuing conflict in former Yugo-
slavia. The risks stemming from the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction are mentioned
several times and also the threat from acts of ter-
rorism. Finally, NATO confrms the importance it
attaches to arms confrol and disarmament agree-
ments and the extension of the treaty on non-pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons, the entry into force
of the convention on chemical weapons and the
negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.
7. The multiplicity of the alliance's ambitions
must not be allowed, however, to conceal the fun-
damental absence of an overall concept for a
Euro-Atlantic security policy covering Central
and Eastern Europe and the Community of Inde-
pendent States (CIS).
8. Unlike the situation in 1945 when plans
were drawn up 
- 
mainly by the Americans 
- 
for
rebuilding Europe and the introduction of a new
post-war order, no one was prepared for the major
changes of 1989 and subsequent years. Three
years after the disbandment of the Soviet Union,
the West has still not agreed on a policy to be pur-
sued with regard to Russia, Ukraine and the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe, be it in secu-
rity matters or in assistance to those countries to
build up their economic and democratic struc-
tures.
9. The new world order advocated by Presi-
dent Bush quickly disappeared into thin air and,
as can be seen from the United States' long hesi-
tation about playing an active r6le in the fighting
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in Bosnia, the determination to establish Ameri-
can leadership accompanied by commitments in
European security matters is less and less visible.
The fact that Americans and Europeans finally
agreed on the ultimatum against Serbia on 9th
February last cannot be considered as a sign that
the overall policy of the United States is turning
back towards Europe. Furthermore, there is grow-
ing evidence of Russia's return to the internatio-
nal stage 
- 
its r6le in the Bosnian affair after
NATO's ultimatum to Serbia is one of the most
striking examples but not the only one. This
should be even greater encouragement to the Uni-
ted States to deal directly with this new Russia to
work out a policy of crisis-management, and to
consider questions of global strategy as a matter
of primary concern for the two great world
powers, thus again linking up with the bilatera-
lism that already existed at the time of the Soviet
Union.
10. If there is no longer true American leader-
ship in the Euro-Atlantic framework, Europe must
prepare itselfto shoulder this task, at least in cer-
tain areas, an undertaking which is certainly very
ambitious in view of Europe's loss of credibility
after demonstrating its inability to take action in
the fighting in former Yugoslavia.
11. If Europe needs new impetus to launch
meaningful initiatives in order to take control of
its own security and also to define and implement
a credible collective security system covering the
counffies of the East, the NATO summit meeting
can provide the basis since it gave Europeans a
very clear and very broad mandate.
12. The common foreign and security policy is
still being worked out in the framework of the
European Union whose structures are not yet ope-
rational enough to allow it to take on this r6le.
Furthermore, it is not yet finalised and its ability
to produce an agreement was seriously called in
question during the recent negotiations on the
accession of Austria, Finland, Norway and Swe-
den. Conversely, the only fully operational stnrc-
ture in terms of security policy is the WEU Coun-
cil. That is the body that will have to handle the
definition and implementation of Europe's secur-
ity concept which is still awaited. To that end, all
its member countries will have to demonsfrate the
necessary political determination because the
tasks are many and there is no time to be lost.
II. Ensuring stability in the East
13. Russia's return to the international stage is
coming at a time when its difficulties in establi-
shing a firm framework for developing lasting
democratic institutions are far from having been
overcome and it is still struggling in its efforts to
convert to a market economy. The fact that Rus-
sian leaders feel they are responsible for the secu-
rity of all the territories of the former Soviet
Union and in particular of the 25 million Russians
in what Moscow calls its "near abroad", the fact
that in the United Nations or the CSCE Russia is
claiming priority for peace-keeping action in
areas of conflict within the Community of Inde-
pendent States (CIS), its hesitation to withdraw
ffoops from Estonia, Latvia and Transdnestr and
its firm opposition to any extension of NATO
towards the East are all matters of great concern
to the countries of Central Europe. This attitude is
above all a challenge to the West which has still
not managed to define in a coherent manner the
nature of its relations with Russia and the ways
and means for that country to take part in a secu-
rity architecture which might meet the aspirations
and appease the concern of all sides.
14. The alliance's response to that challenge
has been ambiguous: on the one hand, it has affir-
med its intention to strengthen security and stabi-
lity in the whole of Europe and to remain open to
other European states by evoking the prospect of
enlarging NATO towards the East as an evolving
process while avoiding geographical details. On
the other hand, it has launched a partnership for
peace programme open to the countries of NACC
and also other countries of the CSCE. This pro-
gramme proposes that they take part in the work
of the political and military organs of NAIO and
co-operate with that organisation but in such a
manner that most of the obligations are incumbent
on the countries invited.
15. This programme must allow NATO to verify
transparency in national defence planning and
budgeting processes, democratic control of defence
forces in the countries concerned and their readi-
ness to contribute to operations under the authority
of the United Nations and/or the responsibilify of
the CSCE.
16. Furthermore, these countries must fund
their own participation in partnership activities. In
exchange, NATO undertakes to consult with any
active participant in the partnership if that partner
perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity,
political independence, or security. The latter pro-
vision is perhaps the one of greatest interest to the
countries invited.
17. The method whereby each state subscri-
bing to the framework document of the pro-
gramme is to establish with NATO an individual
partnership programme allows the formula to be
adapted to the various situations of the countries
in question without discrimination. While this
prograrnme has the advantage of avoiding new
divisions in Eastern Europe, its ultimate aims and
the limits of its goals compared with those of
NACC are still far from clear.
28
DOCI MENT I41O
18. Whereas in March twelve countries of the
East had already joined the partnership for peace,
i.e. the Baltic countries, Hungary, Moldova,
Kazakhstan, Poland, Romania and Ukraine, Rus-
sia, for its part, has only rocently made known its
intention of participating in this programme. It
would seem, however, that it is not over-enthu-
siastic about this question and it prefers to conti-
nue to count on the development of the activities
and responsibilities of NACC and an enlargement
of that body which it believes should become
totally independent of NATO. Moreover, the Rus-
sians feel they were not consulted regarding the
preparation of NAIO's ultimatum against Serbia
which, in their opinion, did nothing to strengthen
the credibility of the partnership for peace pro-
grarnme which they considered too technical and
not political enough.
19. For WEU, what are the implications of the
evolution of NATO's relations with the countries
of the East on the basis of the partnership for
peace? The enhanced status that the WEU Coun-
cil is prepared to offer the nine countries of the
WEU Forum of Consultation was so farprimarily
intended to respect a certain parallelism with the
evolution of the relations the European Union is
establishing with the counfies of Central Europe.
A consequence of this has already been to limit
considerably the number of countries that might
benefit from the new status offered by WEU com-
pared with the number of countries invited to take
part in the partnership for peace in the framework
of NATO.
20. It should also be noted that the WEU Coun-
cil preceded the Twelve in establishing contacts
with Central Europe by inviting nine countries of
Central Europe to take part in the Forum, whereas
the Twelve concentrated first on six of them, their
relations with the Baltic countries not yet having
resulted in the conclusion of Europe agreements
similar to those signed with the Visegrad group of
countries, Bulgaria and Romania.
21. In the meantime, the Ttvelve have started
negotiations with the Baltic countries on free
trade agreements which are considered as a means
of preparing the ground for subsequently inclu-
ding these countries among those that have
concluded Europe agreements. This will allow
WEU to include the Baltic countries among those
which will benefit from enhanced status on the
basis of the Franco-German proposal of l2th
November last. This status could be offered
simultaneously to the nine countries of the Forum.
Any dilatory solution on the pretext that the Baltic
countries have not yet reached Europe agreements
with the European Union would be dangerous and
might convey the wrong message.
22. Regarding the content of the enhanced sta-
tus that is to be offered to the countries of the
Forum of Consultation on 9th May next, one must
not forget that there is also a synergy between
WEU and NATO and any strengthening of
WEU's relations with the countries of the East
must automatically be of interest to the alliance
and the United States in particular. WEU must
therefore hold consultations forthwith on the f,rnal
aims of its new relations with the countries of the
Forum and keep its alliance partners informed.
23. For the time being, it is planned to base
WEU's new relations with the countries of the
Forum solely on a political document, withoutjuridical implications, which will allow the coun-
tries concerned to take part in meetings of the
Council without being able to block its decisions,
establish links with the Planning Cell, the Insti-
tute for Security Studies, the Secretariat-General
and the Chairmanship-in-Office, take part in the
tasks set out in the Petersberg declaration (huma-
nitarian peace-keeping missions, crisis-manage-
ment, including operations to restore peace) and
to be informed about the activities of working
groups with a possibility of being invited ro take
part, with particular regard to the Council's Wor-
king Group. Their participation will therefore be
substantial enough for the term status of associa-
tion to be justified and desirable. That does not
prevent procedure being worked out to preserve
the associate status of Iceland, Norway and Tur-
key as members of NATO.
24. There will no doubt be parallelism between
certain activities of WEU in the framework of
enhanced co-operation with the countries of the
Forum, particularly in peace-keeping, and those
that NAIO will establish with the partnership for
peace countries. That is normal if WEU is consi-
dered as European pillar of the alliance. However,
the aim of the associate status granted to the coun-
tries of the Forum in the framework of WEU is to
prepare the conditions for the full accession of
those countries to the modified Brussels Treaty
and the alliance must be as aware of this as the
European Union.
25. It is therefore necessary to develop without
delay a doctrine to determine to what extent a
country that is not a member of NATO can be
associated with WEU and whether it can even-
tually become a full member. The WEU declara-
tion appended to the Maastricht Treaty gives an
indication in this respect since it invites Ireland
- 
a member of the Union but not of NATO 
- 
to
become a full member of WEU (although that
country has so far preferred the status of obser-
ver), but the case of Ireland cannot be compared
automatically with that of countries of Central
Europe. A similar problem will arise, moreover,
when Austria, Finland and Sweden join the Euro-
pean Union.
26. However WEU must also take a position on
the nature of its future relations with Russia,
Ukraine and the other CIS countries. Here too it
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must take into account its dual function vis-i-vis
the Union and NAIO. Nothing, moreover, in the
latest WEU declaration from Luxembourg or in
that issued after the NATO summit meeting gives
any indication of the political doctrine to be follo-
wed vis-i-vis Russia. It also would appear from a
recent speech by the WEU Secretary-Generalt, in
which he describes the nature of future relations
between WEU and Belarus, Russia and Ukraine,
that the essential aim of contacts with these coun-
tries will be to inform them of WEU initiatives
and that relations will be established on a bilateral
basis. These indications are too vague to enable us
to define what type of relations or even what sort
of partnership could be developed between WEU
and these countries. The co-operation that the
WEU countries have initiated with Russia on a
case-by-case basis, such as the implementation of
the Open Skies Treaty for example, could provide
the stimulus for a political dialogue between
WEU and Russia and other CIS countries.
27. Regarding Russia in particular, the French
Defence Minister, Mr. L6otard, put forward some
interesting ideas in a speech given at a seminar of
the European Movement held in Paris on 3rd
March 1994:
"Our ambition for Europe, which is based,
in the West, on the original core organisa-
tion of European countries, must extend
much further eastward. It is also in our
interest to make room there for Russia in
order to offer it the security framework
which would ensure that this major power
progresses in the direction we wish to see 
-
namely towards democracy. Once free of
the Soviet straight-jacket, Russia's natural
calling in this modern age 
- 
the age of com-
munications, information, space and high
technologies 
- 
must necessarily be to asso-
ciate itself with the European enterprise.
Would it be so unthinkable, if Russia makes
good progress down the road to democracy,
for the security and defence of the conti-
nent of Europe to be organised on the basis
of a triangle of forces consisting of the Euro
pean Union, Russia and North America?"
28. Doubtless these are not the only aspects for
consideration in the context of a plan for a part-
nership between Europe and the CIS countries 
- 
a
plan which must necessarily envisage among
other things a strengthening of stable relations
between Russia and Ukraine. And who could be
better qualified than the WEU Council to take on
the task of developing a coherent policy for
Europe in this area?
29. The prospects open to WEU for asserting
itself as the European pillar of the alliance in the
aftermath of the NAIO summit meeting offer it the
opportunity of increasing Europe's weight in the
alliance, both in determining the framework for a
global strategy and also, as necessary, outside the
alliance through direct contacts with the United
States. The more Europe can make its voice heard
in a credible fashion the more the Americans will
be persuaded of their interest in not making funda-
mental decisions without consulting their Euro-
pean allies and the more Europe will be in a posi-
tion to exercise a decisive influence on alliance
and United States decision-making. It is in this
optic that the statement contained in the NATO
declaration that "the alliance and the European
Union share common strategic interests" should
find practical expression.
IlL lmplementation of a new form
of co-operalion
betweenWEU and NATO
30. It has been agreed 
- 
and this is one of the
significant aspects of the declaration following
the NATO summit meeting and WEU's Luxem-
bourg declaration, that the two organisations
would from now on consult together in the event
of a crisis, as necessary, within the framework ofjoint meetings of their Permanent Councils. Suchjoint meetings will certainly be useful in certain
situations. However it must be guaranteed that the
preparation of WEU ministerial meetings remains
the exclusive responsibility of its own Permanent
Council, and that the latter is also free to discuss
European positions independently in preparing
ministerial meetings of the Norttr Atlantic Council.
31. The essential aspect of the new r6le the
Council has devolved to WEU concerns its pro-
mise to "make the collective a.ssets of the alliance
available, on the basis of consultations in the
North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations
undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of
their common foreign and security policy". The
alliance has thus responded to the request formu-
lated by WEU at Luxembourg to be able to use
not only the forces and means of the European
allies but also the collective assets of the Atlantic
Alliance, such as communications systems,
means of command and headquarters staffs.
32. Even if the possibility thus created of
WEU's being able to draw on NAIO means is not
limited to specific operations, it is nevertheless
closely linked to the missions for peace-keeping
and crisis management on which the efforts of the
two organisations are henceforth likely to be
concentrated.
33. In this context the alliance has adopted the
proposal advanced by the Americans last October
l. "WEU after two Brussels summits: a new approach to
common talks", Institut royal des relations internationales,
Brussels, 27 th Jaruary 1994.
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at Travemiinde for adopting the combined joint
task force concept (CJTF) as a "means to facili-
tate contingency operation$", including operations
with participating nations outside the alliance.
34. Although it may be necessary to wait until
June 1994, when the NATO Permanent Council
will have reported to the ministers, for informa-
tion on the details of this project, it is nevertheless
interesting to note that in a speech delivered at the
IHEDN on 21st January 1994, The French Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Alain Jupp6, stated:
"In operations where it is clear that the Uni-
ted States for its own reasons does not wish
to become heavily involved, this type of
task force could not only be made available
to Western European Union but also, in
such cases, placed under its command
rather than under the authority of SACEUR
- 
andthis has been explicitly accepted.The
United States has therefore taken an impor-
tant step forward in agreeing to a modifica-
tion of the traditional chain of command ..."
35. If this project materialises, these CJTFs
could be deployed under WEU command with
material support from NATO (for example
AWACS). They would function under the orders
of the operational commander appointed by WEU
under the political authority of the WEU Council.
This would constitute a truly revolutionary inno-
vation.
36. Nevertheless the alliance has stated its rea-
diness to loan its means "on the basis of consulta-
tions within the North Atlantic Council". The pro-
cess is therefore not automatic 
- 
which is entirely
understandable. However it remains to be seen to
what extent NATO and the Americans will agree
to waive their right of refusal over a mission deci-
ded by Europeans. Moreover decisions have to be
taken both as to the composition of the forces
making up the CJTFs and who will assign them.
Will they include American units and in what pro-
portion?
37. This leads us to the problem of knowing
how the alliance concept will fit in with that of
"separable but not separate capabilities" and how
it can be reconciled with that formulated by the
WEU Council at Petersberg, which envisaged the
possibility of recourse to "forces answerable to
WEU" (FAWEU). Clearly, in the absence of pro-
cedure automatically ensuring that the assets of
the alliance will be made available to it, WEU
must maintain its autonomous military planning
capability and develop its own operational capa-
bility in order to act independently or at the
request of the European Union.2
2. See the speech given by Mr. van Eekelen on27th January
1994.
38. Up to the present the multinational forces
under the authority of WEU have consisted of the
European corps, the (central) multinational divi-
sion and the Anglo-Dutch amphibious force. It
remains to be determined whether the consent of
the whole of the Atlantic Alliance will also be
required to enable WEU to use these units 
- 
in
other words whether the CJTF and the EAWEU
will be integrated concepts. The status of the
European corps, whose use by NATO services has
been agreed between the relevant chiefs-of-staff
but which is to constitute the nucleus of a force
placed primarily under WEU command, poses a
particular problem.
39. Harmonisation of the concepts of CJTF and
FAWEU forces implies that WEU must, from the
outset, be fully involved in NATO thinking in
order to submit a plan to it that provides, on the
one hand, for its making its own operational capa-
bilities available to NAIO, while ensuring, on the
other hand, that it is possible for it to engage in
missions independently or at the request of the
European Union.
40. NATO's new r6le in peace-keeping and cri-
sis-management, which is based on a wide inter-
pretation of Article 4 of the Treaty of Washington
in order to elicit the necessary consensus in the
alliance for "out of area" action, will have impor-
tant consequences for WEU, which will be called
upon to assume the political direction of such ope-
rations, and, in this connection, be able to take
advantage of the instruments with which it is pro-
vided under the modified Brussels Treaty.
41. Strong reinforcement measures will need to
be taken by WEU in its political relations with the
United Nations and the CSCE, an area where
WEU has much ground to recover. However, if
the aim is for WEU to become a credible partner
in crisis-management and peace-keeping, it will
be necessary to accelerate the development of its
operational capabilities so as to enable it to fulfil
the new tasks assigned to it by the Petersberg
declaration. It would be especially desirable to
know the broad thinking behind the report that the
WEU Chairmanship-in-Office submitted to the
ministers in Luxembourg on the general rOle of
WEU in peace-keeping and on humanitarian mis-
slons.
42. The shortcomings in co-operation between
WEU and NATO over management of the conflict
on the territory of former Yugoslavia 
- 
despite the
success of the joint operation in the Adriatic
known as operation Sharp Guard 
- 
and the new
situation that has emerged in Bosnia, and particu-
larly in Sarajevo, after the expiry of the NATO
ultimatum of 21st February, will require a new
initiative on the part of WEU. It will be necessary
to develop a strategy for the pacification of the
country and for securing the implementation of
the agreements ultimately reached by the parties.
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In military terms this implies burden-sharing bet-
ween WEU and NATO to guarantee, where neces-
sary, a military presence on the ground of the
forces of one or other organisation. In political
terms, WEU will need to develop on behalf of the
European Union iurangements to guarantee secu-
rity in the region after the cessation of hostilities.
43. The NATO declaration contains two impor-
tant paragraphs, one concerning the provision of
preventive measures to counter the threat of proli-
feration of weapons of mass destruction and their
means of delivery (for example ballistic missiles),
the other stressing the importance of achieving
progress on the key issues of arms control and
disarmament, particularly with regard to the follo-
wlng:
- 
extension of the treaty on the non-prolife-
ration of nuclear weapons;
- 
the entry into force of the convention on
chemical weapons and the reinforcement
of the biological weapons convention;
- 
the problem of banning nuclear testing;
- 
ensuring full compliance with the provi-
sions of the treaty on conventional forces
in Europe.
44. The effort to contain proliferation by politi-
cal and defence means is known to be a priority
concern of the European Union and NAIO. It is
the subject of various proposals, in particular by
Mr. Aspin and Mr. Kinkel, while the WEU decla-
ration adopted in Luxembourg on 22nd Novem-
ber last makes no reference to this problem. This
silence is the more surprising given first that the
WEU Council warmly welcomed the symposium
on "An anti-missile defence for Europe" organi-
sed by the Assembly in Rome, in March 1993,
and second that WEU is in the process of acqui-
ring an independent space-based observation and
surveillance system, necessary for organising a
defence against the threat of weapons of mass
destruction.
45. It is wholly unacceptable for WEU to abdi-
cate from the discussion on the political aspects of
proliferation in favour of the European Union and
from the "defence" aspects of the issue in favour
of NAIO. The political dimension of the problem
clearly impacts on the defence dimension and
there is no fear of duplicating NATO's work if
WEU, as its r6le requires, brings a decisive contri-
bution in the domain of anti-missile protection,
taking advantage of progress already achieved
and existing European industrial capabilities.
IV WEU facing unprecedented challenges
46. The achievement of the tasks inherent in
the dual function of WEU vis-i-vis the Atlantic
Alliance and the European Union is proving espe-
cially difficult, not simply because WEU is a
small organisation, but also btrause a majority of
its senior officials regard it essentially from either
a NAIO or a European Union perspective, forget-
ting that it has, by virtue of its founding treaty,
special features of its own that qualify it specifi-
cally to fulfil its functions. However, for it to be a
credible partner it is essential for WEU to have
autonomy of action and for its operational capabi-
lities to be developed rapidly and also indepen-
dently. For this to happen there must first be a
political will which must then be expressed
through specifically "WEIJ" initiatives; without
this, the organisation will remain in a state of sus-
pense until such time as other organisations such
as NATO, the United Nations, the CSCE or the
European Union call upon it to act.
47. The importance of WEU's maintaining and
developing a degree of political autonomy in rela-
tion to the European Union and of ensuring that it
effectively possesses the necessary operational
capacities lies in the fact that the organisation is
vested (under Article IV of the modified Brussels
Treaty) with the responsibility of providing trans-
atlantic links and co-operating with NATO, a
position confirmed by the WEU Luxembourg
declarations and those following the NAIO sum-
mit meeting in Brussels reaffirming the political
will to develop WEU as the means of reinforcing
the European pillar of the alliance and to make the
collective assets of the alliance available to it.
48. WEU alone is able to develop the spirit of
co-operation and solidarity with NATO by secu-
ring its own operational capabilities. This would
strengthen the whole alliance, while avoiding
rivalry and the political and economic problems
that have arisen recently on either side of the
Atlantic between the Twelve and the United
States affecting transatlantic solidarity in security
and defence matters.
49. Title V of the Maastricht Treaty, and speci-
fically Article J.4, paragraphs 4 and 5, tends in an
entirely different direction since it lays down
conditions and imposes limits to co-operation by
its member countries within the framework of the
Atlantic Alliance (as in WEU), without giving the
slightest indication as to the prospects for co-ope-
ration between the Union and the alliance after the
so-called "1998 deadline". The repeal of the
modified Brussels Treaty on which the present
wording of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty is
based would also remove the legal bases on which
the European pillar of the alliance rests and its co-
operation with the alliance.
50. With a view to preventing such a dangerous
development, it is necessary to invite the WEU
Council to take the following measures forthwith:
determine quickly what its working relations with
the European Union are to be 
- 
this is the main
theme of the report on WEU in the process of
European Union, to be submitted by Mr. Ferrari.
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WEU must insist, as of now on the results of its
co-operation with the alliance being accepted and
its initiatives not being limited or prevented even
by the European Union authorities, a situation
which is theoretically possible under Article J.4,
paragraph 5 of the Maastricht Treaty.
51. Preliminary consultations should be held
between WEU and the European Union before the
latter requests WEU, in conformity with Article
J.4, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Maastricht, to
develop and implement Union decisions with
defence implications, if the intention is for WEU
to be capable of assisting the Union with its expert
knowledge sufficiently quickly and of evaluating
the impact of any such request on relations with
the Atlantic Alliance.
52. In order to achieve this there must be genuine
political planning in WEU such as does not at pre-
sent exist for various reasons. Neither the Secreta-
ry-General, nor his small political section, have
the right to take initiatives; it is for the Chairman-
ship-in-Office, at the behest of the member
governments, to take political initiatives, with
each member country reserving the right to put
forward its own proposals. The work that takes
place within the Council's working groups is also
dependent on the insffuctions they receive from
the capitals of the member counffies. Under such
conditions it seems diffrcult to guarantee continuity
of political will 
- 
the more so since the term of the
Chairmanship-in-Office has just been reduced to
six months in order to bring it into line with that of
the European Union presidency. Until now it was
possible to count on FrancoGernan initiatives, or
British and Italian, as the case may be, but con-
tinuity of political planning is not guaranteed in
WEU as it can be in NATO or the European
Union. This is a problem that must be tackled,
however difficult it may be to find a solution.
53. One of the primary objectives might there-
fore be to take the decision to strengthen the
powers of the Secretary-General by giving him
the right to make proposals, to chair the Minis-
terial Council 
- 
as is the case in NATO 
- 
and to
appoint such staff to his secretariat and acquire
such material resources as are necessary to ensure
continuity of the political will of WEU as an auto-
nomous organisation.
54. Strengthening the powers of the Secretary-
General in this way would also improve the effec-
tiveness of the major organs of WEU 
- 
an essen-
tial condition for enabling it to fulfil the mandates
recently assigned to it 
- 
and this should give grea-
ter political impetus to the meetings of the Minis-
terial Council and the Permanent Council. Until
now, a $eat deal of time has invariably elapsed
before the Council was able to take concrete deci-
sions. A more flexible procedure must therefore
be adopted allowing the Council to be convened
whenever there is felt to be a need and not merely
twice a year.
55. The defence ministers must play a greater
r6le with a view to accelerating the process of
making WEU operational and implementing the
tasks assigned to it as a result of the entry into
force of the Maastricht Treaty and of the decisions
taken at the NATO summit meeting. WEU's deci-
sion to convene a meeting of the chiefs of defence
staff twice a year prior to the ordinary Ministerial
Council meetings, and on an ad hoc basis when-
ever necessary, is meaningful only if they receive
clear political insructions on the objectives of and
the programme of work for such meetings.
56. The WEU Luxembourg declaration refers
to the "progress achieved by the chiefs of defence
staff in developing a WEU exercise policy".
However, what are the other objectives of their
meetings? In order to guarantee the effectiveness
of the military organs recently created in WEU, a
definition must quickly be arrived at of the struc-
ture of the relationships and division of responsi-
bilities between:
- 
the chiefs of defence staff;
- 
the military delegates within the national
delegations;
- 
the Planning Cell;
- 
the WEU Secretariat-General.
57. The Planning Cell, which should have the
staff and the material resources necessary for it to
fulfil its tasks 
- 
which is not the case at present 
-
is intended to play a real r6le in co-ordinating
operations between WEU and NATO. In particu-
lar it must develop with NATO the concept of the
formation of the combined joint task forces that
will be called upon to carry out operations, possi-
bly with the participation of countries that are not
members of the alliance. It should quickly com-
plete its work on the development of forces ans-
werable to WEU (FAWEU), their command,
headquarters, logistics, transport and communica-
tions systems, their relations with NATO and the
procedures for their use in the framework of
WEU.
58. It must, in particular, develop operating
procedures for the European corps which is to be
placed under WEU authority. The Ministers assi-
gned to the Planning Cell the task of developing a
plan for setting up European air-maritime forces 
-
is this plan now ready? Also there is an Italian
proposal for a multinational land force intended to
enhance the operational significance of this initia-
tive 
- 
what stage has this now reached?
59. For some time now WEU has been working
on a study (initially a Franco-German initiative)
intended to enhance strategic mobility. It is unac-
ceptable for such a study to be continued indefini-
tely without the slightest sign of yielding concrete
results in the foreseeable future and without the
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Assembly being informed in any way of its aims
or progress. In order to advance matters in this
context advantage should be taken ofthe signing
in October 1993 of a memorandum of understan-
ding regarding the feasibility study for the Euro-
pean transport aircraft, commissioned from a
European industrial consortium (Euroflag). It is
essential to move as soon as possible from the
study phase to the conclusion of firm contracts.
60. It is a matter of urgency for the Assembly
to be informed more closely of the progress of the
work of the Western European Armaments Group
(WEAG), the transfer of its secretariat from Lis-
bon to Brussels 
- 
which should take place accor-
ding to the Luxembourg declaration in spring
1994 
- 
the state of advancement of the Euclid
research progftrrnme, the development of a free
market in Europe for defence equipment and,
above all, the stage now reached in the studies for
a European armaments agency (which is the sub-ject of a report to be tabled by Mr. Borderas on
behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Com-
mittee). Here too the studies are dragging on and
it is time decisions were taken.
61. The initiatives taken by WEU on verifica-
tion of the CFE Treaty and, to an even greater
extent, on implementation of the Open Skies
Treaty, for which the WEU countries have formed
into a group of states, seem very encouraging,
particularly with regard to the project for co-ope-
ration with Russia and other CIS counries in this
area. What progress has been made here? The
WEU Luxembourg declaration offers no answer
in this respect.
62. Having established the Torrej6n Satellite
Centre, officially inaugurated a year ago, the
Ministers have announced that they are to consi-
der at their next meeting to be held in May 1994 a
progress report on the possibility of implementing
a WEU earth observation programme. When will
we finally be in a position to take a decision on the
creation of WEU's own space-based surveillance
system 
- 
a decision which, qualitatively, would be
a step of the highest importance, not just in terms
of European independence in intelligence matters
but for the future of the European space industry?
63. To accelerate the decision-making process
on all of these projects, WEU must be truly
capable of demonstrating a collective will and
determination based on a spirit of European
defence, of which it is the concrete expression.
64. However, as Mr. L6otard recently stated:3
"WEU is still having problems in finding a
place between the Atlantic forum and com-
munity life. The common European vision
of defence matters is slow to take shape.
The only missing ingredient is the commit-
ment at the highest political level that alone
can give the desired impetus to the wish for
a European defence identity.
As I understand it, this impetus can come
only from the common will of heads of
state and of government of the member
countries. A WEU summit meeting would
serve to demonstrate, both symbolically
and in practical terms, the political vitality
of this security instrument of the European
Union and of the European pillar of the
alliance. It would serve also as an illusfra-
tion of the direct interest of the political
authorities in the European countries and
confer strong legitimacy on the project the
organisation embodies. In all democracies,
the heads of state and of government have
supreme authority in defence matters and
are the leaders of the armed forces".
65. Indeed, this proposal for a WEU summit
meeting could give the organisation the necessary
weight and political impetus to make progress in
achieving the manifold tasks expected of it by
both the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance
- 
organisations at times inclined to treat WEU as
a secondary authority that might cease to exist in
the foreseeable future. However, such a project
would require detailed preparation and must be
accompanied by a series of concrete proposals
whose implementation would be of substantial
service to the cause ofa European defence organi-
sation.
66. Decisions might concern:
- 
the creation of European intervention
forces developed by a multinational joint
services European headquarters, as the
French Defence Minister has proposed;
- 
the creation of a European air-maritime
force supported by a multinational ground
force, as set out in the Italian proposal;
- 
prioriry fieafinent for projects concerning
the pooling of joint intelligence means,
equipment and transport units, logistics
and, consequently, the release of essential
funding to allow WEU:
(i) to set up a European space-based
observation system;
(ir) to promote a military transport aircraft
built by European industry on the basis of
the feasibility study;
(iii) to create a European defence industry
and develop standardised interoperable
European equipment. This is dependent
on a final decision to create a properly
structured European armaments agency
with real powers and responsibilities.
WEU capabilities, once operational, could be
made available to the whole alliance.
3. Speech given in Paris on 3rd March 1994 at a conference
held by the European Movement.
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V Conclusions
67. Rarely in the course of its history has WEU
been countenanced to the degree shown in the
decision reached by the heads of state and of
government of the Atlantic Alliance at the summit
meeting in Brussels last January. It was recogni-
sed and confirmed in its r6le of European pillar of
the alliance and was also granted new responsibi-
lities for which the alliance is prepared to make its
collective means available to WEU. If WEU is to
rise to the occasion, an extraordinary effort will
have to be made to overcome the resulting chal-
lenges.
68. If WEU fails to take energetic action here
and now to seize the opportunities just offered by
the political constellation that led the alliance
summit meeting to this result, it may miss a
favourable political juncture that may not be
encountered again for quite some time. Now is
indeed the time for WEU to take its place as the
European defence organisation on which one can
count as a deciding factor of stability and security
and also as a player in the areas of its responsibi-
lity.
69. Yet one has to note that the WEU Council,
its subsidiary bodies and the Secretariat-General
seem to be pursuing all their activities in a routine
manner without any ffue political impetus. Dis-
cussions become entangled in innumerable details
of minor importance and the necessary decisions
cannot be taken or are taken too late. For instance,
it does not seem to have been realised that the
achievement of important programmes that WEU
is certainly studying requires considerable finan-
cial backing and, if it is realised, the courage and
determination to claim these financial means with
all necessary force and persuasion are lacking.
The fact is that the WEU authorities are always
too concerned about not duplicating the work of
other organisations and consider themselves
increasingly as merely having to carry out deci-
sions taken elsewhere.
70. The WEU Assembly is prepared to afford
political support to any effort that might help
WEU to fulfil its increased responsibilities and
overcome the obstacles of all kinds 
- 
political,
structural or financial 
- 
which today prevent it
from playing the r6le that is expected of it and ttrus
facilitate the necessary decision-taking. To that
end, the Council should associate the Assembly to
agreater extent in its thinking by providing it with
better information on questions of substance. The
Council should not underestimate the usefulness
and political weight of an Assembly that has alrea-
dy shown several times in the past that it could
help in breaking deadlocks. In this context, it
would also be in the interest of the Council to
demonstrate publicly that after the entry into force
of the Maasticht Treaty it continues to count unre-
servedly on the importance of the WEU Assembly
as the only international assembly with responsibi-
lity in security and defence matters. Such a
demonstration of confidence on the part of the
Council would give the Assembly added weight in
its efforts to improve co-operation with the parlia-
ments and the foreign affairs and defence commit-
tees of the member countries with a view to
making them better aware of the common cause
that unites the Council and the Assembly.
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Amendments l and 2
3rd May 1994
The evolatian of NATO and its consequences for WEU
AMENDMENTS 1 and 2'
tabled by Mn Baumel Rapporteur
1. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as follows:
" Welcoming the WEU Council's readiness to offer an enhanced status of association to those mem-
ber states of the WEU Forum of Consultation which have or are likely to have ' Europe Agreements '
with the European Union, but regretting that the term ' associatepartnership' may be used for this
arrangement; "
2. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:
" Employ the term ' associate member ' for the relationship already being established with Iceland,
Norway and Turkey and choose 'associate ' to describe the new status of the Central European and
Baltic states which are members of the WEU Forum of Consultation and which have or are likely
to have 'Europe Agreements ' with the European Union; "
Signed: Baumel
1. See meeting of the Standing Committee, 3rd May 1994 (amendments agreed to).
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Amendment 3
3rd May 1994
Tlw evolution of NATO and its consequences for WEU
AMENDMENT 3'
tabled by Mr. De Decker and otherc
3. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:
" Hoping that the new European Parliament to be elected on 12th June next will refrain from adop-
ting resolutions that seek 
- 
conffary to the spirit and the letter of Maastricht 
- 
to hinder WEU efforts
to contribute to the definition of a European defence policy ".
Signed: De Decker Martinez, Valleix, Goerens, Roseta
l. See meeting of the Standing Committee, 3rd May 1994 (amendment agreed to).
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Amendment 4
3rd May 1994
The evolutian of NATO and its consequences for WEU
AMENDMENT 4'
tabled by Mr. Iapez Henares
4. After paragraph 9 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:
" Take the appropriate measures to transform the Planning Cell into a powerful operational cenEe
for WEU co-ordination and planning, with all the resources in equipment and staf[rng required to
achieve this; "
Signed: Iapez Henares
l. See meeting of the Standing Committee, 3rd May 1994 (amendment agreed to).
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Ai.tIExEs
I.Introduction
During the second half of 1993, work was
completed on installing the Council in the new
WEU headquarters. The official inauguration
took place on 15th November, in the presence of
Mr. Jacques F. Poos, Luxembourg Foreign Minis-
ter and Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council
of Ministers, Mr. Willem van Eekelen, Secretary-
General of the organisation, Sir Dudley Smith,
President of the Assembly, the Belgian Foreign
and Defence Ministers and other senior figures
including representatives from the European
Union and the Atlantic Alliance.
The first six months of the Luxembourg Pre-
sidency of the WEU Council brought further pro-
gress in the creation of a European defence policy.
The aim of this major and long-haul task is to equip
Europe with the means it needs to meet the chal-
5th April 1994
lenges of the post-cold war era. Following the rati-
fication of the Maastricht Treaty, and with the
advent of the European Union on 1st November
1993, this task can now be taken forward in a new
framework. As an institutionally autonomous body,
WEU is being developed as the defence component
of the European Union and the European pillar of
the alliance. Under the cornmon foreign and securi-
ty policy (CFSP), the European Union may request
WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and
actions of the Union which have defence implica-
tions. At the same time, strengthening the Euro-
pean pillar of NAIO, the WEU Council has conti-
nued to monitor closely the ongoing process of
renewal of the Atlantic Alliance. In its preparatory
work for the Luxembourg ministerial meeting, it
sought to make a strong and positive European
contribution, in keeping with the principles of
transparency and complementarity, to the prepara-
tion of the alliance summit.
Second part of the thirty-ninth annual report
of the Council n the Assembly
(1st July 1993 to 31st December 1993)
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VII. CFE Verification Experts and Open Skies Working Group
Vm. Activities of the Mediterranean Group
IX. Activities of the Space Group
X. Activities of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) ("at
13,)
XL Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA)
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1. WEU's r6le in former Yugoslavia - press release of 5th October 1993
2. Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers, Luxembourg, 22nd
November 1993 (see Document 1401, Volume IlI, November-
December 1993)
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On 29th October in Brussels, the European
Council, noting the ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty, adopted a document on the implementa-
tion of the treaty. Annex IV of the chapter on the
CFSP concerns relations between the Union and
WEU. On22nd November, the Ministerial Coun-
cil endorsed the Permanent Council's approval of
this document on 26th October. Pragmatic co-
operation between WEU and the bodies of the
Union will be developed on this basis and will be
stepped up through the impetus given by the res-
pective presidencies of the Union and WEU. The
decision taken in Luxembourg to reduce the WEU
Presidency to six months with effect from 1st July
1994 symbolises the willingness to harmonise
WEU's method of working with that of the Euro-
pean Union.
The competent bodies of WEU have conti-
nued their work to develop the organisation's ope-
rational capabilities both as regards the new mis-
sions defined in the Petersberg declaration and as
regards satellite observation or the implementa-
tion of the Open Skies Treaty with the establish-
ment of a common observation system. Lastly,
decisions were taken which will enable the Wes-
tern European Armaments Group (WEAG) to
operate in Brussels; an armaments secretariat
would be set up within the WEU Secretariat-
General.
The Luxembourg declaration takes note of
these advances and underlines the willingness of
WEU member states to continue developing the
organisation's operational means so as to enable it
to respond to requests from the European Union
concerning its decisions and actions which have
defence implications. At the same time, this ope-
rational capability will place member states in a
better position to shoulder their responsibilities as
allies.
It was in this spirit that ministers approved
the report on relations between WEU and national
and multinational forces answerable to WEU;
likewise in this spirit they welcomed the adoption
of the joint declaration stating the conditions for
the use of the European corps in the framework of
WEU, and the understandings in this regard.
Forcefully reaffirming its commitment to
the transatlantic partnership, whose strength was
of fundamental importance for European stability
and security, the Ministerial Council stated that
the first part of the declaration adopted in Luxem-
bourg represented WEU's contribution to the pre-
paration of the Atlantic Alliance summit.
The need to plan for European military
operations outside the specific cases precipitating
a collective response under the terms of Articles
V and 5 of the Brussels and Washington Treaties
led ministers to formulate the principle that WEU
should be able to use the collective assets of the
alliance. The corollary of this principle is a pos-
sible corresponding use of WEU's own operatio-
nal capabilities by the alliance. Implementation of
this principle requires new consultation and co-
operation procedures to be defined particularly in
the context of joint meetings between the WEU
and North Atlantic Councils, especially in future
crises. In this connection, the joint meeting on
14th December 1993 
- 
the third such meeting
since June 1992 
- 
was devoted to prospects for
the NATO summit and was particularly fruitful.
The Luxembourg declaration underlined
that the alliance remained the essential forum for
consultation among its members and the venue for
agreement on policies bearing on the security and
defence commitments of allies under the North
Atlantic Treaty. To a large extent, 1993 saw the
successful application of the principles of transpa-
rency and complementarity to relations between
WEU and the alliance. The preparations for the
NATO summit provided an opportunity to focus
more on the complementarity between WEU and
the alliance, particularly as regards the definition
of new concepts for adapting NAIO's structures.
During its deliberations on the second part
of the thirty-ninth ordinary session of the WEU
parliamentary Assembly, the Permanent Council
reiterated that it was available to address these
subjects at joint meetings with the principal com-
mittees and their rapporteurs.
II. Activifies of the Permanent Council
and the Council Working Group
The headquarters of Western European
Union was inaugurated in a public session of the
Permanent Council on Monday, l5th November
1993. Mr. Jacques Poos, the Luxembourg Foreign
Minister and Chairman-in-Office of WEU, Mr.
Willem van Eekelen, Secretary-General of the
organisation, Sir Dudley Smith, President of the
WEU Assembly and, representing the host nation,
Mr. Willy Claes, Deputy Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister, Mr. L6o Delcroix, Defence
Minister, Mr. Jos Chabert, Minister for the Brussels
Capital Region, all spoke in turn on this occasion.
This ceremony marked the end of the alte-
ration work on the WEU headquarters, which
houses the Secretariat-General and the Planning
Cell. All speakers underlined the r6le of WEU as
the defence component of the European Union
and as the European pillar of the alliance, and this
was confirmed at the meeting of the European
Council on 29th October, on the eve of the entry
into force of the Maastricht Treaty on 1st Novem-
ber 1993.
Apart from those meetings where circum-
stances dictated that a specific subject be addres-
sed, the Council's agendas have continued to
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contain an item devoted to the report on working
grcup meetings and an item on "topical questions".
The Permanent Council has paid particular
attention to the work of preparing draft decisions
for submission to the Ministerial Council and to
their implementation once adopted. In the context
of relations between WEU and the Atlantic
Alliance, the Council discussed WEU's contribu-
tion to the strengthening of a European security
and defence identity at the forthcoming alliance
summit. This contribution, contained in the first
part of the ministerial declaration, was the subject
of a report by the WEU Presidency at the thirdjoint session of the WEU and North Atlantic
Councils on l4th December.
The Council discussed relations between
WEU and the European Union, and more specifi-
cally the harmonisation of the two presidencies,
the reduction to six months of the WEU Presi-
dency and also the Union's representation and
participation in meetings of WEU.
The Council has been kept directly infor-
med of the activities of the WEU Institute for
Security Studies, of the establishment of the
Satellite Centre in Tonej6n, and of the activities
of the Planning Cell. It continued to acknowledge
the vital importance of the institutional dialogue
with the Assembly and followed with great inter-
est the debates of the second part of the thiny-
ninth ordinary session. Lastly, the Council took a
number of administrative and budgetary decisions
on the basis of opinions submitted by the Budget
and Organisation Committee.
Apart from preparing the ground for the
Permanent Council's discussions, the Council
Working Group's agenda ranged over specific
questions concerning associate members' links
with the Planning Cell under a permanent liaison
iurangement, evacuation planning, the Agency for
the Control of Armaments, the secondment of
nationally paid officials to the Secretariat, joint
expenditure funding in the context of possible
future WEU peace-keeping operations, WEU
communications, the formulation of criteria for
receiving high-ranking officials and questions
concerned with the building.
(a) Topical questions
(i) Situation informer Yugoslavia
The Belgian Representative, on behalf of
the Presidency of the Tivelve, regularly briefed
the Permanent Council on the activities and
d6marches of the European Community aimed at
reaching a peaceful solution to the conflict in for-
mer Yugoslavia.
The Permanent Council has closely moni-
tored developments on the ground, its discussions
focusing on the implementation of the Danube
embargo, participation of naval forces of WEU
member states in the Adriatic embargo, and the
possible involvement of WEU in the EC's admi-
nistration of the Mostar district. The actitivies of
the Experts' Groups and the Mostar Working
Group, in co-operation with the Planning Cell,
dealt mainly with this possibility.
The Presidency has regularly briefed the
Council on developments in ttre WEU Danube ope-
ration. The Council has for example discussed the
various measures taken to ensure effective co-ordi-
nation between the WEU and SAM teams and it has
also discussed the funding of the operations. These
discussions have enabled ttre Council to gauge pro-
blems which may recur in similar operations. The
Presidency has regularly taken part in the Vienna
meetings of the Sanctions Liaison Group.
The Council has also closely followed the
conduct of the WEU/I{ATO combined operation
Sharp Guard to strengthen the embargo in the
Adriatic. Together with the NATO Council, it
approved the rules of engagement and decided to
task the military delegates to monitor the rotation
of WEU personnel in the area.
As part of the mandate given by ministers
to the Permanent Council on 19th May to study
the possible participation of WEU member states
in the protection of safe areas under United
Nations mandate, the Council tasked the Planning
Cell to make a weekly report on its activities in
this field and to study the possibility of forming
groups of multinational forces.
On 5th October 1993, the WEU Permanent
Council examined the request made the day
before in Luxembourg by the European Commu-
nity ministers, to study, as regards the administra-
tion of Mostar, the support which WEU might
give to the organisation of a police force and to
improve a number of essential logistic functions,
particularly in the medical field.
The Permanent Council decided to task a
working group to study the feasibility of a WEU
contribution.
The Mostar Working Group, which met for
the first time on 7th October 1993, worked in
close co-ordination with the other organisations
active in planning the various forms of assistance
to this region, including the European Commu-
nity, the United Nations and NATO.
The Council also tasked the Planning Cell to
continue its work and to provide all the necessary
support to the Mostar Working Group. In addition,
the Council agreed that WEU (Presidency, Secreta-
riat and Planning Cell) could, at the invitation of the
NATO Secretary-General, take part in the alliance's
ad hoc Group on Planning Co-ordination.
The Council asked the Planning Cell,
strengthened as necessary by experts, to draw up a
4t
DOCUI\GNT 1411
general action plan covering the conditions under
which WEU member states might supply medical
aid.
(b) Relatians wilh the countries of Central Europe
On 25th October 1993, the first meeting
took place of the Forum of Consultation Counsel-
lors' Group since the group was set up by minis-
ters on 20th May.
The group focused its discussions on two
specific questions; preparing the agenda for the
meeting of the Forum of Consultation at ambassa-
dorial level and defining its rOle. It also prepared
for the meetings of the Forum of Consultation at
ambassadorial and ministerial level.
The meeting of the Forum of Consultation
at ambassadorial level took place on 9th Novem-
ber in Brussels. Discussions centred on an enhan-
ced status for the consultation partners, the expan-
sion of activities and the arrangements for practi-
cal co-operation within the Forum.
The ambassadors decided to draw up a
work programme for their meetings in the coming
months, particularly with a view to the ministerial
meeting in May l994.They also exchanged views
on the situation in former Yugoslavia and on the
implications for European security of recent deve-
lopments in Russia.
At the meeting of the Forum of Consulta-
tion Counsellors' Group on 6th December, the
group commented on the text of the declaration
issued by WEU ministers on 22nd November
1993, and more specifically, Section I, paragraph
5, which states:
"Ministers welcomed the Europe agree-
ments recently concluded which provided
the bases for increased co-operation geared
to the objective of membership of the Euro-
pean Union opening, in turn, the perspec-
tive of membership of WEU. In this context,
ministers requested the Permanent Council
to reflect on an enhanced status and its
content, including the Franco-Gennan pro-
posal of 12th Novembet for those consul-
tation partners who had already concluded
or would conclude a Europe agreement
with the European Union. The Permanent
Council should thus identify ways and
modalities to allow those countries to parti-
cipate to a larger extent in the activities of
WEU and to be involved in initiatives and
missions as envisaged in the Petersberg
declaration."
The consultation partners welcomed this
initiative with great interest. The discussions
demonstrated their satisfaction with the prospects
opened up by the conferring of an enhanced status
and the expedited procedures for implementing
the declaration. The Counsellors' Group resolved
to make an active contribution to the development
of this process.
To enable the group to play its proper r6le
until the May ministerial meoting, it decided to
meet once a month, reserving the possibility to
put forward or put back the date of meetings
depending on circumstances. Henceforward, the
agenda would include an item on WEU activities,
particularly its relations with the European Union,
NATO, the CSCE and the United Nations.
Several government representatives from
the states of Central Europe also paid courtesy
calls on the WEU headquarters: on 10th Septem-
ber, the Estonian Defence Minister, Mr. Juri Luik;
on 4th November, the President of the Slovak
Republic, Mr. Michel Kovac, accompanied by the
Defence Minister, Mr. Imrich Andrejcack and, on
23rd Novembet the Lithuanian Defence Minister,
Mr. Linas Linkevicius.
The Secretary-General visited Bratislava
onZ2ndand23rd September and, during his visit,
had talks with the President, Mr. Michel Kovac,
the Prime Minister, Mr. V. Meciar and the Slovak
Foreign Minister, Mr. J. Moravcik. He also visited
Prague on 20th October and had talks with the
Foreign Minister, Mr. Josef Zieleniec and the
Defence Minister, Mr. Antonin Baudys.
The Institute for Security Studies continued
to play an important r0le in WEU's contacts with
the countries of Central Europe, particularly
through the organisation of two seminars entitled
"Building a new Europe 
- 
the security dimension"
and "Security in the Southern Danube area and the
construction of a new Europe". The Institute
Director also had a visit from Mr. Valentin Alek-
sandrov, the Bulgarian Defence Minister.
Still under the heading of topical questions,
the Council also monitored tlre work being done
within the Atlantic Alliance and the CSCE.
II. Activities of the intergovcrnmental bodies
(i) Council working groups
At each of its meetings, the Council took
note of the results of its working groups'activities
since the previous meeting. The summary records
were discussed as necessary.
(ii) WEU Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
The Institute Director attended all those
Council meetings where the agenda warranted his
presence. The Institute's quarterly reports to the
Council provided an opportunity for exchanges of
view on the current work of the ISS.
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(iii) WEU Satellite Centre
The Centre's Director attended all those
Council meetings where the agenda warranted his
presence. He regularly briefed the Council on the
progress of the Cenffe's activities during its expe-
rimental period.
III. Activities of the Special Working Group
The group's activities were now structured
on a thematic basis, and four topics were addres-
sed in particular. Firstly, the r6le of WEU in peace-
keeping on the basis of a discussion document put
forward by the Italian Presidency. Once reworked
to harmonise terminology and revised to take
account of actual experience on the ground, this
document was submitted as a presidency report to
WEU ministers, who took due note.
Secondly, more detailed European thinking
on an anti-missile defence system. Given the chan-
ge of direction in American govemment policy, it
was decided to stop using the term "GPS" in SWG
documents and to take over the term "anti-missile
defence" used by the Assembly. The group agreed
that WEU should concentrate on the defence
aspects, having regard to the work carried out in
other bodies on non-proliferation. The group deci-
ded initially to recommend to the Council that a
meeting of experts be held to prepare a risk analy-
sis. The resulting document would then be submit-
ted to the Special Working Group.
Thirdly, the group had a detailed exchange
of views on the development of the European
security and defence identity, principally with a
view to the contribution which WEU could make
to the preparation of the alliance summit. The Pre-
sidency reported on the SWG discussion to the
Council, which drew conclusions as to the sub-
stance and form of a possible contribution to the
alliance summit.
The group also addressed the problem of
present and future relations between WEU and
those countries of Central Europe which had
concluded or will conclude association agree-
ments with the Community and also between
WEU and those countries applying to join the
European Community, the concern here being to
ensure consistency between the initiatives taken
by WEU, the European Union and NAIO towards
the aforementioned countries.
IV. Activities of the Defence
Representatives Group
In accordance with the mandate given to it
by the Permanent Council, the Defence Represen-
tatives Group, in close co-operation with the Plan-
ning Cell, prepared a series of documents on:
- relations between WEU and the forces
answerable to WEU (FAWEU);
- WEU humanitarian missions;
- WEU exercise policy;
- intelligence support to the WEU Planning
Cell.
The document on relations between WEU
and FAWEU, of which the Ministerial Council
took note on 20th November, begins by defining
the general rules and procedures in broad terms
and the relations to be established between WEU
and all forces answerable to WEU, whether natio-
nal or multinational. It then addresses the specific
relations with the multinational forces.
The document on humanitarian missions,
which had been endorsed by the Chiefs of Defence
Statr (CHODs), was approved by the Council. It
contains an introductory note prepared by the
DRG, defining in particular the basis for WEU
involvement and the legal framework forhumani-
tarian operations, and a more operational part pre-
pared by the Planning Cell covering the three
broad areas of action, namely, humanitarian assis-
tance, refugee relief and disaster relief.
The directive on a WEU exercise policy,
approved by the Council on a recommendation of
the CHODs, concerns forces which may be made
available to WEU. It highlights the political and
military objectives of exercises and the impor-
tance of the principle of complementarity bet-
ween WEU and NATO; it also specifies the r6le of
the cell in the exercising of headquarters staff and
forces.
The aim of the WEU exercise policy is to
increase the ability of WEU in exercising appro-
priate capabilities to enable the deployment of
WEU military units by land, sea or air to accom-
plish the tasks defined in the Petersberg declara-
tion. These exercises will help to demonstrate the
solidarity of member states and to enhance the
organisation's credibility and profile on the inter-
national scene.
Lastly, the group, with the assistance of the
cell, prepared a document on intelligence policy.
This document was endorsed by the Chiefs of
Defence Staff (CHODs) and approved by the
Council. It defines the line of action to be taken on
intelligence as well as the level and extent of the
intelligence support that the Planning Cell needs
to undertake its tasks.
Among the other specific tasks carried out
by the group, mention should be made of:
- the preparation of the agenda for the
Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting on 22nd
October 1993;
- examination of the progress in the draft
plan for air-maritime co-operation Com-
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bined Endeavour to be submitted to the
Chiefs of Defence Staff to enable them to
complete their guidelines;
- an exchange of views on a study of crisis
areas on Europe's periphery;
- examination of the follow-up to be given
to the Ministerial Council of 22nd
November as regards the Italian proposal
to organise multinational land forces in
the context of air-maritime co-operation,
the list of FAWEU and the finalisation of
the Planning Cell document on the opera-
tional aspects of peace-keeping.
V. Transfer to WEU of cefiain Eurogroup
activities
The transfer to WEU of EUROCOM activi-
ties, approved by the Council of Ministers at its
meeting on 19th May 1993, took effect on 1st
August 1993. A meeting of the "main group" took
place in the WEU building on 4th-5th October
attended by representatives of the thirteen mem-
ber nations, the Secretary-General and the Plan-
ning Cell. An initial progress report was forwar-
ded to the Permanent Council.
The transfer to WEU of publicity activities,
approved by the Council of Ministesr on 19th
May 1993, took effect on lst January 1994. T\e
Council Working Group in its "at 13" configura-
tion looks after these activities. Iceland and Ire-
land, as observers, will be kept fully informed.
The practical arrangements for transferring
the EUROLOG and EUROLONGTERM activi-
ties to WEU were set out in a joint decision by the
WEU Permanent Council and the Eurogroup
Permanent Representatives. This decision calls in
particular for the formulation of new terms of
reference for each of the EUROLOG and EURO-
LONGTERM Steering Groups so that their activi-
ties may be adapted to WEU requirements. These
transfers also took effect on 1st January 1994.
VI. Activities of the Planning Cell
Ot 22nd June 1993, the Planning Cell
moved to its final location within the WEU head-
quarters. The Planning Cell is now able to
respond positively to Council requirements. Close
links have been established with the Secretariat-
General, with capitals, and most importantly with
HQ NAIO, the IMS and SHAPE. Thus the Plan-
ning Cell has been able to function positively and
has become involved in different areas of WEU
activity.
The work of the Planning Cell has centred
on the following topics:
List of FAWEU: The Planning Cell was
tasked to compile a list of forces answerable to
WEU (FAWEU) from which appropriate force
packages for use in future planning could be deve-
loped. On the basis of information forwarded by
member states, the Planning Cell has begun to
draft this list and has made the first technical
contacts with the NATO bodies responsible for
updating NAIO's defence planning questionnaire.
In the case of France, which does not reply
to the defence planning questionnaire, the Plan-
ning Cell has made contact with the competent
staff in the Ministry of Defence.
Maritime c o -operation/Combined Ende a-
vour: Tl.tis activity was based on an initiative of
the Ministers of Defence of France, Italy and
Spain to examine the possibility of promoting
forms of maritime co-operation among WEU
member countries. In October/November 1992,
the CHODs and the ministers tasked the Planning
Cell to take the work forward. The Planning Cell
produced a draft which is now considered capable
of fulfilling the ministerial mandate to promote
WEU maritime co-operation. With its help, mari-
time forces can be generated and deployed, and
maritime force packages can be identified for cer-
tain tasks.
Furthermore, it can be used in conjunction
with any other plan involving maritime forces and
in this capacity it can also be used as the starting
mechanism for and the initial phase of any mari-
time exercise.
Study on WEU strategic mobility require-
ments: At the Council meeting on27th April 1993,
it was agreed that a WEU sfrategic mobility study
(WSMS), under the aegis of the WEU/Planning
Cell, should be initiated. The Franco/German
study on European requirements for strategic
mobility was to be used as a basis for further ana-
lysis. The aim of the WSMS is to evaluate the
WEU movement and fiansportation requirements
for strategic mobility for the mid-1990s period and
beyond and, pending this evaluation, to elaborate a
WEU strategic mobitty concept complementary
to and compatible with the NAIO concept. The
conclusions of the study will form the basis for the
elaboration of the future WEU sffategic mobility
ransport concept. The work is still in hand.
Humanitarian, peace-keeping and peace-
making operations (The United Nations and
NATO use the expression of peace-enforcement
instead of peace-making): Work is in hand on the
broad study of possible missions for WEU forces
in the areas of humanitarian, peace-keeping and
peace-making operations. With regard to WEU
humanitarian missions and WEU involvement in
peace-keeping missions, the Planning Cell has
drawn up the initial drafts and contributed actively
to the further development of these documents.
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Direct contribution to the DRG: With
regard to the documents on relations between
WEU and the FAWEU, intelligence support to the
WEU/Planning Cell and WEU exercise policy,
the Planning Cell has also drawn up the initial
drafts and contributed actively to their finalisa-
tion.
Exercise activity: In accordance with the
WEU exercise policy, the Planning Cell has, since
December, been in close liaison with the United
Kingdom planning staff for exercise Purple Nova
1994,in which WEU will play a rOle.
Studies on possible WEU participation in
former Yugoslavia: At the Council meeting on 6th
July 1993, the Planning Cell was tasked to study
the possibility of participation of the WEU mem-
ber countries in the protection of safe areas. For
that, a questionnaire was submitted to nations in
order to find out which forces nations might be
willing to provide. Most of the answers received
were negative.
In the context of the protection of safe
areas, the Planning Cell was also tasked to make a
basic study on the possibility for the establish-
ment of multinational formations. It is also in this
context that, in anticipation of a probable request
from the EC, the Council mandated the Planning
Cell on 9th September 1993 to make a preliminary
informal study on the problems arising from a
possible EC administration r6le in the Mostar dis-
trict, with emphasis on the restoration of normal
living conditions in the city. A working session on
the situation in Mostar was held with experts from
capitals. A progress report was submitted to the
Council, and its recommendations approved.
The Planning Cell continued its studies on
the subject in co-ordination with NATO, the
European Community Monitoring Mission
(ECMM) and other organisations. A report was
submitted to the Council for consideration on 5th
October 1993 and thereafter the Planning Cell
drew up a general plan of action on the conditions
for any support that WEU might provide in the
medical field. This work was submitted to the
Council on 7th December 1993.
VII. CFE Verification Experts and Open Skies
Working Group
1. The verification experts exchanged views
on the opening of national inspection teams for
CFE declared sites inspections. Referring to the
positive experience with the deployment of such
teams during the first year of the reduction period,
they drew up a respective programme also for the
second year of the reduction period.
The experts discussed a proposal made to
partners to take part in certain member countries'
inspections within their group of states party.
They also discussed the local training of inspec-
tors from Central and Eastern Europe by inspec-
tors from Western Europe; the countries which
had already signed training agreements briefed
their partners on the practical arrangements which
had been adopted.
2. Over the last six months, the work of the
Open Skies Working Group has progressed signi-
ficantly. In the time under reference several WEU
members have notified the Open Skies Treaty. A
d6marche was made to third parties with a view to
their participation in a preliminary set of rules for
the operation of a WEU pool of observation sys-
tems. Generally favourable replies were received
from several states.
Furthermore, standing operating proce-
dures applicable to the WEU group of states party
were drawn up. Negotiations were at an advanced
stage and would be concluded shortly.
Finally, the experts exchanged information
on the development of observation systems in
several WEU member countries on which satis-
factory progress was being made.
VIII. Activiti.es of the Meditenanean Group
The Mediterranean Group met once during
the second half of 1993 on 20th December. At this
meeting, the group made an initial assessment of
the dialogue conducted with the Maghreb coun-
tries in 1993 pursuant to the Rome ministerial
mandate, as confirmed by the Luxembourg decla-
ration. It had an initial exchange of views on
developing this dialogue in 1994.
As regards its future activities, the group
stressed the need to compare its approach with
that of the European Union and alliance bodies
dealing with Mediterranean problems. On this
basis, specific terms of reference would be drawn
up for the group's work in 1994
.IX. Activities of the Space Group
(i) The group's meetings were mainly devoted
to following progress with the setting-up of the
Satellite Centre on the site and on the building
provided by the Spanish Government at the Torre-
j6n airbase. The group heard reports by the Direc-
tor of the Satellite Centre on its recent activities.
A preliminary concept paper for the three-
year experimental period was approved by the
Council in July 1993. This paper describes how
the WEU Council, WEU organs authorised by the
Council and the governments of member states
can task the Centre.
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The Council and member states have already
given the Centre a number of experimental tasks
and prototype dossiers have been produced. This
early exercising of the tasking mechanism is very
valuable to the Centre as it sharply focuses the
internal requirements for training and operating
procedures.
The programme for the experimental phase
of the Cenre is now based on the assumption that
ministers will be requested in November 1994 to
make a decision concerning the future of the Cenfre.
The group also discussed the need for
contacts between the Satellite Centre and NATO
and the possibility of acquiring imagery commer-
cially from new sources.
(ii) The group took stock of the progress of the
main system feasibility study carried out by the
industrial consortium led by DASA/Dornier. The
study is in two phases: the first phase has shown a
set of possible configurations of the system, whe-
reas the second will give, for the most appropriate
configurations, a detailed technical analysis and the
associated costs. The industrial consortium fini-
shed its work on the second phase in December and
presented the final results on lst and 2nd December
1993 at WEU headquarters in Brussels. The feasi-
bility study would end in March 1994, once it had
been evaluated by the study management team.
The Space Group also reviewed the work
likely to be done for the study management team
during 1994 in the event of a decision by minis-
ters at their spring 1994 meeting to proceed with
Phase A development on a WEU earth observa-
tion system.
(iii) Lastly, the group discussed the regulations
applying to future equipment procurement.
X. Activities of the Western European
Annaments Group ("at 73")
The WEAG National Armaments Directors
met on 2TthOctober 1993 in Brussels, for the first
time at WEU headquarters. The defence minis-
ters, for their part, met before the WEU Ministe-
rial Council on22nd November 1993 in Luxem-
bourg, to examine WEAG's activities. The mea-
sures they agreed on were then adopted by the
Council at 13.
Transfer to WEU of former-lEPGfunctions
The second halfof 1993 saw the continua-
tion and implementation of the decision to trans-
fer functions of the former IEPG (renamed
WEAG) to WEU, in accordance with the guide-
lines approved by the thirteen defence ministers at
their meeting in Rome on l9th May 1993.
It was thus decided to plose the permanent
secretariat, currently located in Lisbon, in spring
1994, and to establish in parallel, within the WEU
Secretariat-General, an armaments secretariat
working for the benefit of WEAG activities under
the authority of the National Armaments Direc-
tors.
Current activities
The three panels and tre various working
groups of the WEAG pursued their activities
during the second half of 1993. The main results
obtained during this period were the following:
- 
The signing on27th October of a memo-
randum of understanding relating to the feasibil-
ity study on the future large aircraft (FLA) by the
National Armaments Directors of France, Ger-
many, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey. This pro-ject is the result of discussions held in the frame-
work of WEAG Panel I.
- 
The continuation of the EUCLID pro-
gramme, with a growing number of research and
technology projects (40 projects representing
close on 280 million ecus have already been
approved by WEAG Panel II; of these, 17 have
contracts placed with industry). New research
priority areas continue to be sought for EUCLID.
Measures are being studied aimed at improving
the effectiveness of this programme.
- 
WEAG Panel III is pursuing its work on
the development of an open defence equipment
market in Europe. It has drawn up measures and
principles intended to enable developing defence
indusbry countries to participate more fully in that
market.
- 
The ad hoc Study Group on the European
Armaments Agency has delivered a first report
setting out the tasks that could be given to such an
agency and the governing principles that could
apply.The study is being carried out under the
supervision of the National Armaments Directors
and is, among other things, examining to what
extent it might be possible to make European
armaments co-operation more effective in indivi-
dual areas, through a body having legal person-
dity.
XI. Activities of the Agency tor the Control of
Armaments (ACA)
The Agency for the Control of Armaments
continued its residual tasks regarding the limita-
tion of atomic, biological and chemical weapons
at a level of activity corresponding to that obtain-
ing at the time of the 1984 Rome declaration and
in accordance with the procedures approved up to
that point.
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As regards atomic weapons, the ACA car-
ries out no controls of these weapons.
As to biological weapons, all the member
states decided to renew the lists in force of biolo-
gical weapons subject to control. As in previous
years, the ACA did not carry out any controls in
this field.
In the field of chemical weapons, all the
member states notified the agency of their agree-
ment to renew the list in force of chemical equip-
ment and products (chemical weapons) subject to
control.
In accordance with the usual procedure, the
agency asked the member states if there had been
any effective production of chemical weapons on
their mainland territory. All member states replied
in the negative. No country reported that it held
chemical weapons on the mainland of Europe.
. In accordance with the usual procedure,
four chemical factories were inspected as part of
the "controls on the non-production of chemical
weapons". In no case did the ACA find any evi-
dence that the undertaking not to manufacture
chemical weapons was being breached.
For 1993, the thirty<ighth year of controls
carried out by the ACA, the legal sources used tojustify the levels and control procedures were
unchanged.
XII. Activities of the WEU Institute
for Security Studies
In the period lst July to 3lst December
1993, the Institute organised three seminars:
"Building a new Europe 
- 
the security dimen-
sion", attended by members of the Institute and
former and present study-award holders from
Central European countries; "Security in the
southern Danube area and the construction of a
new Europe" which was held in Sinaia (Roma-
nia) and "Islamic fundamentalism in southern
Mediterranean countries and its implications for
Western Europe". The Institute also organised a
meeting of the Task Force on Russia and the
CIS.
Two documents on security in Central and
Eastern Europe and the CSCM proposal in the
light of the PLo-Israel agreementwere sent to the
Council.
The Institute welcomed three new research
fellows, Peter van Ham, Gabriel Munuera and
Michel d'Oleon, for a period of three years and
also three study-award holders, Luisa Vierucci,
from the University of Florence, Sebastian
Bartsch from the Free University of Berlin, and
Anthony Forster from Oxford University, who
spent several weeks at the Institute.
Information and training meetings for
Netherlands members of parliament, young
diplomats from South Africa on the occasion of
their visit to Paris 
- 
organised by the University
of Birmingham 
- 
and defence attach6s from
embassies of member countries were held in
Paris. Two conference series, one at Sofia,
Bucharest and Bratislava, the other at Prague,
Vilnius and Warsaw, were given by members of
the research team.
The 1993 Institute prize was awarded to
Luisa Vierucci for her study WEU 
- 
a regional
partner of the United Nations? which the Insti-
tute decided to publish in Chaillot Papers No. 12.
Also during this period, the Institute published
Chaillot Papers No. 9, Nationalism, internatio-
nalism and the European defence market, by
William Walker and Philip Gummett, Chaillot
Papers No. 10, Parameters of European security,
by Dieter Mahncke and Chaillot Papers No. 11,
War and peace: European conflict prevention,
by Lawrence Freedman, Pierre Hassner, Dieter
Senghaas, Stefano Silvestri and Carlos Zaldivar,
and edited by Nicole Gnesotto. Issue Number 10
of the Newsletter was also published in Novem-
ber 1993.
XI I I. Administrativ e questions
During the second half of the year, the
Council Working Group prepared the Permanent
Council's decisions on the cost-sharing formula
for budgetary contributions, the status of WEU
staff in Brussels and the recruitment policy in the
WEU ministerial organs. It also supervised the
building alteration work at Rue de la R6gence and
the allocation and refurbishment of offrces made
available to national delegations.
Lastly, the Council Working Group, assis-
ted by the Secretariat-General, monitored prepa-
rations for the inauguration of the WEU head-
quarters.
XIV Public Administratian C ommilte e
Following the wish expressed by the Coun-
cil Working Group at its meetingon23rd Septem-
ber 1993 to wind up the activities of the Public
Administration Committee within the WEU
framework, this committee has not met since 25th
March 1993.
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Press release
WEU's r6le informer Yugoslavia
(5thOctober 1993)
At its meeting on 5th October 1993, the WEU Permanent Council examined the request made in
Luxembourg on 4th October by ministers of the Twelve to study, concerning the administration of Mos-
tar, what support WEU could give in connection with the organisation of a police force and the improve-
ment of some vital logistic functions, particularly in the medical field.
The Permanent Council had decided to respond positively to this request and has tasked a working
group to study the contribution WEU could make. This group will meet at WEU headquarters on 7th Octo-
ber 1993 to consider the question with due regard to the work being done by other bodies.
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Relations hetween the Union and WEU
Annex IV of Chapter IV of the document
on the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty,
transmitted by the Council to the Assembly on 23rd March 1994
1 . WEU is an integral part of the development of the Union: the establishment of a close co-operation
between the two entities is therefore of fundamental importance to the development of a common foreign
and security policy. The Union may, at the level of its Council, request WEU to elaborate and implement
decisions and actions which have defence implications in the following kind of situations. These, while
normally implying the use of military personnel, may include the use of other means. The following
examples should only be considered as indicative and non-exhaustive:
- 
the security interests of the Union are directly concerned;
- 
the Union is politically and economically involved in a specific crisis or conflict and acknow-
ledges that additional WEU support is necessary (military observers, cease-fire, peace-keeping,
sanctions-monitoring and peace-enforcement);
- 
the Union is asked by the United Nations/CSCE to make a contribution and it comes to the
conclusion that WEU, in a cohesive division of labour, could make a specific conffibution;
- 
humanitarian efforts need logistical support.
2. Once the European Union has requested WEU to elaborate and implement its decisions and actions
with defence implications, WEU will take on the request in accordance with the decision-making proce-
dures of that organisation, and will carry out all actions concerning such a request in a manner that is fully
coherent with the overall policy established by the European Union.
Special attention will be required when the request to WEU is part of a broader action which the
Union itself will continue to conduct.
In this case mutual information and consultation procedures will ensure the coherence of the action
as a whole, whilst ensuring that WEU take in an autonomous way the operational decisions, including
military planning, rules of engagement, command structures, deployment and withdrawal.
3. In order to ensure close co-operation between WEU and the European Union, the following mea-
sures will be implemented from the date of entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty:
3.1. Co-operation between presidencies and harmonisation of their duration
The Presidency of V/EU will continuously inform CFSP bodies about ongoing work within WEU
which is relevant to the Union. The Presidency of the Council will inform, on a regular basis, competent
WEU bodies of the work undertaken by the Union which is relevant to WEU, in particular in areas where
WEU could be invited to elaborate and implement decisions of the Union which have defence implications.
The two Presidencies will co-operate closely in order to ensure the consistency and the efficiency
of the work relevant to both organisations.
To facilitate the envisaged harmonisation of presidencies, the Union suggests that WEU reflect on
the reduction of its Presidency's term of office to six months.
3.2. Co-operation between the General Secretariat of the Council and the General Secretariat of Western
European Union
The Secretary-General of the Council will ensure that the Secretary-General of WEU is kept
timely and fully informed on developments of the CFSP, in particular in areas where WEU could be invi-
ted to elaborate and implement decisions of the Union which have defence implications as well as in areas
where complementary or similar activities are being carried out by the Union and by WEU. Similarly, the
Secretary-General of WEU will keep the Secretary-General of the Council punctually and fully informed
of any activities of WEU which are relevant to the Union, including the development of contingency plan-
ning for implementing measures in areas where the Union might call for such action.
The collaboration includes the exchange of written material in the relevant areas. This covers
documents as well as exchanges over the WEUCOM and COREU networks. The two secretariats will
establish the necessary practical arrangements in this regard and ensure that the security classifications
and provisions of the two organisations are respected in the handling of such documents.
49
DOCUIVENT 1412
The collaboration includes cross-participation of collaborators from the two secfetariats in relevant
meetings in the two organisations according to decisions taken on a case-by-case basi$ after consultation
of the two Presidencies at the appropriate level. This applies to meetings at working group level, as well
as with regard to relevant agenda points in meetings at ambassadorial level and at ministerial level. The
two secretariats will keep each other informed about the agendas for all relevant meetings. The collabora-
tors in question will be seated in the delegation of the Presidency-in-Office of the organisation they
represent.
3.3. Arrangements for appropriate modalities to ensure that the Commission of the European Commu-
nities is regularly informed and, as appropriate, consulted on WEU activities
The information and, as appropriate, the consultation of the Commission on WEU activities should
take place through regular contacts between the Commission and the WEU Presidency, on the one side,
and between the Commission and the Secretary-General of WEU, on the other side.
The WEU Secretariat will forward WEU written material to the Commission, in which the Com-
mission has an interest by virtue of its responsibilities in implementing policies of the European Union and
whenever WEU is dealing with matters relating to the Commission's responsibilities under the Treaty on
European Union. Similarly, the Commission will forward documents to WEU in all relevant areas.
The hesidency will represent the European Union at WEU meetings. It is understood that the Pre-
sidency will include representatives of the Commission in its delegation, whenever WEU is dealing with
matters relating to the Commission's responsibilities under the freaty.
3.4. Synchronisation of dates and venues of meetings
The two organisations, at the level of the Presidency and the Secretariats, will whenever possible
consult each other before finalising plans for meetings at ministerial level or meetings of relevant working
groups with a view to establishing the greatest possible synchronisation of dates and venues of meetings.
This applies in particular to situations where successive decisions of the Union and WEU are called for.
The two Secretariats will make the necessary practical arrangements to provide appropriate meeting
facilities whenever successive meetings of the two organisations on the same day and in the same place
are called for practical or operational reasons.
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Action by the Presidential Committee
Terts adopted by the Presidentful Committee
dwing the second part of the thi@-ninth session of the Assembly
Declaration on the sitaotian informer Yugoslavia
Paris, l4th February 1994
The Presidential Committee, appalled at the massacre perpetrated in the market place of Sarajevo
on Saturday, 5th February 1994, approves the decision taken by the North Atlantic Council at its meeting
on 9th February 1994.
The committee wishes all these decisions, intended to put an end to the siege of Sarajevo, to be
implemented without hesitation and fully supports any measures that may contribute to this objective.
The committee recalls that the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo is only one step towards a negotiated
settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and wishes the cease-fire to be extended as soon as possible to other
parts of Bosnia defrned by the United Nations as zones of protection.
It also recalls Recommendation 525, adopted by the Standing Committee of the Assembly on
3rd September 1992.
The committee wishes the political settlement that must follow the cease-fire to conform to the
various resolutions voted by the United Nations Security Council.
It pays tribute in particular to the courage of the United Nations forces ("blue berets") who are enga-
ged in a difficult peace-keeping mission where already severe losses have been sustained.
The Presidential Committee has decided to meet as soon as possible after 21st February 1994.
Declaration on the embargo against the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)
Paris, 28th F ebruary 1994
Meeting in Paris on 28th February 1994, the Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly is
seriously concerned about the partial ffade embargo by Greece against the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM), which could provoke undesirable consequences for peace and stability in
the Balkans.
It strongly supports the European Union's mediation effort to urge Greece and Macedonia to
resume negotiations over their present dispute.
It welcomes the initiatives taken by Italy, Bulgaria and Albania to help the FYROM overcome the
serious problems caused by the Greek trade embargo.
The Presidential Committee looks forward to discussing these important issues in detail with the
Greek authorities during its official visit from l4th-18th March 1994.
Declaralion on the situation in Bosnia-Henegovina
Paris, 28th February 1994
Meeting in Paris on 28th February 1994, the Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly wel-
comes the decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council on 9th February 1994 and NATO's resolve in
continuing to verify compliance with the agreements to which the parties to the conflict in Bosnia-Herze-
govina have subscribed and in maintaining close air support to protect UNPROFOR in carrying out its
mlssron.
It appreciates in particular the efforts of the Russian Federation, which has concluded negotiations
with one of the panies to the conflict, and its military presence in the Sarajevo area, in agreement with the
United Nations.
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The Presidential Committee notes, however, that the North Atlantic Council's courageous decision
could be implemented only thanks to a tacit agreement between Russia and the United States under Uni-
ted Nationst auspices and regrets that it was not possible for there to be prior consultation with the Cen-
ffal European countries, whose close co-operation is vital to the conduct of any United Nations' policy in
former Yugoslavia.
Leading on from the positive development of the situation in Sarajevo, it is now necessary to apply
the same poliiy to other thrbatened areas in Bosnia: Mostar, Srebrenica and Tuzla to mention but a few,
by providing UfVenOfOR with sufficient additional troops to enable it to carry out its mission of control-
ling armaments.
It should be sfiessed once again that any effort to stop the shelling and fighting can be regarded only
as a first step, the final aim being a negotiated, lasting settlement similar to the European action plan of
22nd November 1993, on bases acceptable to all parties involved and negotiated in due form in Geneva.
WEU and NATO member countries should make all necessary preparations so as to be able to
contribute military forces to the substantial peace-keeping force that will be required to ensure the imple-
mentation of a peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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Parliamentary co-operation wilh the countries
of the WEU Forum of Consultation
REPORT'
submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relatians'
by Sir Russeil fohnston, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnarr Onoen
on parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum of
Consultation
Dnerr REcoMMENDATIoN
on parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum of
Consuliation
Expr-eNlronv MSN,IoRANDUM
submitted by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
[I. The WEU Forum of Consultation: aims and prospects
OThe Forum of Consultation, sEucture of political contacts on defence
and security questions with the states of Central Europe
(il) Present position and future prospects
m. Parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum of
Consultation
(i) National parliamentary co-operation
(iil Multilateral co-operation
IV. Conclusion
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee.' Mr. Tummers (Alternate: Eisna) Chairman; Mrs Fischer, Sir John Hunt (Vice-Chairmen); MM.
Amaral, Birraux, Bonrepaux, Biihler, Caldoro (Alternate: Paire), Colombo, Decagny, Sir Anthony Durant, Mrs Err, MM.
Eversdijk, Ghesquibre, Dr. Godman, Mr. Gouteyron, Sir Russe/l Johwton, MM. Kempinaire, Martins, Pfuhl, Reimarrn, Robles
Fraga (Altemate: Ramirez Pen), Rodoti, Sainz Garcia, Mrs. Sanchez de Miguel, Mr. Tabladini.
N.B. ?he names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Order
on parliamenlary co-operation with the countrics of the WEU Forum of Consultalion
The Assembly,
(i) Recalling Order 86 instructing the Presidential Committee:
(a) to encourage visits by Assembly committees to Cenffal European counties, particularly when
they prepare reports concerning that region;
(D) to promote the Assembly's participation in symposia and any other type of meeting at which
parliamentarians are present that might be organised by those countries;
(c) to send Assembly documtintation and other publications to the largest possible number of inter-
ested persons and institutions in Cenral European countries;
(d) to arrange for parliaments, governments and specialised institutions and associations in those
countries to send the Assembly any documents and information they consider useful in order to
ensure a better knowledge and greater understanding of their opinions, aims and decisions;(ii) Stressing the importance of the maintenance and development of relations with the parliaments of
the countries of the Forum of Consultation;
(iii) Conscious of the economic difficulties faced by thgse countries which are hindering more active
co-operation with the WEU Assembly;
(iv) Considering that more intensive co-operation between the WEU Assembly and the Central Euro-
pean parliaments constitutes an important element in the process of integration of these countries in the
structures of European political and defence co-operation,
INsTRucTs ITs CoMMITTEE oN BI.JDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMIMSTRATIoN
To include in the Assembly's budget for the 1995 financial year a provision for setting up an
Assembly support fund for parliamentary co-operation work with the countries of the WEU Forum of
Consultation.
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Drafi Recommendatian
on parliamenlary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum of Consabation
The Assembly,
(i) Recalling Recommendations 528,547 and 548 requesting the Council to:
(a) fulfrl the expectations of the. Central European. states. by 
-regular an$^relevgl dialogue, duly
organising discussions on topical questions, and including the states of Central Europe in appro-
priate seminars to provide an opportunity for debate on subjects of mutual interest;
(D) ensure that consultations held with the Cenral European states at Ministerial Council and WEU
Permanent CounciVAmbassador level and meetings of senior officials or seminars organised by
the Institute for Security Studies are included in the annual report to the Assembly;
(c) establish WEU information points in the capitals of the Central European states;
(d) develop WEU's relations with the countries of the Forum of Consultation by seeking greater
cohesion with the work of the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe and intensify the
work of the Forum of Consultation giving it a structured programme of work, encompassing,
inter alia, joint development of risk and threat assessment;
(ii) Stressing the importance for peace and stability in Europe of the consolidation of democratic struc-
tures and the success of economic reforms in the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation;
(iii) Wannly welcoming the Council's decisions to associate the consultation partners more closely in
the work of WEU;
(iv) Welcoming the signature by several countries, members of the Forum of Consultation, of Europe
agreements with the European Union and wishing all members of the Forum of Consultation to become
party to such agreements;
(v) Stressing the importance, repeatedly confirmed in the Council's declarations, of the development of
relations and co-operation between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the member states of the
Forum of Consultation with a view to integrating these countries into European political and security
structures,
Recot\dN,IeNDS TI{Ar rHE CoLINCIL
1. Keep the Assembly regularly informed on the activities of the Forum of Consultation and of deci-
sions taken at meetings of the latter at ministerial and Permanent Council level and in the Counsellors'
Group;
2. Invite the Assembly to participate on a regular basis in symposia and seminars on subjects of com-
mon interest to WEU and the Forum of Consultation, organised by WEU or by the Institute for Security
Studies;
3. Ensure that the Assembly has adequate means to develop relations and co-operation with the states
of the Forum of Consultation, in accordance with the Council's own expressed wish.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur)
I.Introduction
1. The recent NATO summit meeting held in
Brussels on 10th and 1lth January 1994 devoted
much of its work to the development of relations
between NATO and the states of Central and Eas-
tern Europe.
2. The adoption of the partnership for peace
programme made it possible to progress from
informal contacts and exchanges of views to firm
co-operation in a very sensitive area for the states
of Central and Eastern Europe, i.e. that of defence
and security.
3. Over and above the politico-military
aspects of this programme and the questions it
raises regarding its practical application and the
consequences for the geopolitical balance in the
region 
- 
some states considered this to be a first
step towards joining NATO in the medium term,
others believed it fell short of expectations 
- 
the
adoption of this document shows thatthe politico-
military situation in this part of the continent is
still unstable and the end of the cold war has not
put an end to tension in the area.
4. Political differences, armed conflict, ethnic
fighting, civil war, internal instability and diffi-
culties encountered in applying economic
reforms, all these events help to prevent the crea-
tion of a stable and prosperous regional environ-
ment in which co-operation and diplomacy would
replace distrust and hostility.
5. It is with a view to helping countries to
overcome their fears and foster co-operation in
security and defence matters that NATO decided
in Rome on 8th November l99l to create the
North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC)
and the WEU Council decided at the Petersberg
meeting of its Council of Ministers on 19th June
1992to create the Forum of Consultation destined
to promote contacts between the countries of Cen-
tral Europe (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania
and Slovakia) and WEU.
6. Among the various decisions reached at the
meeting of the Council of Ministers with the
states of Central Europe, one concerned the
WEU Assembly directly, to quote the words of
paragraph 8 of the declaration issued after that
meeting: "Ministers advocated the development
of relations between the WEU Assembly and the
parliaments of the states concerned". This ques-
tion has already been the subject of a report from
this committee presented at the June 1993 session'.
7. The reference to parliamentary co-opera-
tion is of particular importance here because it is a
matter often forgotten when tackling the question
of co-operation with the states of Central Europe.
In the countries concerned, parliament plays a pri-
mordial r6le in reaching political decisions, some-
times to a far greater extent that that played by
parliaments in the countries of Western Europe.
8. Furthermore, the party system and the
instability of political alliances which constitute
the basis of government in several countries give
parliaments a right to know and to join in deci-
sions which is far from negligible with regard to
the political options of governments in every field
of activity. Hence the need for developing co-
operation with the parliaments of Central Europe
in the various areas of parliamentary activity, be it
at the level of exchanging information or of tech-
nical assistance (training of officials in parlia-
ments, introduction of communications networks
and the exchange of data).
9. This helps to improve the working of par-
liamentary institutions and consequently the sta-
bility of democratic institutions in the countries
concerned. Furthermore, the exchange of infor-
mation fosters better understanding of situations
and problems specific to each country and each
area in important mafters such as foreign policy,
defence and security, since the parliaments echo
the various national political feelings which at any
time may influence the direction of state affairs.
10. Today, parliamentary co-operation is a res-
ponsibility of the national parliaments which act
in accordance with national priorities leading
towards contacts with one parliament or another
depending on the views held regarding the coun-
tries concerned. Various institutions handle these
questions at European level, from the WEU
Assembly to the parliamentary Assembly of the
CSCE, according to the possibilities and aims of
each one.
11. While approaches may diverge in regard to
substance and form, the fact remains that parlia-
mentary co-operation with the countries of Cen-
tral Europe helps to create an atmosphere of
I . The development of relations between the WEU Assembly
and the parliaments of Central European countries, Docu-
ment 1365, Rapporteur: Mr. Kempinaire.
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confidence and understanding, promoting a feel-
ing of security in the region and giving it, in part,
the stability it needs for prosperous and peaceful
development.
II. The WEU Forum of Consultation:
aims and prospects
12. Created in June 1992 at the meeting of the
WEU Council of Ministers at Petersberg in Ger-
many, the WEU Forum of Consultation seems to
be the practical consequence of the decision taken
at the meeting of the Council in Brussels onZ3rd
April 1990'.
13. According to paragraph 8 of the communi-
qu6 issued after that meeting, "Ministers agreed
on the opportuneness of establishing contacts for
two-way information with the democratically-
elected governments in Central and Eastern
Europe... Ministers recognised that, by virtue of
its activities, the parliamentary Assembly of
WEU has an important r6le to play in opening up
contacts between the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe."
14. Two years later, and in an attempt to
respond more specifically to the concern shown
by the countries of Central Europe in regard to an
increasingly unstable regional environment (war
in former Yugoslavia, fighting in the Caucasus,
differences between Russia and Ukraine concer-
ning nuclear weapons and the Black Sea fleet,
political instability in Russia), the WEU Council
of Ministers decided, at a meeting with states of
Central Europe, that "a Forum of Consultation
will be established between the WEU Permanent
Council and the ambassadors of the countries
concerned. It will meet at the seat of the WEU
Council at least twice a year."3.
15. After Petersberg, there came a stage of
contacts for information purposes and contacts of
a political nature concerning questions of defence
and security between WEU and the countries of
Central Europe set in the broader context of deve-
loping the common foreign and security policy
(CFSP) and logically following the building of the
European Union in accordance with the principles
laid down in the Maastricht Treaty with which
WEU is associateda.
2. Document 1352, "Information letter on the activities of the
intergovernmental organs, Annex V, chronology of main
decisions and activities concerning WEU's relations with
countries of Central Europe up to October 1992.
3. Document 1322,Extraordinary meeting of the WEU
Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe, Bonn,
19th June l99Z,puagraph7 (2).
4. Document 1315, Annex 3, Declaration of the member
states of WEU on the r6le of Western European Union and its
relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic
Alliance; Maastricht, l0th December 1992.
16. Today, following the NATO summit meet-
ing and decisions regarding the partnership for
peace prograrnme, the Forum of Consultation has
been confirmed as the point of political contact
between the states of Central Europe and WEU
and through this organisation between these states
and the European Union in security and defence
matters.
(i) The Forum of Consultation, structure of
political contacts on defence and security ques-
tions with the states of Central Europe
17. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the declaration
issued after the meeting of the Council with the
states of Central Europe in Bonn on l9th June
1992 defined fairly clearly the framework in
which the Forum of Consultation acts as a struc-
ture for political contacts with the states concer-
ned, WEU and the European Union:
- 
paragraph 5: The enhancement of WEU's
relations with the states of Central
Europe "should reflect the specific rela-
tions which exist and are developing bet-
ween these countries and the European
Union and its member states. Other
appropriate forms of co-operation could
be set up as required in the light of the
development of these relations."
- 
paragraph 6: "Ministers had a detailed
exchange of views on the development of
co-operation between WEU and these
states [of Central Europe]. They agreed to
strengthen existing relations by struc-
turing the dialogue, consultations and co-
operation."
18. "The focus of consultations will be the
security architecture and stability in Europe, the
future development of the CSCE, arms control
and disarmament... Developments in Europe and
neighbouring regions will be of particular interest
to the participants."
19. "In this way, WEU's Central European
partners will be able to acquaint themselves with
the future security and defence policy of the Euro-
pean Union and find new opportunities to co-
operate with the defence component of the Union
and with the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance as these develop."
20. Unlike NACC, which has become the frame-
work for an exchange of information between the
members of NATO and all the countries of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe (including the new states
of Central Asia emerging from the former USSR),
the Forum of Consultation, by turning only to the
countries of Central Europe, gives preference to
political co-operation and, in the last resort, inte-
gration, by associating these countries with the
process of developing the European Union.
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21. This nevertheless remains a long-term pro-
ject even if the adoption of the NAIO partnership
for peace programme may result in the countries
of Central Europe showing greater interest in the
Forum.
22. In fact, the countries of Central Europe are
trying, each in its own way, to integrate, to the
best of their ability, in the structures of the West
which they feel offer them the best guarantees for
their security and development: NATO and the
European Union.
23. Where NATO is concerned, enlargement in
the direction of the countries of Central Europe
has been adjourned in favour of a programme of
contacts and military exchanges (joint
maneuvres, establishment of joint military proce-
dures, transparency of defence budgets, etc.) i.e.
the partnership for peace. While marking a consi-
derable step forward compared with NACC, the
new programme fell short of the expectations of
some countries and in particular the Visegrad
group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and
Slovakia). In addition, the cost of taking part in
partnership activities has to be borne by each
state, which is a handicap for countries experien-
cing economic difficulties.
24. In its approach to the countries of Cenffal
Europe, the European Union elected to follow the
course of association agreements, known as
Europe agreements s. These are agreements for
associating each country in the region with the
European Union, particularly in the economic
field. They include political aspects, however,
which are worthy of attention.
25. The first five articles of each Europe agree-
ment 6 are mainly concerned with political co-
operation in the framework of the association thus
formed.
- 
Article I defines the aims of the associa-
tion as being to create the framework for
the political dialogue between the parties
in order to allow the development of
close political relations [Article I (l)]
and to establish new political and practi-
cal rules capable of forming the basis for
the integration (of the country concerned
by the agreement) with the European
Union [Aticle 1 (4)].
- 
Articles 2,3,4 and 5 concern the political
dialogue:
(a) Article 2 stipulates that the political
component and the economic component
of the agreement are closely linked and
5. The Europe agreements with Hungary and Poland came
into force on lst February 1994. The general and political
provisions are similar in the two texts. Agreement with
Romania is in the process of ratification.
6. For example, the Europe agreement with Hungary.
constitute complemenfary elements of the
association; the purpose of these compo-
nents is to promote mutual understanding
and the rapprochement of positions on
international questions; they will help to
harmonise positions on security matters
and will strengthen security and stability
in Europe [Articles 2 (l),2 and 4].
(b) Artrcle 3 establishes a council of asso-
ciation at ministerial level, which is res-
ponsible for examining all questions the
contracting parties may submit to it
lArticle 3 (2)).
(c) Article 4 concerns the machinery for
the various forms of political dialogue:
contacts at the highest level, between
senior officials, within multilateral autho-
rities (UN, CSCE, for example), through
the exchange of information on European
political co-operation and on the policy of
the country concerned by the agreement,
etc.
(d) Article 5 establishes a parliamentary
committee of association composed of
members of the European Parliament and
of the parliament of the associated coun-
try. This committee is responsible for the
political dialogue between parliaments.
26. Association involves a ten-year transitional
period, divided into two successive parts of five
years. The first part starts on the date of entry into
force of the agreement. Although these agree-
ments do not fix a date for possible accession to
European Union, they pave the way for the deve-
lopment of political contacts on economic ques-
tions and also questions of European common
foreign and security policy (CFSP). The political
provisions of the Europe agreements concord
with the terms of paragraph 6 of the statement
made following the meeting of the WEU Council
of Ministers with countries of Central Europe in
Bonn on 19th June 1992.
27. The NATO summit meeting and the adop-
tion of the partnership for peace programme give
the impression that the sharing out of tasks would
tend to favour the countries of Central Europe.
The European Union handles economic questions
and foreign policy and security matters; NATO
politico-military co-operation in the widest sense';
and WEU, through the Forum of Consultation,
questions of European defence.
28. Due to its dual identity as defence compo-
nent of the European Union and European pillar
7. It should even so be noted that NACC and the partrrership
for peace programme concern all the countries of eenral and
Eastem Europe, including Russia, which inevitably raises pro-
blems with the Baltic countries and those of Central Europe.
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of the alliance, WEU is in a pivotal position bet-
ween the counffies of Central Europe on the one
hand, the European Union and NATO on the
other, the Forum of Consr.r,ltation being the point
of contact between the parties concerned8.
(iil Present position andfuture prospects
29. Two years is too short a time to be able to
pass judgment on the working of the Forum.
Through its work, however, and the decisions
taken by the Council of Ministers in that respect,
abrief review may be made in an attempt to deter-
mine what its future development may be.
30. The first meeting of the Forum of Consulta-
tion between the members of the Permanent
Council of WEU and the heads of diplomatic mis-
sions of the countries of Central Europe in Lon-
don was held in that city on 14th October 1992'.
The communiqu6'0 issued after that meeting was
brief, emphasising that this was the first meeting
of the WEU Forum of Consultation and an
exchange of views was held on questions of com-
mon concern. The information letter on the activi-
ties of the intergovernmental organs of WEU f.or
the period 20th June 
- 
19th November 1992"
refers briefly to the meeting, specifying that the
questions discussed included the development of
the CSCE, the withdrawal of Russian troops from
the Baltic countries and the conflicts in former
Yugoslavia.
31. The second meeting of the Forum was held
in Brussels on 20th April 1993 at ambassadorial
level. This meeting was set in the framework of
preparation for the meeting of the Forum of
Consultation at ministerial level in Rome on 20th
May. According to information provided by the
Council'2, discussions were held on the develop-
ment of relations between WEU and its consulta-
tion partners, the situation in former Yugoslavia
and the questions the ministers might discuss in
Rome.
32. In Rome on 20th May, the first meeting was
held at ministerial level between the enlarged
WEU Council including, in addition to the nine
members, Greece (future member), Iceland, Nor-
way, Turkey (associate members), Denmark and
8. WEU's selective approach to the countries of Central
Europe and the Baltic states alone may in the long run
become more reassuring for them than the NACC frame-
work.
9. London was then the seat of the Secretariat of the Council
before it was transferred to Brussels in 1993.
10. Document 1335, Meeting of the WEU Permanent Coun-
cil at ambassadorial level with colleagues of eight Central
and Eastem European countries, London, 14th October 1992.
I l. Document 1352, Information letter on the activities of the
intergovernmental organs of WEU (20tI June 
- 
19th Novem-
ber 1992), 24th November 1992.
12. Document 1397, First part of the thirty-ninth annual
report of the Council (lst January 
- 
30th June 1993), lzth
November 1993.
Ireland (observers) and the countries of Central
Europe.
33. The ministers decided'3 that the term
"WEU Forum of Consultation" would henceforth
be extended to their annual meetings, the coun-
tries of Central Europe having become "consulta-
tion partners" (paragraph 2).The meeting also
tackled the question of the situation in former
Yugoslavia, questions of joint interest and the
withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic
countries. The communique issued after the meet-
ing gave a few details about the working and aims
of the Forum in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9.
- 
paragraph 7: "... Ministers agreed that the
political dialogue within the Forum of
Consultation should contribute towards
gaining a clearer perception of the r6le of
WEU in the development of the security
and the defence policy of the future Euro-
pean Union and should provide a frame-
work in which security and defence
issues of common concern could be dis-
cussed so as to take account of each
other's views in wider fora without dupli-
cating the co-operation in the Atlantic
framework. The development of WEU's
relations with its consultation partners
would continue to reflect increasingly
close relations between the counffies of
Central Europe and the future European
Union and its member states ..."
-paragraph 8: Ministers decided ... "to
explore and promote the possibilities for
co-operating between WEU and its
consultation partners in particular in the
fields of conflict-prevention, crisis-mana-
gement, peace-keeping and the imple-
mentation of the CSE and the Open Skies
Treaties.
In particular, ministers stressed the value
of an exchange of views on peace-
keeping..."
- 
paragraph 9: ... "Ministers agreed on the
setting up of a Counsellor's Group in
Brussels composed of senior representa-
tives in the delegations of the WEU coun-
tries and the embassy counsellors of the
consultation partners. This group, which
would meet at least three or four times a
year, would hold more detailed
exchanges of view and prepare the
meetings of the Forum of Consultation."
34. On reading these three paragraphs in paral-
lel with later events, a few conclusions may be
13. Document A/WEU/DG (93) 14, Communiqu6 issued by
the Council of Ministers and the Forum of Consultation of
WEU, Rome, 19th and 20th May 1993.
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drawn about the r6le and prospects of the Forum
of Consultation.
35. Paragraph 7 takes up the terms of para-
graphs 5 and 6 of the declaration issued after the
meeting in Bonn on 19th June 1992. The develop-
ment of relations with the consultation partners is
now set unambiguously in the framework of
working out the security and defence policy of the
European Union (one might also add the foreign
policy), for which policy WEU is the operational
body, the decision-making body being the Coun-
cil of Ministers of the European Union'0.
36. The desire to avoid duplicating co-opera-
tion in the Atlantic framework concerned above
all the activities developed in the framework of
NACC. In the details of co-operation with consul-
tation partners (paragraph 8) reference is twice
made however to the maintenance of peace as an
area of special interest whereas in NACC there is
already an active ad hoc group on questions of
peace-keeping ''. Another more recent con-
sequence of this reference to duplication is that
with the adoption of.NATO's partnership for
peace prograrnme, military co-operation with the
countries of Central Europe logically becomes the
task of that organisation, whereas it might be one
of the tasks of WEU's military Planning Cell.
37. By declaring that the development of
WEU's relations with consultation partners is
linked to that of their relations with the European
Union and its members, the ministers seemed to
be establishing a kind of h la carte partnership
depending on the status a given coun0ry has with
the European Union and also in relation to the
national approaches of the WEU member states
towards one or other country of Cenftal Europe.
In practice, that seems to be the case as may be
seen from co-operation in the framework of
supervising the United Nations embargo on for-
mer Yugoslavia and the Franco-German-Polish
proposal of 12th November 1993.
38. Atthe exffaordinary meeting of the Council
of Ministers in Luxembourg on 5th April 1993, it
was decided to afford assistance to Bulgaria, Hun-
gary and Romania for organising customs and
police operations on the Danube in order to
improve enforcement of the United Nations
embargo. Memoranda of understanding were
signed with these states on 20th May 1993 during
14. This evolution, which started with the signing of the
Maastricht Treaty is confrrmed by the Petersberg declaration
which defines WEU as the defence component of the Euro-
pean Union, may raise problems in terms of operational effi-
ciency due to the enlargement of the Union without first
laying down the basic principles of a common foreign, secu-
rity and defence policy.
15. Document 1387, WEU's relations with Central and Eas-
tern European countries, Rapporteur: Mr. Wintgens, Bel-
gium, also drew attention to this aspect ofduplication (para-
graph 6).
the Rome meetings and the operation was started
on 18th June. The mission involves some 240 per-
sonnel from seven WEU member states and seven
patrol boats from three member states'6. The
Forum of Consultation was not involved in the
negotiations although it would have been logical
for co-operation with the Danube states to have
been worked out in that body.
39. On l2th November 1993, the Ministers for
Foreign Affairs of Germany, France and Poland,
meeting in Warsaw, issued a declaration, para-
graph4.2 of which states:
"Given the new framework provided by
ratification of the treaty on European
Union, we hope to see WEU adopt an asso-
ciation status that should be open to the
partners in the consultation that have
already signed an association agreement
with the European Union and, when the
time comes, to those that will have signed
such an agreement. Association status
would make broad participation in WEU
activities possible."
40. This proposal was taken up at the meeting
of the Council of Ministers in Luxembourg on
22nd November 1993: "Ministers requested the
Council to reflect on an enhanced status and its
content, including the Franco-German proposal t'
of 12th November, for those consultation partners
who had already concluded or would conclude a
Europe agreement with the European Union. The
Permanent Council should thus identify ways and
modalities to allow those countries to participate
to a larger extent in the activities of WEU and to
be involved in initiatives and missions as envisa-
ged in the Petersberg declaration."'8.
41. While this initiative seems logical and even
a qualitative step forward in relations with the
countries of Central Europe, it nevertheless gives
the impression that there is a tendency towards ani la carte Forum of Consultation. Indeed, while
the enhanced status may satisfy for the time being
the countries that have signed the Europe agree-
ments (the Visegrad Group plus Bulgaria and
Romania), it may leave outside in the medium
term the Baltic countries that have not yet signed
agreements of the same type but whose security
problems are more acute than those of other
Forum partners. Furthermore, the Prime Minister
of Turkey, Mrs. Tansu Ciller, has already stated
that "If some Eastern European countries are to
16. Document 1402, Communication from the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council, Luxembourg, 23rd November 1993.
17. It is to be noted that the Warsaw declaration was also co-
signed by Poland.
18. Document 1401, Declaration by the WEU Council of
Ministers, I, paragraph 5, Luxembourg, 22nd November
1993.
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gain a status approaching WEU membership ...,
then Turkey's status must be changed."'e.
42. The question of military co-operation is not
mentioned in the texts quoted. Apart from the frame-
work of the partnership for peace, the initiative is
left, for the time being, to the member states of
WEU. Thus, in 1994, the Czech Republic will
take part in joint military exercises with France
and the Netherlands 20. It would be desirable for
the enhanced status in future to include the deve-
lopment of this kind of exercises but in the frame-
work of the activities of the Forum and co-ordina-
ted by the military Planning Cell.
43. The meeting of the Forum of Consultation
at ministerial level in Luxembourg on l0th May
1994 will be devoted mainly to discussion of the
enhanced status and consolidation of the political
and security dialogue with the consultation part-
ners. Qualitative changes and details about the
aims of the Forum are necessary if it is to be able
to play a more active r6le in developing a policy
of stability and security in Europe. Together with
political and security matters, it will be necessary
to integrate in the texts to be adopted a reference
to parliamentary co-operation with the consulta-
tion partners. On defence and security questions,
the WEU Assembly should play an essential r6le
in the framework of parliamentary co-operation in
co-ordination with other European parliamentary
institutions and national parliaments.
III. Parliamentary co-operation with the
countries of the WEU Forum of Consulntion
M. Co-operation with the new parliaments of
Central Europe might seem a secondary issue
when compared to the problems the region is cur-
rently experiencing and which political, economic
and defence co-operation seeks to address with a
greater or lesser degree of success. Nevertheless,
the development of interparliamentary contacts is
an essential component of the dialogue, at every
level, with the Central European countries.
45. Such co-operation can take various forms,
from basic information exchange to ffaining the
staff of parliament secretariats; it may take place
in a bilateral framework between parliaments or
in the wider context of international assemblies
whose members are parliarnentary representatives
of different countries.
46. The links established with the parliaments
of Central Europe contribute to a better perception
of their problems and have the advantage of invol-
ving the various political forces in the counffies of
19. Atlantic News, No. 2589, page 3, 19th January 1994.
20. t e Monde, 26thJaruNy 1994.
the region, both government and opposition, in
the dialogue, which political co-operation bet-
ween states does not always permit. However, in
order to be effective, co-operation with the parlia-
ments of the consultation partners should be more
than a simple exchange of documents, informa-
tion and visits; it should have practical outcomes,
not merely for the parliaments themselves, but
also beyond the parliamentary framework in the
political, economic and defence spheres.
47. The development of links between parlia-
ments facilitates dialogue and exchanges of views
on the problems of the region and on the solutions
that might be envisaged in all of the above areas.
By strengthening parliamentary links, significant
contribution can be made towards enabling the
Central European countries become rooted in a
European environment, for the most part
constructed by the member states of the European
Union and other European institutions. This is a
process of mutual enrichment that can considera-
bly strengthen the stability of the continent and
co-operation at every level.
(il Nafional parliamentary c o-operation
48. The national parliaments, through their
activities directed towards the Central European
countries, are an essential element in the dialogue
with those countries. They also conffibute, by the
development of parliamentary contacts and the
assistance they can contribute in the various areas
of parliamentary life, to political stability and a
stable parliamentary rdgime within the countries
concerned.
49. Their action, as an integral part of the over-
all framework of political dialogue and economic
co-operation, can but encourage the consolidation
of the process of political and economic reform in
Central Europe and, ultimately, the geopolitical
stability of the region.
50. Within the framework of national co-opera-
tion each individual parliament decides on its
priorities in accordance with national interests.
Taking account of these and according to avail-
able means, each parliamentary assembly chooses
the ways best suited to the choices made. The
spectrum of action is wide, ranging from the crea-
tion of parliamentary groups linking one parlia-
ment with another to co-operation between spe-
cialist committees in cases determined by the par-
liaments, through training of administrative staff
and technical and information exchanges.
(a) Germany
51. The relations between the Bundestag and
the parliaments of the Cenffal European countries,
members of the WEU Forum of Consultation, are
of varying orders and revolve around four major
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axes: parliamentary members' groups, student
exchanges, an allowance for parliamentary train-
ing and technical assistance.
52. (i) Parliamentary groups are informal group-
ings of members of parliament which have no for-
mal status or specific internal rules. The fact that
membership is voluntary indicates that they have
a specific interest in relations with the respective
partner states and their parliaments. Members of
the parliamentary groups endeavour to meet as
often as possible with their counterparts from the
Central European countries to consider subjects
and problems of interest to both parties. The
results of these meetings have a useful input into
the legislative process and find concrete expres-
sion in measures adopted by the Federal Govern-
ment. There are parliamentary groups within the
Bundestag for each of the nine countries of the
Forum of Consultation.
53. (ii)ln 1990 the Bundestag launched a pro-
gramme of work placements for students from
Central and Eastern Europe attending German
universities. The aim of the prograrnme, compri-
sing a five-month stay in Bonn, is to provide the
participants with the opportunity of becoming
acquainted with Germany's parliamentary system
and system of government. The participants then
undertake a four-month work placement with
members of parliament, parliamentary groups and
the Bundestag administration. By targeting these
opportunities on young university graduates with
good chances of occupying positions of responsi-
bility during their future careers, the Bundestag is
seeking to strengthen future co-operation in the
parliamentary sector. Polish, Hungarian, Czech
and Slovak students and students from the Baltic
countries have already participated in this pro-
gramme. Bulgaria and Romania will also partici-
pate in the near future.
54. (rrr) Within the framework of its provisions
for parliamentary training, the Bundestag admi-
nistration has set up a training programme for
officials of the parliaments of Central and Eastern
Europe. Senior parliamentary officials visit and
spend time at the Bundestag, familiarising them-
selves with its methods of work and organisation.
There is a regular, reciprocal exchange program-
me for officials from Poland enabling three
people a year each to spend a week in the parlia-
ment of the partner country.
55. (iv) At the request of foreign parliaments,
the Bundestag also provides technical assistance
to a fairly limited extent with the assistance of the
Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs. This techni-
cal assistance basically concerns the supply of
computers and other office equipment, documen-
tation, etc.
(b) Belgium
56. The Belgian Senate and Chamber of Repre-
sentatives have many different types of relations
with their counterparts in Cenffal Europe. From
the early nineties, contacts have developed at
various levels, ranging from parliamentary dele-
gation visits to meetings between government
authorities. Belgian parliamentarians have also
visited Cental European counEies, within the frame-
work of contacts between parliaments, on election
monitoring missions (Romania, 1990) or human
rights monitoring missions (Lithuania).
57. The Senate and the House of Representa-
tives also receive parliamentary officials from
Central Europe who come to familiarise them-
selves with the operations of the various depart-
ments of the Belgian Parliament (a Romanian
official undertook a placement with the Senate,
then with the Chamber in 1992;the Deputy Direc-
tor of the Polish Senate's information department
undertook a placement organised by the Senate in
1e93).
(c) Spain
58. The Spanish Parliament's activities (Senate
and Lower House) in interparliamentary relations
were, like those of other parliaments, of varying
nature and essentially to encourage information
exchange, either by dre provision-of documenta-
tion or through visits by Spanish or Central Euro-
pean parliamentarians. These two-way contacts
enable the Central European parliaments to
become acquainted with the workings of the Spa-
nish Parliament in various fields, ranging from
legislative and legal matters to how parliamentary
services operate, an example being the visit by the
Secretary-General of the Spanish Senate to the
Polish Senate in 1993. Members of the Spanish
Senate and Lower House were also present in an
observer capacity during the elections held in
Romania in 1992.
(d) France
59. The National Assembly and Senate have a
policy of active commitment in the area of parlia-
mentary co-operation with the countries of Cen-
tral Europe, members of the WEU Forum of
Consultation. Within this context, the parliamen-
tary groups put the members of the French Upper
and Lower House in touch with their counterparts
from Cenffal European parliaments, thus playing
a major r6le in co-operation. These contacts
enable better identification of the needs of the
partners and the areas where technical or other
assistance might be useful to them. Through these
contacts, the parliaments of Central Europe can
take advantage ofthe advice and experience ofthe
two houses in fields ranging from the legislative
process to documentary exchange and the running
of the Assembly and the Senate departments.
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60. Contacts at the highest level have taken
place regularly between French parliamentary
delegations and those of the Central European
countries, contributing to establishing a perma-
nent dialogue and exchange ofviews on questions
that fall outside the basic framework of parlia-
mentary co-operation and covering such subjects
as foreign policy, economics and defence. Such
dialogue contributes to understanding positions
on both sides on European questions and has an
undoubted impact on parliamentary debates on
matters concerning central Europe and relation-
ships between the latter and the countries of
WEU. Moreover, the commitment, often on a per-
sonal basis, by French parliamentarians towards
the region 
- 
illustrated by the frequent presence in
former Yugoslavia of members of the French
Upper and Lower Houses or on election monito-
ring missions to Central European countries,
conffibutes to the French Parliament's major and
essential r6le in parliamentary co-operation with
the consultation partners.
(e) haly
61. The Italian Parliament has a three-fold
approach: study visits, interparliamentary co-
operation and the organisation of seminars and meet-
ings in co-operation with other organisations. The
Lower House regularly receives delegations of
parliamentarians and officials from the parlia-
ments of Central Europe, either for contacts of a
general nature or to present a specific topic (par-
liamentary surveys, composition and selection of
delegations to international assemblies or the
working of documentation services, for example).
62. Two groups have been set up within the Ita-
lian section of the Interparliamentary Union to
make contact with the Central European countries
and the former Soviet Republics. These groups
follow the work of the parliaments in those coun-
tries and co-operate with them in various fields
ranging from information exchange on parliamen-
tary business to the organisation of study visits
and raining placements.
63. The Italian Parliament organises seminars
and meetings in co-operation with other organisa-
tions on matters of parliamentary interest. Two
seminars were held in 1993: one, in collaboration
with the European Centre for Parliamentary
Research and Documentation, on parliamentary
archives (March 1993), the other, organised with
the Strasbourg Institute for Democracy, on draf-
ting legislation (September 1 993).
(f) Luxembourg
64. The Luxembourg Parliament's action
towards the Cenfal European parliaments has a
dual focus: co-operation between individual par-
liaments through parliamentary groups, bilateral
contacts, sometimes accompanied by technical
assistance (parliamentary documentation, infor-
mation exchange, etc.) and co-operation in the
framework of the Benelux Interparliamentary
Consultative Council bringing together parlia-
mentarians from Luxembourg, Belgium and the
Netherlands.
65. The aim of this parliamentary institution is
to co-ordinate the work of the parliaments concer-
ned and thus strengthen political co-operation bet-
ween the three states so that they can best advance
their interests within the European Union and
Europe in general. The Council, whose permanent
secretariat is accommodated in the Belgian Parlia-
ment pursues an active policy of contact with the
countries known as the "Visegrad Group" (Hunga-
ry Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republics)
and is keen to promote co-operation between the
Benelux countries as a model for the states of Cen-
tral Europe.
66. Through the Council, Luxembourg has a
wide framework in which to pursue a policy of
active co-operation with the parliaments of the
Central European countries and which opens up
wider possibilities than those afforded merely by
bilateral co-operation. Co-operation between the
Benelux countries ensures a better distribution of
resources and avoids duplication, since each
country provides assistance in the areas in which
it is best qualified to do so. The Luxembourg Par-
liament can thus have a presence in the process of
parliamentary co-operation with the Forum coun-
tries in a much more active and influential way
than if it were to act alone.
(h) The Netherlands
67. The Netherlands Parliament has an active
policy of information contacts with the Central
European parliaments. Exchange visits take place
between Dutch members of parliament and their
counterparts in Central European countries, either
in their capacity as members of their national par-
liaments or in their interparliamentary delega-
tions. Such contacts, which take place on a regu-
lar basis or within the framework of information
exchanges on legislative, statutory and even poli-
tical matters, are an important factor in the deve-
lopment of the dialogue with the parliaments of
the member countries of the Forum of Consulta-
tion. Visits by officials and exchanges of docu-
mentation also take place on a regular basis,
sometimes at the specific request of a Central
European parliament. It should also be noted that
the Netherlands Government finances Dutch poli-
tical parties within the context of developing rela-
tions with their counterparts in Central and Eas-
tern Europe.
(i) Portugal
68. Parliamentary groups for the purpose of
establishing friendly ties between the Assembly
of the Republic of Portugal and Central European
countries are the means of contact between the
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Portuguese Parliament and the parliamentarians
of the Forum countries, enabling both to partici-
pate in various activities involving bilateral or
multilateral parliamentary co-operation. Partici-
pation in the activities of the European institutions
for parliamentary co-operation: WEU Assembly,
Council of Europe, etc. is, for Portuguese parlia-
mentarians, a preferred means of contact with
their Central European counterparts and such ins-
titutions are one of the frameworks best suited to
the definition of areas where the Portuguese Par-
liament can contribute advice and assistance
within the framework of parliamentary co-opera-
tion.
(j) The United Kingdom
69. The British Parliament undertakes various
- activities directed towards the parliaments of
Central and Eastern Europe. In addition to tradi-
tional parliamentary contacts, delegation visits,
meetings at various levels (between individual
parliaments or during interparliamentary assem-
bly sessions), the House of Commons and the
House of Lords, in co-operation with public and
private organisations such as the Know How
Fund, the British Association for Central and Eas-
tern Europe (BACEE), the Westminster Founda-
tion for Democracy and the Future of Europe
Trust, participate in information and training pro-
jects with the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe.
70. In 1993, the House of Commons welcomed
parliamentarians from various countries belong-
ing to the Forum of Consultation. In their turn,
British parliamentarians and officials of the
House of Commons participated, with fifty
Romanian parliamentarians, in a seminar on the
subject of parliamentary procedure held in Bucha-
rest. British parliamentarians also visited Bulgaria
(the chairman of the committee dealing with rules
of parliamentary procedure) and Slovakia.
7I. The House of Lords participates in such
activities together with the House of Commons
and officials of the House have established infor-
mal contacts with their counterparts in Central
European parliaments on various matters of com-
mon interest, such as the organisation of the work
of the parliamentary committees. The Hungarian
and Polish Parliaments have, for example, reques-
ted information on the work of the House of Lords
committee on the European Community with a
view to their participation, in an observer capa-
city, in the conference of parliamentary commit-
tees on European Affairs.
( if M akilate ral c o -op e ratio n
72. Five multilateral parliamentary institutions
coexist in Europe, each with their respective
spheres of action. In general terms they comple-
ment each other even if the legal texts which
define their areas of activity allocate them specific
areas of responsibility.
73. Three of these assemblies are of an essen-
tially European character: the WEU Assembly,
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe and the European Parliament; the North
Atlantic Assembly 2r and the parliamentary
Assembly of the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE), on the one hand, are
Euro-Atlantic institutions 22. Of these, the WEU
Assembly alone has an area of responsibility for
defence and security matters based on texts that
are legally binding23.
74. These institutions, despite a certain overlap
in their responsibilities, in general terms act
within more or less well-defined frameworks in
terms of their relations with the Central European
countries. However, their means are not always
proportionate to the extent of their responsibili-
ties, which does not permit a co-ordinated
approach towards the Central European countries.
This lack of co-ordination, and the fact that they
are at times in competition, makes setting up
effective parliamentary co-operation on a Euro-
pean scale more difficult and piecemeal and hin-
ders the integration of these countries into exis-
ting European structures, because of the large
number of these institutions and the lack of co-
ordination between them.
(a) The WEU Assembly
75. The policy and activities of the WEU
Assembly in the field of co-operation with the
partners of consultation were the subject of a pre-
vious report by this committee2'.
76. Since that time, the Assembly has pursued
its policy of contacts with the consultation part-
ners both at parliamentary and governmlnt level:
thus Mr. Aleksandrov, Minister of Defence for
Bulgaria, attended the November-December 1993
Assembly session. The Assembly also invited Mr.
Zler*o,Minister forForeign Affairs of Ukraine, a
country which is not part of the Forum of Consul-
tation but whose political development is crucial
for the security and stability of the whole of Cen-
tral Europe.
77. As to parliamentary activity, the Standing
Committee of the Assembly held a meeting on
2nd December 1993 with representatives of the
21. The North Atlantic Assembly is an independent parlia-
mentary body without official links with NATO.
22.The parliamentary Assembly of the CSCE established by
the Madrid Conference on 2nd and 3rd April l99l also
includes the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia.
23. Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty of 23rd Octo-
ber 1954 and Article I of the Charter of the WEU Assembly.
24.T\e development of relations between the WEU Assem-
bly and the parliaments of Central European countries, Docu-
ment 1365, Rapporteur: Mr. Kempinaire.
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parliaments of the countries of the Forum of
Consultation, who had been invited in an observer
capacity to attend the debates of the thirty-ninth
Assembly session. This meeting allowed the
consultation partners to express their views on
security and defence problems in Europe and also
on developing co-operation with the Assembly.
78. In early 1994, the Presidential Committee
of the Assembly was involved in the work of the
symposium organised on 1lth and lZth February
1994by the Polish Sejm (parliament) on: "WE[J's
point of view on the security of the countries of
Cenffal and Eastern Europe". Moreover, as in pre-
vious years, the committees of the Assembly have
pursued their contacts with the consultation part-
ners at various levels (visits by rapporteurs and
committees, invitations to government officials to
present their policies to the Assembly).
79. The Central European parliaments also
expressed their interest in co-operating more
closely with the Assembly, through participation
in symposia, exchanges of parliamentary docu-
mentation or, in the case of Romania, by opening
an information office on WEU in collaboration
with the Assembly. These initiatives and activities
constitute a two-way relationship between the
Assembly and the Central European parliaments
and the government authorities of the Forum
countries.
80. The fact remains, however, that the Assem-
bly's relations with the consultation partners are
restricted by the meagrc resources available to the
Assembly for developing regular activities with
the Central European countries. Despite assu-
rances in the communiquds from the Council of
Ministers on the r6le of the Assembly in the pro-
cess of dialogue with the Cenffal European coun-
tries, the latter continues to manage such activities
with resources that are far from commensurate
with requirements25. This can only limit its r6le in
the framework of parliamentary co-operation with
the consultation partners and frequently means
that joint action with other European parliamenta-
ry institutions directed towards the Central and
Eastern European countries is conducted on a
piecemeal basis.
(b) The European Parliament
81. The European Parliament's activity in the
field of co-operation with parliaments, and states,
of Central and Eastern Europe is substantial and
wide-ranging. As a consultative rather than a
controlling institution of the European Union, it
would appear to be the preferred contact for Cen-
25. The granting of an enhanced status to the Central Euro-
pean countries, members of the Forum of Consultation will
imply, in terms of day-to-day management, increased pres-
sure on the logistical requirements of the Assembly. This in
turn will necessitate an increase in the latter's resources
which the Council has not agreed to date.
tral European countries seeking to strengthen
their relations with the Union and aspiring to
accession'u.
82. By vinue of its status as an institution of the
European Union and the means available to it,
both in terms of its competences and resources,
the European Parliament is present at various
levels of co-operation between the Union and the
Central European states, in relation to co-opera-
tion both with states and parliaments. Moreover,
the opinions it provides on financial matters,
especially on aid programmes to the states of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe such as PHARE (original-
ly directed towards Poland and Hungary and sub-
sequently extended to other states in the region)
and TACIS (concerning the states of the former
Soviet Union), contribute to its r6le as an essential
partner in co-operation with the Forum states.
83. Since the enffy into force of the Maastricht
Treaty on lst November 1993, the European Par-
liament has been strengthened in its efforts to play
a more active role in the development of the com-
mon foreign and security policy of the Union
(CFSP). The Maastricht Treaty, Title V Article
J.7 (provisions relating to a common foreign and
security policy) provides that:
" The Presidency [of the Union] shall
consult the European Parliament on the
main aspects and the basic choices of the
common foreign and security policy and
shall ensure that the views of the European
Parliament are duly taken into considera-
tion. The European Parliament shall be
kept regularly informed by the Presidency
and the Commission of the development of
the Union's foreign and security policy."
84. Moreover, regarding co-operation with the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the
Europe agreements linking the Union with certain
Forum countries (described in the first part of the
report) contain a parliamentary co-operation
dimension by creating parliamentary association
committees bringing together members of the
European Parliament and the parliaments of the
signatory countries. Parliamentary co-operation,
thus institutionalised and on a basis binding in
law, gives the European Parliament a capacity to
act that is denied to other parliamentary institu-
tions co-operating on a more or less informal
basis and without the resources the Parliament has
at its disposal.
85. The European Parliament, unlike the WEU
Assembly, has no competency in defence matters
and has for some years been seeking to acquire
the means of acting in this area through the activi-
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ties of its Foreign Affairs and Security Committee
and was not slow initially to advocate rapproche-
ment with the WEU Assembly 
- 
an idea already
expressed in the declaration of WEU member
countries on the rdle of WEU and on its relations
with the European Union and the Atlantic Alli-
ance annexed to the Maastricht Treaty and subse-
quently the absorption, pure and simple, of the
Assembly by the European Parliament with trans-
fer of responsibilities. This position was reiterated
in a resolution of the European Parliament on the
future of relations between the European Union,
WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, adopted on24th
February 1994.
86. In assuming this position, which prejudges
the results of the intergovernmental conferences
in 1996 on the European Union and any decisions
to be taken on revision of the modified Brussels
Treaty in 1998, the European Parliament is
making collaboration difficult between the two
institutions (WEU Assembly and European Par-
liament), and furthermore contributing to frag-
menting the effort and resources necessary for
effective parliamentary co-operation with the
Central European countries members of the
Forum of Consultation.
(c) The Parliamentary Assembly of the Coun-
cil of Europe
87. The pan-European interparliamentary co-
operation programme with Central and Eastern
European parliaments2T run by the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe comprises two
complementary aspects: information and raining
and co-operation in the field of legislation.
I nformntion and trainin g
88. With the aim of facilitating the integration
of the delegations of Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries into the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe, the Assembly organises
seminars on the structure and activities of the
Council of Europe and the Assembly for the bene-
fit of these countries. These seminars, which take
place regularly (four or five times a year) bring
together representatives (parliamentarians and
officials) from the various Central and Eastern
European countries (in groups ranging in size
from several dozen to only a few people) to dis-
cuss questions of common interest in the econo-
mic and social fields and on human rights. They
normally close with participation at an Assembly
sessron.
89. Since 1993, in addition to general training
activities, the Assembly of the Council of Europe
has devised and funded more specific projects
through the development of ad hoc prograrnmes,
27. All the members of the WEU Forum of Consultation
excepting Latvia, which still has special guest status, are full
members of the Council of Europe.
in collaboration with member and beneficiary
countries. These training prograrnmes enable par-
liamentarians and officals frotr the parliaments of
Central and Eastern Europe to familiarise them-
selves with particular aspects of the work and run-
ning of the parliaments of the member countries
of the Council of Europe such as, for example,
parliamentary rules or computerisation of parlia-
mentary services.
I nt e rp arliame ntary c o - o p e ration in the le g i s lativ e
field
90. In this field the Assembly has set up bilate-
ral and multilateral projects:
- 
The first are run at the express demand of
the beneficiary countries. Such projects
might, for example, deal with drafting
internal parliamentary rules and will
involve participation of officials of the
Office of the Clerk of the Assembly,
assisted by those of the member parlia-
ments of the member countries. Some-
times, depending on the area in question,
the Assembly will draw upon the services
of national experts.
- 
Multilateral co-operation projects are in
the form of specialised symposia. The
Assembly identifies in advance subject
areas that might be of interest to the par-
liaments of the countries of Cenfal and
Eastern Europe and organises specialised
symposia at which parliamentarians and
experts present the basic principles of the
legislation of the member countries in
one or other given fields (environment,
social policy, public service, etc.). The
discussions and exchanges of view that
take place thus contribute to facilitate the
integration of the parliaments of the
countries concerned into the structures of
Western Europe.
(d) The North Atlantic Assembly
91. The North Atlantic Assembly, the indepen-
dent parliamentary body of NAIO, began to form
relations with the Central European countries as
soon as democratically-elected parliaments emer-
ged within them. Initially, these contacts took a
variety of different forms: visits by Assembly
sub-committees to Central and Eastern Europe,
participation of delegations of observers from
these countries at Assembly meetings and organi-
sation of seminars on security and defence.
92. These relations were pursued on a more
formal level during the plenary session of the
Assembly in London, in November 1990, when
parliaments from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary, Poland and the USSR were granted associ-
ate delegate status. In April and October 1991,
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Romania, then the three Baltic countries, were
awarded the same status.
93. In October 1991, during the thirty-seventh
annual meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly it
was decided to concentrate an important part of
the latter's resources on assistance for the deve-
lopment of parliamentary democracies in the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, within
the framework of an initiative supported by Char-
lie Rose, a member of the American Congress and
the then Chairman of the Assembly, and by Ame-
rican Senator Bill Roth. The Rose-Roth initiative
is today the major component of the Assembly's
strategy within the framework of co-operation
with the parliaments of Central and Eastern
Europe.
94. The Rose-Roth initiative was accompanied
by a major four-fold effort by the Assembly: faci-
litating participation by parliamentarians of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe in the work of the Assem-
bly, organising seminars on specific subjects, tem-
porary recruitment of nationals of Central and
Eastern Europe to train them in parliamentary
business and development, of a North Atlantic
Assembly prograrnme of study bursaries. Owing
to the lack of financial resources in the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe, the Assembly
undertook to provide financial assistance for a
limited period.
95. In launching such an extensive programme
of activities, the North Atlantic Assembly
demonstrated that it had a coherent strategy
towards the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, designed to achieve specific objectives:
providing a model for the future development of
official ties between Central European and NATO
countries; supplementing existing intergovern-
mental co-operation and aiding the countries
concerned to develop democratic parliamentary
structures. Moreover, the fact that this Assembly
was identified with NATO in the eyes of the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe, and the pre-
sence there of members of United States Congress
are major assets contributing to the success of the
parliamentary co-operation projects.
96. There is little co-ordination between the
North Atlantic Assembly and the WEU Assem-
bly, concerned as both are with defence and secu-
rity problems, within the framework of parlia-
mentary co-operation with the countries of the
Forum of Consultation. The chronic lack of
resources which prevents the WEU Assembly
from launching initiatives on the same scale as its
Atlantic counterpart is part of the reason for this,
however, the absence of a European parliamen-
tary pillar within the North Atlantic Assembly
that would express WEU's point of view is also to
be regretted. This absence is due in part to the fact
that the membership of the national delegations to
the two assemblies overlaps very little. Ultimate-
ly, it is the very effectiveness of the action in
favour of the partners of the Forum that suffers
most because of duplication and the lack of co-
operation between the institutions concerned.
(e) The Parliamentary Assembly of the CSCE
97. The most recent of Europe's parliamentary
institutions was created at a meeting of the parlia-
mentary delegations participating in the CSCE
held in Madrid onZnd and 3rd April 1991. The
CSCE Assembly held its first plenary session in
Budapest, on 3rd July 1992. The Bureau of the
Assembly is located in Copenhagen, Denmark,
and the annual meetings, lasting up to five days,
are held in the capitals or other towns of the mem-
ber countries.
98. The organs of the Assembly 28, which is
made up of 312 parliamentarians, are the Presi-
dent, the Bureau, the Permanent Committee, the
committees and the Plenary Assembly. The Presi-
dent, who is elected for a year, directs the work of
the Assembly, the Bureau and the Permanent
Committee.
99. The Bureau is made up of the President,
nine Vice-Presidents and the Treasurer. It is res-
ponsible for implementing decisions of the Per-
manent Committee and ensuring the smooth run-
ning of the Assembly between Permanent Com-
mittee meetings.
100. The Permanent Committee prepares the
work of the Assembly between sessions. It may
adopt resolutions on urgent political matters and
forward them to the Council of Ministers of the
CSCE. The committee fixes the dates, duration
and place of the annual sessions and draws up the
agenda. It ratifies appointments to committees
and may appoint ad hoc committees. The commit-
tee also approves the budget and appoints the
director and two assistant directors of the secreta-
riat of the Assembly.
101. There are three committees:
- 
Political Affairs and Security;
- 
Economic Affairs, Science, Technology
and Environment;
- 
Democracy, Human Rights and Humani-
tarian Questions.
lO2. The plenary Assembly meets during the
ordinary session held, over no more than five
days, during the first ten days of July. It deals with
questions put to the Council of Ministers of the
CSCE, consideration of motions tabled by mem-
28. S6nat (France) Rapport d'information no.275: Les acti-
vit6s de I'Assembl6e parlementaire de la CSCE (I); Rdgle-
ment de I'Assembl6e parlementaire de la CSCE (II); rappor-
teur: M. Jacques Genton, s6nateur; 22 avril1993.
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bers of the Assembly, discussion of and voting on
the conclusions of committee reports.
103. Although in 1991, the creation of the par-
liamentary Assembly of the CSCE was a logical
step, given the political context in Europe (since
political and military structures in Central and
Eastern Europe had disappeared, it appeared
necessary to create sffuctures to accommodate the
new democracies of the continent), one might
well ask today what specific r6le it has alongside
other existing parliamentary structures.
104. The problems of ddmocracy, human rights,
and social and cultural policy are the responsibi-
lity of the Assembly of the Council of Europe,
those of security and defence are still the respon-
sibility of the WEU and North Atlantic Assem-
blies. Moreover, the scarce resources available to
the CSCE Assembly are insufficient to enable the
latter to play a significant r6le in parliamentary
co-operation with the countries of Central and
Eastem Europe. Nevertheless, it offers tlrem a frame-
work for discussion and contacts that is wider
than that of the abovementioned institutions, if
only on account of the fact that it brings together
parliamentarians from 53 countries, including the
United States and Canada. In this way, it too
brings a modest contribution to co-operation with
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
IV Conclusion
105. Central Europe is today going through a
period of radical transformation at every level:
economic, social, political and defence. In spite of
difficulties and national peculiarities, notions of
democracy, respect for human rights and the law
are an integral part of the political scene in the
region and conffibute to reinforcing stability and
security in this part of Europe more effectively
than the number of military divisions or the
"security guarantees" that these countries might
obtain from European and transatlantic defence
organisations.
106. At the same time, the political gains of
recent years are not yet sufficiently consolidated
to guarantee, in themselves, the smooth progress
of the new democracies towards stability and
prosperity. Economic problems, ethnic issues, the
persistance of a nineteenth century nationalism at
the dawn of the twenty-first century and border
insecurity are major obstacles to the reform pro-
cess, but are not, however, insurmountable. Co-
operation with other states, with regional organi-
sations and between parliaments, is not the only
remedy to the ills of the region, but it is absolu-
tely necessary to overcome present difficulties.
lO7. Parliamentary co-operation, both natio-
nal or multilateral with the Forum countries,
contributes, albeit to a modest extent, to conso-
lidating democracy in the region and integra-
ting these countries into European regional
structures. In a world where countries are
increasingly interdependent, the security and
stability of the WEU countries are closely lin-
ked with those of the Central European coun-
tries and this observation justifies the efforts
that have already been made and which remain
to be made in the area of parliamentary and
government co-operation with the partners of
the Forum of Consultation. The foundations of
democracy and the market economy must be
consolidated and conditions created for full
integration of these countries into existing
structures of European co-operation.
108. A multilateral approach is, for the Forum
countries, a welcome opportunity for participa-
ting in the work of Atlantic and European politi-
cal and parliamentary institutions. The WEU
Assembly, the Council of Europe and the Euro-
pean Parliament are bringing the countries of
Central Europe closer to the European Union
and WEU; the North Atlantic Assembly and the
parliamentary Assembly of the CSCE enable
them to have contact with NATO and the United
States. However here again, individual institu-
tions act without consulting each other and it is
no easy matter to try and remedy the lack of co-
ordination and collaboration in the definition of
objectives and to ensure an appropriate division
of tasks between parliamentary assemblies. The
result is a fragmentation of effort and resources
and at times competition (a particular country
will give more priority to contacts with the WEU
Assembly, another to those with the Council of
Europe and so forth).
109. The WEU Assembly has a major r6le to play
in co-operation with the Forumcountries in the field
of parliamentary discussion on defence and security
in Europe. Its competences in this area are explicitly
laid down in the modified Brussels Treaty, which is
not the case for other parliamenary institutions of a
purely unofficial nature or which seek to encroach,
despite their lack of qualifications, on its sphere of
action. However, in order to act effectively, the
Assembly should have a better defined brief in mat-
ters of co-operation, should be associated in the
clearest way possible with the Forum activities and
should have available to it appropriate means for
supporting, in co-operation with the Council, the
integration of partner countries into twenty-
frst century Europe. European parliamentary co-
operation in defence and security matters will then
have a proper and authoritative framework that will
contribute effectively to maintaining peace and
stability in Cenral Europe and beyond.
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Draft Recommendation
on an operatianal organisation for WEU:
naval and mtrilime co-operation
The Assembly,
(i) Convinced of the importance of a WEU capacity to carry out naval and maritime operations, given
the fragile nature of international relations in many parts of the world where European interests may be at
stake;
(ii) Pleased that, as forecast, the NATO summit meeting on 10th January 1994 confrmed WEU's position
as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and formally recognised the European defence identity;
(iii) Regretting therefore that the North Atlantic Council should choose now to downgrade the single
major NATO commander's post occupied by a European and effectively abolish the Channel Command
which, created by the Western Union, antedates NAIO;
(iv) Welcoming the willingness of the WEU Council to establish pragmatic arrangements for current
naval, maritime and riverine operations;
(v) Recalling previous recommendations of the WEU Assembly to:
- 
"...create a European standing naval force with organic naval aviation including air defence, air-
borne early warning, attack, anti-submarine and heliborne assault assets for deployment under
single command and unified conffol to areas outside the NATO theatre where Western Europe's
security interests are at stake in emergency or war;" (1988);
- 
"...give practical expression to the European pillar of defence:
(a) etcourage more multinational units such as the United Kingdom-Netherlands landing force
and the Franco-German brigade;
(b) take specific action to allow at an individual level the exchange of military personnel bet-
ween countries to enhance their awareness of European co-operation, give them greater
opportunity for travel and a more interesting work environment, and serve as a useful
recruiting incentive at a time when the demographic levels are making recruiting most
difficult;" (1989);
- 
"...examine for the longer term the idea of creating a WEU naval on-call force for external ope-
rations, together with a possible pooling of appropriate national air mobile assets into a European
rapid action force;" (1990);
- 
"Establish in co-operation with the United Nations and especially with the relevant Gulf states, a
WEU maritime presence in the Gulf area in accordance with Article VIII of the modified
Brussels Treaty with as many member countries as possible contributing assets at least on an
occasional basis, to help maintain peace and stability in the region and support diplomatic efforts
directed towards the same ends;" (1991);
- 
"Design a symbol of specific European identity to rqpresent WEU and urge member countries to
use it to distinguish their military forces 
- 
ships, aircraft, vehicles and personnel 
- 
taking part in
WEU operations. Personnel serving in the Planning Cell should be among the first recipients of
such a badge." (1992);
- 
"Re-examine the respective tasks and r6les of the United States and its European allies in the
maintenance of peace and security on the European continent and take the appropriate measures
to ensure that under no circumstances will it be possible for a security vacuum to develop for lack
of appropriate preparation, co-operation and co-ordination;" ( 1993),
RBcouvrexos rHAT THE CoUNCIL
1. Actively encourage member states to maintain and develop naval and maritime assets, co-ordina-
ting national capabilities in line with a defined WEU naval and maritime policy and ensuring compatibi-
lity with NAIO's naval doctrine wherever possible;
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2. Establish a working relationship on maritime mafters with the European Commission's Directorate
for Maritime Transport and develop links with appropriate international maritime agencies such as the
International Maritime Organisation and the International Hydrographic Organisation as well as with
maritime-orientated non-member countries in strategic areas;
3. Consult the North fulantic Council to review the abolition of the Channel Command so that the
European dimension in the new NATO command sffucture is not neglected 
- 
establishing WEU liaison
teams with NATO major and major subordinate commanders is a possible initial solution;
4. Consider the expansion of the Channel Committee to include all WEU full and associate members
from the Atlantic seaboard and also the establishment of a "Mediterranean Committee" to encompass all
Mediterranean full and associate members;
5. Give, via the WEU Chiefs of Defence StaffCommittee, the Heads of European Navies forum a for-
mal status and a specific mandate to contribute to the development of a WEU naval and maritime policy
in conjunction with the Planning Cell;
6. Staffthe Planning Cell with adequate numbers and levels of naval personnel, including marines and
representatives of the other maritime services as required to develop forthwith co-operation in the
following areas:
- 
joint task force planning;
- 
command and confrol for naval operations (including naval intelligence gathering);
- 
logistics (including ffansport by sea);
- 
merchant ship construction and specialist requirements for both numbers and types of merchant
ship as well as safeguards for recruiting and training appropriate crews;
- 
policy for the effective employment of both naval and merchant marine reserves;
- 
a coherent naval exercise policy and programme;
7 . Give priority to practical aspects of aero-maritime and amphibious co-operation such as the need to
co-ordinate the operational availability of at least one ca:rier amongst appropriate member nations and to
maintaining and furthering amphibious capabilities as a component part of a European rapid action force;
8. Encourage the co-ordination of operations, using existing naval assets, especially in the Caribbean
and notably with the United States authorities, to combat the drug frafficking which undermines European
security;
9. Seek to develop co-operation in the domain of naval procurement 
- 
hulls as well as systems 
-
through the Western European Armaments Group and emphasise the naval and maritime dimension of
satellite observation when developing WEU's Torrej6n Satellite Cenffe and the WEU Earth Observation
Satellite programme;
10. Create and award, in conjunction with national authorities, a WEU campaign medal to those who
participate in operations under the aegis of WEU.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Sir Keith Spee$ Rapporteur)
I. WEU experience of naval
and maritime co- operation
1. Those who have been following develop-
ments in Western European Union during the last
six years will have been struck by the fact that
much of the co-operation has been naval- and
maritime-based. Even before the "official end" of
the cold war the focus of interest was shifting
from the balance of forces on the central front
which had occupied the attention of the previous
generation. With the first WEU modified Brussels
Treaty "Article VIII" operations during the han-
Iraq conflict a new era was born as the European
allies began to recognise the possibilities for
concerted action beyond traditional areas.
2. An examination of a series of reports ema-
nating from the WEU Assembly's Defence
Committee during the period bears witness to the
evolution:
- 
Naval aviation, Document 1139, 9th
May 1988, Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson;
- 
State of European security 
- 
intervention
forces and reinforcement for the centre
and the north, Document ll83,26th
April 1989, Rapporteur: Mr. Speed;
- 
Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait:
operations in the Gulf, Document 1243,
20th October 1990, Rapporteur: Mr. De
Hoop Scheffer;
- 
Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait:
continuing operations in the Gulf region,
Document 1248,7th November 1990,
Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop Scheffer;
- 
The Gulf crisis 
- 
lessons for Western
European Union, Document 1268, l3th
May 1991, Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop
Scheffer;
- 
Operational arrangements for WEU 
- 
the
Yugoslav crisis, Document 1294, 27th
November 1991, Rapporteur: Mr. De
Hoop Scheffer;
- 
WEU: the operational organisation,
Document 1307, l3th May 1992,
Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith;
- 
Application of United Nations
Resolution 757, Document l3l9,2nd
June 1992, Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop
Scheffer;
- 
WEU and the situation in former
Yugoslavia, Document 1329, 3rd
September 1992, Rapporteur: Mr.
Marten;
- 
WEU's operational organisation and the
Yugoslav crisis, Document 1337, sth
November 1992, Rapporteur: Mr.
Marten;
- 
United Nations operations 
- 
interaction
with WEU, Document 1366, 19th May
1993, Rapporteur: Mrs. Baarveld-
Schlaman;
- 
WEU initiatives on the Danube and in
the Adriatic 
- 
reply to the thirty-eighth
annual report of the Council, Document
1367, lsth June 1993, Rapporteur: Mr.
Marten;
- 
Lessons drawn from the Yugoslav
conflict, Document 1395, 9th November
1993, Rapporteur: Sir Russell Johnston;
- 
An operational organisation for WEU:
naval co-operation 
- 
Part One: Adriatic
operations, Document 1396, 9th
November 1993, Co-Rapporteurs: Mr.
Marten and Sir Keith Speed.
3. The introduction to this last report read:
"In the course of their fact-finding in prepa-
ration for the presentation of the report on
an operational organisation for WEU 
-
naval co-operation, your Rapporteurs have
discovered such ramifications to the sub-ject, with many more fundamental prin-
ciples at stake than were initially apparent,
that they have decided to present the report
in two parts rather than seek to postpone
discussion to a future session.
Certain aspects of the specific naval opera-
tions in the Adriatic require immediate
attention and therefore this first part deals
with the maritime task in hand. Part Two
will deal with the wider issues involved and
elaborate further on the structures and links
required for the future conduct by WEU of
naval operations in general."
The present report is indeed the "Part Two" men-
tioned above but your Rapporteur has proposed
the following title for it which more accurately
preconises the content: an operational organisa-
tion for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation.
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4. The subject is of particular relevance of
course at the moment, given operations under way
and there has been much outside interest in what
WEU is doing. Recently the current situation
regarding WEU was admirably outlined in the
remarks on "Naval co-operation in WEU" prepa-
red for delivery by the Secretary-General at the
Greenwich Forum Twentieth Anniversary
Conference at the Royal Naval College
Greenwich on 9th February 1994:
"In global geopolitics, the seas and oceans
play a decisive r6le given that they cover
TlVo of the world's surface. This explains
the unique r6le of navies in crisis manage-
ment, monitoring maritime ffaffic and the
environment, checking the implementation
of the United Nations resolutions and even
peace-keeping.
Compared with armies and air forces,
navies provide those states which have
them with a considerable deterrent, attack
and retaliation capability, which, in the case
of the great powers, may extend to the enti-
re planet if they are able to provide a mini-
mum number of shore-based maintenance
and support facilities.
Whereas the end of the cold war may well
bring a reduction in sea-based deterrent
weapons (nuclear submarines equipped
with inter-continental missiles), it is pro-
bable that greater attention will be paid to
air maritime forces for these offer the most
flexible and most effective means of inter-
vention in regional conflicts. This is one of
the lessons to be drawn from the Gulf war.
Not only has naval warfare become air- and
sea-based, but by using aircraft from air-
craft carriers, it is possible to penetrate both
land and sea areas which, centuries ago,
represented almost entirely separate
theatres of operation.
That said, for the medium-sized powers
and to some extent for the major ones, the
cut in military spending has made it impos-
sible to maintain both a modern and effecti-
ve coastal and ocean-going conventional
fleet and the increasingly debatable major
prestige programmes. No longer able to
equip themselves with the full range of
assets befitting a major maritime power,
these countries are tending to integrate
themselves into western sfrategic systems
under American command in which they
are no more than "subcontractors" offering
on an ad hoc basis one or other particular
key asset which less well-equipped coun-
tries do not possess.
This development demonstrates the impor-
tance of strengthening European co-opera-
tion on defence. Taken individually, WEU
member states no longer have the financial
capability to acquire all the necessary
assets for deterrence within the European
continent or for force projection outside
Europe. The urgent need for co-operation 
-
the only way of coping with the steady
shrinkage in national defence budgets 
- 
is
already apparent in the fields of space, sffa-
tegic air and maritime transport, logistics
outside Europe and telecommunications.
There are three areas where WEU is fur-
thering co-operation with an impact on
maritime defence and on successful mis-
sions already carried out by WEU maritime
assets:
- 
WEU maritime action in two Gulf
wars;
- 
the WEUAIAIO operation in the
Adriatic (Sharp Guard);
- 
the WEU maritime operation plan
for the use of maritime forces
answerable to WEU (codenamed
Combined Endeavour).
Maritime action in two Gulf wars (1987-
1991)
WEU has particular responsibilities under
the modified Brussels Treaty for the
defence of its member states' interests
throughout the world.
Article VIII, paragraph 3 of the ffeaty does
not restrict WEU's competence outside
Europe:
"At the request of any of the high
conffacting parties the Council shall
be immediately convened in order to
permit them to consult with regard to
any situation which may constitute a
threat to peace, in whatever area this
threat should arise, or a danger to
economic stability."
There is no such thing as a "WEIJ area"
although Article V guarantees a military
response in the event of an "armed attack in
Europe"; the term "out-of-Europe" is
appropriate for WEU, since the term "out-
of-area" does not have the same meaning as
when it is used in the context of the North
Atlantic Treaty.
ln 1987, the laying of mines in the Gulf
waters as a result of the Iran-Iraq war, led
WEU member states to react to the threat it
posed to freedom of navigation.
Italy and the Netherlands, followed by
Belgium, decided therefore to contribute to
strengthening the naval presence that
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France and the United Kingdom were
already providing in the region by dispat-
ching minesweepers.
Operations ended with a mine-clearance
action codenamed Cleansweep, which
helped to complete clearance of a 300-mile
sea lane from the Strait of Hormuz in 1988.
European countries deployed most of the
forces assigned to the protection of the sea
lanes, a practical illustration of "burden-
sharing" that was fully appreciated by the
United States. The experience gained from
these activities in the Gulf strengthened
Europe's potential for concerted action in
the future. The undeniable success of the
operations in the Gulf heightened
Europeans' awareness of their capability
for joint action.
Three years later, Iraq's overnight invasion
of Kuwait had the effect of throwing new
light on the conceptual debate on the organ-
isation of European security and of putting
to the test its member states' reaction capa-
bility and the organisation's operational
potential on the basis of the reactivation
and extension of the co-ordination mecha-
nisms approved by the WEU Nine during
the first Gulf crisis.
From the outset, the United States showed
great interest in co-ordinating naval deploy-
ments in the Middle East in co-operation
with WEU, the basis for which was the suc-
cess of the 1987-1988 WEU operations.
Meeting in Paris on 21st August 1990,
WEU Ministers decided to co-ordinate
their operations in the area with the aim of
implementing and enforcing Resolution
661 of the United Nations Security
Council, as well as any further measures
the Security Council might adopt.
Ministers emphasised that co-ordination
within WEU should also facilitate co-ope-
ration with other countries' forces in the
region, including those of the United
States.
The crisis was the occasion for offers of
mutual support but, in the absence of a
WEU staff headquarters, or an experienced
planning unit, few practical decisions
emerged. WEU's action evolved step by
step, and the d6nouement of the crisis came
too quickly to allow time to explore or put
into practice a division of labour that might
serve as the foundation for institutionalised
multinational co-operation. The require-
ment for speed in reacting to events 
- 
a
need highlighted by the Gulf crisis 
- 
is,
however, a strong argument in favour of
appropriate permanent structures.
The Gulf crisis provided a timely incentive
for WEU member states to develop joint
planning and consider establishing joint
capabilities. With the pressure of dwindling
defence budgets, a genuine division of
labour among Europeans is the only way to
combine greater effectiveness and interope-
rability with the economies of scale and
cost made possible by standardisation.
Sharp Guard
A second major WEU maritime operation,
stemming from a WEU initiative taken in
the margins of the 1992 Helsinki CSCE
meeting, was launched in July 1992: forces
operating under WEU and NATO and
working in strict co-ordination, began
monitoring the compliance of resolutions
of the United Nations Security Council
against former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic
(Operations Maritime Monitor and Sharp
Vigilance). On 22nd November 1992 both
operations were amplified in scope to
include the enforcement of relevant United
Nations resolutions and became operations
Maritime Guard and Sharp Fence.
On 8th June 1993, the Councils of WEU
and NATO met to approve a combined
concept of operations for the implementa-
tion of Security Council Resolution 820.
This agreement established a unified com-
mand under the codename Sharp Guard,
over which the WEU and NAIO Councils
exert joint political control. Their guide-
lines are translated into military instruc-
tions through the appropriate bodies of the
two organisations, co-operating within ajoint ad hoc headquarters, MILCOM
ADRIAIIC. The concern for the effective-
ness and flexibility of procedures should
reassure all those who complained of dupli-
cation between the alliance and its
European pillar.
The combined operation began on 15th
June 1993 with the mission to conduct ope-
rations to monitor and enforce compliance
with United Nations sanctions in accor-
dance with United Nations Security
Council Resolutions (LJNSCR) 7 13, 757,
787 and 820. The overall operational
control was delegated to an Italian
Admiral, whose mission was to prevent all
unauthorised shipping from entering the
territorial waters of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
At present 12 nations are contributing
forces: 19 vessels are participating and up
to 12 000 sailors are at sea or on shore in
the area.
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In practical terms the WEU naval element
has been absorbed into the COMNAV-
SOUTH process for decision-making, plan-
ning, etc., and there can be no quarrel with
the result: an efficient, well-conducted
embargo operation which to date has dealt
with nearly 19 000 merchant marine ves-
sels. Since the United Nations Security
Council strengthened the sanctions against
Serbia and Montenegro with Resolution
820 in April 1993, no ship has been able to
break the embargo.
Special tribute should be paid to the indivi-
dual efforts of the particular officers concer-
ned with command of operations in the
zone, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces
Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) and
Commander-in-Chief Allied Naval Forces
Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH).
Their patient pragmatism in working out
command and control arangements wittr the
assistance of WEU officers is admirable.
Combined Endeavour
Because of their international commit-
ments and interests, WEU member states
have maintained their conventional mari-
time forces at a level at which they are
capable of operating in any sea in the world
as needed.
Most of the maritime forces of WEU
nations are based in Europe and normally
operate in the North Atlantic, the
Mediterranean, the North Sea and the
Baltic Sea. Some nations maintain standing
forces in more distant locations including
the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean and the
Caribbean and/or regularly deploy forces
worldwide.
In the light of the evolution of the interna-
tional situation, the development of the
European pillar of the alliance and to be
able to deploy maritime forces suited to
foreseeable needs, WEU member states
have agreed to develop a maritime opera-
tion plan for the use of maritime forces ans-
werable to WEU that provides a mecha-
nism for generating and exercising WEU
maritime forces on a mission-oriented basis,
as stated in the Petersberg declaration.
These countries may reach a common deci-
sion, based on the provisions of an appro-
priate framework, in particular Article V of
the modified Brussels Treaty or a United
Nations or CSCE mandate, to pool some of
their resources under WEU auspices in
order to create multinational maritime
forces, under the Council's authority, with
diversified capabilities enabling them to
participate in the execution of new mis-
sions such as to:
- 
carry out humanitarian and rescue
mlssrons;
- 
take part in peace-keeping mis-
srons;
- 
participate on a permanent basis in
military crisis management, inclu-
ding peace-making operations,
whilst maintaining their contribution to
common defence at the appropriate level.
The WEU Planning Cell, which was crea-
ted on lst October 1992 and is under the
Council's authority, has the task of prepa-
ring contingency plans for the employment
of forces under WEU auspices, as well as
recommendations for command, control
and communication arrangements, includ-
ing standing operating procedures for the
headquarters that might be selected. It will
also be the Planning Cell's responsibility to
keep an updated list of units and combina-
tions of units which might be made avai-
lable to WEU for specific operations.
The Planning Cell was tasked to examine
the possibility of promoting forms of air-
maritime co-operation among WEU mem-
ber countries. The Planning Cell produced
an operation plan to fulfil the ministerial
mandate to promote European maritime co-
operation.
Its aim is to organise the initial deployment
of maritime forces and to identify maritime
force packages for certain given tasks.
Furthermore, it can also be used as the star-
ting mechanism for, and the initial phase of,
any maritime exercise.
In the spirit of the Petersberg declaration of
19th June 1992, the objectives of the
Combined Endeavour Plan are to:
- 
evaluate predominantly maritime
forces answerable to WEU which
the organisation is capable of
constituting in response to any mis-
sion it is assigned by the Council;
- 
specify information procedures
whereby the WEU Planning Cell
can monitor the ability of WEU
member states' armed forces to
meet these needs;
- 
specify where necessary the acti-
vation procedures and conditions
for the use of these forces.
The following maritime r6les derived from
the mission areas described in the
Petersberg declaration are being studied for
WEU maritime forces:
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(a) Humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief: this r6le includes
missions conducted to relieve
human suffering, including relief
operations in response to natural
and manmade disasters, search
and rescue, and assistance in the
management of refugees.
(b) Conflict-prevention: which
includes different maritime acti-
vities, in particular under
Chapter VI of the United
Nations Charter, ranging from
diplomatic initiatives to preven-
tive deployment of maritime
units intended to prevent dis-
putes from escalating into armed
conflicts or from spreading.
(c) Peace-makrng; consists of diplo-
matic actions conducted after the
outbreak of conflict with the aim
of establishing a peaceful settle-
ment. They can include such
actions as diplomatic isolation and
sanctions, which could be suppor-
ted by WEU maritime forces.
(d) Peace-keeping: narrowly defi-
ned, is the containment, modera-
tion and/or termination of hosti-
lities between or within states,
using international and impartial
military forces and civilians to
complement the political pro-
cess of conflict resolution and to
restore and maintain peace.
WEU maritime forces may be
included within the military
forces encompassed in this r6le.
(e) Peace-enforcement: consists of
action under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter using
military means including mari-
time forces to restore peace in an
area of conflict. It is in tasks
under this r6le that WEU mari-
time forces will require war figh-
ting and limited power projec-
tion capabilities.
(f) Peace-building: is post conflict
action to identify and support
structures which will tend to
sffengthen and solidify a political
settlement in order to avoid a
return to conflict. Maritime
forces have various capabilities
to support this r6le.
Since WEU has no standing or on-call
forces, the format of forces will be tailored to
the needs ofthe current situation, and contri-
butions by member states will be on a volun-
tary basis. TheWEU Council will retainpoli-
tical control over all WEU operations."
5. TheSecretary-Generalconcludes:
"This is only a beginning and a fairly limi-
ted one. However the ratification of the
Maastricht Treaty is a new step in the evolu-
tion of WEU and the implementation of its
work programme as stated by the Defence
and Foreign Affairs Ministers of its member
countries at Petersberg in June 1992. WEU
offers the European Union a wide range of
co-operative activities in the field of defen-
ce as well as a real operational potential.
What comes next will largely depend on the
political will of the European Union coun-
tries. Shortcomings only demonstrate one
thing: the need to shorten the deadlines as
much as possible in order to accelerate the
rate at which a European defence is
constructed. That need is particularly
obvious and imperative in the field of mari-
time security, i.e. the protection of our
shores and sea routes, all vital for the pros-
perity and survival of Ewopean societies."
6. While agreeing with the Secretary-General
in principle, your Rapporteur would argue that the
WEU Council is taking too narrow a view of its
responsibilities at present. Over the years WEU's
atfributes have gradually been amputated 
- 
given
away to other instances such as the Council of
Europe or the then EEC. This may have been done
from the best of motives but we have now reached
the stage when it would appear that the Council is
abandoning the concept of "security" which is
going to European Union (and implicitly to the
European Parliament) and is holding on (some-
what tenuously some would say) only to its "defen-
ce" remit under the modified Brussels Treaty.
7. However, "security" and "defence" are
inextricably linked - increasingly so, in fact, as
our continent moves from the "black and white"
relationship of the cold war era to the "greyness"
of the risks and dangers we are now experiencing.
8. National "defence" policies and pro-
grammes are intended to support what might be
described as national "security" policies although
the latter is usually a rather nebulous concept 
-
does a nation's foreign policy encompass its secu-
rity policy, or vice versa?
9. In a recent article published in the
International Institute for Strategic Studies publi-
cation "Survival", Sherard Cowper-Coles
addresses the problem in the following terms:
"Security is itself an elastic notion, whose
meaning has been stretched in recent years
to extend far beyond military security
against aggression to include freedom from
economic and environmental threats to the
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state. Security often comes to denote little
more than its root meaning of "freedom
from care" or generalised stability and
well-being. Used in that broad sense, in
which the distinction between overseas and
security policy is all but invisible, the word
is hardly a helpful tool for defence policy-
makers.
The term "security policy" is also mislea-
ding. It implies a coherent subset of foreign
policy, within which nestles defence policy,
as one Russian doll within another. In fact,
all overseas policies and programmes share
the objectives of promoting the security
and prosperity of the United Kingdom and
the stability of the international system to
which it belongs. States maintain standing
forces for the ultimate purpose of defen-
ding the state against external attack or
internal subversion. But, in the absence of
such immediate or obvious threats, armed
forces are again what they always were: an
important, perhaps tlre mostimportant, sub-
set of the larger set of tools which states use
to protect and promote their interests over-
seas. Many of those interests are only
remotely related to war-fighting: promoting
defence sales, countering drug-smuggling,
conducting humanitarian operations, or
goodwill exchanges of all kinds intended
primarily to extend national influence."
10. The arguments above cover the whole
range of traditional forces 
- 
armies, navies and air
forces 
- 
but increasingly also the para-military
forces such as the gendarmerie and even (with
reference to WEU operations on the Danube, for
example) the customs and police services.
11. WEU is already in the business of planning
and carrying out operations which involve such
varied agencies as those mentioned above. It is
obvious therefore that professionals in these
various fields should be appointed to augment the
Planning Cell in Brussels when required.
12. It is also obvious that WEU's present and
future r6le includes a major maritime dimension
and that Europe's security continues to depend to
a large extent on Europe's maritime capabilities.
Hence your Rapporteur's intention to highlight a
number of different facets of the subject in the
present report.
II. General aspects of European naval and
maritime co-operation
13. Co-operation between naval forces, consis-
ting of ships, submarines and amphibious forces,
and other maritime forces such as shore-based
maritime air, has been very widespread in
Western Europe for the last 50 years.
14. Provided there is political agreement, it is a
straightforward matter for co-operation to be arran-
ged between naval forces in peacetime and for low-
intensity operations. At the very simplest level all
users of the high seas expect to co-operate in such
matters as search and rescue and other emergencies
when the only requirement for co-operation to be
established is some internationally-accepted means
of communication, of which there are several. The
passage exercise (Passex), in which forces of diffe-
rent navies meet for mutual training when their
prografirmes take them through the same area, is a
regular feature of most naval deployments. Indeed
European navies have met for passage training
since the earliest days of the Western Union in the
late 1940s and early 1950s. To exercise together,
naval forces need a common communications plan
and some mutually understood procedures both of
which can be as simple or as complicated as the
exercise programme demands.
15. Western European navies almost invariably
use NATO procedures which have continuously
been developed and refined to be available for any
situation. This vast body of doctrine is also fre-
quently used outside the Washington Treaty area.
The United Kingdom, for example, has specific
exercise agreements with some non-NATO
nations, which involve the use of NATO proce-
dures. With Australia and New Zealand, the
United Kingdom, United States and Canada have
a combined exercise agreement, and with
Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand
the United Kingdom has a five-power defence
iurangement which is heavily influenced by the
NATO way of doing business. France also has a
spread of bilateral agreements worldwide and
often uses standard NATO operating procedures.
16. Just as it is easy for navies to meet for ad
hoc exercises, it is a fairly simple matter for naval
forces to co-operate at short notice for low-level
military operations. Naval forces are inherently
highly mobile, possess organic tactical logistics
and the command and control of naval forces is
flexible. On this last point it is a feature of all
naval operations that units will change controlling
authorities several times during an operation and
the force packages for particular tasks are in a
constant state of movement.
17. It is not surprising, therefore, that the first
military initiatives of the revitalised Western
European Union involved co-operation between
naval forces, first during the Iran-Iraq war and
subsequently during the Gulf conflict as already
mentioned. It also explains the ease and speed
with which WEU managed to field a force for
embargo operations in the Adriatic. A political
decision was soon followed by forces in theatre
without the need for the very detailed planning
process required for the mounting, deployment
and support of a ground operation.
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18. It follows that naval forces can be used in
an exemplary or experimental way in establishing
or building military co-operation, especially
during peacetime and for low-intensity opera-
tions. For high-intensity operations it is as impor-
tant for multinational maritime forces as for land-
air forces that formations contain a properly
balanced range ofintegrated capabilities, that they
are fully worked up and exercised and that they
are controlled by practised staffs. The NATO
experience has been that the major maritime for-
mations designed for high-intensity warfare such
as the Atlantic Striking Fleet and Mediterranean
Striking Force South have been predominantly
United States formations to which other nations
have contributed units and subordinate forma-
tions. The staffs for these multiple carrier battle
forces have been United States national staffs
augmented by personnel from other contributing
NATO nations. While the new NAIO reaction
force concept recently adopted is designed to
allow multinational maritime forces to be assem-
bled at short notice to meet a complete range of
contingencies, for high-intensity combat these
forces will still need to have as their core fully-
integrated and worked up balanced battlegroups
predominantly drawn from a single nation and
augmented by units and subordinate formations
from other nations. Similarly, the command and
staffs of these major formations are likely to be
created by the augmentation of national staffs.
19. During the recent Gulf operation a very
large number of nations contributed maritime
forces and many were under a WEU "flag".
Nonetheless very few nations actually participa-
ted in the forward battle area where it was neces-
sary for maritime forces to be fully integrated.
Only those nations equipped for and practised at
full integration with United States naval forces
were able to contribute where there was a require-
ment to carry out high-intensity tasks such as sea
control and power projection.
20. European naval forces have an important
part to play in the range of tasks envisaged in the
Petersberg declaration, as outlined in the
Secretary-General's article for the Greenwich
Forum meeting. Naval forces would be major
contributors to humanitarian tasks, to operations
in support of the peace process, and to crisis
management generally. The ease with which mul-
tinational naval forces can be assembled,
deployed and controlled makes them particularly
useful in the early stages of crisis management
and in any operation where the sea provides an
avenue for access, naval forces will have a crucial
r6le. The vast majority of European naval forces
are assigned in principle to NATO and these
forces would by and large also be available to
WEU. In addition, the United Kingdomhas decla-
red that one of the four star national joint head-
quarters, at Northwood, optimised for and expe-
rienced at maritime operations, would be among
those available to WEU. A two star United
Kingdom national afloat joint force headquarters
is also available for augmentation as a WEU
afloat headquarters.
21. As the Petersberg declaration makes clear,
it is not WEU policy to create new permanent
force structures separate from those of NATO.
However a number of European nations partici-
pate in permanent bi- or multi-national European
forces which are presently assigned to NATO but
could be made available to WEU. The United
Kingdom and the Netherlands have for many
years operated a fully-integrated combined
amphibious force which has at its core a brigade
of British and Dutch marines. This force took part
most successfully in Operation Haven, protecting
the Kurds in Northern Iraq. All WEU member
states are currently in the process of declaring
naval forces which will be available to WEU. The
WEU Planning Cell, in consultation with all
WEU member states, has prepared a naval contin-
gency force generation plan (Combined
Endeavour as mentioned above) together with
proposals for exercises.
22. The naval force generation plan is a useful
frst step and in principle should provide a basis
for the smooth generation of WEU maritime
forces from those declared by nations as available
to WEU for the tasks envisaged under the
Petersberg declaration. The plan should however
be developed and make use of NAIO doctrine and
procedures wherever these are relevant and
useable. Where WEU has specific requirements
that differ from NATO, panicularly in command
and control of forces, the plan will probably need
to develop special arrangements. The Planning
Cell should also draw up specific mission-orienta-
ted plans for naval contingencies such as embargo
operations or disengagement of forces. Some such
plans already exist for current Adriatic operations
but largely only on a national and unco-ordinated
basis.
23. An important aspect of European maritime
co-operation is in training and exercising. A WEU
exercise policy is currently being developed and
is examined in a parallel report for the Assembly's
Defence Committee, "The WEU Planning Cell 
-
reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the
Council" (Rapporteur: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman).
Several European navies, notably Germany, the
Netherlands and Portugal, use the United
Kingdom's operational sea training facility. Other
navies, notably Italy and Spain, use the French
Fleet Training Centre in Toulon. The Belgian
Navy hosts the Mine Warfare School at Ostend
where all WEU navies are welcomed and where
many joint tactics and procedures are developed.
Similarly, several European navies take part in the
United Kingdom Royal Navy/Royal Air Force
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joint maritime courses, which are conducted in
the North Sea and North Atlantic under the direc-
tion of a joint staff at Pitreavie near Edinburgh in
Scotland. These courses combine weapon training
with high-intensity exercises in the open ocean.
24. Initiatives for amphibious training have
been particularly fruitful. The United Kingdom/
Netherlands landing force has a continuous pro-
gramme of training. United Kingdom Royal
Marines exercise regularly in Portugal at the
Santa Margherida ranges and have exercised with
the regiment Fuzileiros. Exercises with a large
amphibious component are run annually by
France, Spain and Italy in turn. The Assembly's
Defence Committee was invited to observe
Exercise Farfadet in southern France in 1992,
Ardente in northern Italy in 1993 and hopes to
observe Tramontana in Spain later this year.
These exercises are proving the model for the
modern, more humanitarian and less threat-orien-
tated action which WEU is likely to be involved
in over coming years. The majority of WEU
nations took part in Ardente and will also be
represented in the United Kingdom-sponsored
Command Post Exercise Purple Nova at
Northwood. The United Kingdom is now to exer-
cise amphibious helicopters on a regular basis
with the French "Force d'Action Rapide" and
Commachio Group of the United Kingdom Royal
Marines, a specialist unit for the protection of off-
shore facilities, holds an annual exchange with
French Marine Commandos 
- 
Exercise Scotch
Wine.
25. In terms of bilateral co-operation, neigh-
bouring maritime states are often to the fore, par-
ticularly over search and rescue, policing, etc.
Joint exercises and joint operations have become
the norm, although on occasion such develop-
ments have particular political overtones.
26. France and Germany have begun a series of
bilateral naval exercises alternating annually bet-
ween the Mediterranean and the Baltic. Germany
and Poland have regular exchanges of units
concentrating on search and rescue and your
Rapporteur would suggest that this example
should be followed not only between WEU
nations and those naval members of the Forum of
Consultation but also with existing and future
WEU associate and observer countries. As men-
tioned previously, naval co-operation at whatever
level is by far the easiest to organise and is proba-
bly the most effective.
27. European maritime co-operation is fertile
ground for development of the framework establi-
shed at Maastricht and Petersberg. While virtually
all WEU nations possess naval forces (see
Appendix I), the major contributors of naval
forces to the security of Western Europe are
France and the United Kingdom which are
playing a full part in these developments. The
French and British navies have a long history of
expeditionary operations and this experience is
particularly useful in the present strategic envi-
ronment. Experience of the requirements of large-
scale and high-intensity maritime operations is of
course the capacity which in the last resort under-
pins all effective crisis management and gives
credibility to the diplomatic use of naval force.
Hence the theme of the next chapter.
III. A specific nucleus for European naval
co-operation
28. The two most complete navies in Europe
belong to France and the United Kingdom and it
is these two navies which therefore form a
nucleus for European co-operation for the future.
Both France and the United Kingdom possess the
three core capabilities which together provide an
attractive option for crisis response and risk
management: amphibious ships, carriers and
nuclear attack submarines.
The three core capabilities
29. A naval force's political attraction is the
range of policy options it affords: it is a highly
effective means of achieving the government's
aims in the face of resistance. It is a versatile and
politically flexible tool which is particularly
effective at the outset of an operation and
throughout its duration.
30. A naval force can throw a long maritime
punch, fust by deploying as a symbol of resolve,
then by confrolling the sea, and finally by interve-
ning and supporting a land battle. But to achieve
this, the naval force must be able to project leve-
rage or power.
31. In this context amphibious ships have never
been more relevant to the strategic and operatio-
nal environment. They offer a combination of
sffategic reach, logistic independence and opera-
tional mobility. Amphibious forces can sail early,
and with orchestrated publicity, to demonstrate
will and capability; or they can be despatched
without demonsffation if political understatement
is required. They may take passage through inter-
national waters without infringement of territorial
boundaries. They could poise at sea, raid or land
on a potentially hostile coast at a time and place of
the commander's choice and independent of shore
infrastructure. Ashore, they can conduct indepen-
dent operations or create the preconditions for the
landing or withdrawal of heavier forces.
32. In 1993 the United Kingdom decided to
contract for the design and construction of
an assault carrier (in technical terms a landing
platform helicopter 
- 
LPH). Such an LPH will be
able to play a key r6le in future amphibious ope-
rations. It will be capable of putting ashore up to
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800 marines in a single assault wave and, together
with assault ships and landing ships logistic
(LSLs), it will provide the British Royal Marines
with the specialised shipping necessary to fulfil
their rdle well into the next century. Complemen-
tary developments in the Netherlands will also
ensure a continuing r6le for the United Kingdom/
Netherlands landing force. As it happens, the first
major amphibious exercise to be conducted by the
United Kingdom Royal Marines for seven years
culminated in an assault on the island of Lewis in
Scotland's Outer Hebrides in February 1994.
Elements of 3 Commando Brigade, including 45
Commando Group and supporting artillery and
combat engineers, were joined by 1 Battalion
Royal Netherlands Marine Corps and a company
from the French Army's Force d'Action Rapide.
For the first time four Griffon light air cushion
vehicles were used to carry commandos ashore.
Much experimentation has been carried out with
hovercraft over the years but only now are they
becoming fully operational. The Assembly's
Defence Committee visited the USS Tortuga, a
landing ship dock which carries such craft, in July
1993 in Norfolk, Virginia.
33. Aircraft carriers are the second of the three
core capabilities. They can provide a whole range
of capabilities ranging from command and control
to direct support of operations ashore, to anti-sur-
face and submarine warfare and air defence for an
amphibious group, or on the sea lines of commu-
nication to an intervention area. Some believe that
this could be done perfectly well by shore-based
aircraft, but experience teaches differently: in
three of the four high-intensity conflicts since
1945 (Korea, Suez and the Falklands) the vast
majority of all air support was carrier-based. The
deployment and sustaining of aircraft in a theatre
of operations, independent of host nation support,
offers a considerable range of options to govern-
ment and is an excellent example of significant
intervention capability.
34. Last of the three core capabilities: nuclear
attack submarines 
- 
SSNs. Capable of sustained
high speed 
- 
they can cover 600 nautical miles per
day with no need to refuel 
- 
they may be the first
on the scene, where they are then available for
insertion of special forces, for example, early
denial of sea control or to procure critical intelli-
gence. They could also remain at sea, operating
overtly or covertly and independently of outside
support, for up to 90 days.
35. The United States Navy's SSNs have the
capability to launch cruise missiles: this was
demonstrated to devastating effect during the Gulf
conflict, and in the two subsequent raids against
Iraq. Cruise missiles, 90Vo of which were fired
from sea during the Gulf conflict, formed the first
waves of attack at the outbreak of hostilities: they
combined a surgical degree of accuracy with none
of the risk of aircrew losses which is associated
with fixed wing operations. Possible procurement
of submarine-launched cruise missiles has been
studied by both France and the United Kingdom.
36. In the spring of 1979 a window of opportu-
nity existed for a short period when the United
Kingdom and France might have decided to deve-
lop a submarine-launched ballistic missile toge-
ther but then Britain was given the opportunity
again of buying "off the American shelf' and the
occasion passed by.
37. Today with both countries engaged on
divergent paths in terms of technology there
is little chance of a common ballistic missile
procurement programme in the foreseeable
future.
38. However, there is still room for some
"common sense" co-operation: what is sometimes
known as "water management". Through co-ordi-
nation of maintenance cycles, "time alongside",
etc., both countries could ensure that their SSBN
assets are employed to best advantage without any
encroachment on the hitherto taboo subject of tar-
geting and all the implications. A parallel report
from the Defence Committee 
- 
the r6le and future
of nuclear weapons (Rapporteur: Mr. De Decker)
- 
will be presented to the Assembly at the next
plenary session.
39. A maritime task force is ideally structured
and equipped for joint operations. Almost any
operation today is of a joint nature, and units
which are able to contribute to the air, land and
sea battle will have obvious merits. An amphi-
bious force has a clearjoint capability, since it is
designed to achieve local sea control, establish a
bridgehead in order to create the conditions for
the landing of heavier forces and then provide air
support for friendly forces ashore. This capability
is at the heart of the combined joint task force
concept announced at the January 1994 NATO
summit and which is currently being elaborated
by NATO and WEU.
40. In addition to the three core capabilities,
some of which are shared by other European
navies (notably Italy and Spain with the Garibaldi
and Principe des Asturias carriers and the
Netherlands with amphibious assets as mentioned
above), the destroyers and frigates, mine-coun-
termeasure vessels and afloat support ships also
play key r6les. Destroyers and frigates are essen-
tial assets in any maritime conflict and are crucial
to the sea denial task upon which all reinforce-
ment and amphibious operations depend. The
Gulf conflict demonsfrated the critical importance
of a highly capable mine counter-measures force,
and replenishment and logistic ships are obvious-
ly indispensable as both the Falklands and the
Gulf conflicts demonstrated. Increasingly for the
types of operation WEU may have to carry out in
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the future, an adequate European Merchant
Marine is a vital asset- an important aspect which
is addressed in Chapter V.
IV. WEa navies and the United Natians
41. In the wake of the end of East-West
confrontation the international community is
again looking to an expanded r6le for the United
Nations in maintaining international peace and
security and ameliorating human suffering. More
United Nations peace-keeping operations have
been authorised since 1988 than in the previous
40 years, and the number of active United Nations
operations has more than doubled since January
1991. Moreover, the size and complexity of the
operations have increased, and the scope of
United Nations missions has expanded greatly.
Recent events in former Yugoslavia and Somalia
suggest that more 
- 
and more complex 
- 
opera-
tions are on the way. In short, the prominent glo-
bal security r61e that the founders imagined for
the United Nations is about to be tested.
42. Little international attention has been devo-
ted to United Nations naval co-operation issues.
Most of the current proposals, in fact, fail to
consider naval forces, except perhaps in connec-
tion with the need for sealift. Yet most of the
United Nations operations recently authorised
have naval components of some kind. Further, the
areas where expansion of United Nations involve-
ment is possible, such as international enforce-
ment of United Nations agreements, are particu-
larly suited for a maritime context.
Status of United Nations military co-operation
43. Anticipating a resurgent r6le of the United
Nations, the first United Nations Security Council
Heads of State and Government summit in January
1992 asked the Secretary-General to report on
ways of "sffengthening and making more efficient
the capacity of the United Nations for preventive
diplomacy, peace-making and peace-keeping". In
his "An Agenda for Peace" submitted to the
Security Council in June 1992, the Secretary-
General called for activation and strengthening of
the provisions of the United Nations Charter to
maintain or restore international peace and
security. In particular, he called for preventive
diplomacy to avoid the breakdown of peaceful
conditions, mutually reinforcing efforts at peace-
keeping and peace-making when conflict breaks
out, and post-conflict peace-building to prevent a
recurrence of conflict by attacking its causes.
United Nations naval missions and supporting
tasks
44. Only a handful of United Nations naval
operations have taken place. As a result, most for-
mal and informal discussions of prospective
United Nations military action avoid consideration
of naval missions, or missions performed by naval
forces. United Nations naval mission areas and
their supporting tasks could include: provide
humanitarian assistance, intervene for humanita-
rian purposes, interdict sea and air traffic, conduct
maritime peace-keeping, respond to aggression,
control armamentyconduct demilitarisation, enfor-
ce maritime agreements, make a show of force, and
protect sea and air traffic. The last three offer new
areas for multinational naval co-operation in a
United Nations context, whereas some United
Nations precedent exists for the other missions.
45. Removal of political constraints and the
experience of the Gulf war have added greater elas-
ticity to plausible United Nations naval r6les,
though the arrangements for military effectiveness
have not kept pace. The missions discussed above
fall into all four areas for United Nations action
identified in the Secretary-General's'An Agenda
for Peace", though the focus is on those mission
areas that involve some element of peace-keeping.
The level of military force involved can range from
zero (as in humanitarian assistance) to moderate (as
in humanitarian intervention) to quite considerable
(as in responding to aggression). Further, many
prospective United Nations naval mission areas are
not likely to be conducted with full local consent.
Thus, they may require greater levels of force and
entail possibly greater levels of risk to the forces
than the majority of United Nations-sponsored
operations in the past (excepting Korea, the Congo
and the Gulf war).
Organising options and analysis
46. Possible options for organising multinatio-
nal naval co-operation in the United Nations
context are plentiful. Four different options exist:
- 
United Nations authorisation, as in the
Gulf war;
- 
United Nations designation, as in the
Korean war;
- 
United Nations direction of on-call
national forces (as called for in the
United Nations Charter and proposed by
the Military StaffCommittee in 1947\ or
peace-keeping units; and
- 
for United Nations standing forces, as
articulated in a 1918 proposal for a
League of Nations Navy.
47. These problems have been examined in two
recent reports of the Assembly: United Nations
operations 
- 
interaction with WEU, Document
1366, 19th May 1993, Rapporteur: Mrs.
Baarveld-Schlaman; Political relations between
the United Nations and their consequences for the
development of WEU, Document 1389, 8th
November 1993, Rapporteur: Mr. Soell.
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48. The naval aspects have been addressed in
three recent studies which have all taken account
of WEU's position:
- 
"Multinational maritime forces: a break-
out from traditional peace-keeping?",
Michael C. Pugh (Southampton Papers
in International Policy 
- 
Mountbatten
Centre for International Studies,
University of Southampton) ;
- 
"Blue Hulls: Multinational naval co-
operation and the United Nations",
Jeffrey I. Sands (Center for Naval
Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia);
- 
"The employment of maritime forces in
support of United Nations resolutions"(Center for Naval Warfare Studies,
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode
Island).
49. Suffice it to say that WEU has been in the
van in implementing a whole range of operations
which have been carried out more or less under
United Nations auspices. Certain grey areas
would need quite considerable clarification if they
were to become the norm but the main lesson
drawn has been the willingness not only of the
WEU nations to become involved in such opera-
tions over past years but also for other countries,
non-member nations, to seek to associate them-
selves with WEU activity either in the Gulf or in
the Adriatic.
50. Of course much of the good co-operation
has resulted from a common usage of standard
NATO procedures, although not where all coun-
tries are concerned. In addition, NATO itself has
had to evolve quickly, especially, for example, in
the realm of logistics.
51. Forexample, NAIO andWEU naval forces
enforcing the United Nations blockade against
Serbia are now being sustained by a new joint
logistics system. A forward logistic site (FLS)
was set up at the Italian Naval Air Station,
Grottaglie, in December 1993 to strearnline logis-
tic support for ships of the twelve allied navies
participating in Operation Sharp Guard in the
Adriatic Sea off the coast of former Yugoslavia.
52. Previously, logistic support for military units
taking part in NATO operations or exercises had
been a national responsibility. The almost perma-
nent nature of the blockade in the Adriatic forced
NATO and the participating countries to look at
ways to streamline logistic support for the mission.
53. The FLS co-ordinates all essential opera-
tional logistic requirements for Sharp Guard
ships; arranges the delivery of mail, cargo and
personnel to and from all ships taking part in the
operation, and arranges for maintenance support
at local harbours and medical evacuation of afloat
personnel.
54. The FLS concept ensures the most efficient
use of scarce helicopter assets. Each nation with a
ship at sea would have to send its own helicopter
ashore to collect or deliver priority items or per-
sonnel. With FLS co-ordination, either a shore-
based helicopter or one of ttre helicopters from
any of the afloat ships can collect and deliver to
any of the ships in the joint NATO/WEU task
force. This ensures that the ships are not deprived
of one of their essential operational assets for long
periods of time on logistic tasks.
55. This type of development is obviously very
useful to all concerned and has a direct influence
on United Nations capabilities. Again WEU must
establish a working relationship with the appro-
priate United Nations authorities and ensure an
efficient liaison.
V Marifime transport and European securily
56. For some years Europe has been going
through a difficult period in terms of its economy
and trade. The world recession is having a more
devastating effect in Europe than in other pans of
the world. Europe is working hard to address the
challenges of today and tomorrow. The European
Union is clearly trying to find an appropriate ans-
wer from within, by completing its internal mar-
ket as well as, in its relations with the rest of the
world, by making sure that it does not become a
Fortress Europe.
57. The first answer of the twelve member
states of the European Union to the structural
problems characterising the hrropean economies
since the eighties has been the creation of the
internal market which came formally into force on
lst January 1993. With the ratification and the
entering into force of the Treaty of Maastricht on
lst November 1993, a further crucial milestone
was reached on the way to European integration.
On lst January 1994, the European Economic
Area, which creates close economic links between
the European Union and six other West European
countries, became reality. The economic potential
of this production and consunrer market of almost
380 million people should certainly not be
underestimated.
58. In the last two decades the global economic
and trade pattern has undergone drastic modifica-
tion. Most striking is the economic development
of the Far East; some even speak about the Asian
miracle. Traditional long-standing economic and
trade structures have to be adapted to these
changes in order to make sure that nations can
remain active in world trade.
59. As far as the external face of the European
Union is concerned, Brussels played a decisive
r6le in the successful conclusion of the Uruguay
round. This will without any doubt lead to a revi-
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val of foreign trade. Europe is not closing its eyes
to economic integration processes taking place in
other parts of the world. Traditional trade patterns
will be influenced by the successful implementa-
tion of the NAFTA Agreement between the
United States, Canada and Mexico, as well as by
the concept of closer economic ties in the Pacific
region with the creation of APEC (Asian Pacific
Economic Co-operation) in which, at present, ele-
ven countries of the region participate.
60. All these global developments and changes
in world rade patterns will have direct or indirect
effects on maritime transport. It is clear, for
example, that maritime transport within as well as
to and from the Far East in the largest sense of the
word will grow progressively over the years and
decades to come. The global view is important for
a clear understanding of the maritime transport
policy of the European Union. The added implica-
tion is that where Europe's merchant ships are
present, Europe may have to deploy its warships
to protect them.
ROle of maritime transport in the European
Union
61. Maritime transport has historically been of
great economic, social, strategic and-political
importance for Europe. At present morc fhan 90Vo
of the Community's total external trade is carried
out by maritime transporfi less than l0Vo by all.
other modes of transport together. Of the total
trade volume between the twelve member states
of the European Union, almost 35Vo is taken by
coastal or short sea shipping (SSS). These figures
explain why the shipping industry of the
Community has invested a total of 60 BECU (bil-
lion ECU) in mobile assets.
62. Notwithstanding these figures, European
shipping is going through difficult times. The per-
centage of the world's ilrerchant fleet sailing
under the flag of an EC member state has fallen
from 45Vo in 1960 to 30Vo in 1980 and has since
then further decreased to l3%o at present. Flagging
out is not just a problem for the European Union.
Recent statistics show that no less than 457o of the
world merchant fleet has flagged out. The fleet of
the European Union, however, has been affected
more than others as almost 55Vo of the total EC
fleet is estimated to have flagged out and the
curve is still rising rather than falling. One might
say that it is not so much the flag that counts but
much more the ownership of a vessel. A correct
assumption, but here too one has to face the fact
that the proportion of vessels owned or effective-
ly controlled by EC companies has fallen from
36Vo in 1980 to less than 25Vo atpresent. A logical
consequence of all this is that employment for
European seafarers has decreased too. In 1992
there were in total some 135 000 seafarers which
is almost 607o less than in 1980.
63. The main reason for this decline is to a
large extent to be found in the unfair or unequal
competition our shipowners face from ships sai-
ling under cheap flags or open registers and, not
least, from substandard ships where international-
ly agreed safety standards are not so strictly
applied. Where European shipping is strong and is
strengthening its efforts further, is in the quality of
the vessels and services offered.
The importance of the shipping industry
&. Despite the recession in the West and the
convulsive events in Eastern and Central Europe,
world trade has burgeoned and will go on bur-
geoning, particularly in the context of the recent
GATT agreement.
65. As in the past, shipping will always be an
international operation requiring international
rules to direct its operations and requiring respon-
sible flag and port state enforcement to protect the
marine environment, to ensure increasing stan-
dards of safety and to safeguard civilised crewing
conditions.
66. Merchant shipping is a significant
European Union asset and critical in terms of the
Union's overall transport policy. As a major inter-
national activity, Europe, in the largest trading
block in the world, will ignore or fail to nourish
this industry at its peril.
67. Dependence on others to transport
Europeans and their cargoes would be an extre-
mely dangerous situation for the 340 million
people of the Union. A fleet is needed to serve
those people. Europe needs to have a voice in
international shipping affairs, to exemplify high
standards of seafaring and safety and to show res-
pect for the maritime environment. Not least
Europe needs an effective merchant fleet to sus-
tain its defence strategy as it is developed.
European shipping policy
68. Over the last decade the overriding purpose
of the European Commission's shipping policy
has been "to maintain and develop an efficient
and competitive shipping industry and to secure
competitive sea transport services in the interests
of community trade".
69. There has been a dramatic decline of the
European fleet since 1980. The causes of that
decline have been attributed to lower taxation,
lower social security and lower wage costs which,
together with a rather more permissive attitude
about international regulations, have been the
prime attractions of flagging out. There has been a
serious reduction in employment of European
Union seafarers and a general ageing of the fleet.
The situation confronting vinually all European
merchant fleets is urgent.
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70. One of the issues which has bedeviled
European shipping has been the increasingly
geriatric nature of the fleets of the member states.
Replacement is critical yet shipyard capacity is
inadequate in order to cope with the problem.
71. This problem in turn is compounded by the
inadequate numbers of European trained crews,
since inadequate training stands in direct propor-
tion to the use of more dubious registries by
shipowners, where the emphasis lies in employing
the cheapest crews with scant regard for safety,
training or the maritime environment. It seems
that only when a disaster occurs that, for a rela-
tively brief period, anxieties are raised, enquiries
undenaken and promises of action given fairly
freely, with the inevitably slow follow-up.
72. What is particularly welcome about the
approach of the European Commission has been
its attempts to frame a strategy to stem the decline
of the Union's maritime industries, as well as
sharpening their competitive edge. What is further
required now is an awareness of the defence and
security aspects of European shipping.
The interdependence of the maritirue industries
73. For far too long too many of the member
states have allowed the various maritime indus-
tries to be dealt with in a somewhat insular way,
failing or refusing to recognise their interdepen-
dence. The various industries have adopted their
own individual defensive positions, often thereby
hampering decisive action which could have been
utilised to hone their international competitive-
ness. In turn this would have been of greater value
to the wider economy.
74. It must be evident that a growing European
Union fleet would provide a more viable internal
market for shipbuilding and repair yards as well
as for suppliers of essential components. This is
especially true of naval construction as well as in
the civilian sector.
75. Seldom has a country developed its mari-
time industries without relying on its national
shipping sector as its main customer. Equally,
European shipping needs to draw on a wide range
of highly-skilled financial, insurance, legal and
brokerage services and, working together, all these
should constitute an asset with critical advantages
for other land-based and port activities.
76. Indifference 
- 
even hostility 
- 
towards the
notion of dealing with the maritime industries in
this way, has led directly to a reduction in compe-
titiveness of shipping and shipbuilding, not sim-
ply within the European Union but in the wider
international field.
Shipbuilding and competition policy
77. There is a definite need for a viable
European Union shipbuilding industry. A great
deal ofrestructuring has been undenaken over the
last decade and a half. Substantial productivity
gains and greater concentration of shipbuilding
with a high technological content has taken place,
yet European shipyards are still incapable of sur-
viving on the market without adequate public sup-
port and this is bound to continue until the main
competitors, notably industries in the Pacific rim,
dismantle their aid systems.
78. A European approach should be based on
stopping the fragmentation of European Union
shipyards and ancillary activities and on looking
for the economies of scale which are so attractive
as far as Europe's Asian competitors are concer-
ned. It is therefore increasingly important to
maximise co-operation between European Union
undertakings, particularly in the field of research
and development, design, purchasing, environ-
mental protection and marine engine manufac-
ture. This is particularly true of co-operation for
naval procurement which must be developed
beyond the realms of the Tripartite minehunter
(even though one of its very successful forebears,
the Ton-class minesweeper, was the result of early
co-operation in the Western Union). Signs for
optimism are perhaps valid with the Anglo-
French-Italian frigate project and Dutch-Spanish
co-operation. Your Rapporteur hopes that before
long the Western European Armaments Group
will turn its attention to this domain.
Defence
79. Europe is more ambitious now about
achieving a concerted defence policy than ever
before. Yet this is certainly not a viable objective
without adequate marine industries, merchant
ships and those to crew them. Your Rapporteur
has been given assurances by those responsible in
the WEU Planning Cell that Europe has adequate
shipping for essential defence purposes. The
Greek Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, Mr. Georgios Papandreou, has pointed
out the advantages of the Greek merchant fleet
becoming available for WEU operations with
Greek membership of the organisation, but even
so an urgent analysis of the current WEU assets,
properly conducted and kept up to date, is vital
before Europe enters into any conflict commit-
ment requiring considerable sea-borne logistic
support.
VI. Co-operatian with the Internalional
Maritime Organisation and the Internalional
H y do graphic Or ganis atio n
80. WEU countries are members of two parti-
cular bodies with which WEU itself should consi-
der co-operating in certain domains impacting on
European security: the International Maritime
Organisation (IMO) and the International
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Hydographic Organisation (IHO). The work of
the organisations is described below.
(a) The International Maritime Organisation
81. When the establishment of a specialised
agency of the United Nations dealing with mari-
time affairs was first proposed, the main concern
was to evolve international machinery to improve
safety at sea.
82. Because of the international nature of the
shipping industry, it had long been recognised that
action to improve safety in maritime operations
would be more effective if canied out at an interna-
tional level rather than by individual countries
acting unilaterally and without co-ordination with
others. Although a number of important internatio-
nal agreements had already been adopted, many
states believed that theie was a need for a perma-
nent body which would be able to co-ordinate and
promote further measures on a more regular basis.
83. It was against this background that a confe-
rence held by the United Nations in 1948 adopted
a convention establishing the International
Maritime Organisation (IMO)' as the first every
body devoted exclusively to maritime matters.
84. In the ten-year period between the adoption
of the Convention and its entry into force in 1958,
other problems related to safety but requiring
slightly different emphasis had attracted interna-
tional attention. One of the most important of
these was the threat of marine pollution from
ships, particularly pollution by oil carried in tan-
kers. An international convention on this subject
was actually adopted in 1954, four years before
IMO came into existence, and responsibility for
administering and promoting it was assumed by
IMO in January 1959. From the very beginning,
the improvement of maritime safety and the pre-
vention of marine pollution have been IMO's
most important objectives.
85. The organisation is based at 4 Albert
Embankment, London, and is the only United
Nations specialised agency to have its headquar-
ters in the United Kingdom. Its governing body is
the Assembly, which meets once every two years.
It consists of all 137 member states and two asso-
ciate members. Between sessions of the Assembly
a Council, consisting of 32 member governments
elected by the Assembly, acts as IMO's governing
body.
The committees
86. IMO is a technical organisation and most of
its work is carried out in a number of committees
and sub-committees.
1. Until 1982 the organisation was called the Inter-
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO).
87. The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) is
the most senior of the committees that carry out
the organisation's technical work. It has a number
of sub-committees whose titles indicate the sub-
jects they deal with: safety of navigation; radio-
communications; life saving, search and rescue;
training and watchkeeping; carriage of dangerous
goods; ship design and equipmenq fire protection;
stability and load lines and fishing vessel safety;
containers and cargoes; and bulk chemicals.
88. The Marine Environment Protection
Committee (MEPC) was established by the
Assembly in November 1973.It is responsible for
co-ordinating the organisation's activities in the
prevention and control of pollution of the marine
environment from ships. The Sub-Committee on
Bulk Chemicals is also a sub-committee of the
MEPC as far as pollution is concerned.
89. The Legal Committee was originally estab-
lished to deal with the legal problems arising from
the Torrey Canyon accident of 1967, but it was
subsequently made a permanent committee. It is
responsible for considering any legal matters
within the scope of the organisation.
90. The Technical Co-operation Committee is
responsible for co-ordinating the work of the
organisation in the provision of technical assis-
tance in the maritime field, in particular to the
developing countries. The importance of techni-
cal assistance in IMO's work is shown by the fact
that it is the first organisation in the United
Nations system formally to recognise a Technical
Co-operation Committee in its Convention.
91. The Facilitation Committee is responsible
for MO's activities and functions relating to the
facilitation of international maritime traffic.
These are aimed at reducing the formalities and
simplifying the documentation required of ships
when entering or leaving ports or other terminals.
92. All the committees of IMO are open to par-
ticipation by all member governments on an
equal basis.
The secretariat
93. The secretariat is headed by the Secretary-
General, who is assisted by a staff of some 300
international civil servants. The Secretary-
General is appointed by the Council, with the
approval of the Assembly.
94. In order to achieve its objectives, IMO has,
in the last 30 years, promoted the adoption of
some 30 conventions and protocols and adopted
well over 700 codes and recommendations
concerning maritime safety, the prevention of pol-
lution and related matters. The "related matters"
include work on a number of subjects which come
under the heading of "security" and are thus of
interest to WEU navies. Piracy and armed rob-
bery at sea are increasing threats, as is drug traf-
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ficking (discussed in the explanatory memoran-
dum). The concerted action proposed should be
carried out in full consultation with the IMO.
Technical assistance
95. While the adoption of conventions, codes
and recommendations has in the past been IMO's
most important function, in recent years the orga-
nisation has devoted increasing attention to secu-
ring the effective implementation of these mea-
sures throughout the world.
96. As a result, the organisation's technical
assistance activities have become more and more
important and in 1977 IMO took steps to institu-
tionalise its Technical Co-operation Committee 
-
the first United Nations body to do so.
97. Thepurposeofthetechnical assistancepro-
grarnme is to help states, many of them develo-
ping countries, to ratify IMO conventions and to
reach the standards contained in the SOLAS
Convention and other instruments. As part of this
programme, a number of advisers and consultants
are employed by IMO 
- 
in the field as well as at
headquarters 
- 
to give advice to governments on
such matters as deck and engineering personnel
and the prevention of pollution.
98. Each year the organisation arranges or par-
ticipates in numerous seminars, workshops and
other events which are designed to assist in the
implementation of IMO measures. Some are held
at IMO headquarters or in developed countries,
others in the developing countries themselves.
99. In the field of environmental protection
IMO has actively co-operated with the Regional
Seas Programme of the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) in the develop
ment of regional anti-pollution arrangements. IMO
is currently involved with programme develop-
ment in all of the eleven seas covered by UNEP
action plans. A particularly interesting
outcome of this co-operation is the Regional
Marine Pollution Emergency Centre for the
Mediterranean Sea (REMPEC) which was estab-
lished by IMO in conjunction with UNEP inl976.
100. But the most important subject of all is
training. IMO measures can only be implemented
effectively if those responsible are fully trained,
and IMO has helped to develop or improve mariti-
me ffaining academies in many countries around
the world. Some of them cater purely for national
needs. Others have been developed to deal with the
requirements of a region 
- 
a very useful approach
where the demand for trained personnel in indivi-
dual countries is not sufficient to justify the consi-
derable financial outlay needed to establish such
institutions. IMO has also developed a series of
model courses for use in training academies.
101. While IMO supplies the expertise for these
projects, the finance comes from various sources.
The United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) is the most important of these, with other
international bodies such as LINEP contributing in
some cases. Individual countries also provide
generous funds or help in other ways 
- 
for
example, by providing training opportunities for
cadets and other personnel from developing coun-
tries. This has enabled IMO to build up a success-
ful fellowship programme which, over the years,
has helped to frain many thousands of people.
102. The most ambitious and exciting of all
IMO's technical assistance projects is the World
Maritime University at Malm6, Sweden, which
opened in 1983. Its objective is to provide high-
level naining facilities for personnel from develo-
ping countries who have already reached a relati-
vely high standard in their own countries but who
would benefit from further intensive training.
Many of those currently at the University have
served as captains or chief engineers at sea and
have moved into adminisffative positions ashore.
Others are teachers at maritime academies, exam-
iners or surveyors, technical port managers, and
so on. The University can train about 200 students
at a time on two-year courses. The University is
necessary because ftaining of the specialised type
provided at Malm6 is not available in developing
countries 
- 
or indeed anywhere else in the world.
It has proved to be so successful that since 1985 a
limited number of places have been made avail-
able to students from developed maritime nations.
103. IMO works through a number of specialist
committees and sub-committees. All these bodies
are composed of representatives of member states
who discharge their functions with the assistance
and advice of appropriate bodies of the United
Nations or the specialised agencies, as well as
international governmental and non-govemmen-
tal organisations with which formal relationships
have been established. Formal arrangements for
co-operation have been established with 33 inter-
governmental organisations, while 49 non-
governmental international organisations have
been granted consultative status to participate in
the work of various bodies in an observer capaci-
ty. If WEU is to engage fully in the realm of mari-
time co-operation, it must establish a working
relationship with the IMO.
(b) The Intemolinnal Hydmgraphio Organisatian
I0/. The International Hydrographic Organi-
sation is another intergovernmental consultative
and technical organisation. The object of the
organisation is to bring about:
(a) the co-ordination of the activities of
national hydrographic offices;
(b) the greatest possible uniformity in nau-
tical charts and documents;
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(c) the adoption of reliable and efficient
methods of carrying out and exploiting
hydrographic surveys;
(d) the development of the sciences in the
field of hy.drography ald.the tech-
niques employed in descriptive ocean-
ography.
105. Hydrography is the science of measuring
and depicting those parameters necessary to des-
cribe the precise nature and configuration of the
seabed, its geographical rdlationship to the land-
mass, and the characteristics and dynamics of the
sea. These parameters include bathymetry, tides,
currents, waves, physical properties of seawater,
geology and geophysics.
106. The primary use of the data collected is to
compile marine charts and other graphic docu-
ments to facilitate and ensure safety of navigation
formariners in all the seas of the world, and foruse
by others concerned with the marine environment
such as ocean engineers, (rceanographers, marine
biologists and environmental scientists. Among
the most important applications of hydrographic
knowledge is its use in the planning of exploration
and exploitation of marine resources, the determi-
nation of seaward limits of national jurisdiction,
and the delimitation of maritime boundaries.
107. International co-operation in the field of
hydrography began with a conference held in
Washington in 1899 and two others in Saint
Petersburg in 1908 andl9l2.In 1919, 24 nations
met in London for a Hydrographic Conference
during which it was decided that a permanent
body should be created. The resulting
International Hydrographic Bureau began its acti-
vity in l92l with 19 member states and with
headquarters in the Prinoipality of Monaco, to
which the Bureau had been invited by H.S.H.
Prince Albert I of Monaco.
108. In 1970, an intergovernmental convention
entered into force which changed the organisa-
tion's name and legal status, creating the
International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO),
with its headquarters (the IHB) permanently
established in Monaco. The organisation current-
ly has a membership of 58 maritime states
although a number of applications are pending.
109. The official representative of each member
government within the IHO is normally the natio-
nal Hydrographer, or Director of Hydrography,
and these persons, together with their technical
staff, meet at five-yearly intervals in Monaco for
an International Hydrographic Conference. The
conference reviews the progress achieved by the
organisation and adopts the programmes to be
pursued during the ensuing five-year period. A
Directing Committee of three senior hydrogra-
phers is elected to guide the work of the Bureau
during that time.
110. This Directing Committee, together with a
small international staff of technical experts in
hydrography and nautical cartography, co-ordi-
nates the technical programmes and provides
advice and assistance to member states. All mem-
ber states have an equal voice in arriving at agreed
solutions to problems of standardisation and in
programming the work of the Bureau, whilst any
member may initiate new proposals for IHO
consideration and adoption. Between conferences
such matters are nonnally accomplished by cor-
respondence.
111. The advent of the very large crude carrier
with its exceptionally deep draught, the recogni-
tion of the need to protect the marine environ-
ment, the changing maritime trade patterns, the
growing importance of seabed resources, and the
United Nations Law of the Sea Convention affec-
ting areas of national jurisdiction have all served
to highlight the inadequacies of the survey data
available to produce the existing nautical charts
and publications. Charts which served well just a
few years ago now require recompilation to incor-
porate new data and these data must be gathered
by hydrographic survey operations. The deficien-
cy is not limited to sparsely surveyed waters of
developing nations, but also exists in the coastal
waters of major industrial states. Fortunately,
technology has advanced to a point where new
insffuments and techniques greatly facilitate the
conduct of the precise and extensive surveys
required. Further, co-operation among the various
national charting agencies can serve to greatly
enhance the effectiveness of chart production and
navigational warning activities.
ll2. The IHB has played a particular r6le
during the Yugoslav crisis providing charts of
special interest for WEU/NATO operations in
the Adriatic in support of the United Nations
embargo.
VII. Navies and space
113. Satellites are proving an increasingly
important asset for naval forces 
- 
as well of
course as posing a potential threat.
Il4. In the first place the use of satellites for
meteorological purposes has led to a considerable
improvement in forecasting techniques 
- 
vital for
naval operations, especially aeromaritime. The
METEOSAT is probably the best-known system
but oceanographic satellites such as Topex-
Poseidon (a France-United States venture) not
only enhance standard weather forecasts, but are
also opening new possibilities in the realm of anti-
submarine warfare (sound-propagation, determi-
nation of sonar techniques, etc.). Submarine
detection possibilities are somewhat increased,
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forcing submarines themselves to become more
discreet but the seas are still far from being trans-
parent.
115. Navigation satellite networks such as
Navstar together with communication satellites
such as Skynet have also altered the pattern of
command at sea. The political authority as well as
the fleet commander has a much more complete
and accurate idea of the tactical picture, with
obvious implications for exercising strict control.
116. Optical observation satellites and those
designed for gathering electronic or signal intelli-
gence (Elint and Sigint) are not yet specially opti-
mised for naval tactical uses but with the develop-
ment of the radar satellite and with increasing
coverage and enhanced resolution space is brin-
ging similar advantages to naval operations as on
land.
117. WEU's own Satellite Centre at Torrej6n
has a particular potential r6le to play in develop-
ing many of the new capabilities which will have
an impact on naval operations. In addition the
procurement of the observation satellite system
currently envisaged as a result of the WEU feasi-
bility study should help enhance the scope for
European action in the naval domain.
VIII. WEa initiativesfor maritime
co-operation
(a) Aero-marilime nec e s s ilics
118. At the origin the Franco-Spanish-Italian
proposal of 7th September 1992 to constitute an
aero-maritime force capable of fulfilling missions
under the auspices of WEU was a comparatively
simple affair. The guiding principle was a desire
to co-ordinate aero-maritime forces so that a
maximum number of assets between the three
countries were available at any one time.
119. With only two fixed wing carriers (France)
and two short take-off and landing (STOL) car-
riers (one each to date for Italy and Spain) avai-
lable to WEU's three Mediterranean members it
was obviously important to ensure that long main-
tenance periods were staggered so that ship-avai-
lability was optimised. From that beginning it was
a short step to the planning of what would amount
to an on-call force to be constituted on an ad hoc
basis for a given operation.
120. The idea was germinating however just as
France and Germany were on the throes of trying
to work out the modalities for using the joint
European Corps and were facing considerable cri-
ticism from the alliance before eventually
agreeing a modus vivendi with SACEUR.
l2L. In an effort to avoid similar sniping over
the aero-maritime proposal, the idea was placed
very firmly on the WEU "table" and led in part to
the Combined Endeavour solution which has been
examined above. It must be admitted however
that Combined Endeavour is a somewhat anodyne
solution 
- 
a palliative which does Iittle to advance
the original idea and lets those nations which have
no intention of participating, for whatever
motives, off the hook.
122. While the proposal has been long in gesta-
tion in a Planning Cell which many believe has its
power for initiative too circumscribed by too
timid a Permanent Council, the world has moved
on. Or rather, United States ideas on maritime
strategy have had to shrink to match a reducing
defence budget. This phenomenon and its poten-
tial effect on European imperatives has not been
sufficiently taken into account in the WEU study.
I23. Secretary Aspin's 1993 "bottom-up
review" stated that "the United States Navy will
continue to patrol the Mediterranean Sea and
other waters surrounding Europe". The disguised
intention however was to accept long periods in
which the United States Navy would not have a
carrier in the Mediterranean at all. There would
also be considerable cuts in the numbers of ships
the United States would deploy in the
Mediterranean, North Atlantic and European
waters generally, and in the number and duration
of exercises.
124. The review did state that the United States
would try to make up for gaps in carrier coverage
by deploying either a "small" amphibious task
force (including AV-8B Harriers, Cobra attack
helicopters and a 2000-strong Marine
Expeditionary Brigade), or a task force based on a
Tomahawk missile-equipped Aegis destroyer
together with attack submarines and P-3 Orion
land-based maritime patrol aircraft. This was
referred to in the review as the srarcgy of "adap-
tive joint force packages" for future maritime
deployments.
125. Immediately after the "bottom-up review"
came the January 1994 NATO summit which
recognised the legitimacy of the European defen-
ce identity, seen by some as the start of a serious
United States disengagement from Europe, or at
best the return of the burden-sharing debate of the
mid-1980s, seen by others as the point to begin
flexing European muscles which had all but atro-
phied through lack of use...
126. For the countries which had originally pro-
posed the aero-maritime initiative the considera-
tion given it by WEU's Planning Cell is not the
response expected. Italy is already now sugges-
ting a ground element to complement the naval
and air components. The new idea has all the
makings of the European rapid action force the
Assembly has recommended for at least the last
three years or indeed the "European standing
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naval force with organic naval aviation including
air defence, airborne early warning, attack, anti-
submarine and heliborne assault assets for
deployment under single command and unified
control to areas outside the NAIO theatre where
Western Europ's security interests are at stake"
(Naval aviation , Document 1139, submitted on
behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr.
Wilkinson, Rapporteur, on 9th May 1988). Later
reports made specific recommendations on the
European rapid action force (State of European
security 
- 
intervention forces and reinforcement
for the cenffe and the North, Document ll83,26th
April 1989, Rapporteur: Mr. Speed, and WEU:
the operational organisation, Document 1307,
13th May 1992, Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith).
I27. The French force d'action rapide became
operational ten years ago, in 1984; Italy has very
up-to-date experience of quick reaction for United
Nations service in Mozambique and Somalia;
Spain in the Gulf and Adriatic and is developing a
rapid action capability which with that of its
Mediterranean neighbours would probably be of
greater use than making a fourth hand for the
European corps in Strasbourg. In addition, it
would be particularly disappointing if the United
Kingdom, with its naval experience and its ttree
STOL carriers, were not to be associated with the
elaboration of these ideas.
128. In passing, it is worthy of note that the
French Defence Minister no less, Mr. Frangois
L6otard, has recently wondered aloud whether it
would not be a more attractive option to "create
European intervention forces, commanded by a
European General Staff and which would be both
multinational and have integrated (air, land and
sea) forces". Mr. L6otard was speaking in Paris on
3rd March 1994 and linked the new plan to the
existing one for the creation of an air and naval
force irade up of French, Spanish and Italiair
units.
129. Your Rapporteur believes that it is only a
matter of time before such a force becomes a rea-
lity and urges the WEU Permanent Council to
charge the Planning Cell to examine more imagi-
native options as a matter of priority.
(b) Countering *ug tmffuking
130. While the European nations are slowly
tackling the problem of drug trafficking, trying to
prevent the plague hitting European shores,
United States officials running the Pentagon's
portion of the "drug war" are shifting their atten-
tion almost exclusively to combating cocaine at
the source in Latin America, rather than trying to
interdict the flow of illegal drugs across air and
sea routes into the United States or towards
Europe. The shift is due to a variety of factors,
including the relatively low volume of drugs sei-
zed in transit, United States budgetary constraints
and a variety of organisational and force structure
changes that emerged from the Pentagon's recent-
ly completed "bottom-up review".
131. The Pentagon's counternarcotics office
participated in a six-month government-wide
counternarcotics policy review earlier this year
and recently published a report detailing revisions
to the Department of Defense's counterdrug pro-
gramme. According to the review, although the
United States military will continue to be invol-
ved in the detection and monitoring of the drug-
smuggling aircraft and boats in the so-called tran-
sit zones 
- 
areas between the borders of the
narcotics source countries and those of the United
States 
- 
the equipment currently deployed will be
partially replaced by hardware that is less expen-
sive to operate and maintain.
I32. For example, instead of monitoring air
traffic with United States Air Force E-3 airborne
warning and control system (AWACS) and Navy
E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft,
the Pentagon will rely more on the relocatable
over-the-horizon radar (ROTHR) system.
ROTHR was originally developed by Raytheon
for early detection of incoming Soviet bombers
and ships, but was curtailed after the cold war
ended.
133. The 1988 Vienna Convention on the illicit
traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic sub-
stances requires police co-operation, and permits
boarding and seizure outside territorial waters
with prior permission of countries whose flag sus-
pected traffickers are flying (Articles 11 and 17).
Enforcement will require co-operation between
police, customs, coasf guards and navies, with the
latter particularly important for maritime and
aerial surveillance. A host of maritime co-opera-
tion activities are now under way, including co-
operation among European states on maritime and
aerial surveillance, co-operation between the
United States, Britain, and occasionally others in
the Caribbean, and several specific tailored cases
of co-operation elsewhere involving military aid
to civil ministries.
134. This may well provide an opportunity for
WEU itself to lend a hand to United States efforts.
When the Defence Committee visited the United
States in the summer of 1990 at the invitation of
the then Secretary Cheney, your Rapporteur dis-
cussed European co-operation with the United
States in the Caribbean. The idea would be to
build on the assets which France, Britain and the
Netherlands maintain in that part of the world: fri-
gates or corvettes based in the West lndies (some
of which were instrumental in helping the United
States apply the United Nations embargo on Haiti
last year). The danger from drug trafficking is an
obvious threat for European security and WEU
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with experience gained from its Danube opera-
tions would be well placed to take initiatives in
this domain.
135. Given reduced United States funding for
national measures as described above, Washing-
ton's present administration would certainly wel-
come a WEU proposal to help co-ordinate a
European effort in the Caribbean. In 1990 the res-
ponse was very warm from the Assistant
Secretary for Defense responsible in the Pentagon
for combating drug traffrcking, but less so from
the European side. Your Rapporteur has reason to
believe that the climate for WEU co-ordination
may well be changing and urges the Permanent
Council to address the suggestion as a matter of
urgency.
IX. Command and control of WEU naval and
maritime operations
(a) A little histary
136. When the Brussels Treaty was signed in
1948 and the Western Union came into being
there was of course an operational dimension to
the organisation which continued until NATO
itself was given the operational side completely,
in the mid-1950s. The original operations took the
form of mainly naval exercises which helped the
allied European navies maintain the co-operation
which had been born during the rigours of the
second world war. The Korean conflict also dis-
played a considerable maritime aspect.
137. With the advent of NATO the Western
Union command structures were superseded 
- 
the
bulk of the forces stationed in Europe came from
the United States and the two major commands
created 
- 
Allied Command Europe and Allied
Command Atlantic Ocean 
- 
were very firmly pla-
ced in the American orbit.
138. There was a particular anomaly in this
arrangement however in that the sea areas closest
to Europe (the Channel and the southern North
Sea) were left to the Europeans to command and
organise. From the beginning the Western Union
Chiefs of Staff had assumed responsibility for
these sea areas, delegating authority to the respec-
tive Chiefs of Naval Service from Belgium,
France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom,
who formed the Channel Committee and created
the Channel Command.
139. The reasoning behind the various decisions
taken then makes very interesting reading in the
modern context. On 6th December 1950, the
British Joint Planning Staff were reporting to the
Chiefs of Staff Committee on "Naval/Air
Command in the Channel and southern North Sea
area" in the following terms 2:
"The sea areas of the Channel and southern
North Sea under present plans, are not
included in the area of responsibility of
SHAPE or the Atlantic Ocean Command,
but are the responsibility of the Western
Union Chiefs of Staff.
As a result of the decisions which have
been taken to establish SHAPE and
SACAO, the command in the Channel and
Southern North Sea Area requires review to
bring it under NATO control, since
Holland, Belgium and France will no lon-
ger be able to represent their views through
the Western Union Chiefs of Staff.
In this connection the Dutch have recently
raised the question of whether the United
Kingdom to Holland convoys which are at
present the joint responsibility of the
United Kingdom/Dutch naval authorities,
should not now come under the Standing
Group since with the establishment of
SHAPE this area is not under any NATO
body.
They have further suggested that, in order
to effect this, the area should be included in
the NAOR.
In anticipation of instructions we have re-
examined the organisation of the NavaUAir
Command in the Channel and southern
North Sea area with a view to associating
the area with NATO. Our report is at
Annex, its conclusions are as follows:
(a) The Channel and southern North
Sea area should be a separate
command area under NATO
authority.
( b ) \\e Bnnsh Chiefs of Staff should
become the NATO authority res-
ponsible for the area, acting as
agents of the Standing Group.
(c) The British Chiefs of Staffshould
exercise control through the
Naval Commander-in-Chief
Home Station who would be the
responsible naval authority, and
through the Air Commander-in-
Chief Eastern Atlantic who
would be the responsible air
authority.
(d) The views of the continental
national authorities will be
represented at Chiefs of Staff
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level through accredited repre-
sentatives who should be the
Naval Attach6s. At the level of
Commander-in-Chief Home
Station the views of the conti-
nental countries will be repre-
sented by an integrated staff of
Dutch, Belgian and French offi-
cers.
(e) The views of SHAPE will be
represented at the Headquarters
of Commander-in-Chief Home
Station by a representative of
FOWE appointed to the integra-
ted staff.
(f) The Headquarters of Comman-
der-in-Chief Home Station should
remain at Portsmouth where the
Air Commander-in-Chief will be
represented by a liaison staff.
(g) The Command organisation for
the Channel and southern North
Sea area should be established in
peacetime.
(ft) Some of the existing staff of the
Naval Advisory Committee
should be absorbed into the staff
of the Commander-in-Chief
Home Station for planning pur-
poses.
The following appendices are attached:
(a) Appendix A: diagram showing
command structure with the
British Chiefs-of-Staff respon-
sible for the Channel southern
North Sea area acting as agents
of the Standing Group.
(b) Appendix B: map showing
boundaries of the British Home
Station command and Channel
southern North Sea area.
Recornmendation
We recommend that, if the Chiefs of Staff
approve our report, they should forward it
to the British representative on the Western
European Regional Planning Group for use
as a brief in discussions with the Dutch,
Belgian and French authorities with a view
to drawing up an agreed paper for presenta-
tion to the Standing Group."
l4O. By 14th November 1951 decisions were
ready but the Europeans were having to resist a
United States "takeover":
" P roposals for a NATO Chnnnel Command
The Channel and southern North Sea is an
area which was originally covered by the
plans of the Western European Regional
Planning Group. On the dissolution of the
WERPG this area was not allocated either
to the NAOR or to SHAPE and was not the-
refore within any NAIO Command. Since
the area is of vital importance to the
European countries bordering it, these
countries would not accept any command
organisation for this area which did not
give them representation in matters directly
concerning this area. Hence the Channel
Committee on which these nations would
be represented was set up to act as agents of
the Standing Group.
A proposed Command organisation based
largely on United Kingdom draft proposals
was therefore submitted to the Standing
Group by the Western Region Naval
Advisory Committee. Except for minor
amendments this proposed organisation has
been incorporated in the Standing Group
paper. All amendments have been discus-
sed fully and agreed to by the Chiefs of
Staff.
Terms of Reference for Allied Commander-
in-Chief Channel
The Chiefs of Staff approved the draft
terms of reference before they were consi-
dered by the Channel Committee who in
turn approved and forwarded the report to
the Standing Group. The final draft submit-
ted by the Standing Group to the Military
Representatives met our requirements and
was acceptable.
Last minute amendments have, however,
been submitted by the United States. Some
of these are of a minor nature and have been
included in the report. On the ottrer hand the
United States have also proposed two major
amendments which, although not in the pre-
sent report, they will probably submit to ttre
Military Committee. These are:
(a) that SACLANT will as a matter
of principle retain operational
control of his forces when they
enter the Channel area.
(b) that Commander-in-Chief
Channel should communicate
direct with the Standing Group
on operational matters.
We are prepared to accept (b) if necessary
but we think it unlikely that it will be
accepted by the French and Dutch.
We are not prepared to accept (a) above and
consider that it should be strongly resisted
since the Allied Commander-in-Chief
Channel must have overriding authority in
the Channel area."
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(b) A particular paradox
l4l. The Europeans achieved their aim in 1951
and Allied Command Channel was duly estab-
lished (at first in Portsmouth, subsequently at
Northwood, near London), with a British
Commander-in-Chief on equal terms with the
other two major NATO Commanders (MNC). The
situation has continued from that day to this but
the particular paradox is that the Channel
Command is about to be abolished (at the end of
June 1994!).
I42. This is taking place at the very moment that
the European defence identity is recognised by
NATO, and especially the United States, as legiti-
mate. The decision to downgrade the single
European MNC was perhaps taken from the best
of motives, in an attempt to save costs and ration-
alise NAIO command structures. Nevertheless
the effect is very unfortunate at best, if not deci
dedly negative.
I43. The only plus factors in this saga are the
decisions of the members of the Channel
Committee not to abandon their independent rOle
and to continue to meet and ensure the continuity
of European interest in this important area.
144. In addition the British Secretary of State for
Defence has declared that the joint headquarters at
Northwood (where Commander-in-Chief
Channel is currently established) would be made
available as an HQ for WEU operations if requi-
red. It is worth considering, as a matter of urgen-
cy, whether the Channel Command should not
rather purely and simply revert to its original
European dimension with Western European
Union taking over a similar responsibility to that
originally assumed by the Western Union.
(c) WBU Marifime Headqaarterc
145. The precedent for now proposing the estab-
lishment of a "WEU Element" at Northwood, to
work alongside what will continue to be the
NATO Eastern Atlantic Command, is of course
the "WEU Element" already established with
another NATO sub-command: CINCSOUTH/
COMNAVSOUTH in Naples. This latter organi-
sation has been very successful in running
NATO/WEU operations in the Adriatic. It could
perhaps be developed to form the nucleus of a
"WEU Maritime Headquarters (Mediterranean)"
in Naples to match the "WEU Maritime
Headquarters (Atlantic/Channel)" at Northwood.
146. The move would be logical in the sense of
giving credence to the combined joint task force
concept by providing a ready-made liaison ele-
ment in two important maritime regions. Similar
arangements could be envisaged for land and air
headquarters.
147. Nations would provide staff on a regional
basis also: French, British German, Dutch,
Portuguese and Belgian officers already serve on
the Northwood staff, as do French, British, Italian,
Spanish, German and Greek officers in Naples.
Staff might be "double-hatted" NATO/IVEU to
prevent duplication of numbers.
148. Such regional headquarters would liaise
closely with the WEU Planning Cell in Brussels
and provide a much-needed operational link to
ensure a more practical input into the Planning
Cell's sometimes theoretical studies. NATO
would also gain from the arrangement through the
increased transparency with WEU which would
result. It would also be of particular advantage for
making the NATO infrastructure available for
WEU, as decided at the January summit.
149. If the WEU and North Atlantic Councils
decide to pursue this idea they should do so with
some alacrity. The Commander-in-Chief Channel
will haul down his flag at Northwood on 30th
June this year. With full analysis of the proposal
and prompt decision-making it might even be pos-
sible to raise the WEU flag at Northwood before
NATO's Commander-in-Chief Channel has put
his own flag into a museum...
150. France's r6le is pivotal in these considera-
tions with a sea board on both the Atlantic and
Mediterranean and a tradition of worldwide mari-
time presence. French goodwill and support for
these ideas is essential if they are to be adopted
and developed. French participation at the highest
level recently in the Channel Committee and a
lasting and robust commitment (much more so
than other supposedly more "NATO-minded"
nations) to United Nations and WEU operations
augurs well.
151. Another initiative for the WEU
Mediterranean members would be for them to
form a "Mediterranean Committee" along the
lines of the present Channel Committee which
would expand slightly to include Germany and
perhaps Norway and Denmark. Ideally such
committees would turn their attention to the wider
maritime issues in their regions and in turn liaise
with each other to build up the WEU-wide naval
and maritime picture.
(d) The Heah of European Navics
I52. In fact this latter body already exists,
although in very informal fashion. For over five
years now the Heads of European Navies have
been meeting on a regular basis to "exchange
ideas". Such a grouping has no "legal entity" at
present and is not subject either to political gui-
dance or parliamentary control. For the future it
could well be developed along the same lines as
the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHODS)
t
I
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Committee which meets on a regular basis and
especially prior to WEU Ministerial Council mee-
tings.
153. It is to be hoped that once WEU policy has
been agreed by ministers on a maritime issue ela-
borated in the Planning Cell, it is passed for
implementation via the CHODS to the service res-
ponsible. Consultation between the single service
chiefs on a WEU-wide basis is therefore to be
encouraged and the Heads of European Navies
forum might well be replicated by both WEU
armies and air forces, just as the Heads of WEU
Defence Procurement Organisations meet in the
Western European Armaments Group.
X. The way forward
(a) Dialogue with the Council
1,54. While much of the tenor of the present
report is designed to encourage the WEU
Ministerial Council, the Permanent Council and
the various instruments of WEU to take greater
initiatives towards a reinf0rcing of co-operation
in security and defence in Europe, it would be
very remiss not to pay a parficular tribute for what
has already been achievedi In the six and a half
years your Rapporteur has had the honour to be a
member of the WEU Assembly, the organisation
has undergone a step change in terms of both
theory and practice, as well as in the development
of an efficient pragmatism.
155. Of course the member governments of
WEU must take credit for giving their support and
successive Ctrairmen-in-Office have given added
impetus to progress over the past few years. But in
addition the small number of individuals who
serve the various instances of WEU 
- 
Assembly,
Secretariat General, Plahning Cell, Satellite
Centre, Institute for Security Studies, WEAG
Secretariat 
- 
do so with much "devotion to duty".
Their small numbers 
- 
circa 100 until just 18
months ago when, with the creation of the
Planning Cell and the Satellite Centre, numbers of
permanent staff doubled to 200 
- 
and the low bud-
get of the whole organisati,ron bear witness to the
cost efficiency of WEU in relation to most other
international bodies.
156. As essentially an intergovernmental organi-
sation WEU relies a great deal on those who come
from national ministries to contribute to the
various committees, although with the move to
Brussels many are now beginning to serve in
national permanent delegations. The uniformed
services also are being exposed increasingly to
WEU and what it stands for as they take part in
operations under WEU auspices.
157. In passing and in this context your
Rapporteur should draw attention to the fact that
the Council has recently accepted the Assembly's
proposal that those serving under the WEU flag(which now does exist, again thanks to the
Assembly's prompting!) should wear a distingui-
shing badge. Thus, individuals on the Danube (in
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania), in the Adriatic
and in Naples wear the WEU insignia; ships in the
Adriatic and patrol craft on the Danube fly the
flag. It therefore would now be appropriate to take
a further step: why not award a WEU "campaign
medal" to all those (servicemen and women, poli-
ce, customs officials, etc.) who have served in
WEU operations for a specific period? The
Assembly has shown the way with the presenta-
tion of its medallion to Admirals Bonnot and
Mariani for their conduct respectively of WEU
operations in the Gulf and Adriatic.
158. Just as the Council has seen fit to accept an
increasing number of specific recommendations
emanating from the Assembly over recent years,
it has also now begun to heed requests for more
detailed information both in the annual report and
in replies to written questions. In particular the
reporting on the various operations currently
under way on the Danube and in the Adriatic has
been explicit (c.f. the answer to Written Question
323 put by Mr. De Decker:
Question:
On 6th October 1993, the French weekly
information letter, TTU, gave the following
information:
"Six Romanian barges transporting
oil violated the international embar-
go on Serbia under the nose of WEU
observers in Calafat (Romanian-
Serb frontier).
Officially destined for the Romanian
port of Turnu-Severin, 80 km up-
stream on the Danube, the barges
transporting 4 415 tonnes of petrol
and I 334 tonnes of fuel oil were
unloaded at the port of Prahovo, on
the Serbian bank, near the Iron Gates
lock. Similar violations had already
occurred last January when barges
from Ukraine repelled by Serb ves-
sels had unloaded at Prahovo".
1. Can the Council confirm the truth of this
violation of the embargo? Can it confirm
the Romanian nationality of the barges?
2. If so, why was the WEU unit on the
Danube not able to prevent this violation?
3. Why does the Council continue to refu-
se to publish the list of violations noted on
the Danube and in the Adriatic whereas, in
the absence of coercive means, such publi-
cation would be the only democratic means
of pressure to deter these violations?
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Answer:
1. The Council did indeed receive
information to the effect that a convoy of
six barges which, in early September, were
heading for the Romanian port of Turnu-
Severin, did not arrive at their destination.
This was a Romanian convoy known as
Giurgiu 18 belonging to the Navrom com-
pany.
2. The WEU Danube mission is carried
out on the basis of memoranda of under-
standing concluded between WEU and
each of the three riparian states concerned.
The memoranda are based on the relevant
resolutions of the United Nations Security
Council. They set out the mandate for the
mission and the tasks needed to accomplishit. The memoranda are substantially the
same, the one concluded with Romania
being the most significant as regards the
incident referred to by the reference ques-
tion. It contains the following stipulations:
"Article 1
3. (...) In fulfrlling their tasks, WEU
personnel will act under the general
autlority of Romania, which has the
main responsibility for ensuring
strict implementation of the relevant
United Nations Security Council
Resolutions, and on a basis of mutual
agreement.
4. The support given to Romania by
WEU member states will consist of
patrol boats, appropriate personnel
and the necessary equipment (...).
Article III
3. A control area will be established
on the territory of Romania at
Calafat, and an additional checking
point will be established in Galati
(...)".
The memorandum indicates that
WEU is providing technical assistan-
ce to Romania in the form of person-
nel and equipment and that its mis-
sion is being carried out on the
Danube downstream of Calafat. The
checks carried out are designed to
deter and, if necessary, to detect or
even thwart any attempt at violation
on this section of the'Danube. On
the section upstream of Calafat,
which is much shorter than the
downstream seclion, there is a cer-
tain amount of cabotage traffic.
WEU has no authority over this traf-
fic since it is not covered by the rele-
vant resolutions."
3. Only the United Nations is compe-
tent to publish information on the violation
of an embargo imposed on the basis of
United Nations resolutions.
159. Your Rapporteur's previous report, prepa-
red jointly with Mr. Giinter Marten, on "An ope-
rational organisation for WEU: naval co-opera-
tion 
- 
Part One: Adriatic Operations", prompted a
positive and reasonably rapid response from the
Council. The following comments in particular
are gerTnane:
"I. At the meeting of the Council of
Ministers in Luxembourg on 22nd
November 1993, Ministers agreed that the
relevant statements in Part I of their declara-
tion were intended as a European contribu-
tion to the alliance summit. The NATO
summit gave its full support to the develop
ment of the European security and defence
identity which, as envisaged in the
Maasricht Treaty, in the longer term pers-
pective of a common defence policy within
the European Union, might in time lead to a
corrmon defence, compatible with that of
the Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly, the
European allies will take greater responsibi-
lity for their common security and defence.
2. The NATO summit made clear that
the Sixteen stood ready to make collective
assets of the alliance available to WEU, on
the basis of consultations in the North
Atlantic Council, for operations undertaken
by the European allies within the frame-
work of joint actions under the common
foreign and security policy of the European
Union. Better European co-ordination and
planning will strengthen the European
pillar and the alliance itself.
Translated into military terms, this will
mean in particular the setting-up of combi
ned joint task forces (CJTF) able to serve
under both WEU and NATO commands for
specific peace-keeping operations for
example, including operations with coun-
. fies outside the alliance such as the coun-
tries of the WEU Forum of Consultation or
the countries signatory to the partnership'
for peace.
The WEU Council is considering the prac-
tical arrangements for the use of these com-
bined joint task forces as part of its own
operations, and also the procedure under
which they might be made available.
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3. An appropriate working budget for
the two WEU staff elements working with
COMNAVSOUTH staff in Naples and for
the COMWEUMARFOR in the Adriatic is
under consideration.
5. The Council confirms that WEU
member states support the Adriatic opera-
tions with all the means at their disposal.
The Council pursues an active public infor-
mation policy to ensure the ffansparency of
the combined NAIO and WEU operations,
thereby contributing to a better understan-
ding of WEU's action.
7. The Councilhas placed on its agenda
consideration of the possibility of using the
naval assets of the member states of the
WEU Forum of Consultation as part of the
operations in the Adriatic. Such participa-
tion is to be seen in the context of the
enhanced status which the Council plans to
propose to the consultation partners. Co-
operation of this kind between WEU and its
consultation partners is among the mea-
sures curently being studied as part of the
work on the enhanced status, soon to be
proposed to the consultation partner coun-
tries."
160. In addition the Council paid tribute to the
men and women involved in the Adriatic opera-
tions and joined the President of the Assembly in
sending a Christmas message to express "great
appreciation to WEU personnel engaged in the
Danube and Sharp Guard operations for their
dedication and achievement".
161. Elsewhere the Council responded quickly
to the President of the Assembly's message rela-
ting to the first official ship visit by the WEU
Flotilla and the need to maintain WEU assets:
"The President of the Western European
Union Assembly, Sir Dudley Smith, MP,
welcomed the news of a first offrcial visit
by WEU's Contingency Maritime Force to
Taranto from 5th to 9th March.
The three frigates: 7-efftro (Italy), Cassard
(France) and Cataluna (Spain), are partici-
pating in the embargo operations in the
Adriatic, flying the WEU flag. The WEU
force comprises five ships at present, under
the command of Rear Admiral Bolongaro
(Italy) and is fully integrated into the com-
bined NAIOAilIEU Operation Sharp Guard
which was established in the Adriatic on
14th June 1993.
The three frigates rejoined the operational
zone on 10th March.
The President of the Assembly expressed
the hope that the WEU Permanent Council
and member governments would ensure
that the necessary material and human
resources are made available to maintain
the effectiveness of the Adriatic opera-
tions."
162. The Council has "charged WEU military
delegates with monitoring the rotation of WEU
personnel"; your Rapporteur ffusts that given the
recommendations expressed elsewhere that such
monitoring will prove effective. The use of the
military delegates as a WEU "military commit-
tee" is a welcome initiative as is the news in the
annual report that the rules of engagement for
Adriatic operations have been approved jointly
with the NATO Council.
163. The beginning of a relationship with
European Union is also evident in the annual
report, especially with regard to the situation in
former Yugoslavia:
"The Belgian Representative, on behalf of
the Presidency of the Twelve, regularly
briefed the Permanent Council on the activi-
ties and d6marches of the European
Community aimed at reaching a peaceful
solution to the conflict in former Yugoslavia.
The Permanent Council has closely moni-
tored developments on the ground, its dis-
cussions focusing on the implementation of
the Danube embargo, participation of naval
forces of WEU member states in the
Adriatic embargo, and the possible invol-
vement of WEU in the EC's administration
of the Mostar district. The activities of the
Experts' Groups and the Mostar Working
Group, in co-operation with the Planning
Cell, dealt mainly with this possibility.
The Presidency has regularly briefed the
Council on developments in the WEU
Danube operation. The Council has for
example discussed the various measures
taken to ensure effective co-ordination bet-
ween the WEU and SAM teams and it has
also discussed the funding of the opera-
tions. These discussions have enabled the
Council to gauge problems which may
recur in similar operations. The Presidency
has regularly taken part in the Vienna mee-
tings of the Sanctions Liaison Group."
164. Much remains to be done however, ideally
along the lines detailed throughout the present
report and in the draft recommendations.
(b) Relations with the wider world
165. Your Rapporteur has urged a variety of
wider contacts and co-operation in the naval and
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maritime domain in an effort to improve WEU's
operational organisation.
166. Suggestions range from co-operation with
the United Nations's burgeoning military organi-
sation and United Nations maritime subdivisions
in particular through to naval links with those
maritime nations amongst the WEU Forum of
Consultation member countries. In addition, the
naval and maritime assets of some of the new
members of the European Union are not negli-
gible.
167. Last but not least your Rapporteur would
like to highlight six countries with which WEU
would be wise to establish relations in the near to
mid-term.
168. In the Mediterranean Malta and Cyprus
represent not only a traditional interest strategi-
cally but also specific maritime advantages. Both
countries are developing special links with
European Union and may well soon be in a posi
tion to request a statute vis-i-vis WEU. Malta
hosts the United Nations's Law of the Sea
Institute which is taking students from all over the
world. Malta also possesses an excellent infra-
structure of naval facilities hard to match in the
Mediterranean area which are somewhat under-
utilised. Cyprus is developing the use of its flag
for a growing merchant marine which has already
proved invaluable for replenishment operations
during the Gulf conflict.
169. Amongst the states of the southern hemis-
phere both Argentina and Australia have shown a
particular willingness to co-operate in a wider
naval arena and both countries took part alongside
WEU in embargo operations in the Gulf or Red
Sea in 1991192. Both are strategically placed in
their respective parts of the world as is South
Africabetween the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.
The Simonstown naval base has had a particular
importance in days gone by and might well have
again in the future. South Africa's new demo-
cracy will allow a greater participation on the
international maritime scene. The growing impor-
tance of the Cape route heralds a much-needed
development of the Naval Control of Shipping
Organisation which was designed originally by
the western allies to monitor and conftol merchant
marine routes and convoys and whose representa-
tives South Africa has continued to host over the
years.
l7O. In the Pacific, Japan's naval and maritime
assets are developing considerably. Japan (as well
as Germany, of course) sent mine-hunting vessels
out of ftaditional areas to co-operate with WEU in
mine-sweeping operations in the Gulf at the end
of the conflictin 1991192.
l7I. Overall there is no escaping the fact which
permeates the whole of the present repor[ naval
and maritime co-operation is generally much
easier than any other. WEU nations individually
and the organisation as a whole should be ready to
co-operate whenever possible with all states
which seek naval and/or maritime links: it is very
difficult to predict when such links may prove
vital for future WEU operations. Europe's naval
and maritime interests are worldwide 
- 
WEU's
should be also, with a naval and maritime opera-
tional structure to match.
172. Your Rapporteur has tried to demonstrate in
the present report that WEU naval and maritime
operational co-operation is already "alive and
well" but that there is room for improvement and
greater efficiency. A number of recommendations
are designed to widen the naval and maritime
remit of WEU in general and the Planning Cell in
particular. Without a coherent strategy for naval
and maritime affairs WEU is likely to be slow to
react, either as the European pillar of NAIO or as
the operational arm of European Union. Recent
history has proved the efficacy of action at sea in
a series of conflicts where WEU has been very
much to the fore. Let us ensure that our operatio-
nal organisation is properly equipped and ready to
meet similar naval and maritime challenges in the
future.
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APPENDX I
Composition of WEU navies
B F D I NL P E UK
Total armed forces 80 700 41r 600 287 WO 344 600 74 600 50 700 200700 2748W
Navy 4 400 65 400 3t 200 43 600 14 900 12 500 32 000 59 300
Submarines
t9
(s ssBN
6 SSN
8 SS')
20 SS' 8 SS' 5 SSI 3 SS' 8 SS' 18
(3 SSBN
13 SSN
2 SS')
Principal surface
combatants
3FF 42(2CY
ICC
4DD
3s FF)
l4
(6 DD
8 FF)
28(1CV
1CC
4DD
22FF)
t7
(4 DD
13 FF
I1 FF t6(l cv
l5 FF)
40
(3 CV
12DD
2s FF)
Patrol and coastal
combatants 25 38 l8 30 28 26
Mine warfare vessels 13 2t 4t t2 2t t2 30
Amphibious
3 LPD
1 LSD
5 LSM
34 LCM
8 LCT
11 LCU
/LCM
2LPD
3 LCU
3 LCM
12LCA 3 LCU
13 LCM
2 LST
3 LCT
2LCU
8 LCM
2LPD
5 LST
19 LCU
Support and miscellaneous 3 37 40 42 t3 8 28 32
Naval air arm/
Maritime air I n"t
lO7 ac
40 hel
115 ac
l9 hel
2ac
89 hel
13 ac
22hel in"t
2l ac
28 hel
42 ac
153 hel
Key
B=F=
DI=
NLP=E=
UK
SS'
SSBN
SSN
CV
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Ponugal
Spain
United Kingdom
submarine(s) (tactical)
nuclear-fuelled ballistic-missile
submarine(s)
nuclear-fuelled submarine(s)
(tactical)
aircraft carrier(s)
CC
DD
FF
ac
hel
LCA
LCU
LCM
LSD
LPD
LSM
LST
LCT
cruiser(s)
destroyer(s)
frigate(s)
combat aircraft
helicopter(s)
landing craft, assault
landing craft, utility
landing craft, mechanised
landing ship, dock
landing platform, dock
landing ship, medium
landing ship, tank
landing craft, tank
Source: IISS Military Balance 1993-94 (modified and uPdated)
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APPENDIX II
WEaINATO Operation Sharp Guard
Missian
To conduct operations to monitor and
enforce compliance with United Nations sanc-
tions in accordance with United Nations Security
Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 713,757,787 and
820. Combined Task Force 440, in particular, pre-
vents all unauthorised shipping from entering the
territorial waters of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
Achievements
During Operation Sharp Guard, over
19 000 merchant vessels have been challenged.
Of them, over 1 850 have been halted and inspec-
ted, or diverted to a port for inspection. As a result
of the co-ordinated efforts of the forces which
have operated under NAIO and WEU, I O32mer-
chant vessels were halted and boarded 
- 
or diver-
ted to a port for inspection 
- 
fromZZndNovember
1992 to 15th June 1993, when Operation Sharp
Guard began. During the same period 12 367 mer-
chant vessels were challenged. Therefore, an
overall total ofover 31 000 ships have been chal-
lenged so far, with over 3 000 inspected or diver-
ted. These results have been possible thanks to
over 5 400 ship days spent at sea, over 3 500 sor-
ties by MPA aircraft and over 2 500 sorties by
NATO airborne early warning aircraft.
After the United Nations Security Council
strengthened the embargo against Serbia and
Montenegro with Resolution 820 in April 1993,
no ship has been able to break the embargo.
History
In July 1992, forces operating under NAIO
and WEU, working in strict co-ordination, began
monitoring in the Adriatic Sea the compliance of
resolutions of the United Nations Security
Council against former Yugoslavia (Operations
Maritime Monitor and Sharp Vigilance). On22nd
November 1992 both operations were amplified
in scope to include the enforcement of relevant
United Nations resolutions (Operations Maritime
Guard and Sharp Fence).
On 8th June 1993 the Councils of NATO
and WEU, at a joint session, reviewed the embar-
go operations and approved a combined concept
of operations for the implementation of United
Nations Resolution 820, which strengthened the
existing embargos against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This
concept included a single command and control
iurangement for the combined Operation Sharp
Guard under the authority of the Councils of both
organisations. The operation began on 15th June
t993.
Nations c ontributing forc e s
Nations contributing forces at the moment
are: Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey,
United Kingdom, United States.
Organisation
The overall operational control is delegated
to General Mario Angeli, Italian Navy, as
Commander, Combined Task Force 440 (CCTF
440). He is assisted by Rear Admiml Gianfranco
Coviello, Italian Navy, as Deputy CCTF 440.
Admiral Angeli is the Commander of Allied
Naval Forces Southern Europe. As CCTF 440, his
staff has been complemented by a WEU staff
element.
Surface ships operate under two operatio-
nal combined task groups (CTG) at sea to conduct
operations in the Adriatic Sea. A thfud task group
has responsibility for ships conducting fiaining or
port visits. Operational responsibilities rotate
among the task group commanders. Currently, the
two operational CTG commanders are Commo-
dore Alastair Ross, UKN, and Rear Admiral Elio
Bolongaro,Italian Navy, who is also Commander
of WEU's "Contingency Maritime Force". The
third task group is commanded by Rear Admfual
James R. Stark, United States Navy.
Maritime Patrol Aircraft operate under
operational control of CCTF 440 through the
Commander of Combined Task Force 431, Rear
Admird John Coleman, United States Navy.
Participating forces
Surface ships:
HMCS Halifax (F 330), frigate
(Canada);
HMCS Preserver (D 280), support
ship (Canada);
HMDS Peter Tordenskiold (F 356),
frigate (Denmark);
FS Premier Maiffe L'Her (F 792),fi-
gate (France);
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FS Georges Leygues (D 640), des-
ftoyer (France);
FGS Augsburg (F 213), frigate
(Germany);
HS Kimon (D 218), destroyer
(Greece);
ITS Aliseo (F 574), frigate (Italy);
ITS Chimera (F 556), corvette(Itdy);
ITS Lupo (F 564), frigate (Italy);
HNLMS van Kinsbergen (F 809),
frigate (The Netherlands);
HNLMS Jacob v. Heemskerk
(F 812), frigate (The Netherlands);
HNOMS Narvik (F 304), frigate
(Nonvay);
NRP Corte Real (F 332), frigate
(Portugal);
SPS Cataluna (F 73), frigate (Spain);
SPS Santa Maria (F 8l), frigate
(Spain);
TCG Turgutreis (D 241), destroyer
(Turkey);
HMS Birmingham (D 86), frigate
(United Kingdom);
HMS Chatham (F 87), frigate
(United Kingdom);
USS Comte De Grasse (DD 974),
destroyer (United States);
USS Bainbridge (CGN 25), cruiser
(United States).
CTF 440 is also supported by the United States
AEGIS cruiser USS Philippine Sea (CG 58).
Fighter aircraft
Eight Italian Air Force Tornado aircraft are
available to support Operation Sharp Guard from
their home base at Gioia del Colle. These aircraft
can contribute to the defence of ships from attacks
from surface ships. Other aircraft from allied
forces operating in the area also contribute to this
support.
M aritim e p atr o I air c raft
Continuous maritime air paffol support to
the naval forces of CTF 440 is provided with
assets from nine NATO and WEU nations:
Canada (CP-140 Aurora), France (Atlantique),
Germany (Atlantique), Italy (Atlantique), the
Netherlands (P-3C), Portugal (P-3P), Spain
(P-3B), United Kingdom (Nimrod), United States
(P-3C). The above aircraft operate from the air
bases at Sigonella (Sicily) and Elmas (Sardinia),
in Italy.
NATO airborne early warning
Eight E-3A and two E-3D from NATO's
Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF) are sup-
porting Operation Sharp Guard, as well as NAIO
Operation Deny Flight. The E-3A aircraft are
flown, from their home bases at Geilenkirchen,
Germany, and forward operating bases at Aviano
and Trapani, Italy, and Preveza, Greece, by multi-
national crews provided by eleven NATO nations
(Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey
and the United States). The E-3D aircraft from the
United Kingdom's Number 8 Squadron operate
from their home base at Royal Air Force Station
Waddington, United Kingdom, as well as Aviano
and Trapani, Italy. French E-3F aircraft operating
from the French air base in Avord and Italian air
base at Trapani under the auspices of WEU are
also participating.
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Amendmentslr2 and 3
14th June 1994
An operational organisation for W BU :
naval and maritime co-operation
AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 3'
tabled by Mr. Lopez Henares
1. Draft paragraph? of the draft recommendation as follows:
" Establish a working relationship on maritime matters with the European Commission's Directo-
rate for Maritime Transport. Develop links in order to exchange information with appropriate inter-
national maritime agencies such as the International Maritime Organisation and the International
Hygrographic Organisation, as well as with maritime-orientated non-member countries in strategic
areas. "
2. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " and maritime ".
3. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " merchant ship construction and spe-
cialist requirements for both numbers and types of merchant ship as well as safeguards for recruiting and
training appropriate crews ".
Signed: lnpez Hennres
l. See 5th sitting, l5th June 1994 (amendments withdrawn).
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Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure
of the Assembly in view of the creation
of a status of associate member
REPORT'
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges'
by Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DRAFI Dpclsron
on the revision of the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly with
a view to the creation of a status of associate member
ExpLnNlronv MSN,IoRANDLTM
submitted by Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur
I. Generalconsiderations
U. Amendments to the rules of the Assembly
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Thompsoz (Chairman);MM. Amaral, Ferrarini (Vice-Chairmen);MrsAguiar, MlvI. Battis-
tuzzi, Bolinaga, Mrs. Brasseur, MM. Couveinhes (Alternate Alloncle),_Cuco, Deniau (Altemate: Briale\, Dicks, Lord Finsberg,
MM..Hughei (Alternate: Gothnan), Junghanns, lrjeune, Mignon, Ottenbourgh, Sainz_Gar-cia (Altemate: Mrs. Sanchez de
Miguet),5cheei, von Schmude, Mrs. Soutendijk van Appeldoorn, Mr. Stoffelen, Mrs. Terborg, MM. Trabacchini, Van der
Maelen, Visibelli.
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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L
Drafi Decisian
on the revision of the Clurter and Rules of Procedure
of the Assembly wilh a view to the creation of
a stotus of associate member
The Assembly
DBcross
To revise the Charter of the Assembly, as revised by Decision 11, as follows:
At the end of Article II, add a new paragraph (c) as follows:
"(c)The Assembly shall admit delegations of representatives and substitutes from the parliaments
of each associate member state of WEU and grant them prerogatives appropriate to the p-articipation
of those states in the activities of WEU without voting rights in the Assembly."
To revise the Rules of Procedure, as revised by Decision 11, as follows:
In Rule 15, paragraph 3, delete "without voting rights".
In Rule 17:
(a) Paragraph 1: replace "These representatives" by "The members of these delegations".
(b) Paragraph2 (a): replace "representatives of associate member states" by "associate members of
the Assembly".
(c) Paragtaph2 (b): replace "representatives of associate member states" by "associate members of
the Assembly".
(d) Delete (d), (e),(f) md(il.
(e) Add a new paragraph (d) as follows:
"Associate members of the Assembly of WEU may request that a consultative vote be taken,
enabling them to express their opinion on any text adopted by the Assembly. Such a vote shall
be consultative, but never indicative. This request must be tabled by at least three associate
members of the Assembly. In voting in committee, it will be sufficient for such request to be
tabled by only one associate member of the Assembly. Voting by associate members will take
place immediately after the result of voting in the Assembly or the committee is announced and
will be held in accordance with the provisions of Rule 36.1 , 2 and 3 of the Rules of Procedure. "
(fl Former paragraph (ft) becomes pangraph (e).
In Rule 38, delete paragraph4.
II.
l.
2.
3.
N.B. Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure as amended by Decision I I is Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure in the 1991 version and
Rule 38 is former Rule 37.
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Exphnatory Memorandum
(submitted by Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur)
I. Ge ne ral c onside ratio ns
1. During the second pan of the thirty-ninth
ordinary session of the Assembly, the Committee
on Rules of Procedure and Privileges tabled a
draft decision proposing amendments to the Char-
ter and Rules of hocedure of the Assembly, to
take account of the creation by the Council of
associate member status of WEU for three NATO
member countries: Icelan4 Norway and Turkey
(Document 1390). Your Rapporteur, at the time of
preparing the preliminary draft decision, drew
upon Order 85 on the enlargement of WEU, adop-
ted by the Standing Committee in Rome on 19th
April 1993, which invited the Committee on
Rules of Procedure and Privileges:
"to examine the creation of a specific "asso-
ciate member" status for representatives of
associate member states which will give
full participation and voting rights in com-
mittees and the right to participate in the
plenary sessions of the Assembly with
membership of delegations on the same
basis as the present Council of Europe
arangements;"
2. A thorough study was made by the commit-
tee and the draft decision tabled complied with
this brief by defining a status for those delegations
that corresponded as closely as possible to that
offered by the Council to goveflrment delegations
of associate member countries, as defined by the
Council in its Reply to Written Question 300. The
Assembly adopted Decision 11 subject, however,
to two amendments which destroyed its coherence
by denying the parliamentary representatives of
these countries voting rights in plenary session,
and also, owing to the fact that paragraphll3.2 (e)
was not amended in committee, even within the
limits the Committee on Rules of Procedure and
Privileges had felt should be permitted.
3. The Assembly's rules were therefore amen-
ded by this decision but the new rules have not
come into effect, since Decision 11 stipulated that
this would not occur until the date on which the
status of WEU associate members itself came into
force. The Presidential Committee, which was
instructed under Order 85 to co-ordinate the work
of the various committees on matters relating to
the enlargement of WEU, noting that the balance
proposed by the Committee on Rules of Proce-
dure and Privileges had been profoundly altered
by the amendment adopted by the Assembly, ins-
tructed that committee to re-examine the question
with respect to the rules as amended.
4. In point of fact the text of Decision 11, as
adopted, presents a number of contradictions: it
denies voting rights in plenary session to associ-
ate members of the WEU Assembly (Decision 11,
paragraphs I.2 and II.2) but defines the manner in
which they vote U1.3.2 (e)1, excludes them from
voting under certain circumstances [II.3.2 (b) and
11.3.2 (f)) and does not comply with Order 85
which stipulated that the delegations of associate
member countries had full participation and
voting rights in committee UI3.z (e)1. Since
Decision 1l does not grant associate members of
the Assembly voting rights in plenary session, the
draft decision as a whole submitted by the Com-
mittee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges
needed to be revised, since it was based on the
granting of voting rights restricted to certain ques-
tions. If those associate members can no longer
participate in Assembly decisions there is no
longer any point to this restriction.
5. The r6le of the Committee on Rules of Pro-
cedure and Privileges is obviously not to open a
political debate. This debate took place when
Order 85 was adopted. Rather it is to consider the
will of the Assembly, as expressed through the
adoption of this order and the two amendments to
Decision 11, and to deduce the consequences for
the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assem-
bly such that these two texts conform to the same
principle, are coherent and enable the Assembly
to work effectively.
6. It would seem to your Rapporteur that the
expressed will of the Assembly can be summari-
sed as follows:
(a) To enable full participation by parlia-
mentary delegations of associate mem-
ber states in all the Assembly's work;
(b) To ensure that decisions reached by
voting in plenary session are the prero-
gative only of representatives of mem-
ber states of the organisation.
7. This will, thus expressed, is entirely conso-
nant with the Council's policy as formulated in the
reply to Written Question 300, since the associate
member countries participate fully in WEU's
intergovernmental activities but cannot prevent
the formation of a consensus which is the Coun-
cil's method of reaching a decision. It should be
added that the substantive text proposed by the
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Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges
in December 1993 addressed the same concern,
but distinguished between decisions concerning
the functioning of WEU, in which associate mem-
bers of the Assembly were not to have a part, and
those relating to general policy, in which they
were associated. Since the Assembly has rejected
this distinction, there is a need to find another way
of reconciling "full participation" in the work of
the Assembly with non participation in decisions.
This has been the substance of your Rapporteur's
considerations and those of the members of the
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
*
*{<
8. Since December 1993, new circumstances
have arisen. They contribute to complicating fur-
ther the factors with a bearing on the problem to
be resolved. Indeed, according to the information
available to your Rapporteur, a proposal for a fur-
ther sfrengthening of the status of WEU associate
members, by guaranteeing them greater participa-
tion, as "associate allies", in all WEU activities,
including the work of the Assembly, was put to
the Council in t994. Moreover, at the ministerial
meeting on 9th May 1994, the countries of the
Forum of Consultation of WEU mightbe awarded
the status of "associate partners" as distinct from
that of "associate allies", thus obliging the Assem-
bly to develop a new status for their parliamen-
tary delegations. If the Assembly's rules do not
grant any form of voting rights to the NATO
member countries, there will be very little room
for defining a suitable status for countries that are
neither NATO nor European Union members but
which already have permanent observer status
and will be seeking, quite justifiably, for their
enhanced status in the ministerial organs of WEU
to be accompanied by enhancement of their status
in the Assembly.
9. Finally, we are all aware that certain asso-
ciate member countries have made known their
extreme displeasure at the decision taken by the
Assembly which did not, in their view, follow the
guidance given by the governments when they
established associate member status. Naturally
the governments left the Assembly master of its
own decisions in matters that concerned it. One
wonders whether the Assembly genuinely wished
to dissociate itself from the member governments
by only granting associate members a status that
falls far below that offered to them by the Coun-
cil. Moreover it did not escape associate members'
notice that granting voting rights in committee,
had these been effective, which was not even the
case, would have represented a purely formal
concession since only voting rights in plenary ses-
sion, or, in certain cases, in the Standing Commit-
tee, produce Assembly decisions, the adoption of
texts in committee being no more than the expres-
sion of an opinion that is in no way binding on the
Assembly.
10. The brief of the Committee on Rules of
Procedure and Privileges is clearly not to propose
that the Assembly repeal the decision taken by
adopting the two amendments, which would with-
draw voting rights in plenary session and in the
Standing Committee from associate member dele-
gations, and in point of fact also withdraw their
voting rights in committee, but to look for a form
of words that would achieve a better correspon-
dence between the new rule and Order 85.
11. Your Rapporteur in drafting the present
report is indebted to the committee for its very
substantial conffibution when it made a prelimi-
nary examination of the question on 7th March
1994.ln particular he wishes to express his grati-
tude to a member of the committee, Mr. Van der
Maelen, on whose in-depth research and written
suggestions your Rapporteur has drawn extensi-
vely in developing the proposals contained in the
present report.
II. Amendments to the rules of the Assembly'
12. The committee's proposal, which was not
endorsed by the Assembly in December 1993,
made the distinction, as did the Council in its
reply to Written Question 300, between the Coun-
cil's acting in a legal capacity, specifically in
adopting its annual report, when only member
countries take part in decisions and its acting as a
political body, debating more general questions.
In this instance, associate members participate in
meetings, without, however, being able to prevent
the formation of a consensus among member
countries. The committee was proposing to grant
voting rights in the Assembly to parliamentary
delegations of associate member countries in all
matters relating to the second circumstance, but
not the frst. This proposal was rejected by the
Assembly.
13. Another way of giving effect to associate
member country status which would approximate
even more closely to Council practice would be to
gmnt voting rights to associate member counffy
delegations but without such voting rights being
able to prevent texts being adopted by the Assem-
bly. To achieve this, a separate, consultative vote
by the delegations ofthese countries, subsequent
to voting in the Assembly, might be held in cases
where associate members wished to express
l. N.B. As the Rules of hocedure of the Assembly, as amen-
ded by Decision I I have not yet come into effect, the present
text refers either to the rules as they stood prior to Decision
I I taking effect or to the text of this decision. However the
draft decision refers to the wording of the rules as amended
by Decision 11.
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disapproval of substantive texts adopted by the
Assembly, as constituted under Article IX of the
ffeaty. Such a vote would strow whether the dele-
gations of these countries approved an Assembly
decision or not. This special vote would be in
order when a certain number of members of these
delegations requested it. In the contrary event,
associate members of the Assembly would be
deemed to have approved the substantive text
adopted by the Assembly.
14. This procedure would have the advantage
of enabling delegations of WEU associate mem-
ber countries to participate fully in the work of the
Assembly since, were it adopted, there would no
longer be any need to distinguish between the
Council and the Assembly acting in its legal or
political capacity, but these delegations would
have no part in decisions as is the case in the
Council where governmental delegations of those
countries are not at liberty to challenge the
consensus.
15. Its implementation would require the
following amendments to the wording of the rules
as they stand since the adoption of Decision 11.
(a) ln paragraph I.2 of Decision 11 refer-
ring to Article tr (c) of the Charter of
the Assembly replace "without voting
rights in plenary sessions" by "without
the right to participate in votes of the
Assembly", which would enable asso-
ciate members of the Assembly to par-
ticipate in a consultative vote, that was
not a vote of the Assembly, but the
expression of an opinion which would
be recorded in the minutes of commit-
tee meetings or Assembly sittings.
(b) ln paragraph II.2 of Decision 11 refer-
ring to Rule 15.3 of the Rules of Proce-
dure of the Assembly concerning the
Standing Committee, delete "without
voting rights". The expression "in
accordance with the prerogatives deri-
ving from their status" implies that they
do not have the right to participate in
votes of the Assembly. This means that
representatives of associate member
countries can request that a consultative
vote be held in the Standing Committee
in the same way as in plenary session.
The result of such consultative voting
would be recorded in the minutes of the
meetings of the Standing Committee.
(c) lnparagraphs 113.2(a) and(b) of Deci-
sion l1 replace "representatives of
associate member states" by "associate
members of the WEU Assembly" to
indicate that the relevant rules applying
to "representatives" do not concern
WEU Assembly associate members, in
accordance with the Assembly's deci-
sion not to grant them voting rights. In
paragraph II 3.1, for the same reason,
replace "These representatives" by
"The members of these delegations".
(d) Delete paragraphs I13.2. (d), (e), (f) and(d of Decision 11 since these para-
graphs were only meaningful in as
much that associate members of the
Assembly were at times called upon to
participate in voting in the Assembly
under the draft decision which the
Assembly amended in December 1993.
(e) Add a new paragraph (d) to paragraph
113.2 of Decision 11 as follows:
"Associate members of the Assembly
of WEU may request that a consultative
vote be taken, enabling them to express
their opinion on any text adopted by the
Assembly. This request must be tabled
by at least three associate members of
the Assembly. [n voting in committee,
it will be sufficient for such request to
be tabled by only one associate member
of the Assembly. Voting by associate
members will take place immediately
after the result of voting in the Assem-
bly or the committee is announced and
will be held in accordance with the pro-
visions of Rule 35.I, 2 and 3 of the
Rules of Procedure."
The requirement that three members
table the request is based on two consi-
derations: first, avoidance of repeated
consultative voting which would unne-
cessarily slow down the business of the
Assembly; second, to enable the smal-
lest delegation, Iceland, if unanimous,
to obtain a consultative vote.
It should be noted that the present pro-
visions confer only consultative voting
rights in committee on associate mem-
bers of the Assembly under Rule 42.4
of the Rules of Procedure of the Assem-
bly which states that the rules adopted
by the Assembly relating to its voting
procedures shall apply in committee. In
point of fact the failure, when adopting
Decision 11, to amend Rule 35 or Rule
42.4 had the effect of withdrawing
associate members' voting rights in
committee, even though it appears that
the intention of those who drafted these
amendments was to grant such rights,
in conformity with Order 85.
(f) Delete paragraph II.5 of Decision ll
relating to Rule 37, which is now point-
less.
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16. The proposals submitted by your Rappor-
teur are, like Decision l l, not absolutely consis-
tent with the terms of Order 85, in as much that
associate members do not have genuine voting
rights in committee but simply the right to
express their opinion here by means of a special
vote, the results of which would be recorded in
the minutes of meetings. They are based on the
principle that the r6le of the committees is to
prepare substantive texts to be put to the vote in
the Assembly, and to explain the reasons for
them. It would therefore be somewhat undesi-
rable for voting procedures in committee to dif-
fer substantially from those in the Assembly. If
the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges or the Assembly wished to grant associate
members voting rights in committee they would
need to follow through the consequences and
amend Rules 42.4 or 35 of the Rules of Proce-
dure.
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WEU in the process of European Union 
-
reply to the thifi-ninth annual report of the Council
REPORT'
submitted on behalf of the Political Committee '
by Mr. Fenari, Rapporteur
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Draft Recommend,ation
on WEU in the process of European Union
- 
reply to the thifi-ninth annual report of the Council
The Assembly,
(i) Recalling that the Assembly of WEU, as part of the organisation of Western European Union under
the terms of the agreement on the status of WEU signed in Paris on 11th May 1955, is an integral part of
the development of the European Union as provided in Article J.4, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on European
Union;
(ii) Underlining that Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty obliges the Council to keep the Assem-
bly better informed than hitherto about developments in the CFSP and other sectors of the Union in all
matters which come within the competence of WEU in accordance with the modified Brussels Treaty;
(iii) Disapproving the Council's delay in ransmitting Annex IY on the links between the Union and
WEU, to Chapter IV of the document on the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty;
(iv) Deploring also the poor information contained in the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council to the
Assembly on the new working relations between WEU and the Union;
(v) Considering that the wording of Article J.4, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on European Union gives
reason for doubts about the sharing of responsibilities between WEU and the Union;
(vi) Considering also that the hitherto agreed "practical ilrangements" contained in Annex [V on the
links between the Union and WEU restrict the areas of action for WEU in a way which is not compatible
with WEU's far-reaching obligations stemming from the modified Brussels Treaty;
(vii) Deploring in fact that these iurangements and the lack of political will are some of the many factors
which contributed to WEU's marginalised rOle in international crisis-management panicularly regarding
the conflicts in former Yugoslavia;
(viii) Underlining the important r6le WEU has to fulfil on behalf of the Union in maintaining transatlan-
tic solidarity and co-operation in security and defence matters;
(ix) Welcoming the successful outcome of the negotiations with Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden
regarding their accession to the European Union;
(x) Welcoming also the firm commitment of all the acceding states to include in their accession, in full
and without reservation, the provision of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty regarding the establishment of a
common foreign and security policy;
(xi) Expressing the hope that the referenda to be held in Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden will be
positive;
(xii) Recalling the important contribution and experience of the four EFIA countries in peace-keeping
operations within the United Nations;
(xiii) Convinced that defining a common European defence policy should now commence even though
all members of the European Union are not yet full members of WEU;
(xiv) Noting that the countries called upon to accede to the European Union have not applied for mem-
bership of WEU with the exception of Norway which seeks full membership of WEU once it becomes a
member of the European Union;
(n) Recalling that the NATO summit meeting on 10th January 1994 did not agree to the accession to
the North Atlantic Treaty of any of the member countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation;
(ni) Repeating therefore paragraphs 1 and 2 of Recommendation 556, to grant simultaneously to all
the member countries of the Forum of Consultation an associate status in WEU;
(mii) Earnestly desiring the progressive integration of all the states of Western and Central Europe in a
system of co-operation ensuring security, stability and peace for Europe as a whole;
(niii) Hoping that the necessary conditions can be created for other countries, such as Slovenia and
Moldova, to acquire the new associate status in the future, on the basis of the same historical, geograph-
ical and political considerations which allowed this status to be granted to the countries of the Forum of
Consultation;
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(xix) Considering that the devolution of the exercise of matters within the competence of WEU to other
international institutions or to counffies which are not members of WEU or NATO might paralyse any
steps towards joint action on defence and security in Europe ;
(xx) Recalling the importance of maintaining, in any future parliamentary system required to supervise
a common foreign security and defence policy, the possibility of bringing together delegations from the
parliaments of member countries in an Assembly which represents the will of the peoples of Europe in this
particular area,
RECoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL
1. Carefully prepare the intergovernmental conference planned for 1996 in line with its declaration
I D8 annexed to the Maastricht Treaty;
2. Fully associate the Assembly with the Council's reflection on its preparation for the 1996 conference;
3. Retain the modified Brussels Treaty so that all the members of the European Union will be able to
accede to its provisions;
4. Seek, in conjunction with the authorities of the European Union, to clear up the ambiguities of
Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty with a view to obtaining a general mandate to elaborate and imple-
ment decisions and actions on behalf of the Union in WEU's area of responsibility;
5. Reconsider the WEU declaration II annexed to the Maastricht Treaty with a view to allowing the
European members of NATO which are not members of the European Union the right to accede to the
modified Brussels Treaty;
6. Encourage all member countries of the European Union and those acceding to it to become full
members of Western European Union;
7 . Study the possibility of creating a WEU peace-keeping training centre on the basis of experience
gained in this area by the Nordic countries and especially Finland;
8. Improve the inforrnation communicated to the Assembly on developments in the CFSP and the
Council's activities in the framework of the Union.
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Exphnatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Fenari, Rapporteur)
I.Introductian
1. During the period from December 1991 to
November 1993,in which it was uncertain when
and if the Maastricht Treaty would be ratified, the
ministerial organs of Western European Union
concenffated on the development of working rela-
tions with NATO, whereas WEU's relationship
with the European Union had been left in limbo as
Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU,
described it in his speech at the last plenary ses-
sion of the WEU Assembly on 29th November
1993.
2. During the abovementioned period, the
Assembly continually reminded the Council of
the importance of preparing a WEU position on
its future relations with the Union as witnessed in
particular by the reports presented by Mr. Goerens
on WEU after Maastricht', European security
policy 
- 
reply to the thirty-seventh annual report
of the Council; Part one: European Union, WEU
and the consequences of Maastricht2, and on the
interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty3.
3. Nevertheless, now faced with the situation
after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty
on 1st November 1993, the problems seem far
from crystal-clear. In answer to a question put by
Mr. Rathbone at the last plenary session of the
Assembly about whether an increasing r6le for
WEU in the formation of foreign policy in the
context of the European Union could be seen, the
WEU Secretary-General replied:
"I do not know how the relationship (with
the European Union) will develop. I was a
bit disappointed that the European Union
did not envisage the possibility of a WEU
r6le in Yugoslavia at the meeting which it
had on 22nd November before our ministe-
rial meeting. However, that is something
which we must consider...
We shall be able to make a contribution to
European Union deliberations, but the
emphasis in political terms will be on a
common foreign and security policy,
because only the European Union is
capable of providing convergence in rela-
L Document 1308, l3th May 1992.
2. Document l342,Part One,6th November 1992.
3. Document 1369,24th May 1993.
tion to a political and foreign policy and to
the economic measures that we can take in
terms of sanctions or of support 
- 
the coun-
tries of Central Europe have much more
need of economic support than of the mili-
tary measures which have been envisaged
or the guarantees that have been requested.
We have to look at this in the framework of
the interesting arrangements by which
WEU is an integral part of the European
Union but at the same time maintains its
autonomy as long as not all members of the
Union are prepared to engage in military
activities. If Austria, Finland and Swedenjoin, we shall have even more observers.
We can act either in the context of a full
foreign and security policy or in an autono-
mous r6le. The situation is not entirely
neat, but international relations are never
lNTo neat and I think that this is a fairly
ingenious ilrangement. Then, in 1996, we
shall see whether we need to take new steps
or whether we can continue this arrange-
ment for a further two years."
4. Of course, it will not be possible to wait
until 1996. In fact, Western European Union is
now faced with manifold challenges:
- 
it has to find and implement practical
iurangements for a working relationship
between WEU and the European Union;
- 
Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty
which enables the European Union to
request WEU to elaborate and imple-
ment decisions and actions of the Union
having defence implications has to be
implemented;
- 
the consequences of WEU's new r6le in
the development of the Union for its
relationship with NAIO have to be iden-
tified;
- 
the consequences for WEU of the
Union's enlargement to include Austria,
Finland, Norway and Sweden have to be
elaborated;
- 
the parallelism between the Union and
Western European Union regarding the
nature of their new relationship with
Central Europe on the one hand, and
with Russia and the countries of the
Community of Independent States (CIS)
on the other has to be transformed into a
specific policy;
110
DOCUMENT 1417
- 
WEU has to elaborate here and now a
doctrine regarding its conribution to the
intergovernmental conference planned
for 1996 and it must be fully involved in
the preparation of this conference.
5. The Assembly has to recall that, accor-
ding to the agreement on the status of Western
European Union signed in Paris on
1lth May 1955 and ratified by all member par-
liaments, the organisation of " Western Euro-
pean Union " comprises the Council, its subsi-
diary bodies and the Assembly. The Assembly
therefore, on the basis of Article IX of the
modified Brussels Treaty and the abovementio-
ned convention, is included in all measures
envisaged by the WEU declaration annexed to
the Maastricht Treaty, in particular regarding
paragraph 3 of that declaration stating that " the
objective is to build up WEU in stages as the
defence component of the European Union. To
this end, WEU is prepared, at the request of the
European Union, to elaborate and implement
decisions and actions of the Union which have
defence implications ". In the same way,
Article J.4 of the Maastrioht Treaty, considering
Western European Union as an integral part of
the development of the Union, applies to the
WEU Assembly as an organ of the WEU orga-
nisation. The Assembly has therefore a major
task to fulfil in the framework of Title V and
in particular of Article J.4 of the Maastricht
Treaty.
II. The consequences of the ratification of
the Maastricht Treaty for Westem European Unian
(i) The new quality of co-operotion between WEU
andthe Eurofuan Union
6. During the first half of 1993 (covered by
the first part of the thirtyrlinth annual report of
the Council to the Assembly o), the process of rati-
fication of the Maastricht Treaty was still pen-
ding. The Council's indications regarding WEU's
future r6le in the process of European Union were
confined to the following:
" Both at the level of the Council working
groups and at that of the Secretariat, wor-
king links may be forged as required with
the European institutions ... having due
regard to the principles of transparency,
complementarity and reciprocity. These
links will assume even greater importance
in the months to come ... as the Maastricht
Treaty ratification process is brought to a
conclusion. "
7. However a study of the second part of the
thirty-ninth annual report of the Council s yields
no concrete information as to how WEU intends
to organise its new responsibilities in the frame-
work of the European Union, other than a repeti-
tion of the wording of the relevant provisions of
the Maastricht Treaty and of the declaration
issued by the WEU Ministerial Council in
Luxembourg onZZnd November 1993.
8. This declaration drew the following conse-
quences from the entry into force of the Treaty on
European Union. First, in a political assessment:
" Ministers welcomed the fact that the links
now established between the European
Union and WEU were such that concrete
form could now be given to the definition
of a global concept of security in accord-
ance with the aims and conditions of the
Maastricht Treaty and recalled that Euro-
pean security included political, economic
and military aspects. In parallel, WEU
would continue to develop its activities on
the basis of the guidelines established in the
Maastricht and Petersberg declarations. In
so doing, WEU would also contribute to the
framing of common European defence
policy. This might, in time, lead to a com-
mon defence. Thus WEU would reinforce
the dynamic process of European LJnion. "
9. Furthermore, they:
" acknowledged the importance for WEU
of the conclusions reached by the heads of
state and government at the European
Council in Brussels on 29th October on the
implementation of the common foreign and
security policy of the European Council of
the European Union " and " reaffirmed that
WEU was fully prepared to play its r61e in
accordance with the Treaty on European
Union and the Maastricht declaration of
WEU member states and to respond to
requests from the Union concerning its
decisions and actions having defence impli-
cations. "
10. Does that mean that, with the entry into
force of the Maastricht Treaty, Western European
Union has ceased to be an autonomous organisa-
tion and to act as such? The Luxembourg declara-
tion of the WEU Council is far from clear in this
respect. It confirms only that " in parallel, WEU
would continue to develop its activities on the
basis of the guidelines established in the Maas-
tricht and Petersberg declarations ". In the second
part of its thirty-ninth annual report however, the
Council confirms that WEU is being developed
" as an institutionally autonomous body" as the
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defence component of the European Union and
the European pillar of the alliance. Furthermore,
according to a declaration of the WEU Secretary-
General during the last plenary session of the
Assembly in Paris, WEU will maintain its auto-
nomy "as long as not all members of the Union
are prepared to engage in military activities ".
11. But none of these declarations names the
modified Brussels Treaty as the fundamental
basis of WEU's autonomous legal existence and
activity. It is a matter of fact that references by
the WEU Council to that treaty have almost
disappeared from WEU's recent public docu-
ments and declarations. Neither in WEU's last
Luxembourg declaration, nor in the second part
of the Council's thirty-ninth annual report can
any reference be found to the modified Brussels
Treaty.
12. These omissions enhance suspicions that
the Council, firmly insisting arbitrarily on a so-
called " 1998 deadline " for the modified Brussels
Treaty, is doing everything to give the public the
impression that this treaty and its obligations may
be increasingly neglected.
13. Nevertheless, in the platform on European
security interests adopted in The Hague on
27th October 1987, which is one of the docu-
ments new member states must accept if they
wish to accede to WEU6, WEU ministers had
rightly stressed the importance of the modified
Brussels Treaty for building an integrated
Europe.
14. If this part of The Hague platform is still
valid, it will be necessary for the WEU Council
to give a clear indication of how WEU will har-
monise its new obligations under the Maastricht
Treaty with those under the modified Brussels
Treaty. Yet the way the authors of the Maastricht
Treaty have regulated the r6le of WEU within the
Union does not facilitate this task since the wor-
ding of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty, and in
particular of paragraph 6 of Article J.4 indicates
that their clear intention was to base the European
Union on the abrogation of the modified Brussels
Treaty.
15. Here it might be recalled that in Recom-
mendation 517 the Assembly asked the Council to
request signatory states to correct the error in
paragraph 6 of Article J.4 of the Maastricht
Treaty (referring to a non-existent Article XII of
the Brussels Treaty) before the text was submitted
for ratification. However, both in the English text
of the Maastricht Treaty issued by the office for
official publications of the European Communi-
ties in Luxembourg and in the French text publi-
shed by the same office the error was not correc-
ted. Thus the relevant paragraph still reads as fol-
lows:
" with a view to furthering the objective of
this treaty, and having in view the date of
1998 in the context of Article XII of the
Brussels Treaty, the provisions of this
article may be revised... on the basis of a
report to be presented in 1996... "
16. Your Rapporteur therefore deems it neces-
sary to repeat that paragraph 31 of the Goerens
report on WEU after Maastricht' is still fully
valid when it states:
" As everyone knows, the Brussels Treaty
is no longer in force since it was modified
by the 1954 Paris Agreements, but the
Article Xtr in question is an article of the
modified Brussels Treaty taken from
Article X of the Brussels Treaty. The
governments continue, therefore, to encou-
rage confusion between the two treaties as
your Rapporteur has already had the oppor-
tunity to underline, because, if it is the
modified Brussels Treaty that is referred to,
the date indicated would be 2004 and not
1998. "
ll. Regarding the WEU Council's negative
reaction to the various written questions and its
replies to Recommendations 517 and 539 on the
interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty, one has to come to the conclusion that
the Council is not prepared to consider the various
legal arguments put forward by the Assembly nor
to refer the question to independent arbitration. In
the absence of a system of legal protection in the
framework of the modified Brussels Treaty, the
Assembly maintains its position and reserves the
right to take further appropriate measures to
uphold its legal and political position in this
important matter. The aggravating factor of this
question is that it is not only an internal dispute
between the WEU Council and the Assembly but
that it had fundamental consequences for the wor-
ding of the relevant provisions of the Maastricht
Treaty. We are thus faced with a strange and per-
haps unique case where the contracting parties of
a new treaty (the one governing the European
Union) impose a binding intelpretation for a spe-
cific clause of the treaty of another organisation
which has different origins and signatories. This
is even less understandable, as there seems to be
no unanimity among governments on this ques-
tion. For instance in a debate on WEU in the Bri-
tish House of Commons on 18th March 1994,the
representative of the British Government said that
the modified Brussels Treaty would not terminate
in 1998.
I
I
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tt2
6. Petersberg declaration, 19th June 1992, Chapter III B. 7. Document 1308, 13th May 1992.
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18. However, with the entry into force of the
Maastricht Treaty on lst November 1993, WEU
obtained a supplementary legal basis for its activi-
ties, the implementation of which raises the ques-
tion of how they are to be harmonised with the
obligations laid down in the modified Brussels
Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty (Article B of Title I
and Anicle J.4 of Title V) distinguishes between
" common foreign and security policy ", " com-
mon defence policy " and " common defence ",
specifying that " the Union requests Western
European Union (WEU), which is an integral part
of the development of the Union, to elaborate and
implement decisions and actions of the Union
which have defence implications. " That means
that the Maastricht Treaty restricts WEU's com-
petence to purely defence matters, whereas the
common forbign ind secudty policy is confined to
the Union in the framewofk of the institutionali-
sed common foreign and security policy (CFSP).
The area of competence remaining within WEU
seems even more restricted since the Maastricht
Treaty specifies that:
" The common foreign and security policy
shall include all questions related to the
security of the Unidn, including the even-
tual framing of a common defence policy,
which might in time lead to a common
defence. " (Article J,4,1).
19. What does this mean? The conclusions of
the presidency of the European Council, pub-
lished at its meeting in Brussels on 29th Octo-
ber 1993, provides the following explanation:
" Common foreign and security policy is
the framework which must enable the
Union to fulfil the hopes born at the end of
the cold war and the new challenges gene-
rated by the upheavals on the international
scene, with the resultant instability in areas
bordering the Union. The aim of the com-
mon foreign and security policy is to enable
the Union to speak with a single voice and
to act effectively in the service of its inter-
ests and those of the international commu-
nity in general.
Foreign and security policy covers all
aspects of security. European security will,
in particular, be directed at reducing risks
and uncertainties which might endanger the
territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence of the Union and its member states,
their democratic character, their economic
stability and the stability of neighbouring
regions. In this context Western European
Union will shortly implement the various
provisions embodied in the treaty and the
statement on WEU.
20. In another document on the implementa-
tion of the Maastricht Treaty, published at the
same time under the title " Chapter IV: From poli-
tical co-operation to the common foreign and
security policy (CFSP) " one can find a slightly
different wording:
" (a) The common foreign and security
policy of the European Union covers all
areas of security and will aim to achieve the
objectives of the Union referred to in
Article J.1 of the treaty. Common security
policy will be based on a global concept of
security. European security includes politi-
cal, economic and military aspects, under
the conditions laid down in Article J.4.It
will be primarily aimed at reducing the
risks and uncertainties likely to pose a
threat to the territorial integrity and politi-
cal independence of the Union and its
member states, to its democratic character,
its economic stability and the stability of its
neighbouring regions.
(b) The Union has means at its disposal,
backed up by conributions from the mem-
ber states and the " acquis" of political co-
operation, to achieve its security objectives,
particularly in the areas of crisis manage-
ment, the promotion of United Nations and
CSCE principles, disarmament, non-prolife-
ration and the economic aspects of security.
In some cases, measures may be taken by
the Union itself. The Union can also take
action with regard to security through mul-
tilateral diplomacy within international
organisations such as the United Nations,
the CSCE and the Council of Europe.
(c) A common defence policy, which
might in time lead to a common defence,
must eventually be framed by the Union on
the basis of its security interests. CFSP pro-
ceedings conducted with a view to the 1996
intergovernmental conference will benefit
from the development of the activities of
WEU, which forms an integral part of the
development of the Union.
The links between the Union and WEU
established by Article J.4 of the treaty are
such that the Union can now give concrete
form to the global approach to security
meeting the treaty's objectives. These links
will be of a developing nature and must be
reviewed in the light of the report to be sub-
mitred in 1996.
The Union notes that WEU is continuing to
develop its own line of activity autono-
mously on the basis of the guidelines
established in the Petersberg declaration
and that, in the dynamics of the process of
European Union, it is destined to become
its defence component. "
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21. Despite the various references to WEU in
these declarations of the European Council, the
WEU Council has offered the Assembly not the
slightest information or explanation regarding
these documents, on what basis the Union made
them and if and to what extent WEU is bound by
them.
22. Furthermore, the second part of the thiny-
ninth annual report of the Council provides no
clear position regarding WEU's remaining com-
petences. It states that:
" the first six months of the Luxembourg
presidency of the WEU Council brought
funher progress in the creation of a Euro-
pean defence policy. The aim of this major
and long-haul task is to equip Europe with
the means it needs to meet the challenges of
the post-cold war era. Following the ratifi-
cation of the Maastricht Treaty, and with
the advent of the European Union on
lst November 1993, this task can now be
taken forward in a new framework. "
Does the term " new framework " mean that
WEU's responsibility in creating a European
defence policy has been transferred to the
CFSP?
23. In the absence of an official definition of
the term " defence policy " it might be useful to
refer to definitions used in the excellent study
published in January 1994 by two former State
Secretaries of the Swedish Foreign Ministry on
the consequences for Swedish foreign and secur-
ity policy of membership or non-membership of
the European Union.
24. According to this study:
" A common defence policy probably means
co-operation concerning certain questions
regarding the drawing up and orientations of
national defence, for example defence doc-
trines, intelligence service, communications,
training and equipment. "
If this definition is correct, it would mean that
according to Article J.4,1 of the Maastricht
Treaty, WEU would no longer have competence
in the abovementioned areas.
25. In this context, however, it should be noted
that the German text of Article J.4, pangraph2s
of the Maastricht Treaty does not correspond with
the French and the English versions. The English
words " defence implications " appear in the Ger-
man version as " verteidigungspolitische Bezii-
ge " which means " implications in the area of
8. The text in German reads as follows: Die Union ersucht
die Westeuropiiische Union (WEU), die integraler Bestand-
teil der Entwicklung der Europiiischen Union ist, die Ent-
scheidungen und Aktionen der Union, die veneidigungspoli-
tische Bezige haben, auszuarbeiten und durchzufiihren. . . .
defence policy". In an address on the rOle of Wes-
tern European Union in Bonn on 13th April 1994,
at a meeting of the German society for military
technology, Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General
of WEU, based his speech on the German version
of the Maastricht Treaty when he said inter alia:
" Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty on
European Union provides for three phases
in the process of evolution of WEU. In the
first, Western European Union is descri-
bed as forming ' an integral part of the
development of the [European] Union'
and as providing a link between the Euro-
pean defence identity and the Atlantic
Alliance.
The second phase is, 'in time', the fram-
ing of a common European defence policy
which, in a third phase, might lead to a
' common defence. '
WEU is requested to ' elaborate and imple-
ment decisions and actions of the [Euro-
peanl Union which have implications in the
area of defence policy. ' It is essential
therefore that the Union itself does not
conduct the defence policy but uses
WEU for this purpose, since the 'defence
policy ' of the European Union falls within
WEU's area of responsibility. "
26. Nevertheless, regarding WEU's remaining
competence under the Maastricht Treaty,
Article J.4, paragraph 2 does not even constitute a
general mandate for WEU's action but is only the
basis for specific requests issued by the Union to
WEU on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the Maas-
tricht Treaty deals with Western European Union
as if the modified Brussels Treaty did not exist
and in particular not the provision of its
Article VIII, paragraph 3, providing that:
" at the request of any of the high contrac-
ting parties the Council shall be immedi-
ately convened in order to permit them to
consult with regard to any situation which
may constitute a threat to peace, in what-
ever area this threat should arise, or a dan-
ger to economic stability. "
27. How can this far-reaching general obligation
be brought into line with the restrictive r6le the
Maasricht Treaty reserves for WEU in Article J.4?
Will ttrere remain any likelihood that a WEU mem-
ber country will make a request to convene the
WEU Council on the basis of this article?
28. This seems rather unlikely since the wor-
ding of paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article J.4 of the
Maastricht Treaty leave room for serious doubts
about whether their provisions are compatible
with the modified Brussels Treaty. Paragraph 4
says that:
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" the policy of the Union... shall not preju-
dice the specific character of the security
and defence policy of certain member
states and shall respect the obligations of
certain member states under the North
Atlantic Treaty... "
but does not mention the modified Brussels
Treaty. Paragraph 5 stipulates that:
" the provisions of this article shall not pre-
vent the development of closer co-opera-
tion... in the framework of WEU..., provi-
ded such co-operation does not run coun-
ter to or impede that provided for in this
title. "
Again, the modified Brussels Treaty is not men-
tioned and co-operation within WEU is restricted
by a proviso clause.
29. After all, there is a definite danger that the
Council of WEU might base its future activities
exclusively on concrete requests from the Euro-
pean Union and no longer on its obligations under
the modified Brussels Treaty. The most recent
replies of the Council to various Assembly recom-
mendations seem to confirm this trend: in its
reply 'to Recommendation 548, the Council
informed the Assembly that ... " the WEU Coun-
cil cannot allude to the decisions of European
Community countries regarding their relations
with the successor states to the former Yugoslav
Federation". In its reply'o to Recommenda-
tion 552, the Council stated: " The WEU Council
is not competent to intervene with its members
regarding their relations with successor states to
the former Yugoslav Federation ". In its reply't to
Recommendation 554:
" It is not within the competence of the
WEU Council to recommend the creation
of a European data centre nor even to dis-
cuss it.
The Council is awre of the need to pro-
mote transparency in the ffansfer of equip-
ment for civilian and military use. Never-
theless, advanced tochnologies are outside
the WEU Council's field of competence.
... the WEU Council has no authority to
invite member governments to give their
political and financial backing to the Interna-
tional Cenre for Science and Technology. "
30. The Political Committee is therefore grate-
ful for Written Question 326plt to the Council by
Document A/WEU/DG (94) 3,5th April 1994.
Document A/WEU/DG (94) 3, 5th April 1994.
Document A/WEU/DG (94) 3, 5th April 1994.
Mr. Goerens on 25th April 1994 '' and fully
endorses it. While reiterating the provisions of
Article VIII, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty Mr. Goerens asked the Coun-
cil what was the basis of its abovementioned
statements and in particular:
" what under such circumstances are the
topical questions that the Council regards
itself competent to consider and deals
with, as we are led to believe from Chap-
ter II of the second part of the thirty-ninth
annual report? Has the Council not for
many years devoted its meetings mainly to
bilateral relations between member coun-
tries and non-member countries of the
organisation? Does the Council consider
that its competences have been modified
since reactivation of WEU and, if so, by
what acts? "
31. In paragraph 8 of the Council's reply to
Recommendation 548:
" on the question of possible financial com-
pensation for riparian countries implemen-
ting the Danube embargo, the Council
would inform the Assembly that this issue
does not come within the competence of
the WEU Permanent Council. "
32. This kind of argument for not needing to
reply to a recommendation of the Assembly is
absolutely inacceptable. Such a non-answer
should be the subject of an urgent approach to the
chairmanship-in-office if the Council is unable to
provide, in due time, a satisfactory answer to
paragraph 4 of Written Question 326 put by
Mr. Goerens in which he asked what was the basis
of the Council's statement that:
" The Permanent Council has separate com-
petences from those attributed to the Coun-
cil by the modified Brussels Treaty and that
the Council need not reply to recommenda-
tions from the Assembly if the Permanent
Council does not discuss the questions
addressed by such recommendations (Reply
to Recommendations 548 and 554).
Does the Council no longer admit it should
reply to Assembly recommendations dea-
ling with the application of the modified
Brussels Treaty, even if certain WEU com-
petences are entrusted to other organisa-
tions? What is the point of exchanges bet-
ween WEU and NATO or the European
Union if they do not permit the Council to
make such reply, despite the fact that it
undertook to do so before such exchanges
were organised? "
9.
10.
ll.
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33. This question is the more justified if one
considers the lack of or incomplete information
from the Council regarding a number of practical
decisions which WEU ministers reached in
Luxembourg. First they:
" endorsed the measures to ensure close co-
operation between the European Union and
WEU set out in Annex IV of Chapter IV of
the conclusions of the General Affairs
Council of 26th October on the implemen-
tation of the Treaty on European Union,
which had been approved by the European
Council on 29th October. "
34. In fact on27th October 1993, WEU issued
the following press release:
" At its meeting on 26th October 1993, the
WEU Permanent Council mandated the
Luxembourg presidency to convey to the
European Council on 29th October its
agreement to the text of Annex IV 
- 
on the
links between the Union and WEU 
- 
to
Chapter IV of the document on the imple-
mentation of the Maastricht Treaty "
35. Since the Assembly was not informed of
the contents or context of these documents,
Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman of the Political Commir
tee, put the following Question 324to the Council
on 8th November 1993:
" Is the Council prepared to communicate
to the Assembly Annex IV, relating to the
links between the Union and WEU, of
Chapter IV of the document concerning the
implementation of the Maastricht Treaty
which was approved on 26th October 1993,
as announced in a press communiqud dated
27th October? "
36. In a letter dated 23rd March 1994 
- 
nearly
six months later 
- 
the Secretary-General of WEU
transmitted the relevant document,3 with the fol-
lowing reply of the Council:
" ... This annex was formally approved by
the Permanent Council on 26th October
1993 and that approval endorsed by the
Ministerial Council on 22nd November
last. This text is a joint European Union and
WEU working document. The Council
invites the Secretary-General to forward
Annex IV to the parliamentary Assembly. "
37. If this text is a joint European Union and
WEU working document, one has to ask why it
has not been incorporated in the second part ofthe
thirty-ninth annual report of the Council to the
Assembly or transmitted, in time, in an official
way to the Assembly, whereas the European Par-
liament was informed of the text already in
November 1993. Furtherrnore, the text cannot be
understood in isolation since it is part of another
paper, called " Chapter IV of the document on the
implementation of the Maastricht Treaty ",, deal-
ing with the new procedure for the common
foreign and security policy (CFSP) which has four
appendices, the last of which concerns Western
European Union.
38. Without further knowledge of the status
and basis of Annex IV, one can only presume that
it is based on Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty,
according to which the Council of the Union
shall, in agreement with the institutions of WEU,
adopt the necessary practical iurangements regar-
ding requests emanating from the Union to WEU
to elaborate and implement decisions and actions
with defence implications.
39. This kind of case-by-c:Ne approach led the
WEU Secretary-General in his address to the
Assembly on 29th November L993,to express the
wish " that requests from the Union should be
made at a sufficiently early stage so that WEU,
which brings together the Foreign and Defence
Ministers' viewpoints, can beneficially influence
the development of the common foreign and secu-
rity policy. "
40. In this context, the abovementioned
Annex IV provides the following specifications:
" The Union may, at the level of its Coun-
cil, request WEU to elaborate and imple-
ment decisions and actions which have
defence implications in the following kind
of situations. These, while normally
implying the use of military personnel, may
include the use of other means. The follow-
ing examples should only be considered as
indicative and non exhaustive:
- 
the security interests of the Union are
directly concerned;
- 
the Union is politically and economically
involved in a specific crisis or conflict and
acknowledges that additional WEU sup-
port is necessary (military observers,
cease-fire, peace-keeping, sanctions
monitoring and peace+nforcement) ;
- 
the Union is asked by the UN/CSCE to
make a contribution and it comes to the
conclusion that WEU, in a cohesive divi-
sion of labour, could make a specific
contribution;
- 
humanitarian efforts need logistical sup-
port."
13. Document 1412, 8th April 1994.
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41. Annex IV stipulates then that:
" 2. Once the European Union has reques-
ted WEU to elaborate and implement its
decisions and actions with defence implica-
tions, WEU will take on the requestin accor-
dance with the decision-making procedures
of that organisation, and will carry out all
actions concerning such a request in a man-
ner that is fully coherent with the overall
policy established by the European Union.
Special attention will be required when the
request to WEU is part of a broader action
which the Union itself will continue to
conduct.
In this case mutual information and consul-
tation procedures will ensure the coherence
of the action as a whole, whilst ensuring
that WEU take in an autonomous way the
operational decisioqs, including military
planning, rules of eqgagement, command
structures, deploymeht and withdrawal. "
42. Such arrangements can only strengthen the
firm impression that WEU'slr6le is to be reduced to
little more than that of a stbordinate organisation
and subconffactor, awaiting instructions from the
European Union. Thus, it is anticipated, for
example, that requests for a European contribution
from the United Nations and ttre CSCE would be
addressed only to the European Union which
would decide whether WEU should be involved or
not and which would also decide what kind of
contribution WEU should make. The same line is
followed by the Council's reply to Recommenda-
tion 549 on political relations between the United
Nations and WEU, which envisages any activities
by WEU in this context only via the European
Union. Under these circum$tances, nobody seems
to consider that the United Nations and/or the
CSCE might contact WEU directly in order to ask
for a contribution. Not only would this be more
practical, it would correspond more accurately to
the specific duties and competences of WEU ari-
sing from the modified Brussels Treaty. Othenvise,
what practical use would it be for WEU ministers
to instruct the Permanent Council of WEU " to
consider how to enhance relations with the United
Nations and the CSCE " as reported in the second
part of the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council?
43. Regarding the other examples referred to in
Annex IV it should be sffessed that in all cases
where " the security interests of the Union are
directly concerned " or " the Union is politically
and economically involved in a specific crisis or
conflict ", the provisions of the modified Brussels
Treaty are automatically applicable, obliging WEU
member countries to take appropriate action.
44. However, the implementation of the proce-
dure provided for under Annex IV will, first and
foremost, lengthen the decision-making process
and make it more cumbersome. The result will
effectively represent the lowest corlmon denomi-
nator. A specific example of this is the request
made in Luxembourg on 4th October by ministers
of the Tlvelve to study, concerning the administra-
tion of Mostar, what support WEU could give in
connection with the organisation of a police force
and the improvement of some vital logistic func-
tions, particularly in the medical field ".
45. Another, much more serious consequence
is that every decision by the Union as to whether
or not to request a contribution from WEU will
depend on the approval of those member coun-
ries of the European Union that are not prepared
to become full members of WEU and to fulfil the
obligations of the modified Brussels Treaty. If the
accession of the EFTA countries to the European
Union is ratified, the number of member countries
of the European Union not prepared to become
full members of WEU will soon increase. Thus
future action of WEU will soon depend on the
positions adopted by all these countries.
46. If such dependence on the part of WEU is
not the intention of Annex IY the WEU Council
should quickly provide the necessary clarifications
and explanations. If the possibility of autonomous
decisions and actions on the basis of the modified
Brussels Treaty shall remain open to WEU, it is
not sufficient to confirm that WEU will be develo-
ped as an " institutionally autonomous "
body'6. To avoid the decision-making process in
the European Union, particularly with regard to
counffies not prepared to participate in a common
defence in the framework of WEU, hampering
decisions on whether to request a contribution
from WEU, it would make more sense to interpret
Article J.4, paragraph 2, as a general clause obli-
ging WEU, in all cases with defence implications,
to take the necessary initiatives on behalf of the
Union in elaborating (and implementing) the rele-
vant decisions. Instead of waiting for specific
requests from the Union it should be for WEU to
propose the appropriate measures to the Union in
any given case. In cases where the Union could not
reach a decision WEU should be free to act on its
own initiative. This should have been the content
of the " necessary practical arrangements " refer-
red to in the second sentence of Article J.4, para-
graphZ, of the Maastricht Treaty.
47. Annex IV also provides that:
" 3. In order to ensure close co-operation
between WEU and the European Union,
the following measures will be implemen-
ted from the date of entry into force of the
Maastricht Treaty:
15. See WEU press release, 5th October 1993, Document
1411, Annex 1.
16. See introduction to the second part of the thirty-ninth
annual report of the Council to the Assembly, Document l4l l.
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3.1. Co-operation between presidencies
and harmonisation of their duration
The presidency of WEU will contin-
uously inform CFSP bodies about
ongoing work within WEU which is
relevant to the Union. The presidency
of the Council will inform, on a regular
basis, competent WEU bodies of the
work undertaken by the Union which
is relevant to WEU, in particular in
areas where WEU could be invited to
elaborate and implement decisions of
the Union which have defence impli-
cations.
The two presidencies will co-operate
closely in order to ensure the consis-
tency and the efficiency of the work
relevant to both organisations.
To facilitate the envisaged harmonisa-
tion of presidencies, the Union sug-
gests that WEU reflect on the reduc-
tion of its presidency's term of office
to six months. "
48. Regarding this last item, WEU ministers
agreed in Luxembourg to reduce the period of the
WEU presidency to six months from
lst July 1994 as suggested by the European Coun-
cil. They requested the Permanent Council to
consider further the question of harmonising the
presidencies of the European Union and WEU
and to report back. It should be noted in this
context that in the Rome declaration of Octo-
ber 1984 WEU ministers had decided to prolong
the period of its presidency from six months to
one year, in order to render the presidency more
effective! According to the second part of the
thirty-ninth annual report of the Council, the
reduction in the term of the WEU presidency
" symbolises the willingness to harmonise WEU's
method of working with that of the European
Union ". Do such statements mean that the Coun-
cil of WEU is itself not convinced of the useful-
ness of its decisions?
49. Regarding further practical modalities of
co-operation the following details are set out in
the abovementioned document:
" 3.2. Co-operation between the Secreta-
riat-General of the Council and the Secreta-
riat-General of Western European Union
- 
the Secretary-General of the Council will
ensure that the Secretary-General of
WEU is kept timely and fully informed
on developments of the CFSP, in particu-
lar in areas where WEU could be invited
to elaborate and implement decisions of
the Union which have defence implica-
tions as well as in areas where comple-
mentary or similar activities are being
carried out by the Upion and by WEU.
Similarly, the Secretary-General of
WEU will keep the Secretary-General of
the Council punctually and fully infor-
med of any activities of WEU which are
relevant to the Union, including the
development of contingency planning
for implementing measures in areas
where the Union might call for such
action.
- 
The collaboration includes the exchange
of written material in the relevant areas.
This covers documents as well as
exchanges over the WEUCOM and
COREU networks. The two secretariats
will establish the necessary practical
arrangements in this regard and ensure
the security classifications and provi-
sions of the two organisations are respec-
ted in the handling of such documents.
- 
The collaboration includes cross-partici-
pation of collaborators from the two
secretariats in relevant meetings in the
two organisations according to decisions
taken on a case-by-case basis, after
consultation of the two presidencies at
the appropriate level. This applies to
meetings at working group level, as well
as with regard to relevant agenda points
in meetings at ambassadorial level and at
ministerial level. The two secretariats
will keep each other informed about the
agendas for all relevant meetings. The
collaborators in question will be seated in
the delegation of the presidency-in-office
of the organisation they represent. "
50. Regarding co-operation between the two
secretariats, it would appear that initial arrange-
ments have been made for the exchange of docu-
ments drawn up by the different working groups
and for cross-participation of collaborators. As far
as the latter is concerned, it seems that the secre-
tariat of the Council of the European Union may
participate in all meetings of the WEU Council of
Ministers whereas the arrangement for participa-
tion by the Secretariat-General of WEU in meet-
ings of the Council of the European Union is not
entirely reciprocal as it is restricted to certain
items of its agenda only:
" 3.3. Arrangements for appropriate moda-
lities to ensure that the Commission of the
European Communities is regularly infor-
med and, as appropriate, consulted on
WEU activities
The information and, as appropriate, the
consultation of the Commission on WEU
activities should take place through regular
contacts between the Commission and the
WEU presidency, on the one side, and bet-
118
DOCLnGNI1417
ween the Commission and the Secretary-
General of WEU, on the other side.
The WEU secretariat will forward WEU
written material to the Commission, in
which the Commission has an interest by
virtue of its responsibilities in implemen-
ting policies of the European Union and
whenever WEU is dealing with matters
relating to the Connnission's responsibili-
ties under the Treaty on European Union.
Similarly, the Commission will forward
documents to WEU in all relevant areas. "
51. It appears that in the meantime the Com-
mission and the Secretariat-General of WEU have
agreed on the modalities of the exchange of docu-
ments. Furthermore, it has been clarified that the
Commission is to be included in the delegation of
the presidency of the European Union to WEU
meetings and form part of the delegations of the
presidency of the European Union to WEU minis-
terial meetings. Conversely, the Commission will
regularly inform the WEU secretariat of meetings
organised by the Commission which might be of
interest to WEU. Attendance by the WEU Secre-
tariat-General at such meetings is to be requested
through the presidency of WEU:
" The presidency will represent the Euro-
pean Union at WEU meetings. It is under-
stood that the presidency will include
representatives of the Commission in its
delegation whenever WEU is dealing with
matters relating to the Commission's res-
ponsibilities under the ffeaty. "
52. It is not made clea4 in the paper how the
presence of WEU in Eurdpean Union meetings
will be ensured. According to an Agence France
Presse communiqu6 date{ 3rd March 1994, the
Secretary-General of WEU complained that rela-
tions between WEU and the European Union
were less satisfactory thar\ those with NAIO and
that WEU was not represented in meetings of the
Twelve dealing with security matters. On
l8th April 1994 however, Agence Europe relea-
sed information stating it had been decided that
WEU would be represented by its Secretary-
General and by a representative of the WEU pre-
sidency at the meeting of the European Union to
be held in Brussels on 17th and 18th May. Such a
decision is of course to be welcomed, but the
representation of WEU in such meetings should
not be the subject of ad hoc decisions but based on
an overall agreement:
" 3.4. Synchronisation of dates and venues
of meetings
The two organisations, at the level of the
presidency and the secretariats, will when-
ever possible consult each other before
finalising plans for meetings at ministerial
level or meetings of relevant working
groups with a view to establishing the grea-
test possible synchronisation of dates and
venues of meetings. This applies in particu-
lar to situations where successive decisions
of the Union and WEU are called for.
The two secretariats will make the neces-
sary practical arrangements to provide
appropriate meeting facilities whenever suc-
cessive meetings of the two organisations on
the same day and in the same place are cal-
led for practical or operational reasons. "
53. According to information your Rapporteur
gathered during a visit to the European Commis-
sion and the WEU Secretariat-General in Brussels
in March, the discussions for implementing the
various arrangements are only just starting.
Unfortunately the Secretariat-General of the
European Union which has to be reorganised, was
not able to receive your Rapporteur. He therefore
has no detailed information about the background
of the abovementioned Annex IV. But he recalls
that in Chapter A of the declaration of Western
European Union annexed to the Maastricht Treaty
dealing with WEU's relations with European
Union, WEU announced that " the WEU Council
shall, in agreement with the competent bodies of
the European Union, adopt the necessary practical
arrangements. " Will this still be done or has it
become obsolete by agreeing to the Union's
paper?
54. Should this be the case, it would be a fur-
ther example of the consequences of the inactiv-
ity of the WEU Council in allowing the Union to
impose its practical arrangements and provisions
in matters which are within WEU's specific pur-
view. If WEU is to avoid losing the basis of its
responsibilities and competences, it will be cru-
cial to remind the Council that it must continue to
implement fully all provisions of the modified
Brussels Treaty and not restrict WEU's area of
activities to obligations arising from specific
requests stemming from the European Union
alone. The far-reaching obligations of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty also make it impossible to
reduce WEU's activities to defence matters alone.
Threats to peace are not just military threats; they
also include political, economic and other threats
and dangers.
55. What is even more important is that WEU
must be both the subject and a player in the elabo-
ration of the institutional architecture of the secu-
rity and defence branch of the European Union. In
this respect, WEU has so far been more an object
than a subject of reflexion. WEU must put for-
ward its own vision of the future European
constmction; the modified Brussels Treaty itself
obliges the Council to make a proper contribution
in this area, since its Article VIII, paragraph I
clearly provides that the Council of WEU had
been created for the purposes ... " of promoting
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unity and encouraging the progressive integration
of Europe and closer co-operation between them
and with other European organisations " even
before the European Community was created and
a long time before the Maastricht Treaty was
concluded.
56. That means first and foremost that the
Council should now do what it should have done
already during the preparation of the Maastricht
Treaty: it must decide on its approach to the
1996 intergovernmental conference. During his
recent visit to Brussels, your Rapporteur was
told that WEU instances were too busy with
their heavy day-to-day duties to have the iime to
think now about the 1996 conference. That
enhances the need to think about improving
WEU's means of ensuring continuous political
planning. First, however, the Council and the
Secretariat-General must realise the importance
of being involved in the planning for 1996 from
the very outset.
57. Furthermore, it is crucial to remind the
Council that with the entry into force of the Maas-
tricht Treaty WEU's activities are closely connec-
ted with those of the European Union and the
structures of the CFSP. In the framework of the
latter, subjects connected with the responsibilities
of WEU and practical co-operation with it will
play an increasingly important r6le. The exchange
of information and documents will be developed.
Consequently, the Council has to inform the
Assembly about developments in the CFSP and
other sectors of the Union in all matters which
have implications for WEU and in which it is
involved. The Council should reply to recorlmen-
dations of the Assembly dealing with the applica-
tion of the modified Brussels Treaty, even if the
exercise of certain WEU competences are entus-
ted to other European organisations, such as the
European Union.
58. Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty
created an Assembly whose activities are not just
an echo of those of the WEU Council. They are
based on its political independence which was
recognised by the Council from the very outset. In
this spirit, the Assembly was able to draw up a
Charter which lays down that the Assembly car-
ries out the parliamentary function arising from
the application of the modified Brussels Treaty
and may proceed on any matter arising out of that
Treaty. The Assembly's recommendations to the
Council constitute the Assembly's formal answers
to the annual report of the Council which is trans-
mitted to the Assembly in accordance with
Article IX and reflect its formal positions on any
matter arising from the treaty. The Assembly's
recommendations therefore cannot be considered
as simple " suggestions " as implied in the Coun-
cil's reply to Recommendations 548 (paragraph 6)
and 550 (paragraph 3).
(ii1 fhe parliamentary dimension ofco-operatian between
WEU and the European Union
59. The need to elaborate. a WEU concept
regarding the future place of the security and
defence element within the future European (and
Atlantic) institutional architecurre applies also to
the question of how democratic and parliamen-
tary supervision of the European executive insti-
tutions should be guaranteed and organised in the
best possible way. As already stressed in para-
graph 5 of the infroduction, the Assembly should
be conscious of its special responsibility in put-
ting forward constructive proposals and recom-
mendations in this area, which is still far from
being examined and clarified with due attention.
Whereas the Maastricht Treaty does not refer to
specific WEU organs but to " WELJ " as an inte-
gral part of the development of the Union, the
WEU declaration annexed to the Maastricht Trea-
ty contains encouragement for closer co-operation
between the Assembly of WEU and the European
Parliament.
60. In answer to Written Questions 302 and
303, on 16th October 1992 the Council specified
that its:
" encouragement of closer co-operation bet-
ween the parliamentary Assembly of WEU
and the European Parliament is based on the
fact that the Maastricht declaration of the
Nine on the r6le of Western European Union
and its relations with the European Union
and with the Atlantic Alliance specifies
under the heading 'WEU's relations with
European Union ' (paragraph 3): 'The
objective is to build up WEU in stages as the
defence component of the European Union.
To this end, WEU is prepared, at the request
of the European Union, to elaborate and
implement decisions and actions of the
Union which have defence implications.'
The 'encouragement of closer co-operation
between the parliamentary Assembly of
WEU and the European Parliament' is one
of the ' measures ' which 'WEU will take...
to develop a close working relationship with
the IJnion'. "
61. This specification is very important. Mea-
sures to develop a close working relationship with
the Union have to be seen in the context of
Aticle J.4 according to which WEU is an integral
part of the Union and will, at the request of the lat-
ter, elaborate and implement decisions and
actions of the Union which have defence implica-
tions. Consequently, all efforts to establish close
co-operation between the Assembly of WEU and
the European Parliament should be seen in this
context. The objective of building up WEU in
glages as the defence component of the European
Union has to be implemented in its parliamentary
component too, this being the Assembly of WEU.
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62. That means that arrangements which need
to be made for establishing closer relationships
between the WEU Assembly and the European
Parliament should take into account WEU's
enhanced responsibilities in the framework of the
Union. They should therefore be based on a spirit
of equality, reciprocity, transparency and comple-
mentarity. To this end, informal contacts have
been established between the Assembly and the
European Parliament.
63. They led to a meeting in Paris on
29th January 1993 at which the Political Commit-
tee of the WEU Assembly was briefed by
Mr. De Gucht, Rapporteur of the Committee on
Institutional Affairs of the European Parliament
on future relations between the European Com-
munity, WEU and the Atlantic Alliance. On that
occasion, the Political Committee of the WEU
Assembly gave its views on bertain points and on
2nd March 1993 the Presidential Committee
adopted a declaration on the WEU Assembly's
place in the European Union which the President
of the WEU Assembly transmitted to the Presi-
dent of the European Parliament'?.
64. Following an exchange of letters in
April 1993 between the Sub-committee on Secu-
rity and Disarmament of the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the European Parliament and the
Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly it was
decided to form a small group of parliamentarians
of the Political Committee with the task of main-
taining contact with the said sub-committee of the
European Parliament. On 15th June 1993 a meet-
ing was held between MM. Holzfuss and Laga-
kos, members of the Sub-committee on Security
and Disarmament of the puropean Parliament,
and Lord Finsberg, MM. Goerens and Stoffelen,
members of the working group for contacts with
the European Parliament nominated by the Politi-
cal Committee of the WEU Assembly. It was
agreed that a formal meeting between the working
groups of both the European Parliament and
the WEU Assembly should be held in early
autumn 1993, most probably in Brussels, in order
to discuss proposals for contacts between the two
parliamentary bodies.
65. In fact, no such meeting was held but it was
agreed that, in principle, all parties should be on
an equal footing in such contacts. All participants
agreed that the contacts could include:
- 
an exchange of draft reports at an early
stage;
- 
regular contacts between rapporteurs;
- 
joint meetings of committees.
Participation in plenary sessions with the right to
speak on a reciprocal basis was a problem which
might not be solved easily at short notice, but both
sides agreed that constructive proposals on this
matter should be discussed at their next meeting.
66. On24th February 1994, however, ttre Euro-
pean Parliament adopted Resolution 43-0041/94 on
future relations between the European Union, WEU
and ttre Atlantic Alliance emphasising inter alia:
" that the primacy of the European Union
over WEU should be confirmed unambi-
guously, with the European Union taking
the political decisions concerning security
and defence, with WEU implementing the
decisions which have defence implica-
tions... that the European Parliament may
address questions and recommendations to
the WEU Council " and that " in the third
stage, the European Parliament should
replace the WEU Assembly in its entirety
at plenary and committee levels... "
67. Reading the explanatory memorandum
attached to that resolution, the Rapporteur
Mr. De Gucht already proposes in a frst stage a
modification of Articie D(of the modified B-rus-
sels Treaty in the sense that the WEU Assembly
shall be composed of the representatives of WEU
member countries elected to the European Parlia-
ment. Of course, this is the personal view of the
rapporteur, but if his argument that " the WEU
Assembly, unlike the European Parliament, is
under the current provisions not included in the
normal process of European integration ",
becomes the official position of the European Par-
liament, it will be very difficult for the WEU
Assembly to develop a working relationship with
it because such a starting point would run counter
to the text of the relevant provisions of the treaties
and also to the spirit of understanding the liaison
group of both parliamentary assemblies had
already reached.
68. The Assembly therefore expects that the
Council will take appropriate steps in the frame-
work of its new working links with the inter-
governmental authorities of the European Union,
with the European Commission and last, but not
least, also whenever its representatives have
contacts with members of the European Parlia-
ment. Thus the Council should make it clear that
the planned closer relationship between the WEU
Assembly and the European Parliament which the
Council has encouraged the WEU Assembly to
develop will not be possible, if the relevant ins-
tances of the Union, and in particular the Euro-
pean Parliament, continue to claim that the WEU
Assembly, which is a component of the WEU
organisation, is excluded from the process of
European integration.
69. The future structure of the parliamentary
dimension of a European Union in which security
and defence will take their appropriate places will
tzt
17. See Appendix.
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be the subject of a carefully-prepared study the
Political Committee is to present at a later stage.
The committee is also ready to reopen the dia-
logue with a newly-elected European Parliament
in order to agree appropriate ways and means for
developing closer co-operation. The primary aim
of these efforts should be the elaboration of ways
to strengthen and improve democratic control
bearing in mind the will of the peoples concerned
in the most sensitive political area, i.e. defence
and security. However, in pressing steadfastly for
a single European framework for security and
defence matters and for introducing the principle
of majority decisions in these areas and asking to
replace the WEU Assembly in its entirety, the
European Parliament has never explained why all
this would lead to greater democracy in security
and defence matters, nor why it should lead to
greater efficiency. The European Parliament's
fight against the intergovernmental decision-
making process in the European Union and in
WEU, which has been even further strengthened
by the Maastricht Treaty, seems particularly coun-
terproductive when one considers that the true
goal is to bring together all the nations of a conti-
nent such as Europe whose greatest quality is the
very diversity of its peoples and countries, inclu-
ding especially the " smaller " countries and for-
mer neutral counffies, which are now prepared tojoin European Union but wish nevertheless to
retain some control over their destiny.
(iii) European Union, WEU and NATO
70. The problem of pressing for a single Euro-
pean framework in security and defence must also
be examined carefully with regard to Europe's
future transatlantic relations in these matters and
even its relations with the United Nations. Reso-
lution A3-0MIl94 of the European Parliament:
" Takes the view ... that aspects of the rela-
tionship with the United States should come
under the responsibility of the same politi-
cal authority, which implies that the Euro-
pean Union should become responsible for
defining the European position in the Atlan-
tic Alliance; considers that this will allow
the development of a more consistent atti-
tude towards the United States as well as a
less ambiguous relationship between the
Union and the United States;
Considers it important that ultimately, toge-
ther with the revision of the treaties leading
to the full incorporation of WEU into the
European Union, the existing North Atlan-
tic Treaty is adapted or a new treaty signed
between the United States and the Euro-
pean Union to reflect better the new equal
relationship between the two sides of the
Atlantic."
71. Again, in aresolution on the " development
of a common security and defence policy for the
European Union " adopted on24th March 1994,
the European Parliament:
" Welcomes the thought being given on
both sides of the Atlantic to the possibility
of anchoring all political, economic and
defence policy relations between the Euro-
pean Union and the United States and
Canada in a comprehensive fteaty; "
72. It cannot be the purpose of this report to
enter into discussion of numerous reports and
positions adopted by the European Parliament in
the area of competence of Western European
Union. Nevertheless your Rapporteur deems it
necessary to emphasise that Europe's relations in
security and defence matters with the United
States and Canada in the framework of the Atlan-
tic Alliance are particularly sensitive and have to
be handled most carefully. It is well known that a
number of problems and rivalities in political and
economic areas have arisen recently between the
Twelve and the United States. For the security of
Europe, it will be crucial to avoid difficulties and
competition on either side of the Atlantic affec-
ting transatlantic solidarity in security and defen-
ce matters. Suggesting in this context to replace
the North Atlantic Treaty by another treaty
without specifying the purpose and the content of
such a new arrangement can be a dangerous
undertaking. The Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Union in no way indicates in which way the
Union intends to develop its relations with the
United States and with NATO other than reques-
ting that co-operation between member states
within NATO shall not run counter to or impede
that provided for in the Union. Again, the Union
is already in competition and even in conflict with
the United States, particularly in economic mat-
ters. To maintain transatlantic solidarity, it is
therefore most important that WEU has been
developed as the European pillar of NATO on the
basis of Article IV of the modified Brussels Trea-
ty obliging it to work in close co-operation with
NATO. The importance of this provision increa-
sed considerably after the January NATO summit
meeting which explicitly supported sffengthening
the European pillar of the alliance through Wes-
tern European Union.
73. It will be a main task of Western European
Union to use its new working relations with the
relevant instances of the European Union and the
CFSP, to strengthen transatlantic cohesion and to
advise the Union on possible repercussions of cer-
tain decisions with defence implications on trans-
atlantic co-operation. It was therefore a wise deci-
sion to confirm WEU as a separate institution
with the task of developing co-operation with
NATO to the benefit of the European Union as a
whole.
r22
DOCUMENT 1417
74. Both the European Union and WEU will
also have to study the impact the establishment of
a single European framework in the security and
defence area would have on relations with the Uni-
ted Nations. According to Article 2 of its Charter,
the United Nations is based on the principle of the
sovereign equaliry of all its member states. When
the Assembly recommended in Recommenda-
tion 549 that the Council study the proposals ...
with regard to reforming the United Nations and
its Security Council with a view to srengthening
its effectiveness in peace-keeping and improving
WEU's participation in the decision-making pro-
cess in the United Nations, the Council replied that
" this issue is solely a matter for the member states
as members of the United Nations. "
75. Article J.5, paragraph 4 of the Maastricht
Treaty obliges member states which are penna-
nent members of the Security Council to ensure
the defence of positions and the interests of the
Union, but without prejudice to their responsibili-
ties under the provisions of the United Nations
Charter. So far this Charter allows only individual
sovereign member countries to become members
of the United Nations Council. Furthermore, Uni-
ted Nations member states alone can decide indi-
vidually on the basis of their autonomous political
evaluations and in conforrnity with their constitu-
tions whether or not to contribute to peace-keep-
ing or peace-enforcing operations requested or
authorised by the United Nations. Appropriate
parliamentary supervision of these decisions is
becoming increasingly important. It must be car-
ried out by a parliamentary assembly whose mem-
bers should have far closer links with the deci-
sion-making process in the relevant countries than
members of the European Parliament elected by
direct universal suffrage could have. Neither the
present member countries of the Union nor the
EFTA countries now joining as new members
with their long experience in peace-keeping in the
framework of the United Nations would agree that
powers to decide on sending national or multina-
tional military contingents abroad for peace-keep-
ing or peace-enforcing purposes should be trans-
ferred to supranational institutions.
III. The enlargement of the European Unian
and ils implicatians for Watern Earopean Union
(i) The EFTA countries
76. The recently successful negotiations with
Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden regarding
their accession to the European Union seemed
particularly difficult in a number of areas but
not in regard to foreign and security policy
(Chapter 24 of the agreement package). Whereas
Norway as a member of NATO had from the very
beginning no difficulties with this chapter, the
other three countries had so far maintained a pol-
icy of neunality, in each case based on different
legal, political and historical grounds. Neverthe-
less, all three countries agreed with the European
Union on the following joint declaration :
77. " I. The Union notes the confirmation by
Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway of
their full acceptance of the rights and obli-
gations attaching to the Union and its insti-
tutional framework, known as the " acquis
communautaire", as it applies to present
member states. This includes in particular
the content, principles and political objec-
tives of the treaties, including those of the
Treaty on European Union.
The Union and Austria, Sweden, Finland
and Norway agree that:
- 
accession to the Union should strengthen
the internal coherence of the Union and
its capacity to act effectively in foreign
and security policy;
- 
the acceding states will, from the time of
their accession, be ready and able to par-
ticipate fully and actively in the common
foreign and security policy as defined in
the Treaty on European Union;
- 
the acceding states will, on accession,
take on in their entirety and without
reservation all the objectives of the
treaty, the provisions of its Title Y and
the relevant declarations attached to it;
- 
the acceding states will be ready and able
to support the specific policies of the
Union in force at the time of their acces-
sion.
II. With regard to member states' obliga-
tions deriving from the Treaty on European
Union concerning the implementation of
the Union's common foreign and security
policy, it is understood that, on the day of
accession, the legal framework of the acce-
ding countries will be compatible with the
acquis. "
78. In its reply to Recommendation 548 asking
the Council to define without delay the nature of
its future relations with Austria, Finland and Swe-
den, offering them means of co-operation corres-
ponding to the specific situation of each one, the
Council stated that:
" The nature of WEU's future relations
with Austria, Finland and Sweden depends
on the decision which these countries will
take regarding their relations with WEU.
Under the terms of the declaration by
Ministers on l9th May 1993, and at these
countries' request, WEU has established
the appropriate contacts with them in order
to inform them about WEU's rOle. "
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79. Nevertheless, it would be helpful if the
Council would clarify whether the entry of these
countries into the European Union, once approved
by the European Parliament and the population of
the countries concerned, will enable them to bene-
fit from the WEU declaration appended to the
Maastricht Treaty according to which " states
which are members of the European Union are
invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be
agreed in accordance with Anicle XI of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if
they so wish ". Since this declaration assumed
that ffeaties and agreements corresponding to the
above proposals would be concluded before
31st December 1992, it has to be made clear whe-
ther the same procedure will apply to counftiesjoining the European Union after that date.
80. So far, only Austria has publicly announced
its intention to become an observer in WEU.
There are regular informal information contacts in
Brussels between representatives of Austria and
WEU representatives, but according to the infor-
mation your Rapporteur received in Brussels the
three countries in question have made no formal
requests regarding their future relationship with
WEU.
81. The Political Committee's information visit
to Austria in March 1994 was particularly rich in
enhancing knowledge of the country's commit-
ment to join the European " club ". It became
clear that the Austrian authorities consider that the
reasons for incorporating in its constitution in
1955 a declaration of permanent neuffality have
become more and more obsolete following the
radical political changes in Europe since 1989.
Ausffia has an important geographical position as
a direct neighbour of three of the Visegrad coun-
tries, Slovenia and a short distance from Ukraine.
Since the outbreak of hostilities on the territory of
former Yugoslavia, Austria views its application
to join the European Union increasingly from a
security angle. It intends to become an active par-
ticipant in the development of a security policy
within the Union and sees its future relationship
with WEU as an evolutionary process. Further-
more it has expressed its commitment to contri-
bute to the deepening of the Union ". According to
Mr. Mock, Minister for Foreign Affairs, there
would in the long run be full identity between
members of the Union and WEU. Austria is
concentrating its present efforts on the European
Union and WEU whereas the question of relations
with NATO are not at present on the agenda of the
political discussion. Austria considers the partner-
ship for peace prograflrme as a positive initiative,
but does not envisage participating in it for the
time being.
18. See the contribution by Mr. Mock, Austrian Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Le Monde, 30th April 1994.
82. 
.Austria's longstanding participation and
experience in peace-keeping operations of the
United Nations will constitute a valuable contri-
bution to the European Union and Western Euro-
pean Union provided the referendum on joining
the Union, which is to be held on t2thlune 1994,
is positive. According to opinion polls conducted
prior to the successful conclusion of the accession
agreements, a majority was in favour of the coun-
try's accession to the Union. Gallup counted 48Vo
in favour, 38Vo againstand14% undecided, whe-
reas Market Institute counted 397o infavotx,34Vo
against and 27Vo undecided'e. But most recent
opinion polls indicate more than 53Vo in favour,
about 32Vo against and ll-147o undecided. There
are therefore good reasons to hope that Austria
will be the first of the four EFTA countries whose
population will approve its entry into the Union
which undoubtedly will have a positive impact on
the results of the referendums to be held in the
other three countries.
83. ln Finlandzo, an opinion poll was organised
by Finska-Gallup on 14th February 1994 accor-
ding to which 39Vo of those questioned were in
favour of Finland joining the Union, 30clo agnnst
and3l%o undecided. When the Political Commit-
tee visited Finland on 25th and26thApril 1994, it
saw a country which had succeeded by its policy
of neutrality in maintaining its national indepen-
dence next door to a superpower neighbour which
had defeated it in war and demonstrated expan-
sionary tendencies. However, neutrality for the
Finns was never an end in itself but only a means
of safeguarding their national existence and secu-
rity. Ever since achieving independence from
Russia in 1917, Finland had sought a modus
vivendi with Moscow. For 43 years after the
second world war, Finland was enmeshed in a
special relationship governed by a 1948 treaty of
friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance
and on strong bilateral trade relations. The failure
of the August 1991 coup in Moscow hastened the
end of the 1948 reaty in its entirety, abrogated by
a new treaty signed on 20th January 1992. Nego-
tiations are now expected with the Russian
Government on trading and border questions.
During European Union membership negotia-
tions, Finland insisted on the importance of ensu-
riSg prospects for continuing and_indeed develo-
ping economic co-operation with Russia.
84. Finland's security has been greatly affected
by the strategic game of superpower doctrines,
weapons and deployments that was played around
the Kola base complex and in the northern waters
and airspace. Despite the implemented and forth-
coming deep reductions in strategic and tactical
nuclear weapons by the United States and Russia,
Le Monde,4th March 1994.
Le Monde,4th March 1994.
19.
20.
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Northern Europe retains its strategic significance
for the residual forces of the superpowers. Now
that the Baltic states are independent, the focus of
military policy in the Baltic has shifted from the
Straits of Denmark to the mouth of the Gulf of
Finland, and when the START II Treaty on the
reduction of strategic nuclear forces comes into
force, nearly half of Russia's nuclear capacity,
consisting mainly of sffategic missile submarines,
will be concentrated in the Kola Peninsula. No
matter how positive development may be in Rus-
sia, this will not change the reality that Russia's
two most important areas from a strategic point of
view 
- 
the Leningrad military district and the
Kola Peninsula 
- 
are located next door to Finland.
In the Leningrad district in particular, important
units of Russian ftoops and matdriel are deployed
which had been withdrawn from Central Europe
and Germany.
85. On 18th April l994,Finlanddecidedtojoin
NATO's partnership for peace programme. Since
June 1992, Finland has also an obseryer's status in
NACC. Despite the large Russian military
deployment near the Finnish borders the President
of the Republic of Finland confirmed in a speech
to the plenary session of the European Parliament
on 16th November 1993:
" Finland is not asking for a free ride in
terms of security. We do not feel threatened
and are not in the search for new security
solutions. Finland pursues a policy of mili-
tary non-alliance and an independent and
credible defence.
In the European Union, we are fully prepa-
red to take an active part in the common
foreign and security policy and in its fur-
ther development as foreseen in the treaty.
We do not exclude any options. "
86. This Finnish attitude was confirmed by the
Foreign Minister Mr. Haaviston Tapaaminen,
when he told the Political Committee in Helsinki
on 25th April 1994:
" to the extent our military security is
concerned, maintaining military non-
alliance and an independent, credible
defence capacity remains our point of
departure. This is the way we have defined
our policy of neutrality in the post-cold war
Europe. We are prepared to participate acti-
vely and constructively in the further elabo-
ration of the defence dimension. We do not
foreclose any options but believe it is our
legitimate right and obligation to look at
future arrangements from the point of view
of our national security.
We are engaged in an informal and useful
dialogue with WEU at various levels. No
decision has been taken by the government
to formalise this relationship for the time
being. Our priorities are very clear: we
have to tackle with European Union acces-
sion first. Only after that can further aspects
be considered. In this perspective, it is
significant that there will be a referendum
on membership some time in the autumn,
probably in October.
One further consideration deserves to be
mentioned here: full membership in WEU
implies an Article V security guarantee. We
are not seeking one, nor would a guarantee
be compatible with our present policy.
Observer status in WEU, in conffast, would
not seem to contradict the fundamentals of
our policy. "
Mrs. Rehn, Finnish Minister of Defence, conside-
red Finland's obseryer status in WEU as a mini-
mum.
87. The Finnish Government showed that it
was well aware of the wish of the Swedish and
Norwegian authorities that the Finnish referen-
dum should be held earlier than in the other nordic
countries since both Sweden and Norway counted
on a positive vote from the Finnish population.
Nevertheless, the Finnish authorities told the
committee that no definite date for the referendum
had yet been fixed.
88. They also made clear that, apart from cer-
tain threats voiced by Mr. Zhirinovsky during a
recent visit to Helsinki, no pressure had been
brought to bear by the Russian Government regar-
ding Finland's ambitions to join the West. The
Russian Defence Minister did not like to see Fin-
land joining NAIO, whereas WEU was not men-
tioned. The Finnish authorities avoid discussing
these issues with the Russian authorities in order
to avoid giving the impression that they might
seek Russian advice in this area.
89. The committee's visit to the Defence
Ministry's peace-keeping training centre in Niini-
salo was particularly interesting in the context of
the recent decision by Finland to join the NATO
partnership for peace programme. According to a
Finnish press release dated t9th April 1994,
" The Finnish presentation document will
list the forms of co-operation Finland is
interested in within the partnership for
peace. They are:
- 
co-operation in the field of peace-
keeping, primarily providing peace-
keeping training;
- 
co-operation in search and rescue as well
as in humanitarian operations;
- 
visits and educational exchange;
- 
co-operation in the field of the environ-
ment. "
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90. From Finland's longstanding experience in
peace-keeping, in particular in training, the rele-
vant European institutions such as WEU could
find much to their advantage even if initially Fin-
land chose only observer status in WEU. In view
of the increasing need to develop peace-keeping
capabilities and training, a study might be made
of the usefulness of creating such a training centre
under the aegis of Western European Union.
91. Regarding the position of Sweden, your
Rapporteur was able to hold comprehensive talks
with various governmental, parliamentary and
scientific authorities of that country during a visit
to Stockholm at the end of March 1994. In these
talks he was particularly impressed by the way
most of the Swedish speakers expressed their feel-
ing of responsibility and concern for maintaining
the independence of the Baltic states. They parti-
cularly believed that WEU's decision to grant
enhanced status for the countries participating in
the WEU Forum of Consultation should not
exclude the Baltic states so that a new dividing
line would not be drawn between Poland and
Lithuania. These questions will be developed in
greater detail in the following chapter dealing
with the Central European countries.
92. Furthermore, the Swedish analysts in the
Defence Ministry underlined even more than the
Finns the importance of new Russian deployment
on the Kola Peninsula and in the Leningrad dis-
trict. In a speech at the Royal Academy of Mili-
tary Sciences, Stockholm, on 7th December 1993,
the Swedish Prime Minister, Mr. Carl Bildt,
emphasised with reference to the Kola Peninsula:
" It is somewhat of a paradox that, although
current developments mean that nuclear
weapons are declining in importance and
are being cut back, the importance of the
Kola bases and their immediate area of
operations will increase in step with these
reductions.
Developments are affected by several fac-
tors. The main ingredient is the START tr
Treaty which was signed by the United
States and Russia earlier this year, under
which strategic nuclear arsenals will be cut
back to 3 500 warheads on each side. The
structure of these arsenals will also be
changed, and this will result in a marked
increase in the proportion of warheads
deployed on submarines. In addition, the
independence achieved by Ukraine and
Kazakhstan, and the resultant depletion of
Russia's ground-based missile systems,
now means that warheads deployed on sub-
marines have become even more important.
In combination with technological deve-
lopments which mean that only the Russian
Navy's Northern Fleet is equipped with the
two most modern types of military laun-
ching submarines, this will imply that, in
the future, slightly morE than half of the
total Russian strategic nuclear-weapon
arsenal will be located on some ten sub-
marines based on the Kola Peninsula. "
93. " The changes which affect our neighbour-
hood in a major way include the CFE Trea-
ty for the reduction of conventional forces
in Europe.
Under the CFE Treaty, Russia has two geo-
graphically distinct sections of the flank
zone: the Leningrad military district to the
north, and the Northern Caucasus military
district to the south. The principle is that of
" communicating chambers ". Thus the
Russian areas of the flank zone have a com-
mon maximum ceiling for the volume of
heavy military equipment permitted, but
Russia can decide where this equipment
should be deployed, for example with an
emphasis on the north or the south. "
94. In the same speech, the Swedish Prime
Minister said that if the economic aspects have
been an important factor for Sweden's decision to
apply for such membership in the European Com-
munity, it was very clear that the security policy
reasons for membership have gradually become
sffonger. Sweden wants to give the CFSP of the
European Union a clear Northern European
dimension. Its second objective consists of " buil-
ding up a network of co-operation and stability in
the Baltic Sea area and between Sweden, the Bal-
tic countries and Russia, whose importance for
developments in the North of Europe will always
be very considerable. " As things now stand, the
Swedish referendum on joining the Union should
be held on 13th November 1994, the outcome of
which seems still to be an open question.
95. In a study entitled " A historic choice, the
consequences for Swedish foreign and security
policy of membership or non-membership of the
European Union " published in January 1994 by
two former State Secretaries of the Swedish
Foreign Ministry at the request of the govern-
ment, the authors plead for Sweden to join the
Union. They underline that this would not oblige
Sweden to decide whether or not to participate in
a corlmon defence. The paper is part of the efforts
made by the government to convince the popula-
tion to vote in favour of joining the Union. A last
poll published on 13th February 1994 showed
only 28Vo in favour, but 4O7o against joining
whereas 287o were undecided 2'.
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96. Bearing in mind Sweden's longstanding
policy of neurality, it is understandable that neu-
trality still has important roots in Swedish public
opinion. The decision to join the European Union
is therefore to be considered as a fundamental
new step in a new direction. Sweden's future rela-
tionship with WEU is largely tantamount to
entering a whole new world. The Swedish autho-
rities therefore prefer to handle this question only
after entering the European Union in order to have
a possibility of influencing its development in the
light of the intergovernmental conference of
1996.
97. In an interview on llth April 1994 with
" Die Welt ", however, Mr. Bildt answered the
question about Sweden's position towards WEU
and the prospects it offerod and whether neutra-
lity was an issue as follows:
" Sweden's position of neutrality to date
will not constitute an obstacle as the cir-
cumstances on whidh neutrality in Europe
was based have completely changed, in the
sense that the histotical meaning and pur-
pose of neutrality disappeared with the dis-
solution of the Warsaw Pact.
Our main interest is to help establish demo-
cratically-controlled national defence sys-
tems, based on international co-operation,
in the former Warsaw Pact countries with
NATO's partnership for peace initiative
meeting their security needs. In order to do
so, we can draw on Sweden's valuable
experience of its own defence system and
its participation in United Nations peace
operations. However, the most important
consideration for Sweden is to play an acti-
ve part in the common foreign and security
policy, within the framework of the Euro-
pean Union, since this is participation in its
most essential form at the heart of a policy
aiming to extend stability and security
throughout Europe. Once Sweden has
become a member of the European Union,
we will decide if it should also become a
member of WEU or merely have observer
status. I feel that the latter option is the
more likely. "
98. Meanwhile, Sweden has adopted a positive
attitude about participating in the partnership for
peace programme 22 and, unlike Finland, did notjoin the NACC which is considered to be devoted
first and foremost to the former Warsaw Pact
countries. Nevertheless Sweden continues to give
high priorities to participation in various forms of
peace-keeping operations in which the Nordic
countries co-operate effectively. Two joint Nordic
22. See contribution of the Swedish Minister for Foreign
Affairs in NATO Review, April 1994.
battalions under United Nations command have
been deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM) and in Bosnia. During its
stay in Helsinki, the committee was informed that
as the Nonvegian and Swedish contingents were
to leave the FYROM, the Finnish units were
asked to fill the gap.
99. The three counffies are faced with a funda-
mental political new choice and orientation which
will not be easy to put over to public opinion,
which has to be convinced that this choice will be
to the advantage ofthe countries concerned and of
Europe as a whole. For various reasons which dif-
fer from country to country it is understandable
that these countries should be granted time to
consider what kind of relationship they wish to
establish with WEU.
100. But it is obvious that, in order to achieve
the objective of Article J.4 of the Maastricht
Treaty at a later stage, the broadest possible
identity between member states of the Union and
of WEU should be the political goal. More aston-
ishing is the position adopted on24thMarch 1994
by the European Parliament in a resolution " on
development of a common security and defence
policy for the European Union " when it empha-
sises " that relations with countries with which
accession negotiations are under way should be
conducted in such a way as to make these coun-
tries fully aware that membership of WEU as a
military alliance is not an essential condition for
accession to the European Union ". How does
this fit in when the same resolution in another
paragraph " advocates that all member states of
the European Union should become full members
of WEU? "
101. Norway's position regarding joining the
European Union is slightly different since it is one
of the founder members of NATO and already has
observer status in WEU. Nevertheless the public
opinion that supports the Union still seems to be
in a minority. The Nielsen Norway Institute made
public at the beginning of March the result of a
poll which showed 28Vo in favour, 427o agunst
and 3OVo undecided. According the results of an
opinion poll published by Dagbladet on
18th April 1994,50Vo of the Norwegians remain
opposed to their country's accession to the Euro-
pean Union, 36Vo are in favour and l4Vo are still
undecided. Opinion polls in March were 52Vo
against and 34Vo in favour. According to other
surveys the number of those who have not yet
made up their minds is even higher.
IO2. During an information visit to Oslo on
21st and 22nd April 1994, your Rapporteur was
told that parliament had not yet definitely decided
on the date of the referendum, but that it would be
held late in November, probably on 28th Novem-
ber 1994, in order to give voters enough time to
form their opinion. Furthermore, while most
t27
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governmental and parliamentary authorities are
fairly optimistic that the result of the referendum
will be positive, they feel it would be advantage-
ous to give the voters an opportunity to hear the
results of referendums in the other three EFTA
countries.
103. Everyone your Rapporteur had the oppor-
tunity to meet underlined that the security and
defence aspect was the government's most impor-
tant reason for applying for membership of the
European Union. The State Secretary for Foreign
Affairs said clearly that, once a full member of the
European Union, Norway would also seek full
membership of WEU. Official circles are satisfied
with the outcome of the negotiations, including
the fishing and agricultural sectors, but there is
still considerable public opposition to the treaties.
Governmental authorities therefore believe that
the security aspects will be crucial for a positive
vote.
lO4. Norway has a 200 km land border with
Russia. It is fully integrated in the military com-
mand structure of NATO, but does not accept the
permanent stationing of foreign ffoops on its terri-
tory nor the deployment of nuclear weapons. In a
speech at the Leang Kollen Seminar on
7th February l994,the Norwegian Foreign Minis-
ter recalled that the only remaining Russian
nuclear test site is located at Novaya Zemly4
close to Norwegian territory. Norwegians are
concerned about the risk accidents or leakage
from nuclear tests. The minister said inter alia:
" Although Norway remains the only
NATO country with a common border with
Russia, we do not today view Russia as
posing a concrete threat. We do however
realise that there is widespread discontent
and uncertainty. Barents co-operation and
Baltic Sea co-operation are new approaches
for solving old problems. The Baltic Sea
and the Barents regions are the only two
regions in which, in a foreseeable future,
Russia will share a common border with
countries of the European economic area,
hopefully soon also member states of the
European lJnion. "
105. ... "The problems related to the military
complex on the Kola Peninsula and the
Kola nuclear power plant, which is 200 km
from the Norwegian-Russian border, are of
particular concern. "
One parliamentarian said that the largest concen-
tration in the world is located in the Murmansk
area. It is therefore understandable that Norway
wishes to bring its so far bilateral cross border
dialogue with Russia into the broader context of
the European Union. Like the Swedish authori-
ties, the Norwegian representatives in the Minis-
try for Foreign Affairs stressed the importance of
not excluding the Baltic states from the enhanced
status to be granted by WEU to the Central Euro-
pean countries. But the Norwegian authorities
also made clear that they did not want to see coun-
tries becoming full members of WEU which were
not closely linked with NATO.
106. In the abovementioned address, the Norwe-
gian Foreign Minister evaluated NAIO's partner-
ship for peace initiative in a specific and positive
manner. In his view it provides a dynamic pers-
pective that has been largely underestimated in
the public debate, whereas its political element,
the granting of consultation rights, has potential
as a significant contribution to European crisis-
management and crisis-prevention. Norway
which, like the other Nordic countries, has a signi-
ficant experience in peace-keeping, intends to
contribute actively in order to make the initiative
a success. It wants Finland and Sweden to partici-
pate, in particular with regard to peace-keeping:
" The successful Nordic co-operation in
this field already established within the
framework of the United Nations could be
further developed in a broader European
context. "
Norway is also prepared to provide concrete assis-
tance to partnership for peace countries in order to
enable them to seize in full the opportunities now
open to them. In particular, the Norwegian
Government will consider co-operation with the
Baltic states as an important contribution in this
respect.
107. Summarising the various information and
impressions gathered in all four EFTA countries,
one can come to the conclusion that their acces-
sion to the Union will strengthen its cohesion and
homogeneity and contribute also to stability in
Europe as a whole. Notwithstanding the decisions
still to be reached by these countries regarding
their future relationship with Western European
Union, the Council should increase appropriate
contacts with them in order to keep them fully
informed about WEU's r6le and activities and
also to indicate how much contributions from
these countries in the specific areas of their capa-
cities and experience 
- 
for instance in peace-
keeping 
- 
and as important factors of stability in
their respective regions will be appreciated.
(ii) The Central European countries
108. On 9th M.ay 1994, the Council of WEU is
to take a decision on the scope of the " associate "
status it intends to grant to the countries par-
ticipating in the WEU Forum of Consultation. In
this context, your Rapporteur wishes to recall the
importance of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Recommen-
dation 556 on the evolution of NATO and its
consequences for WEU adopted by the Standing
128
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Committee on 3rd May 1994 on the basis of the
report submitted by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the
Political Committee, and also paragraphs 19 to24
of the explanatory memorandum of that report.
109. After the Political Committee's visits in
1993 to six of the nine countries in question, your
Rapporteur deemed it necessary to complete the
information by visiting the three Baltic countries
which call for special attention bearing in mind
their close links with the Nordic countries such as
Denmark, Sweden and Finland. These countries,
which had lost their independence as victims of
the Stalin-Ribbentop Pact which was confirmed
at the Yalta Conference, succeeded only in 1991
in regaining their independence, but in Latvia and
Estonia a number of Russian troops still remain.
110. The Rapporteur's visit to the Baltic states,
which was particularly rich in information, confir-
med his convinction that the Council of WEU took
the right decision by including these countries in
the Forum of Consultation and granting them an
associate status in WEU. Like the Nordic countries
and the other Central European countries, they
belong to the European frnily which sooner or
later should be united in the European Union.
111. Important steps have been taken by all the
Baltic states to pave the way for drawing closer to
the West and for settling their relationship with
their neighbours, and in particular with Russia.
All three countries participate in NAIO's partner-
ship for peace initiative and have created a joint
peace-keeping battalion. The creation of a Baltic
Council, composed of the Heads of State, a Coun-
cil of Ministers and a Baltic parliamentary
Assembly with strong links to the Nordic Council
offers a valuable means of strengthening intra-
Baltic co-operation, solidarity and stability.
lI2. All the countries need substantial support
and help in order to establish the necessary admin-
isffative infrastructure for their new democratic ins-
titutions including ffaining, mat6riel and equipment
for their police forces and for protecting and
controlling their borders. In this respect they
already receive considerable assistance from the
Nordic countries, especially Denmark, Sweden, and
Finland but also, in the economic field, Germany.
113. This generally positive development howe-
ver cannot hide the fact that a number of important
problems remain to be solved. Whereas Lithuania
no longer has Russian troops on its soil, the large
Russian military presence in the disrict of Kalinin-
grad is a source ofconcern. In his annual address to
Parliament on 10th February 1994, the President of
the Republic of Lithuania stressed that:
" Lithuania is raising the issue of demilita-
rising the Kaliningrad district in internatio-
nal forums, because that is a problem that is
shared not only by Lithuania, but by all of
the states in the Baltic Sea region. The eco-
nomic, environmental and cultural interests
of the Kaliningrad region often overlap
with those of Lithuania and in that sense
they become common. In our opinion, it
would be useful for Russia, and the states
that neighbour the Kaliningrad district to
establish a special trade zone in this region.
International organisations, especially the
European Union could play an increasingly
more important r6le in it. Statements by
Russian politicians and military officials to
significantly reduce the military potential
in this district and to react more flexibly to
suggestions for changing its economic sta-
tus should be evaluated positively. "
ll4. Lithuanian authorities have therefore indi-
cated in their talks with the Rapporteur that this
question should be included in the conference on
a stability pact initiated by the French Prime
Minister, Mr. Balladur. After some difficulties,
Lithuania and Poland have now normalised their
relationship on the basis of a bilateral ffeaty sett-
ling inter alia the question of minorities ".
115. Latvia has now signed an agreement with
Russia according to which all remaining 12 000
Russian troops will leave the country by
3lst August 199420. The package of agreements
also settles the right for retired Russian officers
(about 20-25 000) to remain in the country and to
benefit from social assistance but they will not be
allowed to take Latvian citizenship. Furthermore,
the Russian side was granted the right to use their
radar early warning system in Skrunda for a fur-
ther four years with the proviso that the installa-
tions will be dismantled within 18 months at the
end of this period.
116. Finalising this agreement was particularly
difficult in the light of a decree published on
5th April l994by the Russian President, Mr. Yelt-
sin, to establish Russian military bases in the ter-
ritories of the Community of Independent States
(CIS) and the Republic of lnnia. The mentioning
of Latvia in that decree was later described by the
Russian side as an " error "
ll7. Similar negotiations between Estonia and
Russia have not yet reached final results. The
Russians link the signing of an agreement on
withdrawing the remaining 2 500-odd Russian
troops from Estonia with other questions such as
the rights of retired military personnel and pay-
ment for building housing in Russia. Whereas
Estonia is ready to participate in international
efforts regarding accommodation facilities for
Russian military personnel withdrawn to Russia,
it is not prepared to link these questions with the
Russian commitment to withdraw their troops.
Furthermore, a special problem stems from a for-
NZZ,28th April 1994.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Znitung,2nd, May 1994.
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mer Soviet nuclear submarine training and study
base in Paldiski on the Baltic sea coast southwest
of Tallinn which is still under Russian control.
Nevertheless there is agreement that the site has to
be dismantled under Russian responsibility. Cer-
tain Estonian authorities fear that while the Rus-
sians succeeded in concluding separate negotia-
tions on similar problems with Latvia, they are
trying to breach Baltic solidarity.
118. Last but not least, one should mention that
both Latvia and Estonia have open border
problems with Russia due to the fact that in 1945
the borders fixed by the peace treaties of 1920
were changed slightly in favour of the Soviet
Union; when these countries at the same time
became part of the Soviet Union, the relevant bor-
ders became merely administrative lines.
ll9. It has already been sffessed as one of the
essential conditions to be fulfilled by countries
wishing to join the European Union and Western
European Union that they should first have settled
any bilateral disputes between each other and with
third counries. This applies also to the other Cen-
tral European countries. In this respect the impor-
tance of the initiative by Mr. Balladur, French
Prime Ministet for an international conference on
a European stability pact should be underlined.
t20. The conference will be opened by the Euro-
pean Union in Paris on 26th and2TthMay l994in
a context of preventive diplomacy with the main
objective of settling problems of minorities and
strengthening the inviolability of frontiers. It is
intended to help in particular those countries
wishing to draw closer to the European Union, but
not to handle the problems of countries which are
engaged in open conflicts. Apart from the twelve
member countries of the Union, all countries
interested in European stability and those with
association agreements with the Union will be
invited, such as Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bulga-
ria, Canada, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Malta, Mol-
dova, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, the Vati-
can, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, Ukraine and the United States as well as
representatives of the CSCE, the Council of
Europe, WEU, NATO and the United Nations. It
is to be hoped that it will be possible for the
conference to help to settle most of the problems
mentioned in previous paragraphs regarding the
Central European countries and the Baltic states.
l2I. Regarding the future work of WEU, it is
obvious that however the relations of the EFTA
counffies with WEU develop after their entry into
the Union, and how exactly the WEU Council
will define a new status to be granted to the Cen-
tral European countries, WEU will soon be faced
with the problem of organising a new quality of
relations with at least thirteen newcomers.
122. There might soon be some fifteen countries
participating in the work of Western European
Union as associate members, as members with
associate status or as observers, without acceding
to the modified Brussels Treaty. This will create
important organisational and political problems
because it will not be possible to base a common
defence policy or common defence on a group of
states only a minority of which is linked by a for-
mal treaty. Furthermore, enlargement of the
Union and of Western European Union to the
north and east will considerably change the strate-
gic significance of the European security architec-
ture. With Norway, Finland (and perhaps Estonia
and Latvia), the European Union will have a com-
mon frontier with Russia some 2 000 km long.
123. In the context of enlarging the Union and
establishing WEU's enhanced relationship with
the Northern and Central European countries,
your Rapporteur would draw attention to the fact
that Western European Union does not discuss in
sufficient detail the problem of Moldova, a region
which is the victim of the Ribbentrop-Stalin
iurangements similar to the Baltic states.
IV WEA in the percpective of 1996
124. With the entry of the EFTA countries into
the Union and the future enlargement of the Union
to include a number of Central European coun-
tries, the goals laid down in Title V of the Maas-
tricht Treaty regarding the implementation of a
common foreign and security policy (CFSP)
" which might in time lead to a common defence "
will certainly not become easier. The new struc-
tures to be established under the CFSP with the
secretariat of the Council, the conference of the
pennanent representatives and the Political Com-
minee of Political Directors re rather complica-
ted. The CFSP will not be more homogenous than
it is at present. Probably there will be even less
identity of membership in the CFSP and in WEU
than is the case at present. In 1996 it will therefore
be more difficult than now to establish common
defence within the European Union by incorpora-
ting WEU.
I25. It will therefore be crucial for the Council
of WEU to begin here and now its thinking in
regard to its conception of the intergovernmental
conference in 1996. The more the Union is enlar-
ged to include countries which are not prepared to
subscribe to obligations in defence matters and to
become full members of Western European
Union, the less it will be possible to subordinate
WEU to the authority of the Union. WEU must
therefore elaborate proposals for the new intergo-
vernmental conference with a view to ensuring
that it is granted a general mandate and authority
to elaborate and implement, for the Union, all
questions with defence implications. Further-
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more, WEU will have to reconsider its doctrine
determining the degree to which it can develop its
relationship with European member countries of
NATO which are not members of the European
Union such as Turkey and Iceland. Shall member-
ship of the European Union remain the principal
condition for becoming a full member of Western
European Union?
126. Since WEU as a whole is now an integral
part of the development of the European Union, it is
for the Council and the Assembly to take an active
part in preparing an eventual revision of the Maas-
tricht Treaty, reminding the Council that WEU
declared in an appendix to the Maasnicht Tleaty:
" WE(J will re-examine the present provisions in
1996. This re-examination will take account of the
progress and experience acquired a nd will extend to
relations betwe en WEU and the Atlantic Allianc e " .
It should be noted that the part of the sentence in
italics is missing from the corresponding
paragraph 6 of Article J.4 of the Maasricht Treaty.
V Conclusion
127. 23rd October 1994 will be the fortieth anni-
versary of the modified Brussels Treaty. Ten years
ago, the thirtieth anniversary was taken as an
occasion for an extraordinary meeting of the
WEU Ministers in Rome, leading to the Rome
declaration initiating the reactivation of the
organisation. The extraordinary challenge
Western European Union is now facing is to
prove its efficiency as the defence component of
the European Union, and in assuming enhanced
responsibilities, endorsed by the NATO summit
meeting in January 1994. There is now even
greater reason to hold an extraordinary meeting
than ten years ago.
128. With the approaching " deadline " of 1998,
it would be crucial to take this year's anniversary
as an opportunity to recall the importance of the
treaty, as was done in Rome, and to start reflecting
on how it can continue to serve in the framework
of the Union. In issuing a public document similar
to the Rome declaration of October 1984, WEU
could start a move to give basic orientation for the
work to be done in order to ensure that the objec-
tive of furthering European integration in security
and defence matters will not be seen only as an
end in itself but will lead to a real improvement in
the security of the citizens of Europe. For this pur-
pose, it is crucial for the fundamental aspects of
the modified Brussels Treaty, which are the only
guarantees for this security, not to be diluted .
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APPENDIX
Dechration on the WEU Assembly's place
in the European Union
Paris,2nd March 1993
The Presidential Committee, the steering
body of the WEU Assembly, met in Brussels yes-
terday. It adopted the enclosed declaration on the
WEU Assembly's place in the European Union and
instructed Mr. Hartmut Soell (SPD, Germany), Pre-
sident of the Assembly, to transmit it to IvIr. Egon
Klepsch, President of ttre European Parliarnent.
At its meeting, the Presidential Committee
met thb new Permanent Council of WEU for the
first time. Exchanges of views related mainly to the
Yugoslav crisis, WEU's operational dimension, the
consequences of the enlargement of WEU for its
Assembly and improving the institutional dialogue
between the Assembly and the Council.
1. Building the European Union is a task
which calls for co-operation between all appro-
priate bodies and every step must be subject to
effective parliamentary supervision. The co-ope-
ration of the European Parliament and of the
WEU Assembly provided for in the Maastricht
Agreements is necessary to this end.
2. The Assembly of Western European Union
therefore welcomes the fact that, in accordance
with the wishes expressed by the governments in
Maastricht, exchanges of views are now being
held between its committees and those of the
European Parliament. It believes that such
exchanges can be fruitful when reports are being
prepared, provided those taking part are willing to
take account of the points of view expressed by
their partners.
3. The meeting on 29th January at which the
Political Committee of the WEU Assembly was
briefed by Mr. De Gucht, Rapporteur of the Com-
mittee on Institutional Affairs of the European
Parliament on future relations between the Euro-
pean Community, WEU and the Atlantic Alli-
ance, was particularly lively and led the Presiden-
tial Committee of the WEU Assembly to give its
views on certain points.
4. Noting that the Maastricht Treaty states
that " the common foreign and security policy
shall include all questions related to the security
of the Union, including the eventual framing of a
common defence policy, which might in time lead
to a common defence ", the WEIJ Assembly notes
that the signatory states of the Maastricht Treaty
took no decision limiting their sovereignty in this
area and that several states that are members of the
Union or have applied for membership have shown
that they are not prepared to accept such provisions
in the near future. It recalls that the Maastricht
Treaty provides for these aims to be pursued only
through " systematic co-operation between mem-
ber states in the conduct of policy " and by the
implementation of " joint action in the areas in
which the member states have important interests
in common. " It believes that only a completed
European Union might develop joint defence.
5. As long as this is not the case, the modified
Brussels Treaty remains the essential legal foun-
dation for a European identity in defence matters
and the structures WEU is progressively setting
up are the instruments for European military
action. It would therefore be dangerous to
denounce this treaty and to abandon these instru-
ments as long as no agreement has been reached
to give defence Europe other legal bases, other
institutions and other means of action.
6. At the present juncture, because the WEU
Assembly is composed of delegations from the par-
liaments of member countries, it is better able than
the European Parliament to supervise co-operation
between member countries on security and defence
matters. The WEU Assembly in no way challenges
the right of the European Parliament to consider
receiving, in the framework of a future European
Union, responsibilities that allow it to handle exter-
nal policy including questions relating to common
security and it wishes to develop a dialogue with it
on these questions, in appropriate conditions, based
on the principle of equality and reciprocity. How-
ever, it considers that such a dialogue requires the
European Parliament to co-operate with the WEU
Assembly in pursuing the aim set by the modified
Brussels Treaty which is " to prcmote the unity and
to encourage the progressive integration of
Europe ", as laid down in the preamble, and to
recognise that the task of the WEU Assembly is to
supervise the application ofthis treaty.
7. The WEU Assembly for its part considers
itself to be committed to the process of European
Union defined by the nine member states in the
Maastricht declaration which confirms its voca-
tion to be the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance. It considers that, when the time comes,
it will, as a European Assembly in which the par-
liaments of member states are represented, have
an important r6le to play in the European parlia-
t1
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mentary system, in particular with a view to har-
monising European activities and those of the
member states of the Union in defence matters. As
long as every aspect of the European Union is not
in place, a European defence policy which would
not be supervised in accordance with a treaty by
an assembly composed of representatives of
national parliaments would be without parliamen-
tary supervision.
8. The WEU Assembly invites the European
Parliament to take account of these facts in its
thinking on the institutional future of the Euro-
pean Union and in particular on relations bet-
ween the Community, WEU and the Atlantic
Alliance so that Europe will be better able to
take over the growing responsibilities incum-
bent upon it in the areas of foreign policy and
defence.
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Amendmentslr2 and 3
9th June 1994
WEU in the process of European Union 
-
reply to the thifi-ninth annual report of the Council
AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and3'
tabled by Mr. Fenari
1. At the end of paragraph (xiii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add " and welcoming
therefore the decision of the Council to task the WEU Permanent Council to start work now on the
formulation of such a policy; ".
2. After paragraph (xiv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add two new paragraphs as
follows:
" Welcoming the fact that the Council's Kirchberg declaration of 9th N.day 1994 recognises the
significant contribution of the three associate members of WEU to European security and stability;
Convinced however that the Council's wish to reinforce the relationship of these three countries
with WEU in order to strengthen its position as the defence component of the European Union and
as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance could be achieved better if the Council invited them
to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty; ".
3. Leave out paragmph (xvi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
" Welcoming therefore that by its Kirchberg declaration, the Council is following paragraph I of
Recommendation 556 in granting simultaneously to all the member countries of the Forum of
Consultation a status of association with WEU; ".
Signed: Fenari
I
il
f,
l. See 2nd sitting, 14th June 1994 (amendments agreed to).
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Amendment to Amendment 2
14th June 1994
Signed: Stoffilen
WEU in the process of European Union 
-
reply to the thifi-ninth annual report of the Council
AMENDMENT TO AMENDMENT 2'
tabled by Mr. Stoffelen
In Amendment2,leave out the second paragraph.
1. See 2nd sitting, 14th June 1994 (amendment to amendment negatived).
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Amendment 4
WEU in the process of European Union 
-
reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council
AMENDMENT 4'
tabledby Mn De Decker
13th June 1994
4. Delete paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.
Explanatory Memorandum
Under the Maastricht Treaty, WEU has become the defence organisation of the European Union. To
be a full member and benefit from Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty it is necessary to be a mem-
ber of NATO and of the European Union.
Signed: De Decker
l. See 2nd sitting, 14th June 1994 (amendment negatived)
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European s e c urity : crisis -prev ention and management
REPORT'
submitted on behalf of the Political Committee2
by Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnarr RrcorralGNperoN
on European security: crisis-prevention and management
ExpLeNaronv Mnuonaxouvr
submitted by Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
[. The activities of the WEU Council
m. Real and potential risks to European security
(a)The dangers of proliferation
(b) Regional tension and conflicts
IV. Instruments for crisis-prevention and management
V. Conclusions
Appgr.rolx
Joint statement by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Defence
Ministry of the Russian Federation
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman); Lord Finsberg, Mr. Roseta (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Agnelli, Alegre,
Andreotti, Benvenuti, Bowden, De Hoop Scheffer, Ehrmann, Fabra, Feldmann, Foschi (Alternate: Ferrarini), Goerens, Homs I
Ferret, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Kaspereit, Lord Kirkhill, MM. Kittelmann, L,eers, de Lipkowski, Miiller, P6criaux, Polli (Alter-
nate: Fenai) de Puig, Reddemann, Rodrigues, Seeuws, Seitlinger, Soell, Vingon, Ward, Wintgens, Zapatero.
N.B. IDe names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
on European security: crisis-prevention and management
The Assembly,
(i) Deploring the powerlessness of the European institutions to avoid the outbreak of a bloody war bet-
ween the components of former Yugoslavia and their inability to find joint ways and means of bringing it
to an end;
(ii) Stressing the urgency of implementing co-ordinated operational mechanisms between the United
Nations, the CSCE, NATO, the European Union and WEU capable of preventing conflicts and managing
future crises constituting a threat to peace and security;
(iii) Stressing that any measures to maintain and re-establish peace in any region where it is threatened
must be authorised by the United Nations;
(iv) Stressing also that reliance should be placed on the crisis-prevention mechanisms of the CSCE;
(v) Welcoming paragraph I of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 549 and paragraph 6 of its
reply to Recommendation 548 recognising the need to develop joint assessment of risks and threats;
(vi) Recalling nevertheless that the Assembly does not make "suggestions" to the Council but recom-
mendations that have been formally adopted;
(vii) Noting with interest the work of the Council on:
- 
WEU's r6le in peace-keeping;
- 
anti-missile defence;
- 
intelligence policy;
- 
missions by WEU forces in humanitarian aid, peace-keeping and restoring peace;
- 
WEU policy on exercises;
- 
the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty;
- 
progress in the feasibility study for a WEU space-based observation system;
- 
air and naval co-operation in WEU;
(viii) Wishing sincerely that these studies will rapidly lead to actions that will make WEU truly opera-
tional in crisis-prevention and management;
(ix) Perturbed nevertheless by information received from the Council to the effect that most of the WEU
member countries have responded negatively to the request to make troops available to protect the safe
areas in former Yugoslavia;
(x) Consequently recalling the wide-ranging obligations placed on all the member countries under the
modified Brussels Treaty to preserve peace and security;
(xi) Believing that a fully operational WEU will be capable in future of preventing the development of
a conflict such as that in former Yugoslavia,
RecorravrBNDs THAr rHE CoUNCIL
1. Make a regular assessment of risks and threats in the world liable to affect peace and security and
draw the consequences therefrom for Europe;
2. Take an initiative in the context of the common foreign and security policy to define a crisis-preven-
tion and management policy taking account of the lessons drawn from the crisis in former Yugoslavia;
3. Inform the Assembly of the results of the work on "mutually reinforcing institutions" carried out by
the CFSP working group on security and of the Council's own contribution to this study;
4. Play an active part in the conference on the pact for stability in Europe, by offering its good offrces,
in the framework of this conference, to the associate partners of WEU and future associate partners, insis-
ting in particular on the principle of the inviolability of present frontiers;
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5. Establish a permanent dialogue with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on
crisis-prevention and managemenq
6. Complete the development of the measures referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9 of Recommendation
556 necessary for WEU to become fully operational in the framework of crisis-management and relating
to:
- 
the space-based observation system;
- 
strategic means of transport;
- 
the European corps and the European air and naval force and other forces answerable to WEU so
as to enable a European rapid action force to be created;
- 
armaments co-operation;
- 
interaction between the chiefs of defence staffs, military representatives, the Planning Cell and the
WEU S ecretariat-General ;
7. Co-ordinate with NATO the means available and the sharing of responsibilities in crisis-manage-
ment, particularly in the area of restoring peace;
8. Establish direct co-ordination with the United Nations and the CSCE with a view to pennanent
representation in these two organisations;
9. Take the necessary steps to ensure that, in the event of a given crisis, member states increase their
efforts to seek the necessary political consensus;
10. Pursue its dialogue with the Maghreb countries and with Egypt and keep the Assembly informed;
11. Establish a dialogue with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN);
12. Contribute to the repatriation of foreigners obliged to leave Yemen on account of the civil war.
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I. Introduction
1. Paradoxically, all who fervently hoped that,
with the end of East-West confrontation and the
(conventional and nuclear) arms race between the
two alliances led by the United States and the
Soviet Union, a lasting peace would emerge under
the rule of law and a new world order were mis-
taken. On the contrary, innumerable disputes,
conflicts and tensions have arisen in many parts of
the world, but also in Europe itself. The situation
is such that people are already referring to world
disorder and the notion of peace-keeping has
already become a far more topical term than was
the case during the cold war period.
2. The ambitions of Western European coun-
tries to see Europe become a prime factor of sta-
bility, security and peace in the world, capable, if
necessary, of "exporting" security to other regions
of the world, have practically collapsed in the
light of the total failure resulting from their inca-
pacity to reach agreement on a policy for avoiding
the bloody conflict that has raged in the past three
ye.us among the peoples of former Yugoslavia
and subsequently putting an end to continuing
hostilities in the immediate vicinity.
3. Preventing crises, assuring international
peace and security, opposing all policies of
aggression, defending basic human rights, demo-
cratic principles, civil and individual liberties and
the rule of law: such were the principles on which
the countries of Western Europe were founded
almost forty years ago as a result of their conclu-
ding a treaty of legitimate collective defence
which bound them not only to accept responsibil-
ity for security and peace in Europe itself, but also
to react to any situation that might constitute a
threat to peace in whichever part of the world this
might arise. In the present situation the question
must therefore be asked as to how and by what
means Western European Union and its member
countries are fulfilling their wide-ranging obliga-
tions under the treaty which attributes heavy res-
ponsibilities to all the member states in the WEU
Council.
II. The activities of the WEU Council
4. With the exception of an allusion to the
situation in former Yugoslavia, a study of the
declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur)
issued in Luxembourg on 22nd November last
reveals no specific mention of the existence of
dangers or conflicts in the world likely to affect
the security of Europe. On the subject of the crisis
in the Balkans the WEU Council merely refers to
the conclusions already reached by the Council of
Ministers of the Twelve, which met immediately
prior to the WEU Council and to which meeting
the WEU Secretary-General was not even invited.
Moreover the Ministers hailed the progress of
democracy in the countries of the former Soviet
Union, stressing the importance of the parliamen-
tary elections in Russia and Ulaaine. In conclusion
the declaration contained a brief reference to the
Council's contacts with the Maghreb countries.
5. The declaration issued after the NATO
summit meeting on 10th January 1994 on the
other hand identifies certain causes of instability,
tension and conflict by referring specifically to
the dangers arising from the proliferation of wea-
pons of mass destruction and their means of deli-
very which, according to NATO, constitute not
simply a risk, but a "threat to international secur-
ity". It mentions also, as giving cause for concern:
international terrorism, the denuclearisation of
Ukraine, the situation in the southern Caucasus
and that in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.
Although it certainly does not provide a complete
and systematic assessment of the risks and threats
that could affect world security and particularly
security in Europe, the NATO summit meeting
declaration at least has the merit of drawing the
attention of public opinion to several specific pro-
blems and risks.
6. The last WEU ministerial meeting in
Luxembourg was given over in large part to exa-
mining WEU's r6le afterthe entry into force of the
Maastricht Treaty and its contribution to the
NATO summit meeting, but with the aim of per-
suading public opinion of the essential nature of
the projects WEU was striving to achieve, in par-
ticular in the areas of peace-keeping and crisis-
management. WEU's Luxembourg declaration
would certainly have been much more convin-
cing, however, if it had included a general assess-
ment of the dangers to peace and security in
Europe, which, under the organisation's treaty, it is
WEU's primary task to safeguard. In the absence
of such an assessment, the impression is increa-
singly conveyed that WEU has indeed abandoned
the exercise of its basic responsibilities to the
authorities of the Atlantic Alliance or the Euro-
pean Union.
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7. Certain signs however seem to indicate that
the Council and its subsidiary organs are taking a
considerable number of initiatives on which it is
reluctant to provide information if not expressly
requested to do so. Thus it emerges from the
Council's reply to Recomnrendation 549 on politi-
cal relations between the United Nations and
WEU and their consequen@s for the development
of WEU:
"... that the Chiefs of Defence Staff, basing
themselves on an initial report by the
Defence Representatives Group on the
European security implications of military
changes in the former Soviet Union, have
proposed that the scope of this study be
extended.
The DRG has had an exchange of views on
a French contribution entitled "Study of cri-
sis areas on Europe's periphery", the main
conclusions being that to take into account
those factors of more specific concern to
the security of Europe - and in particular
the r6le of WEU 
- 
WEU must now analyse
in detail:
- 
the risks of a crisis in the area of the
member countries of the Forum of
Consultation;
- 
the instability and risks existing in the
countries bordering the member, associ-
ate or observer states;
- 
the overall problem of security in the
Mediterranean.
The practicalities and appropriate methodo-
logy for this work is on the DRG's agenda."
It is clear that the Assembly is very interested to
know the ourcome of these discussions.
8. Moreover, in its reply to Recommendation
548 on WEU's relations with Central and Eastern
European countries by which it invited the Forum
of Consultation inter alia to undertake "the joint
elaboration of risk and threat assessment" the
Council undertook a commitment vis-d-vis the
Assembly and reserved the option of placing "thejoint elaboration of risk and threat assessment" on
the agenda of the Counsellors' Group of the
Forum of Consultation.
9. As to the conflict in former Yugoslavia,
WEU had developed contingency plans in parti-
cular with regard to the possible creation of safe
areas; these plans had been transmitted to the Uni-
ted Nations and the CSCE but without any practi-
cal action being taken upon them. WEU's current
r6le in this area is confined to continued opera-
tions in relation to the embargo on the Danube,
Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic and to len-
ding support, at the request of the ministers of the
European Union, to the administration of Mostar
with a view to organising a police force and
improving certain essential logistic functions,
especially in the medical field. However, it
appears that WEU's contribution in this connec-
tion is still in its study phase.
10. The second part of the Council's thirty-
ninth annual report to the Assemblyl states that
the Planning Cell has undertaken various work
and studies in crisis-management which are wor-
thy of note. These consist specifically of:
"Studies on possible WEU participation in
former Yugoslavia: at the Council meeting
on 6th July 1993, the Planning Cell was tas-
ked to study the possibility of participation
of the WEU member countries in the pro-
tection of safe areas. For that, a question-
naire was submitted to nations in order to
find out which forces nations might be
willing to provide. Most of the answers
received were negative."
11. In point offact, such a result requires seve-
ral urgent clarifications: if the majority of member
countries are not ready to make forces available
for the protection of safe areas in former Yugo-
slavia, it should come as no suprise that WEU
and the whole of Western Europe are being increas-
ingly marginalised in the management of this crisis.
12. What use is served therefore by the research
into the r6le of WEU in peace-keeping that the
Special Working Group has undertaken on the
basis of a study document initiated by the Italian
Delegation? It emerges from the last annual report
of the Council that a document on this subject was
submitted as a report from the Chairmanship-in-
Office to the ministers of WEU who took note.
But what was the outcome?
13. The last annual report of the Council also
reveals that a major study is in progress on "mis-
sions for WEU forces in the areas of humanita-
rian, peace-keeping and peace-making opera-
tions." If, as the annual report states, the Planning
Cell has already prepared preliminary projects for
the first two types of mission, it is imperative to
ensure that everything is done to develop them to
the full and that the Assembly is informed of this.
14. The document on intelligence policy prepa-
red by the Group of Representatives of the Defen-
ce Ministers with the assistance of the Planning
Cell should also be noted, given that intelligence
is an essential tool in crisis-prevention. Similarly,
it is most welcome to learn that the work of the
Open Skies Group has progressed substantially.
According to the annual report of the Council,
approaches have been made to third parties with a
view to their accession to an initial series of ope-
rational rules for a cluster of joint observation
r4t
l. Document l4ll, 5th April 1994.
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systems within the framework of WEU. It is to be
hoped that work on the feasibility of the WEU
European space-based observation system will
yield definitive results this year.
15. In particular the fact should be welcomed
that the annual report refers to in-depth considera-
tion of European thinking on anti-missile defence
in the framework of the activities of the Special
Working Group of the Council. [t was, in part, the
symposium organised by the Assembly in Rome
in March 1993 which led to the Council's taking
the following decision:
"Given the change of direction in American
government policy, it was decided to stop
using the term "GPS" in SWG documents
and to take over the term "anti-missile
defence" used by the Assembly. The group
agreed that WEU should concentrate on the
defence aspects, having regard to the work
carried out in other bodies on non-prolife-
ration. The group decided initially to
recommend to the Council that a meeting
of experts be held to prepare a risk analysis.
The resulting document would then be sub-
mined to the Special Working Group."
16. In point of fact, the area of proliferation
was where the competent organisations ought to
show the greatest vigilance with a view to taking
appropriate measures to prevent risks arising from
the activities of certain countries in this connec-
tion becoming a threat.
III. Real and potential risks
to European security
(a) The dangerc of proliferatinn
17. The dangers arising from the proliferation
of weapons of mass desffuction and their means
of delivery and from the nuclear programmes of
certain countries which have not signed the non-
proliferation Eeaty or are not ready to submit their
programmes to the scrutiny of the IAEA stem
mainly from activities of China and North Korea
as exporters of nuclear technology and ballistic
missiles to the countries of the third world, among
which India and Pakistan in particular are in the
process of developing ambitious programmes for
acquiring nuclear capability. Neither of the latter
has as yet signed the nuclear non-proliferation
treaty.
18. Tension in the Korean peninsula remains
high as a result of uncertainties over North
Korea's intentions about seeking to acquire a
nuclear capability, refusing to allow inspection of
its installations by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), and threatening finally to
withdraw from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty
and from the Joint Amnesty Committee. For a
time North Korea was even on,maximum alert. To
sftengthen protection of South Korea, American
Patriot anti-missile missiles have been deployed
in South Korea. Efforts to find a way forward out
of a major crisis will depend not only on the evo-
lution of domestic policy in North Korea but also
on China's policy within the United Nations Secu-
rity Council. However this is also primarily a
diplomatic problem for the United States which
North Korea still regards as its principal adver-
sary. Furthennore North Korea is one of the
countries making major efforts to acquire ballistic
missile capabilities and to export them.
19. R6gimes apparently hostile to the West,
such as kan, haq or Libya, are also customers for
non-conventional technology from China, North
Korea or Russia. To illustrate the justifications put
forward by certain countries to explain their acti-
vities in nuclear weaponry, suffice it to recall that
in India, the former chief of staff of the armed
forces declared himself in favour of "minimum
deterrence", based on missiles and nuclear arms,
in order to discourage "American intimidation"
and prevent "possible racist aggression" from the
West2. Europe's vulnerability in the face of risks
from ballistic weapons acquired by "hostile"
countries could be increased by the development
of very low-altitude "poor man's cruise missiles",
which are extremely difficult to detect. Iraq, Iran,
North Korea, Indonesia and Pakistan are among
the countries seeking to acquire such capabilities.
20. More specifically as regards Iran, where
the rdgime is considered to be unstable, the coun-
try has recently been suspected of supporting cer-
tain terrorist groups such as the IRA and ofhaving
supplied them with armaments 
- 
an allegation
which the Iranian authorities have nonetheless
categorically denied. Rumour also has it that the
Iranian authorities have financed Islamic terrorist
groups in Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon,
Israel and in the Maghreb countries3.
21. Alongside these dangers is also that of
clandestine proliferation of the nuclear techno-
logy and technical know-how of the former Soviet
Union, even after the signature, on 14th January
1994, of the trilateral agreement between the Uni-
ted States, Russia and Ukraine on the denucleari-
sation of the latter and the transfer of the LJkrai-
nian nuclear warheads to Russia for destruction.
This agreement opens the way for Ukraine to
become a signatory of the nuclear non-prolifera-
tion freaty, although this has yet to happen.
22. The NAIO summit tmk the decision to
"intensify and expand NATO's political and
defence efforts against proliferation": the first
based inter alia on a ten-point plan put forward on
2. l* Figaro, 9th November 1993.
3. The Times, 29th Apil 1994.
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15th December last by the German Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kinkel, and the second on a
proposal by the American Defence Secretary, Mr.
Aspin. The Kinkel plan is flounded mainly on pre-
ventive measures and proposes that all countries
sign the non-proliferation treaty and the conven-
tion on chemical and biological weapons, which
still has to be supplemented by verification mea-
sures.
23. It further provides for:
- 
renewal, in 1995, of the nuclear non-pro-
liferation ffeaty for an indefinite term;
- 
a sfrategy for the avoidance of nuclear
contamination by regional confidence
measures similar to those of the CSCE;
- 
transplantation of the CSCE model to
four other regions of the world where
regional security forums should be crea-
ted;
- 
establishing international co-operation in
controlling the exportation of armaments;
- 
increasing financial resources available
for eliminating weapons of mass destruc-
tion;
- 
creation of a system of control for pluto-
nium;
- 
conclusion of a comprehensive test ban
fteaty;
- 
limitation of the measures of military
coercion provided for under Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter solely to
cases of serious threat to international
peace and security.
24. Mr. Aspin's proposals tended rather more in
the direction of a "counter proliferation" initia-
tive, the first aim of which was to guarantee pro-
tection against the risk of attack from weapons of
mass desffuction, either by maintaining small
nuclear arsenals and a system of protection
against chemical and biological weapons or by
acquiring the means to detect missile deployment,
possibly by creating a tactical anti-missile system
compatible with the provisions of the ABM treaty,
and by sffengthening the means of intelligence.
25. It is clear that the two approaches 
- 
politi-
cal and military 
- 
in the struggle against the dan-
gers of proliferation fall squarely within WEU's
areas of responsibility and expertise, and the
Council cannot dissociate itself from them by lea-
ving the essential part of the discussion and pre-
paration of decisions to the authorities of the
alliance or the European Union. It is therefore
necessary to strengthen the position of the WEU
Secretary-Generalo who has recalled that Europe(and WEU) have experience and know-how
appropriate to the creation of an early-warning
and surveillance system and the development of
appropriate defences. WEU should therefore,
logically, consider the development of an ABM
defence system as a continuation of its own space
programme. However it should also make a major
contribution to the political aspects of the issue.
This relates particularly to armaments exports
where common rules can be found only in a forum
able to harmonise the defence interests of the
various member countries. This forum is WEU,
not the European Union.
26. For one should not neglect the risks of a
return to a conventional arms race in certain
regions of the world. While the Tlvelve have so
far been unable to agree on common rules on the
exportation of dual-use equipment and arma-
ments, there has been a perceptible increase in
exports from Russia, particularly to counffies
such as China, India, kan, the United Arab Emi-
rates and Syria, and also to Turkey. With a view to
restricting unauthorised exports, Russia has
strengthened control over its sale of armaments
abroad in order to offset the sharp fall in exports
that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Moreover, it intends to offer much more advanta-
geous tenns for the sale of arms to all CIS coun-
tries ready to join it in an economic union 5. More
recently Russia signed a military co-operation
agreement with Syria, opening up the possibility
of resuming armaments sales to that country. In
the past the Soviet Union was the principal sup-
plier of arms to Syria6.
(b) Reginnal tensian and conflicts
27. It should first be noted in the context of an
assessment of the various loci of instability and
conflict that have developed in the world since the
end of the cold war that there are at least two
conflicts in which NATO member countries are
directly involved: one concerns Turkey (soon to
become an associate member of WEU) and its
Kurdish problem and the other Greece (member
of the European Union and soon to be a full mem-
ber of WEU) and its quarrel over the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Also it must
not be forgotten that Turkey and Greece are still
opposed to one another in bilateral disputes, such
as that over Cyprus, for which a final settlement
has never been reached. So far, it has been pos-
sible for the WEU "family" to keep away from
4. Speech to the Royal Institute for International Relations,
Brussels, 27 th J anuary 199 4.
5. NZZ, 22nd February 1994.
6. Intemational Herald Tribune,29th April 1994.
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domestic conflict and retain the unity essential to
its r6le as a major factor of stability in Europe and
the world; no effort should therefore be spared in
avoiding bilateral conflicts between members and
third countries that might jeopardise that unity.
The example of the dispute between Greece and
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
clearly demonstrates how difficult this may prove,
as members of the Presidential Committee were
able to ascertain during their recent visit to
Athens.
28. With particular regard to Turkey, it should
be recalled that the in-depth report submitted by
Mr. Moya on behalf of the Political Committee on
30th November 1992'did not fail to address the
Kurdish question and the Turkish occupation of
Northern Cyprus. On this latter issue it should be
recalled that a joint communiqu6 was issued by
the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers in Davos,
on 1st February 1992, according to which both
parties stated their common objective of quickly
reaching a fair and lasting negotiated settlement
on Cyprus. Also one should not forget the exffe-
mely useful r6le of the Council of Europe which
uses its influence and every means to ensure that
Turkey conforms to the principles recognised by
the European democratic community of which it
intends to remain a member.
29. In the case of Greece it is more specifically
through the mechanisms of the European Union
that disputes such as those between Greece and
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(FYROM) can be resolved by diplomatic means
rather than by force.
30. The conflict in Bosnia and recent events in
the town of Gorazde are again swelling the toll of
victims 
- 
already numbering hundreds of thou-
sands 
- 
of the slaughter and violence, with no
political or military solution yet in sight. There is
a constant danger that the conflict may spread to
neighbouring regions where the situation conti-
nues to be sensitive. In this context several new
factors in the conflict should be borne in mind.
Firstly Russia's increased involvement in this
matter which has led to a heavy bilateral weigh-
ting in the management of the crisis in favour of
the United States and Russia and the marginalisa-
tion not only of the United Nations but also the
European institutions. Another factor is the Mus-
lim dimension of the conflict which threatens to
cause a deterioration in relations between the Isla-
mic world and the West.
31. Such a development could have extremely
negative repercussions for crises and flashpoints
in several regions of the Islamic world: in Kash-
7. Document l34l and
1992.
mir, India, the border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan and inside Egypt and Algeria. It is
therefore increasingly important for the European
Union and WEU to continue and intensify their
dialogue with the Maghreb countries, indispen-
sable for security in the Mediterranean and also
for the whole of Europe.
32. With the prospect of links being strengthe-
ned between the Central European countries, the
European Union and WEU in the near future, it
should not be forgotten that bilateral differences
persist between some of these countries 
- 
namely
Hungary's dispute with Romania and Slovakia
over their Hungarian minorities and also certain
problems over minorities between Poland and
Lithuania, which nevertheless seem to have been
resolved recently, and between Romania and
Ukraine. In the Baltic countries, there is still ten-
sion between Estonia and Russia both as regards
the withdrawal of Russian troops and also the
rights of the Russian-speaking populations and
the border to the north and east of the town of
Narva, as a result of differing interpretations by
the two countries of the Tartu peace treaty signed
in 1920.
33. A large part of the problems between Lat-
via and Russia have been settled recently, in parti-
cular the complete withdrawal of the Russian
troops which had been stationed in the country by
31st August 1994.The two countries have agreed
that Russia will maintain the anti-missile warning
station at Skrunda for four years and on an ilrran-
gement for granting retired Russian soldiers the
right to remain in Latvia. However Latvia is rais-
ing the issue of the interpretation of the Treaty of
Riga on its borders with Russia signed in 1920.
34. The differences between Lithuania and
Russia principally relate to the problem of the
major concentration of Russian troops in the Kali-
ningrad region. Russia still has the 14th army sta-
tioned in the Dnestr region in Moldova, despite
efforts within the CSCE to encourage negotia-
tions for the complete withdrawal of the Russian
troops. However Russia, which considers the pre-
sence of the 14th army as a stabilising factor in the
region, seems in no hurry to move in this direc-
tion.
35. In the context of the many conflicts raging
in the territory of the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States (CIS) 
- 
in particular, the southern
Caucasus region, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Nagorno-Karabakh; also the problems in Tajikis-
tan 
- 
Russia continues to demand priority in the
settlement of these conflicts (for example it has
demanded five military bases in the southern Cau-
casus, three in Georgia, one in Armenia and one in
Azerbaijans. This should lead the United Nations
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and the CSCE, in particular, to insist that peace-
keeping and crisis-management missions should
be carried out in these regions under the authority
of these organisations and in accordance with the
rules they have established.
36. [f Russia does not wish the notion of "near
abroad", which includes the whole of the territory
of the former Soviet Union, including that of the
Baltic states, to be regarded as a new Brezhnev
doctrine, it must clarify what it means exactly.
This notion is worrying a number of the countries
concerned, in particular Ukraine whose indepen-
dence has still not yet won universal acceptance.
In this connection it should not be forgotten that
some 25 million Russians live on "nea.r abroad"
territory and that Russian troops are stationed in
Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, the
Caucasus, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan.
37. Moreover, the dispute between Russia and
Ukraine on the division of the Black Sea Fleet is
still not settled in spite of preliminary agreements
reached in Moscow on 15th April 1994 between
hesidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk which allocated
80 to 85Eo of the fleet to Russia.
38. On the settlement of conflicts on the terri-
tory of the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), it should be noted that Russia, in a declara-
tion issued in Moscow on 29th March I994,bear-
ing the joint signatures of the Russian Foreign
and Defence Ministers, said that it would inform
the United Nations and the CSCE of any peace-
keeping operations it undertook within the CIS
but that it had no need of their permission'. Nei-
ther the United Nations nor the CSCE nor the
major western political leaders approved this atti-
tude. The French Ministen for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Jupp6, among others, stated that Russia
should not undertake such operations without a
formal decision by those international bodies,
such as the United Nations or the CSCE'., which
have the competence and r6le to pronounce on
such issues.
39. Furthermore one has to ask what is the
significance of the new Russian military doctrine
which states that "Russia will not use its armed
forces or its other troops against any state what-
soever except in individual or collective self-
defence, in the event of armed attack against the
Russian Federation, its citiTens, its territory, irs
armed forces, its other troops or its allies"?
40. Similarly one can only wonder about Rus-
sia's intentions when it declares it reserves the
right, under its military doctrine, to use nuclear
weapons "in the event of joint action by a non-
nuclear state and one in possession of nuclear
9. See full text ofthe declaration attached as an appendix.
10. Le Monde, 3lst March 1994.
weapons, which ... commit an act of aggression
against ... its armed forces and its other ffoops, or
against its allies". There are therefore several rea-
sons for wishing to maintain a permanent dia-
logue with Russia and to involve it in participa-
ting in the building of a collective security system
so as to convince it that the outside world does not
represent a danger to its security or legitimate
interests; and also that a doctrine defending what
were formerly known as "vital interests" can no
longer have pride of place in modern international
relations. A firm decision by Russia on panicipa-
tion in the NATO partnership for peace program-
me would be an important step towards reassuring
the world that the fears recently expressed " that
Russia's r6le in security policy was becoming less
and less predictable are without foundation.
41. The south-east Asia region is developing at
an extremely rapid rate while much of its vast
population remains in a state of dire poverty, thus
giving rise to risks of conflict and dangers to
peace which cannot be overlooked. A permanent
dialogue between the European and Atlantic insti-
tutions with responsibility in security matters and
the countries of south-east Asia, and in particular
with the Association of South-East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), would therefore be most desirable, as
this group has always been a factor of stability in
the region. Such a dialogue, in which WEU
should participate, could help to remind this
group of states of the collective responsibility it
must assume for maintaining peace and for non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
also to strengthen a reciprocal exchange of infor-
mation about all matters relating to security and
defence policy.
IV I nstrume nts for crisis-prev ention
and management
42. The lessons of the war on the territory of
former Yugoslavia have resulted in the common
foreign and security policy bodies, at the initiative
of France, taking an important measure in terms
of preventive diplomacy, which therefore does not
concern the counffies engaged in open conflict.
Thus, on a proposal by the French Prime Minister,
Mr. Balladur, the European Union's common
foreign and security policy authorities called a
conference in Paris on26thand2TthMay 1994 in
order to conclude a stability pact in Europe, a spe-
cific aim of which is to settle the problem of
minorities and strengthen the inviolability of fron-
tiers. This initiative is therefore initially addressed
to the countries of Central Europe and the Baltic
countries hoping in future to become members of
the European Union and with which the Union
I l. See for example the address by Mr. van Eekelen in Bonn,
l3th April 1994.
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has concluded or negotiated agreements. The aim
of the project is to facilitate rapprochement and
co-operation by the aforementioned states with
the Union by helping them to comply with the
conditions of membership.
43. The Union intends to invite to the "launch
conference" the countries principally concerned
by the initiative, the immediate neighbour coun-
tries of those countries, states likely to make a
specific contribution to the development of the
initiative, counties with an interest in the stabi-
lity of Europe by virtue of their defence commit-
ments and countries having association agree-
ments with the Union (Albania, Ausffia, Belarus,
Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Finland, the Holy See, Hungary,Iceland,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Norway,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the
United States), also representatives of the interna-
tional organisations concerned by the initiative
(CSCE, Council of Europe, WEU, NAIO and the
United Nations). Other states participating in the
CSCE in agreement with this concept and these
procedures are also to be invited as observers.
44. The aim of this conference justifies the fact
that it should be called at the initiative of the
European Union. However, WEU should take an
active part in it. It is to be hoped that a lasting
solution will also be found to a number of
conflicts between neighbours such as those refer-
red to in paragraphs 32to34 above. Once ratified,
these agreements will be nansmitted to the CSCE
in their entirety for safe keeping.
45. Indeed, the CSCE should be offered firm
support because of its major functions in the area
of preventive diplomacy and crisis-prevention.
Clearly, the economic aspect of international co-
operation plays a highly significant r6le in crisis-
prevention and is an essential factor in encourag-
ing certain countries to participate in disarma-
ment, armaments control and non-proliferation
agreements and in agreements limiting arma-
ments exports and also if one wishes them to be
involved in various confidence-building mea-
sures.
46. In this context the CSCE model has shown
itself to be successful, since it has invariably taken
economic aspects of security into account. The
CSCE's activities in the area of preventive diplo-
macy have proved increasingly useful and effec-
tive in the various regions where its representa-
tives have been active, although public opinion
has hardly been aware of this. The Political Com-
mittee's meeting in Vienna with the Secretary-
General of the CSCE has made a considerable
contribution to improving its knowledge of the
current missions of that organisation, particularly
in the Baltic counties, former Yugoslavia and in
the CIS countries.
47. However the CSCE can act only within the
geographic limits of its fifty-three member states
and it has no means ofcoercion. It cannot therefore
exercise any influence on China or North Korea.
48. The United Nations is the only organisation
with such means of coercion, but, as several crisis
situations have demonstrated, it is, on the one
hand, required to operate in too many parts of the
globe and, on the other, it lacks the military
resources for crisis-management. The use of
troops made available by member states raises
difficulties with regard to areas of responsibility
and command structures. Moreover, there is
insufficient agreement between member countries
of the United Nations and especially within the
Security Council on the legal bases and conditions
for using force to restore pea@.
49. Moreover, it is becoming urgent to define
more clearly the responsibilities and competencies
assigned to the military units deployed in a given
region of crisis on the basis of a precise political
objective determined by common agreement
among all the counffies participating in the opera-
tion. In this context, it is exffemely interesting to
note that, according to the report presented by the
German Government to the Bundestag on the evo-
lution of European integration between lst July and
31st December 1993, the CFSP Working Group on
Security drafted a document on the basis of Ger-
man proposals on "mutually reinforcing institu-
tions" which defines the criteria for better co-ordi-
nation between the United Nations, the CSCE,
WEU, NATO and the Council of Europe as regards
conflict-prevention and crisis-management. This
document is to be revised in early 1994 before
being submitted to the Council of Ministers.
50. It would be desirable not only to be infor-
med of the result of this work but also to know to
what extent WEU is taking part in it and what is
is contribution.
51. One way or another, it will prove increas-
ingly useful to draw on the means of mititary
organisations such as NATO and, shortly, WEU,
which are ready to act as necessary either at the
request of the United Nations or at that of the
CSCE. WEU in particular must speed up its
implementation of the decisions taken at Peters-
berg, namely the establishment of units ready to
participate in humanitarian and peace-keeping
missions and also combat forces for crisis-mana-
gement and operations to restore peace.
52. This is the essential condition for WEU's
help being requested by the United Nations or the
CSCE. According the Secretary-General of
WEI-I 12, the latter might become involved in four
types of peace-keeping operations:
12. Speech to the Royal Institute for International Relations,
Brussels, 27 th J anuary 1994.
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- 
WEU member countries might alone be
invited to undenake operations in the
event of their being better placed to do so
than a wider European-Atlantic grouping;
- 
WEU could undertake operations in close
co-ordination with another organisation
(eg. operation Sharp Guard with NATO);
- 
it might constitute the operational com-
mand and control cenffe for missions in
which non-member countries would also
participate;
- 
it might take on the task of harmonising
contributions from its member states to a
United Nations operation, which was
unfortunately not the case for the Somalia
operation in which forces from several
WEU member countries participated
without any co-ord,ination being provided
within the framework of WEU.
53. Still in the view of the Secretary-General of
WEU, NATO would be the main player in the
settlement of regional crises in Europe to which
the United States was prepared to make a contri-
bution. In other cases, in the absence of substan-
tial United States participation, WEU might play
a leading r6le in the area of peace-keeping and
crisis-management, always within the framework
of a United Nations mandate or in conformity
with the Charter of that orlanisation.
54. However all of this will remain purely
hypothetical if WEU does not quickly establish
and bring into operational service the forces it
terms forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU).
WEU must move from the study stage to that of
decision-taking in order to achieve all the plans
being prepared which were described in ChapterII, with particular regard to strategic mobil-
ity, intelligence work, verification, space-based
observation of the earth; in short, it must become
truly operational if it is not to be just as powerless
in the event of another challenge like the Yugo-
slav one.
V Conclusions
55. Up till now, when WEU has been the sub-
ject of discussion in political circles, in the media
or in public opinion, reference has invariably been
to its future r6le because its achievements, unde-
niable as they are, in certain specific areas are not
yet substantial enough for politicians and public
opinion to appreciate their full impact. Crisis-pre-
vention, and even more so crisis-management, are
areas which are absolutely cenfral to WEU com-
petency. However, WEU can play a credible and
effective r6le in this area only if all the govern-
ments give a decisive political impetus to the
achievement of the various projects to which the
Council and its subsidiary organs are committed.
While it is true that a major success is invariably
essential to boost a feeling of self-worth, set-
backs such as that Europe has suffered in the case
of the conflict in former Yugoslavia can equally
be effective in encouraging people to pull together
and unite in a supreme effort.
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APPENDIX
loint statement by the Ministry for Foreign Affairc
and the Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation
Lately some foreign politicians and mass
media as well as international fora have, on seve-
ral occasions, made allegations concerning the
"ambiguity" of Russia's peace-making mission in
a number of member countries of the Common-
wealth of Independent States. The thesis of "neo-
imperial ambitions" of Russia is gaining popular-
ity. Whatever form such reproaches take, their
essence is invariably the same: under the guise of
peace-making activities 
- 
and maybe even bypas-
sing universally recognised standards of interna-
tional law 
- 
Russia allegedly intensifies power
pressure on her neighbours, brying to acquire a
right to "interfere" in their domestic affairs. This
is accompanied by arbifary interpretation of facts
and also by their 
- 
voluntary or not 
- 
distortion.
The main argument of the advocates of
such a vision of the Russian peace-making activi-
ties in neighbouring states is a thesis of supposedly
"one-sided" assignment by Russia of her troops
to unstable regions. Based on that thesis is a
conclusion that the involvement of the world
community in peace-keeping efforts aimed at
unblocking conflicts in the territory of the former
USSR should include monitoring the activities of
Russia.
We do not want to exaggerate the signifi-
cance of this policy in certain political and public
circles both in the West and in the East. The lea-
ders of the majority of countries demonstrate a
responsible and sensible approach recognising the
realistic and positive r6le of Russia in containing
and settling crisis situations. As to peace-making
operations in the CIS countries, Russia favours a
real establishment of a truer and more solid part-
nership based on equality, mutual trust and res-
pect, not stopping at mere declarations of intent.
For these reasons we consider it timely to
draw attention to a number of political, internatio-
nal and legal aspects of principle of Russia's parti-
cipation in peace-making activities in the CIS
countries.
Russia's actions are directed only at stop-
ping armed conflicts in a number of independent
states, stabilising the situation there and creating
conditions for lasting and durable settlement. We
are proud that the presence of Russian peace-
making forces in "hot zones" prevented even
more numerous victims among innocent civilians.
Our efforts are being taken in the context of
a dramatically serious economic and financial
situation in Russia itself; diverting considerable
resources for peace-making purposes over the last
ten months alone amounted to 26 billion roubles
(though it is difficult to make an accurate calcula-
tion and one should take into account inadequate
provision of our "peace-making forces" as compa-
red with the United Nations Blue Helmets). More
than 15 000 Russian servicemen are stationed in
hot spots in the CIS member states.
Peace-making as such in the CIS countries
is not "a purely Russian initiative". In all cases
without exception our actions are carried out at
the request and with the consent of the relevant
states and conflicting sides. Peace-making troops
are sent on the basis of bilateral and multilateral
agreements which comply with the rules of inter-
national law. This completely agrees with the pro-
visions of the United Nations Charter, according
to which a possibility of dealing with matters of
peace-making on the basis of agreements of the
states concerned not only is accepted but welco-
med (Article 52 of the United Nations Charrer).
The only exceptions are enforcement actions,
which, according to Article 53 of the United
Nations Chaner, should be taken under the Secu-
rity Council's authority. But all current peace-
making operations on the territory of the former
USSR do not fall under this provision, because
they do not involve enforcement and are taken
with the consent of all conflicting sides. The Uni-
ted Nations and the CSCE are informed on these
operations on a regular basis.
Russia is consistently favouring the widest
involvement of the United Nations and the CSCE
in the settlement of conflicts in the CIS countries.
There is no need, however, for any "permission"
on the part of the United Nations and the CSCE to
conduct peace-making operations in accordance
with the abovementioned criteria, in which Russia
and its neighbours take part. The operations are
carried out on the basis of the sovereign rights of
respective states enshrined in the United Nations
Charter and do not require additional legitimisa-
tion. It is true, however, that the co-operation with
the United Nations and the CSCE and their active
and substantive support of Russia's and its neigh-
bours' peace-making efforts could really facilitate
more effective and faster settlement of conflicts.
This is what we stand for when we suggest that
the United Nations and the CSCE should interact
with the peace-making operations in the CIS
countries in different forms, including sending of
missions, observers, advisers, etc. Russia will be
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ready to participate also in peace-making opera-
tions by the United Nations and the CSCE in the
territory of the former USSR if the parties to any
conflict ask those organisations to start such opera-
tions and if a decision on their carrying out is taken.
Meanwhile, it has to be noted that the
repeated appeals of the CIS countries for support
from the United Nations and the CSCE (in parti-
cular in connection with conflicts in Abkhazia and
Tajikistan) are still awaiting the appropriate reac-
tion. Therefore, the agreements between Russia
and its neighbours as well as mechanisms created
within the CIS remain major peace-making ins-
truments in this region. It is thanks to them that
the tasks of maintaining there international peace
and security that constitute an integral part of the
global process of ensuring global stability are
being solved. The international community must
acknowledge this objective reality and proceed to
a closer interaction with Russia and its neigh-
bours. This, by the way, would help all "those in
doubt" see the "transparency" of the peace-
making operations and the groundlessness of sus-
picions in this respect.
Being consistent in its efforts to ensure
peace and stability around its frontiers and within
the CIS, Russia does not intend to put obstacles in
the way of others. We do not demand a special sta-
tus or an exclusive r01e for ourselves, nor do we
elude our responsibility for the situation in this
region of key importance to Russia. We are ready
to co-operate meaningfully in those questions
with the United Nations, the CSCE and the inter-
national community at large.
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Amendments l, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6
13th June 1994
European security : crisis-prevention and management
AMENDMENTS 1,2,3,4,5 and 6'
tabledby Mr. de Puig
1. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:
" Concerned by the Council's silence regarding the continuation of the civil war in Yemen and the
terrible massacres perpetuated in Rwanda; "
2. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:
" Concerned at North Korea's nuclear policy and its threatening attitude towards South Korea. "
3. Draft paragraph 12 of the draft recommendation proper as follows:
" Support the United Nations' call for the cease-fire in Yemen to be respected immediately; "
4. After paragraph 12 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
" Examine at the earliest opportunity the r6le ttrat WEU might play in terminating the killings in
Rwanda and establishing order and peace in that countr5/; "
5. After paragraph 12 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
" Hold consultations 91 the consequences for European security of North Kor€a's nuclear policy
and inform the Assembly of its conclusions. "
6. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
" Maintain a dialogue on a permanent basis with the Mediterranean states which are not members
of WEU; "
Signed: de Puig
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The European annaments agency -
reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council
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submitted. on behalf of the Technologital and Aerospace Committee
by Mr. Borderas, Rapporteur
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Drafi Recommendation
on the European arrrurnents agency 
- 
reply to the
thiny-ninth annual report of the Council
The Assembly,
(i) Taking account, on the one hand, of the declaration of the member countries of WEU annexed to
the Treaty on European Union, which, with reference to WEU's operational r6le, provides inter alia for
examination of " enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European
armaments agency "and, on the other hand, the Petersberg declaration which follows the same direc-
tion;
(ii) Welcoming the decisions taken in Bonn in December 1992 by the Defence Ministers of the thirteen
IEPG countries to transfer the functions of that group to WEU and the decisions taken at the meeting in
Rome in May 1993 on the practical measures relating to this transfer, in particular the new name for the
IEPG which has become the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG);
(iii) Noting with satisfaction the report on armaments co-operation prepared by the National Armaments
Directors and submitted for examination by the WEAG Defence Ministers meeting in Luxembourg on
22nd November 1993;
(iv) Similarly welcoming the creation of an ad-hoc working group for the purposes of identifying the
tasks of a European armaments agency and determining the legal grounds on which it should be based;
(v) Welcoming the transfer to WEU of certain activities of Eurogroup, specifically the information
activities, EUROCOM, EUROLOG and EUROLONGTERM;
(vi) Considering furthermore that a European armaments agency should be based on a common Euro-
pean industrial and defence policy, an integrated armaments market and a common export policy for such
armaments;
(vii) Noting that the ultimate objective of a common defence policy involving agreement on political
guidelines in military and armaments matters is far from being achieved;
(uiii) Considering that in present circumstances a European armaments agency must be regarded as a
point of departure for an undertaking that will be developed until it achieves its full capability as European
positions converge in security and defence questions;
(ix) Convinced nevertheless that the creation of a European annaments agency, initially with a mini-
mum of specific tasks, meets a clear need, as testified by the present dispersal of the armaments sector in
Europe, the many bodies responsible for various co-operative progralnmes, the need to make the most of
diminishing resources, to increase industrial trade, to improve and widen co-operation in the research sec-
tor and to continue work on the principles of harmonisation and standardisation including in particular
their political, administrative and legal aspects;
(x) Bearing in mind that the increasingly multinational composition of armed forces in Europe implies
interoperability of military units, which must be accompanied by a firm move towards armaments
co-operation;
(xi) Welcoming the decision of the French and German authorities to create a joint armaments agency;
(xii) Considering the importance of a European armaments agency in securing a competitive presence
for Europe in the world armaments market;
(xiii) Regretting that the Kirchberg declaration in no way tackles the question of creating a European
armaments agency,
RgcotrrrunNDs THAT THE CoUNCIL
1. Have a study made for the harmonisation of the political and administrative structures of the bodies
responsible for armaments in the WEU member countries;
2. Examine fiscal and employment legislation governing the defence industries of the member coun-
tries, with a view to their possible harmonisation;
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3. Inform the Assembly of the results of the report by the ad hoc working group on the tasks to be
assigned to the European armaments agency and the legal grounds on which it should be based;
4. Complete the integration of the armaments secretariat into the Secretariat-General in order to
promote synergy between WEU's armaments activities and the other activities of the organisation;
5. Strengthen the means of the armaments secretariat so that it might afford more active support to the
work of WEAG panels and working groups;
6. Establish forthwith a European armaments agency as a subsidiary body of the Council, initially
tasked as follows:
(a) management of co-operative programmes;
(b) management of the EUCLID programme;
(c) management of joint research and testing facilities;
(d) technological and operational studies;
(e) establishment of information and data services and a register of patents relating to innovation in
the defence sector;
(f) research into and evaluation of the world armaments market; the agency would be assisted in
this task by industrial groups such as EDIG, which already has extensive experience in this
sector.
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Explnnatory Memorandum
(submifred by Mr. Borderas, Rappofteur)
I.Introduetion
l. The Technological and Aerospace Com-
mittee has paid close attention in recent years to
armaments questions. Mr. Wilkinson's report
(Document 1228) on the Independent European
Programme Group (IEPG) and Western European
Union, the reports by Sir Dudley Smith on wea-
ponry after ttre Gulf war (Document 1272), arms
and equipment for a European rapid action force(Document 1292), Mr. Aarts's report on arms
export policy (Document 1305) and lastly the
report by Mr. Lopez Henares on European arma-
ments co-operation after Maastricht (Document
1332\ are examples of a realistic approach to an
important subject where effective and disciplined
solutions are required.
2. The aim of the present report is to chart the
way forward towardi establishing a European
armaments agency as provided in the declaration
annexed to the Treaty on European Union, in a
practical but determined fashion, based on the
conviction that this project represents a qualita-
tive advance of major importance for the future of
the security and defence of Europe; also on the
overriding need to respond realistically to the
political, military and indusrial problems caused
by the lack of such an agency and which can only
deteriorate further if a balanced solution is not
found to them.
II. Maastricht, Petersberg, Rome ...
3. The declaration attached to the Treaty on
European Union of the WEU member states on
the r6le of Western European Union and its rela-
tions with the European Union and with the
Atlantic Alliance, states, in the section referring to
the operational r6le of WEU, that " other propo-
sals will be examined further, including enhanced
co-operation in the field of armaments with the
aim of creating a European annaments agency, ... "
4. In fact, the Maastricht declaration merely
recalls earlier declarations such as the 1984 Rome
declaration which provides for "... the develop-
ment of European co-operation in the field of
armaments in respect of which WEU can provide
a political impetus ... " or a provision in similar
terms in the 1987 Hague platform on European
security interests.
5. A short time afterwards in the Petersberg
declaration (19th June 1992) the Ministers for
Foreign Affairs and the Defence Ministers of the
WEU member states welcomed the decision taken
in Oslo on 6th March of that year by the IEPG
defence ministers to analyse the future r6le of this
group in the new European security architecture.
The WEU Ministers took the view that this deci-
sion was a step in the direction set out at Maas-
tricht towards the future creation of a European
armaments agency.
6. The Petersberg declaration also included a
proposal that WEU and IEPG experts " analyse
this issue in depth, carry out an initial examina-
tion of the r6le of and functions of a possible
European armaments agency and submit a report
for consideration ".
7. At their meeting in Bonn in December
1992, the defence ministers of the thirteen IEPG
countries agreed to transfer to WEU the functions
which, until then, it had been carrying out. This
was to be done in accordance with a set of basic
principles which can be summarised as follows:
- 
all IEPG members should be entitled to
participate fully, and with the same rights
and responsibilities, in any armaments
co-operation forum;
- 
there should be a single European arma-
ments co-operation forum in order to
avoid any duplication;
- 
the IEPG should continue to operate
until the replacement forum becomes
operational;
- 
this body should be based initially on the
agreed policies of the IEPG and maintain
existing links with NATO;
- 
its activities in Europe should be mana-
ged by the national armaments directors,
who will be accountable to their defence
ministers;
- 
initially, the existing basic structure of
the IEPG should be incorporated into the
structure of the new body and the exis-
ting link between the IEPG and EDIG
should be maintained.
8. In May 1993 the defence ministers of the
thirteen IEPG member countries, meeting in
Rome, adopted a series of practical measures rela-
tive to the transfer of the IEPG to WEU. From
then onwards the group has been known as the
Western European Armaments Group (WEAG);
additionally:
- 
defence ministers will meet at least once
a year in co-ordination with the WEU
Council of Ministers;
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- 
the chairmanship will continue to rotate
between the thirteen members;
- 
the national armaments directors will
meet half-yearly and will constitute the
operational level of co-operation on
armaments questions within the frame-
work of WEAG;
- 
the permanent secretariat will be trans-
ferred from Lisbon to Brussels (March
r994);
- 
relations with NATO as regards co-ope-
ration on armaments questions will
conform to the principles agreed at
Petersberg.
9. The WEAG Defence Ministers meeting in
Luxembourg on22nd November 1993 studied the
report on annaments co-operation by the National
Armaments Directors (NADs) as provided for in
the Petersberg declaration. This report was also
submitted to the meeting of the WEU Ministerial
Council following that of the thirteen WEAG
ministers.
10. Your Rapporteur is aware that this docu-
ment comprises three sections at the end of which
the NADs recommend that the ministers approve
a series of proposals. Thus the fnst of these sec-
tions on the creation of an armaments secretariat
in Brussels recommends the closure of the perma-
nent secretariat in Lisbon on lst April 1994 and
the creation in Brussels of an armaments secreta-
riat within the framework of WEU, subject to cer-
tain conditions as follows:
(a) solution to be found to the legal, admi-
nistrative and organisational issues;
(b) the armaments secretariat to work
under the authority of NADs in confor-
mity with the basic principles relating
to the transfer of the IEPG functions to
WEU;
(c) the concept of operations, including
tasks, to be worked out by the Staff
Group;
(d) armaments secretariat personnel to be
recruited under the same conditions as
the present WEU secretariat personnel;
(e) the WEAG budget to be a separate
chapter of the WEU budget, based on
contributions from all l3 nations.
11. The integration of WEAG into WEU of
necessity encountered a number of difficulties,
some of which have been resolved already, while
others are likely to be so in the near future. Until
the present, five people worked for WEAG in Lis-
bon, paid directly by their countries of origin. The
armaments secretariat in Brussels initially
employed three staff, an A4 Head of Section, an
A2 and a 84 administrator. Staffing costs are to be
divided by thirteen, adjusting the principles of
budget-sharing used by WEU to WEAG's thir-
teen- strong membership.
12. Moreover, the WEU Council will have a
different composition when armaments issues are
being discussed; the procedure will remain the
same but in these particular instances thirteen
countries will attend meetings and all will be
entitled to vote. For their part the National Arma-
ments Directors (NADs) will be responsible for
the armaments secretariat for the aspects that
concern them and will keep their respective mins-
ters of defence informed.
13. A study is currently in progress ofthe pos-
sible creation of one or more technical working
groups which will be equivalent to those that exis-
ted in WEAG and Eurogroup, i.e. steering com-
mittees in direct contact with the NADs. A deci-
sion will be reached in the next few months in
regard to their creation and number (should there
be one or two groups, possibly composed of the
same people?).
14. Lastly, in the section dealing with the Euro-
pean annaments agency, the NADs had discussed
a first report on this subject addressing possible
tasks for such a body and governing principles.
The NADS recognised that the conditions did not
yet exist for the creation of an agency which
would take over the full range of procurement
activities on behalf of WEAG member nations
although there might be potential in individual
areas for more effective co-operation through a
body having a legal personality.
15. In the light of this first report the NADs
agreed that further work should be undertaken to
examine the usefulness of resorting to an agency
in these areas against the criterion that this should
lead to a demonstrable improvement in the
conduct of business and to consider the legal and
administrative iurangements for an agency and its
relations with other bodies.
16. The above report was the first produced by
the ad hoc working group set up by the NADs in
March 1993 with the aim of analysing the tasks of
a European armaments agency and the legal basis
on which such an agency might be created.
ll. According to the information available to
your Rapporteur, the report is a preliminary study,
which must be supplemented by more detailed
research, especially on the areas of activity that
have been identified as possible tasks for the
agency.
18. Having identified these areas the report
recommends that the NADs support the conclu-
sions that it is not viable at present for a single
agency to have responsibility for managing pro-
curement on behalf of the member countries; and
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that studies should be continued in order to ident-
ify the areas of activity that might be covered by
such an agency.
19. Finally, your Rapporteur feels it extremely
useful to refer here to certain paragraphs of an
address given by the WEU Secretary-General to
the Royal Institute for International Relations,
Brussels, on 2nd January 1994, on the subject of
the present report, which reflect Mr. van Eeke-
len's consistent support for the creation of a Euro-
pean armaments agency and also constitute an
extremely enlightening contribution to its achieve-
ment in practice:
" Individually, WEU member states can no
longer afford to acquire all the necessary
assets for deterrence in Europe or force
projection outside Europe. Co-operation is
the only way of coping with the steady
shrinkage in national defence budgets,
notably in the fields of space, strategic
transport (a memorandum of understanding
on the feasibility study for the future large
aircraft was signed in October 1993), logis-
tics and telecommunications.
Work is under way to develop the open
European defence equipment market,
which includes guidelines and measures to
support and increase participation of deve-
loping defence industry countries.
Set up within WEU, the Western European
Armaments Group (WEAG) has inherited
the tasks of the IEPG. Denmark and two
associate countries, Norway and Turkey,
continue to play a full part in that frame-
work. This institutional arrangement
should help to achieve the objective of pro-
viding political impetus for European co-
operation in the field of armaments, as reaf-
firmed in the WEU Maastricht declaration.
An armaments secretariat will be estab-
lished within WEU this spring.
The creation of a European armaments
agency is actively under study. Among the
missions that might be assigned to this
agency are the provision of assistance to
the presidency of WEAG, support for the
implementation of the EUCLID technology
programme, further standardisation, joint
management of test facilities, co-operative
programmes and the creation of common
pools of equipment. "
20. To the above must be added, in accordance
with the first part of the thirty-ninth annual report
of the Council to the Assembly 
- 
Chapter IV.
Activities of the Defence Representatives Group
(DRG) 
- 
the approval of the Council of Ministers
on 19th May 1993 of the transfer to WEU of cer-
tain activities of Eurogroup and specifically the
information activities and EUROCOM. The
Eurogroup ministers meeting on24th May 1993
also approved the transfer. According to this
report on its activities for the frst half of 1993,
discussions are continuing on the new operating
procedures for information activities and EURO-
COM and also on the transfer of EUROLOG and
EUROLONGTERM to WEU.
21. In the second part of the thirty-ninth annual
report of the Council, it can be seen that the trans-
fer of EUROCOM to WEU took effect on 1st
August 1993, whereas that of information activi-
ties (called " Publicity activities " in this second
part ofthe annual report) took effect on lst Janu-
ary 1994, the Council's working group being res-
ponsible for these tasks.
22. The transfer to WEU of the activities of
EUROLOG and EUROLONGTERM also took
effect on 1st January 1994 following a joint deci-
sion by the WEU Council and the Permanent
Representatives of Eurogroup. The EUROLOG
and EUROLONGTERM steering groups have
been given new terms of reference in order to
adapt their activities to WEU requirements.
23. With regard to WEAG activities, in addi-
tion to the information already given, the annual
report calls attention to the meeting of National
Armaments Directors (NADs) held for the first
time at WEU headquarters in Brussels on 27th
October 1993. The WEAG panels and working
groups pursued the following activities during the
second half of 1993: in the framework of Panel I,
a memorandum of understanding relating to the
feasibility study for the future large aircraft (FLA)
was signed by the National Armaments Directors
of the six countries participating in this pro-
gramme: France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain
and Turkey.
24. The EUCLID programme has been conti-
nued in Panel II with a number of projects and the
signing of contracts. At the same time, measures
are being studied for improving the effectiveness
of this prograrnme.
25. Panel III is pursuing its work on the deve-
lopment of an open defence equipment market in
Europe and has drawn up measures to enable
developing defence industry countries to partici-
pate more fully in that market.
26. A question might be raised here: although
undoubtedly progress has been achieved in inte-
grating the IEPG and Eurogroup in WEU accom-
panied by a general evolution towards closer co-
operation in armaments questions and ultimately
towards a European armaments agency, is it not
now time to give greater impetus to the overall
process? By thus speeding up the process, our
organisation would be capable of coming effecti-
vely to grips with a challenge that calls for realis-
tic and reasonable answers without delay.
t57
DOCUMENT 1419
III. The Standing Armaments Committee,
Eurogroup, the IEPG
(a) The Standing Armnments Committee
27. The creation of a European armaments
agency has been a long-standing item on the
European agenda over the last forty years. The
reluctant support given to its establishment has
been matched by declarations of varying enthu-
siasm regarding the need for such an agency.
28. In May 1955 the WEU Council decided on
the creation, as a subsidiary body ofthat organisa-
tion, of the Standing Armaments Committee
(SAC). Its aim was to "... find joint solutions
which would assist governments of member
countries in meeting their military equipment
requirements " by " agreements or alTangements
on such subjects as the standardisation, produc-
tion and procurement of armaments concluded
between all or some WEU countries ... ". This
aim was to be achieved in close co-operation with
NAIO, with the SAC being free to set up any sub-
committees and working groups required and
observers from NAIO able to be associated with
them.
29. The greatest and seemingly the sole merit
of the SAC has been that the frequent meetings of
those responsible for armaments in the member
countries in the framework of the SAC, NAIO or,
later on, the IEPG, have created productive rela-
tionships which have in some cases led to bi-, tri-
or multilateral co-operation progralnmes, even
though no specifically WEU equipment has ever
been produced. On 13th November 1989 the
Council of Ministers decided to abolish the SAC.
The question of European co-operation in arma-
ments matters remained on the agenda, however.
(b) Eurogroup
30. Eurogroup was formed in November 1968
as an informal association (without official status)
between the defence ministers of the European
countries members of NATO. It included Bel-
gium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Turkey and the United Kingdom; its creation
responded to the need to provide an informal body
in which ministers might be able to hold
exchanges of views on questions of particular
strategic and political interest and to promote co-
operation in a concrete manner through a series of
sub-groups.
31. Ministerial meetings prepare the work of
the Eurogroup staff which is composed of mem-
bers of the various delegations to NAIO.
32. Shortly after its creation, Eurogroup started
the EDIP prograrnme (European Defence Impro-
vement Programme) providing for joint invest-
ment in infrastructure work, the development of an
integrated communications network and the finan-
cing of arms procurement and transport aircraft.
33. Where armaments are concerned, Euro-
group's activities were directed mainly (and stran-
gely) towards co-ordinating Europe's procure-
ment of American equipment.
34. Eurogroup is sub-divided into a series of
sub-groups as follows: EUROCOM, whose work
has been mainly to ensure that the various natio-
nal communications systems meet previously
fixed technical and operational conditions;
EUROLOG, whose aim is logistic co-operation;
EUROLONGTERM, which works on operational
long-term docrines; EUROMED, responsible for
co-operation between the various health services
of the military forces; EURONAD, whose aim is
to reduce armaments investments through stan-
dardisation and the procurement of armaments
and EURO/I.{ATO training, which tries to organ-
ise training in a multinational framework. To this
end, programme information centres have been
set up in accordance with the duration of the
periods of insffuction.
35. From the very outset, the fact that France
did not belong to Eurogroup made it difficult to
find common solutions for the European members
of NATO. It is indeed difficult to promote co-ope-
ration in a practical manner without a country
such as France whose technological, industrial
and commercial level in armaments is surpassed
in the alliance only by that of the United States.
(c) The IEPG
36. The Independent European Programme
Group (IEPG) was created on 2nd February 1976.
It is a co-operative structure grouping the thirteen
European countries of the Atlantic Alliance, with
the exception of Iceland. Its work is shared mainly
between three panels. Panel I deals with operatio-
nal requirements and equipment programmes,
Panel II, the most recent one, deals with research
and technology, EUCLID being its main activity,
and Panel trI deals with procedural and economic
questions.
37. The ministers or secretaries of state meet
every nine months and take decisions if they have
been well-enough prepared. The National Arma-
ments Directors (NADs) meet once or twice bet-
ween ministerial meetings.
38. The European defence industries have
organised themselves to meet with the IEPG. This
is the European Defence Industrial Group (EDIG)
which has the backing of the national professional
organisations. EDIG has a stnrcture similar to that
of the IEPG, i.e. with Panels I, II and III.
39. The IEPG's first eight years passed without
significant results. During that time, the group
mainly tried to harmonise timetables and replace-
ment plans for the defence equipment of the mem-
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ber countries with a view to promoting co-opera-
tive programmes.
40. In 1984, the rather meagre results of the
IEPG urged Europeans to try to revive it by gui-
ding its action towards the promotion of co-opera-
tion in technological research in armaments mat-
ters. This was the purpose of the EUCLID pro-
grarnme launched on29th June 1989 (European
co-operation for the long term in defence) which
has sometimes been called " military Eureka ". Its
aim was to co-ordinate and rationalise the efforts
of the armaments industries and make them co-
operate in advance technology. To come to grips
with the many difficulties, a list of eleven joint
priority areas for Europe was drawn up (CEPA:
common European priority areas) with a pilot
country for each one. In each of these areas, a
group of officials of the countries concerned met
to identify and define the projects likely to interest
several countries and to fix their limits. Once pro-
jects are outlined, they are submitted to the appro-
priate authorities of each country who decide
whether or not to earmark the necessary financing
for a given project. This procedure is necessary
since it has not been possible, at the presentjunc-
ture in European defence co-operation, to define
the budgets to be allocated to the various CEPAs.
41. However this may be, the EUCLID pro-
gramme is now running smoothly and the idea has
developed in parallel to pursue European co-ope-
ration in armaments questions in a firmer, more
visible framework, such as WEU.
IV. The futare European annaments agency
42. Clearly, as matters now stand, a European
armaments agency in the broadest sense of the
word covering the full range of such an agency
would not yet be a viable proposition.
43. The European armaments agency should be
based on a complementary and co-ordinated
policy resulting from agreement among defence
industries on an integrated armaments market and
a common export policy for such armaments. The
present European juncture is hardly promising in
this respect.
44. The common foreign and security policy
(CFSP) is almost inexistent and a common defence
policy is still far away. What hope could there
then be for a joint armaments and military policy?
45. In the short and medium term, one cannot
expect to create a European armaments agency
with wide-ranging responsibilities; on the con-
trary, if starting positions are neither reasonable
nor achievable, this project might well come to
grief and it would be diffrcult to find the necess-
ary consensus to launch that body. It would appear
necessary however to begin work on the most
important aspects of its probable infrastructure:
definition, basic budgetary requirements, equip-
ment and human resource requirements, pro-
grarnmes, production, trade and exports.
46. This being so, one principle should be affir-
med: while the usefulness of an agency has
always been generally recognised, the political
and economic circumstances which now prevail
in Europe make it more necessary than ever,
although paradoxically these very circumstances
exacerbate the prejudices ofcertain states (on the
part of the government, the national defence
industry, public opinion, or all these sectors toge-
ther) towards its creation.
47. Before listing the tasks that might be
entrusted to the European armaments agency,
brief mention should be made of a few of the dif-
ficulties to be encountered at the very start, some
of which will be developed further in subsequent
chapters. First are the different politico-adminis-
trative structures of the bodies responsible for
armaments in the various member countries.
These bodies are of differing types, particularly
with regard to their areas of responsibility, procu-
rement, exports, research establishments or tes-
ting sites and procedures applicable for planning
and starting armaments programmes.
48. Moreover, other factors affect the defence
industries of member countries and make their
position uncertain. Legislation governing patents,
working conditions and the various fiscal systems
affecting these industries vary from one country
to another.
49. Better harmonisation in these areas would
make relations between the national bodies more
flexible and consequently more fruitful; it would
facilitate co-operation and would help to maintain
a balance between national defence industries and
in the end would improve the discipline and effec-
tiveness of the future agency.
50. Harmonisation should not necessarily have
priority over the creation ofthe agency but ihould
be pursued in parallel with the latter's first steps.
51. There is a clear need to create an agency as
testified by the considerable dispersal of arma-
ments matters in Europe today, the presence of an
agency or an armaments organisation in each
counfiy, the existence of many bodies responsible
for various co-operative programmes, the need to
use the funds available to better avail, to cenffalise
present irrrangements around prograrnmes and to
tighten up indusrial co-operation, and co-ordinate
major invesffnent; nor must one forget the deve-
lopment sector, the improvement and enlargement
of co-operation in research with due respect for the
principles of harmonisation and standardisation
(particularly from the legal point of view).
52. A whole series of initiatives should be
taken to meet the challenge of the European
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Union in armaments matters: by resolving exis-
ting problems and difficulties, Europe would
prove itself to be equal to its requirements, its
possibilities and would take a competitive posi-
tion on the world scene.
53. The tasks identified for the agency should
be kept to a minimum to allow it to operate effec-
tively and make it an efficient tool that would
open the way for its subsequent development.
54. The missions entrusted to the agency
should not be undertaken simultaneously but
should correspond to r6les to be achieved in the
medium term with an appropriate timetable in
each case. It should be made clear that the first
r6le of the agency is to offer a simple flexible
structure which would firmly promote co-opera-
tion in different prograrnmes, avoiding at all costs
the formation of a bureaucratic straidacket.
55.
be:
Possible tasks for the agency initially might
(a) management of co-operative pro-
grarnmes;
(b) management of the EUCLID pro-
gamme;
(c) management of joint research and
testing facilities;
(d) technological and operational studies;
(e) establishment of information and data
services.
(a) Management of co-operative programmes
56. In recent years, a whole series ofco-opera-
tive programmes has been started. These bi-, tri-
or multilateral programmes have been achieved
thanks to a general political process of co-opera-
tion without which they could not have been
continued.
57. Experience shows that without a true long-
term political commitment and effective confi-
dence with political backing the plan will even-
tually fail. Again, the multiplication of costs due
to the participation of a very high number of
countries also leads to failure. Many examples
may be quoted in support of this affirmation,
including that of the first frigate of the nineties.
58. To succeed a co-operative programme, one
must take the view that it is not a joint prograrnme
but a common programme, guided by a strategy
for the whole prograrnme with a frm political and
financial commitment which must, of course, be
based on the requirements expressed by defence
staffs.
59. A first aim of these prograrnmes is to allow
savings to be made: it is therefore necessary to
respect the principle of the long-term commit-
ment, the need for the programme to be a coflrmon
one, avoiding variations insofar as possible, and
fair work- and cost-sharing.
60. The choice of the industrial consortium
must first be made in accordance with criteria of
efficiency and next allow a global handling of the
problem of industrial return. The political will to
use European equipment must be a goal to be
attained, even if, be it only in the short term, this
is not a sine qua non. Co-operation must be based
on the fact that in industrial matters each country
must do what it is best placed to handle and a
country's inordinate industrial ambition may jeo-
pardise the profitability of co-operation.
61. This being so, what might be the contribu-
tion of the European armaments agency to co-
operative prograrnmes? First, it would provide a
juridical basis. At tlre present time, offrces respon-
sible for co-operative programmes may work
under the wing of NAIO agerrcies or international
project offices (IPOs). These offices have no legal
status and any work they wish to pursue to its
conclusion has to be achieved in conformity with
the laws and standards of the host country. For
example, they themselves cannot draw up
contracts or grant employees a juridical status.
62. The agency would first offer an appropriate
juridical framework for working effectively and at
a high level. It would co-ordinate the execution of
co-operative prograrnmes. In this respect it would
play the r6le of board of directors on which all the
countries would be represented and which would
have its own rules of procedure with an intelligent
approach to present regulations and able to
operate i la carte.
63. The agency would endeavour to rearrange
present systems taking prograrnmes into account,
tighten up industrial co-operation, avoid the dis-
persal of co-operative programmes and all in all,
make better use of available funds.
@. Furthermore, the European armaments
agency might offer the various co-operative pro-
grafilmes a series of services, particularly through
the creation of a data bank covering such ques-
tions as the pros and cons of various procedures,
intellectual property rights, regulations governing
contracts (commercial law, rules for industrial
association), VAT, etc.
(b) Management of the EUCLID programme
65. The EUCLID programme mentioned ear-
lier is a good example of how being used to wor-
king together is a very great help when everyone
agrees on principles but not on the methods of
work. An additional advantage of EUCLID is that
it proves that Europe has the ability to join the
competition even if the researrch effort of the thir-
teen member countries of the programme repre-
sents about half of the effort made by the United
States.
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66. The machinery for operating the EUCLID
programme is complicated and it is clearly not
easy for thirteen countries to work together, yet its
present achievements can be considered as posi-
tive. At present there are 43 programmes which
imply state financing amounting to some 280 mil-
lion ecus and 22 co-operative contracts have
already been signed.
67. According to the information available to
your Rapporteur, however, the programme is
encountering three major obstacles. First, it is
very time-consuming. Thirteen-power co-opera-
tion involves considerable delays at national level
due to the need for approval of the authorities of
each country, legal, industrial problems, etc.
Second, new proposals are lacking. From this
point of view, some sectors are better than others.
This lack of new proposals is linked to a third obs-
tacle: the existence of bi-, tri- or multilateral pro-
grarnmes often make some countries prefer this
type of framework to that of EUCLID.
68. Panel II has drawn a number of conclusions
from what has been said above: a permanent
structure is needed to over@me the problems lis-
ted. In this respect the creation of a European
armaments agency would help EUCLID's work to
advance in a more satisfactory manner. Further-
more, the panel has raised the idea of creating a
research cell which in a way would be a vanguard
of the agency. It would help to motivate the indus-
ries which often lose interest in EUCLID because
of the obstacles they encounter and which have
already been mentioned. This cell would be a
driving force for all the groups which depend on
the programme and would be quite small, thus
ensuring its profitability. These initiatives would
help to put an end to delays and would make
procedures more flexible.
69. At present, France and the United Kingdom
devote some l7o of their research budgets to the
EUCLID prograrnme, Germany 2Vo and the other
countries between 5 ard 507o. The total defence
research budget in the thirteen countries of the
Western European Armaments Group amounts to
some F 18 000 million compared toF 42 000 mil-
lion for the United States.
70. The management of EUCLID by the
agency would avoid wasting our resources and,
through rationalisation, it would at least be pos-
sible to avoid widening the gap between Europe
and the United States.
(c) Management of joint research and testing
establishments
71. The prevailing situation in this area calls
for joint and global solutions due mainly to the
cost and space involved in these activities; such
solutions are more necessary than ever at a time
when budgets everywhere are being sharply cur-
tailed. Since it is impossible to improve condi-
tions for co-operation in this sector, a European
armaments agency would first offer a juridical
framework for these establishments which might
thus be managed jointly offering the possibility of
immediate benefits from the savings stemming
from an efficient and rational use of these installa-
tions.
(d) Operational and technological research
72. Mention has already been made of the
many efforts in recent years (Standing Arma-
ments Committee, Eurogroup, IEPG) to promote
inter alia the goal of harmonising military specifi-
cations although little significant progress has yet
been made. Short- and medium-term prospects in
this matter are hardly optimistic but there is a
clear need to move forward in this sector. At pre-
sent there is a trend towards an overall definition
of forces such as the future Franco-Italian-
Spanish maritime group which implies that these
units are interoperable and hence have close links
with the Planning Cell. Being multinational, such
forces will give considerable impetus to co-opera-
tion in armaments matters.
73. One should not try to conceal the difficul-
ties a research group might encounter in this sec-
tor, nor should they prevent steady relentless pro-
gress in identifying the possibilities of agreement.
(e) Creation of an information and data service
74. In paragraph 64 on co-operative pro-
' grammes, mention was already made of a number
of services that a European armaments agency
might offer its members in regard to information;
this service should be capable ofproviding speci-
fic and accurate information and data regarding
the market for defence items extending from
defence expenditure to the description of the
defence industry including exports and imports of
such equipment in regard to the member countries
and their transatlantic links; it should also keep a
register of patents together with all relevant infor-
mation.
75. Such data already exist although clearly
they can be improved. In fact, most members of
the WEAG publish periodically information bul-
letins on the procurement needs of the various
contracting bodies and a report on the firms obtai-
ning contracts. The question is to obtain fuller
information about the above sectors and from this
information to build up a data bank which will be
available to the member countries.
76. Mention has already been made of the main
tasks that might initially be entrusted to the agency
but clearly a more detailed study is necessary in
order to define these tasks more accurately and
establish operating rules that are flexible enough
to escape from burdensome and delaying bureau-
cratic structures.
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77 . The legal bases for creating this agency are to
be found in the modified Brussels Treaty which pro-
vides for the possibility of the Council setting up
subsidiary bodies. Participation in this future subsi-
diary body by WEU associate members and obser-
vers should raise no legal or political diffrculties.
78. The fact that the agency may be able to
undertake some tasks considered to be common
tasks and others that would come under different
co-operative programmes between certain coun-
tries does not seem to be a major obstacle.
79. Concerning the agency's relations with the
European Union and NATO, the Treaty on
European Union and the appended declaration of
the WEU member countries together with subse-
quent declarations and more recently the declara-
tions issued at the NATO summit meeting in
January ofthis year, and also the explicit backing
of the United States for the common foreign and
security policy and the European security identity
illustrate the r6le assigned to each of these organi-
sations (WEU, European Union and NAIO), their
present relationship and the level of these links.
80. Furthermore, as far as your Rapporteur can
see, the member countries of WEU and the WEAG
are not firying for the time being to change their rela-
tionship with the European Commission at the ins-
titutional level nor at the level of defence indusries.
V. The Franco-Gertnan armaments agency
81. At the Franco-German summit meeting in
Bonn at the beginning of December 1993, the
Defence Ministers, Mr. Ldotard and Mr. Rtihe,
decided to create a joint armaments agency.
82. According to the information at your Rap-
porteur's disposal, this agency would have the
task of managing bilateral armaments pro-
grarnmes with a view to improving the efficiency
of these prograrnmes and reducing management
costs. There is now a joint office that manages all
bilateral programmes, although each counfr still
has its own national office to verify the work of
the joint office.
83. The Franco-German agency would create a
single management office which would replace
the national offices and consequently save money
and increase management effrciency.
84. The initial intention is that at the middle of
this year those responsible for equipment procure-
ment should make a series of specific proposals
for starting the agency so that the latter might start
its work immediately, but the date of 1995 now
seems more realistic.
85. Current bilateral programmes include the
Tiger attack helicopter, the Roland, Milan and Hot
Euromissiles and, with the United Kingdom, the
Trigat anti-tank missile progmrnme. Furthermore,
the agency would be given the new development
programme for the next generation of
wheeled combat vehicles.
86. The defence ministers have agreed that
work should be started on the standardisation of
equipment for the European corps.
87. Apparently two solutions are being studied
for the legal framework in which the agency
should be set. The frst would be for a treaty bet-
ween the two countries 
- 
this would make parlia-
mentary ratification compulsory. The problem
with this solution is that Germany is at present in
the midst of an electoral period, in particular
general elections which are to be held on 16th
October 1994: there is therefore little hope of the
parliamentary process being completed in the
coming months. The alternative would be to make
the Franco-Gerrnan agency a subsidiary organ of
the Council which your Rapporteur believes would
raise juridical difficulties and political problems.
88. This solution would raise a number of
questions: how could a subsidiary body be created
that would not be open to the participation of all
the member states? Moreover, the Council would
maintain control over a body composed solely of
two of its member states. Since this is merely a
hypothesis, the matter will not be taken further.
89. Again, there is every indication that this
agency is not intended to be the initial nucleus of
the future European armaments agency but, one
way or another, it is to stimulate the creation and
development of the latter by following a parallel
course and preserving its bilateral character,
although exceptionally it is o,pen to Belgium, in
order to be integrated sooner or later in the Euro-
pean armaments agency which, in principle,
would not be before the year 2000.
90. Finally, it should be noted that the agency
would have its own market code, with the possibi-
lity of following the example of NATO in this res-
pect and in any case excluding community law
since defence equipment cannot be compared
with any other. It is crystal-clear that if the Franco-
German proposal materialises it will indeed be a
stimulus of the greatest importance for all the ini-
tiatives of the European armaments agency.
VI. The European Defence Industries Group(EDrc)
91. The European Defence Industries Group
was created in 1990 by the national associations
of defence industries of the member countries of
what was then the IEPG. EDIG represents the
interests of the European defence industry and
maintains a close working relationship with the
governments of the WEAG countries.
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92. EDIG has a board of directors, a technical
committee and an economic and legal committee.
EDIG is a source of information of very high stan-
dard and therefore of very grcat interest. This body
seeks Europe-wide responsibilities which, accor-
ding to its representatives, implies a joint industrial
policy. EDIG believes standardisation is necessary
from the military point of view whereas in indus-
trial terms a co-operative structure is needed; initia-
tives to promote co-operation should come from
both industrial and governmental circles.
93. Similarly, EDIG considers it would be desi-
rable to move more quickly in this sector and lea-
ders of industry generally take a favourable view
of the creation of a European armaments agency.
94. Basing itself on Article 223 of the treaty
instituting the European Community', EDIG
emphasises the need for it to remain in existence
mainly in order to avoid the risks from abroad that
would follow its disappearance, with particular
regard to the United States. It is appropriate to
refer here to the discriminatory practices and
measures applied by the United States in the
defence sector for the purposes of protecting and
promoting its own interests through support for its
defence industry and particularly by facilitating
exports. It might further be noted that the Euro-
pean Commission is now preparing a Community
regulation on armaments exports to third coun-
tries. With regard to dual-use items and the sys-
tem regulating them, work is now being conduc-
ted on lists of items; the appropriate legal regula-
tions still have to be defined. As regards exports
of conventional defence equipment, the document
prepared by EDIG appended to the present report
is of major interest and puts forward a highly
interesting view that is representative of the Euro-
pean defence industry and, in your Rapporteur's
opinion, very much to the point. The document
deals mainly with export controls in co-operation
projects and underlines the need for governments,
in conjunction with industry, to establish standard
measures and procedures relating to the exporta-
tion of defence equipment.
1 . Article 223: l. The provisions of this treaty shall not pre-
clude the application of the following rules: (a) No member
state shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of
which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its
security; (b) Any member state may take such measures as it
considers necessary for the protection of the essential inter-
ests of its security which are connected with the production
of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such mea-
sures shall not, however, adversely affect the conditions of
competition in the common market regarding products which
are not intended for specifically military purposes.
2. During the frst year after the entry into force of this treaty,
the Council shall, acting unanimously, draw up a list of
products to which the provisions of paragraph I (D) shall
apply.
3. The Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from
the Commission, make changes in this list.
95. The report by Mr. Aarts on arms export
policy (Document 1305) contains the following
considerations:
" 145. The continuing reluctance of the
WEU Council to debate the problems of
armaments transfers due to the fact that
most member governments envisage a
greater r6le for the European Community
and the future European Union in these
matters must be overcome because of the
obvious implications for the essential secu-
rity and defence interests of member coun-
tries. The crucial problems standing in the
way of a harmonised arms export policy
must be resolved in WEU and not in the
framework of European political co-opera-
tion. "
In the opinion of your Rapporteur these conside-
rations are still highly relevant today. It is there-
fore WEU, taking account of sectoral interests
and common European policy, that remains the
competent organisation in an area that is absolut-
ely crucial to the security and defence of Europe.
96. Apart from the position adopted by EDIG
for the creation of the agency, some countries
have made public their position on the need to
create a defence Europe which, for industry, is
both a need and a chance, according to the
defence white paper published by the French
Ministry of Defence in 1994.
97. According to this white paper, with which
EDIG generally agrees, no future major conven-
tional armaments programme seems able to
escape from the logic of co-operation. Political
co-operation has already paved the way towards
co-operation on programmes at a time when this
was becoming an economic necessity; furthermore,
this policy also supposes that the European states
demonstrate their solidarity by showing their pre-
ference for Europe. Again, without a common
strategy, the decline of the European armaments
industry will be started and the independence of
Europe called into question.
98. Still according to the white paper, the IEPG
integrated in WEU and the European armaments
agency provided for in the declaration appended
to the Treaty on European Union offer possible
frameworks for this policy. For his part, Mr. Tony
Pryor, British Chairman of the Defence Manufac-
turers' Association, speaking at a conference
organised by GICAT in Paris on 26th October
1993, voiced the idea that EDIG would become
the main cenffe for grouping the defence industry
vis-i-vis WEU and any future European arma-
ments agency. He also said that British represen-
tatives of the defence industry were far from
convinced that Europe offered the only way out.
99. The fact is that there is not unanimity
regarding the agency or its responsibilities in
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industrial circles, nor in political circles. There are
even sectors that give the impression that they
want this body to come into existence whereas in
reality they are not at all prepared to transfer some
of their national responsibilities to such an inter-
national organisation. As has so often been repea-
ted in this report, it will be necessary to start with
the srnallest common denominator.
100. Finally in this chapter, your Rapporteur
wishes to take up a consideration discussed in a
publication of the French Commissariat g€nlral
du Plan, the future of defence-related industries
which, referring to the creation of a European
armaments agency, stated that it would be neces-
sary to avoid a dogmatic approach which might
prevent the formation in Europe of alliances of a
small group of partners with homogenous respon-
sibilities for certain research or certain pro-
grammes within the agency or outside it when its
framework did not offer the best solution.
101. Your Rapporteur agrees entirely with this
warning and is convinced that the European agency
should in no case limit or prevent co-operation
that might prove to be more convenient or more
fruitful outside its framework for a specific pro-
grarnme. It should not be forgotten that industry
has always been ahead of political necessities and
that co-operation has always been more satisfac-
tory and more rapid from the industrial point of
view than from the governmental point of view.
VII. Conclusians
I02. As emerges clearly from the previous
pages, your Rapporteur strongly advocates the
creation of a European armaments agency as a
subsidiary body of WEU with a narow but realis-
tic range of activities which would be limited to
the minimum accepted by all participants. Its
structure would be a simple one but after proving
its efficiency and usefulness as it develops it
would provide the foundation for wider responsi-
bilities in the future. It is quite certain that the
time is not yet ripe for the creation of a European
armaments agency in the broadest sense as explai-
ned in Chapter IY but at the present time pressure
must be brought to bear to obtain a convergence in
the political, military and technical fields and, to
this end, the creation of the agency is a useful and
necessary initiative that can be achieved in the
manner described above.
103. The process started by the introduction of
the agency will contribute to the advancement of
the integration of defence policy in general and
should be accompanied by a similar process in the
armed forces concerned; without technical co-
operation, military co-operation is not possible.
104. Your Rapporteur believes that the tasks
assigned to the agency, at least during the initial
running-in period, can be accepted by all the
WEAG countries and the creation of this body as
described in the present report should raise no
objections in the various countries since there can
be no threat to their national interests.
105. [t matters little that some may feel that an
agency with such responsibilities is not worthy of
the name. It hardly matters that the agency should
take over the duties of WEU armaments secreta-
riat or that it should be the secretariat itself that
carries out the tasks of the agency, as they have
been described, without it being necessary to
create it officially.
106. Before the end of the present year, the
WEU Council of Ministers should take a decision
on this matter. Co-operation in armaments ques-
tions is an essential dimension of our organisation
and to take a first, albeit it small, step in this direc-
tion will eventually provide us with a framework
which is absolutely necessary for the future policy
of common defence. Without this framework,
who could honestly define WEU's raison d'6tre in
the European Union or imagine the future of this
Union?
107. In this undertaking, the Council can count
on the firm and vigilant support of the Assembly.
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APPENDIX
Document on EDIG's policy on conventional defence equipment exports
1.1
l.Introduction
In considering the question of defence
disadvantages their home-based suppliers from
taking part in co-operative programmes.
2. Export regulatians in co-operative projects
2.1. It is suggested that there will be three main
types of international business activity in the
defence equipment field of the future:
(a) jointventure projects on a government-
to-government basis, i.e. initiated by
governments and subject to agreed
government-to-government MOUs.
They will include elements of design,
development and production;
(b) jointventure projects on a company-to-
company basis with no official govern-
ment involvement. These also will
include elements of design, develop-
ment and production;
(c) company-based initiatives which rely
on collaboration at the sub-contractor
level in the production phase only.
2.2. To develop these examples one by one:
(a) Joint venture projects on a government-to-
government basis
It is most unlikely that any formal govern-
ment-to-government agreement will be reached
without the question of exporting policy being dis-
cussed. However, industry should emphasise to
governments the importance of this matter being
properly resolved during the negotiations leading
up to any agreement on a project-based MOU.
It would also be appropriate for the regula-
tions and procedures applicable to the movement
and export of defence equipment to be relaxed
when this activity takes place under the umbrella
of an intergovernment MOU. For example, that in
such circumstances the approval of only one
government authority may be adequate.
(b) Joint venture projects on a company-to-com-
pany basis
In this case, industry requires some form of
assurance regarding the policies of the govern-
ments of the companies involved before it enters
into contractual agreements and financial com-
mitments to develop and produce for sale a defence
equipment system. Competitive pressures for cost
reductions by single sourcing of components and
spares will demand some form of government
advice at a relatively early stage of inter-company
discussions. Sooner or later any successful defence
equipment exports it is of prime importance to
remember that these matters are an integral part of
government policy, defence and foreign, and that
normal commercial solutions to problems will not
always be appropriate. This assumption involves
considerable problems since it has an immediate
impact on one of the basic operating assumptions
for defence industry, that of long-term investment
policy. At the present time, this impact is even
more significant than hitherto since, with reducing
defence budgets and increasing technology costs,
it is highly unlikely that any single nation will be
able to contemplate the research and development
and production costs of a major item of defence
equipment. Pan-European projects will become
the norm and even then it is possible that the Euro-
pean " home market " alone will be insuffrcient to
support their existence. Thus collaboration and co-
operation will become commonplace and accepted
standards of exports policy will become vitally
important in the formation of future collaborative
partnerships. It would be difficult, if not impos-
sible, for a major company to contemplate colla-
boration with another company unless that com-
pany exists in a country where the government has
accepted common principles of exponing policy.
An absence of national government agreement
could therefore mean that its national industry
would find itself effectively debarred from partici-
pation in collaborative projects.
1.2. The overall future aim of industry is that a
common European policy on defence equipment
exports be developed which does not impede
international co-operation and which takes into
account the need to strengthen the European posi-
tion in defence equipment production. However
an intergovernmental agreement on a long-term
harmonised framework of defence export proce-
dures and regulations is unlikely to be practicable
before the acceptance of a common foreign and
security policy amongst the member nations of
WEU/EEC and even in the most optimistic scena-
rio this may take some years.
In the meantime, the European defence
industry needs some interim arrangements if it is
to survive and to develop into a strong and more
competitive industry in the world marketplace.
The main problem for industry is how it will bridge
the gap in time between industrial survival and the
full implementation of political decisions.
Governments should neither act in a way that
constrains the export of defence goods from
nations willing to export them nor in a way that
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equipment project of any size will be the subject
of a possible export order. In fact, as already sta-
ted in paragraph 1.1. above, the time may not be
too far off when even a pan-European defence
industry cannot contemplate the development and
production of a major defence equipment project
without the support of a market outside WEU and
the EEC. Companies will require to consult with
governments on a case-by-case basis to establish
what the official policy on export approval is likely
to be. Whilst even on a case-by-case basis it is
unlikely that governments will be prepared to give
long-term approval at this time they should be
prepared to give adequate warnings of the proba-
bility of export embargo decisions in the future.
Once again, in this type of activity it is hoped
that once government "agreement to proceed" is
received, less onerous procedures for obtaining the
necessary export licences 
-ight be available.
( c ) Company-based initiative s
The increasing tendency of governments to
have official national research and development
policies which forecast prograrnmes of national
research and development activity with only limi-
ted opportunities for even prototype production to
follow, will make it of prime importance that com-
panies obtain government reassurance that long-
term export potential can be realised. Without such
assurances at an early stage in the development
phase, and in the abs-encelf a guaranteed home
market, it is unlikely that companies, even those
which are to some degree state-owned, will ven-
ture their own capital and this can only lead to a
further weakening of the industrial base.
In this particular case, it would also be
beneficial if governments would accept that it
would be the export regulations of the counfiry in
which the prime or lead contractor was resident
which would form the basis of the operating rules
for that particular project. Wide government
agreement to such a principle would mean that
prime and lead conftactors would be free to range
across all of the countries of WEU in a compe-
titive search for subcontractors, thus preparing the
way for a final product which could be compe-
titive in the world marketplace.
3. Conclusians and recommendntions
3.1. In the short term, arrangements between
member nations will be just as vital for govern-
ment-to-government co-operation as for industry-
to-industry co-operation. In both cases, the prin-
ciple should be that, while the govemment of the
intending exporting state should consult other
governments whose industries are involved in thejoint venture before making any final decision, it
must be accepted that governments may not debar
companies in their own state involved in the joint
venture from meeting their contractual obliga-
tions. Without an agreement of this nature, it will
be impossible to maintain the efficient defence
co-operation sffucture in Europe which is increa-
singly necessary in the wake of falling national
demand.
3.2. Should governments decide to work
towards the establishment of standard regulations
and procedures for the export of defence equip-
ment, industry should take a very positive interest
in the negotiations and the following recoflrmen-
dations are made accordingly:
(a) that for defence equipment produced
in co-operation with another WEU
member state, i.e. government-to-
government, the principles covering
export authority should be firmly sta-
ted in the MOU associated with the co-
operation agreement and that relaxed
administrative procedures should be
defined;
(b) that for defence equipment produced
on a company-to-company basis bet-
ween companies situated in two or
more WEU states, member states
should not, in normal circumstances,
withhold export approval for the sup-
ply of component parts between mem-
bers of the industrial consortium invol-
ved and that agreed relaxed administra-
tive procedures may be applied;
(c) that the supply of component parts for
defence equipment within WEU and
Cocom should be unrestricted.
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Amendments l and 2
13th June 1994
The Earopean annarnents agency 
-
reply to the thifi-ninth annual report of the Council
AMENDMENTS 1and2'
tabledby Mrs. Blunck
1. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:
" Document the regulations on arms exports in force in the member states and provide information
on its methods for their standardisation as well as the time schedule previewed for realising harmo-
nisation;"
2. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:
" Ensure and document parliamentary control, either through national parliaments or the parlia-
mentary assembly, over defence procurement as well as arms exports; "
Signed: Blunck
l. See lst sitting, l3th June 1994 (amendment I agreed to; amendment 2 amended and agreed to).
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The rdle andfuture of nuclear weapons
REPORT'
submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee 2
by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PRrpacs
Dnerr RncoprumNolnoN
on the r6le and future of nuclear weapons
ExpLeNRroRv Mr,uonaNnura
submitted by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur
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II. The evolution of the United States and NATO's nuclear strategy
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IV. The United States
(a) United States nuclear forces(b) United States nuclear posture review(c) The counter-proliferation initiative(d) The United States nuclear posture 
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l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Baumel (Chairman); MM. De Decker, de Puig (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Alloncle,Mrs. Boarveld-
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Leite, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, Sir Keith Speed, MM. Steiner, Lopez Valdivielso (Altemate: Lopez Henares),Yazqtez, Zierer.
N.B. Tfte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Prefoce
In preparing the present report, your Rapporteur has been extremely fortunate to receive much kind
help and assistance from all the authorities consulted and he would like to take this opporhrnity publicly to
thank all concerned for their co-operation.
The Rapporteur met or received evidence from the following:
7th-9th March 1994 
- 
Washington D.C.
His Excellency Juan Cassiers Belgian Ambassador to Washington
Mr. James Timbie Senior Advisor of Undersecretary of State for International Security
Affairs
Mr. Stephen Hadley Former Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy
Mr. Leonard Spector Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Mr. Robert Einhorn Deputy Assistant Secretary forPolitical-Military Affairs, State Department
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski Former National Security Advisor, Cenffe for Strategic and International
Studies
Mr. Dean Millot Rand Corporation
General Brent Scowcroft Former National Security Advisor, Forum for lnternational Policy
Mr. Steven Andreasen Deputy of the Senior Director for Defence Policy/Arms Control, National
Security Council
Mr. Steven Cambone Senior Fellow 
- 
Politico-Military Affairs, Centre for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies
Dr. John Steinbruner Director Foreign Policy, Brookings Institute
Mr. Andy Johnson l,egislative Assistant to Senator Exon, Armed Services Committee
Mr. Brett O'Brien Defence and Foreign Policy Advisor to Senator Mitchell
Mrs. Eliane Bunn Principal Director for Forces Policy, Department of Defence
8th April 1994 
- 
l,ondon
Mr. Jonathan Eyal Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies
Mr. David Omand Deputy Undersecretary of State for Policy, Ministry of Defence
l3th April 1994 
- 
Paris
Mr. Alexandre Orlov Minister Counsellor, Embassy of Russia, Paris
MM. Jean-Charles Gaudillet Department of Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Defence
and Bruno Tertrais
Mr. Martin Barry Director Strategic Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
de Longchamps
28th-29th April 1994 
- 
Moscow
His Excellency Baron Belgian Ambassador to Moscow
Thierry de Gruben
Mr. Alexander Yereskovsky Minister Plenipotentiary, Senior Counsellor, Minisury for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Bachkirov Head Counsellor, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Mr. B. Kazantsev Minister Plenipotentiary, Assistant Director Department for Co-operation
in Europe, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Professor Sergei Karaganov Institute of Europe
Gen. Major Pavel Zolotarev Ministry of Defence
Mr. Zagladine Gorbachev Foundation
Mr. Sergei Oznobichev Institute of the United States of America and Canada
Mr. Alekseji Arbatov Institute for World Economy and International Relations of the Russian
Academy of Sciences
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Draft Recommendation
on the rdle andfuture of nuclear weapons
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming the large reductions in both the United States and Russian nuclear arsenals as a conse-
quence of the START I and START II treaties and the end of the cold war;
(ii) Conscious that START I and START II will not be fully implemented before the year 2003;
(iii) Noting that the United States is at present making a full reassessment of its nuclear posture and is
showing true political determination to prepare a new reduction in sffategic arsenals in the framework of
a future START III treaty;
(iv) Noting, however, that Russia, for its part, is increasingly tempted, mainly due to the decline of its
conventional forces, to make its strategic nuclear capability the centrepiece of its defence policy;
(v) Assessing present political instability in Russia and the former Soviet republics and the ensuing
dangers;
(vi) Noting that there are still doubts about whether Russia really wishes to ratify and implement the
START II treaty;
(vii) Noting that, notwithstanding the end of the cold war and the signing of the historic nuclear arms
reduction treaties, the mutual relationship of deterrence between Russia and the western nuclear powers is
still topical, including the possibility of first-use of nuclear weapons which is still the keystone of the doc-
trine of deterrence everywhere;
(viii) Noting that, notwithstanding recent efforts to establish confidence between the former cold war
adversaries at the level ofpolitical leaders and experts, there is still an astonishing lack ofreciprocal confi-
dence, wish for transparency and mutual understanding in many other circles;
(ix) Conscious that if greater account is not taken of lingering suspicions, prejudices and fundamental
differences in military doctrines and diverging interests in foreign policy, the establishment of new rela-
tionships of security, stability and confidence between the members of the Atlantic Alliance on the one
hand and of the Russian Federation on the other may be jeopardised;
(x) Hoping, in this respect, that Russia will agree to join the partnership for peace proposal proposed by
the Atlantic Alliance;
(xi) Welcoming the bilateral agreements reached between the United States and Russia and the United
Kingdom and Russia to detarget nuclear arms, even if the value of these agreements is symbolic rather
than inffinsic;
(xii) Believing that other measures, such as taking most strategic missiles off alert status and separating
nuclear warheads from their missiles should be envisaged;
(xiii) Expressing in general the wish that the theory of mutual assured destruction (MAD) should be
replaced by a policy of mutual assured co-operation (MAC);
(xiv) Noting that it would be totally illogical to start the implementation of a European common foreign
and security policy (CFSP) including the framing by WEU of a common defence policy " which might in
time lead to a common defence " without closely examining the r6le of the French and British nuclear
forces in the definition of a common defence policy of the European Union;
(n) Welcoming the work of the permanent Anglo-French Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and
Doctrine which among other things has confirmed that there are many points of convergence in the assess-
ments made by the two counffies;
(xvi) Aware that the existence of a formidable nuclear arsenal in Russia continues to determine the struc-
ture and deployment of tlre nuclear forces of France, the United Kingdom and the United States;
(ryii) Noting that, regarding proliferation, there are doubts about whether the possession of nuclear wea-
pons by the official nuclear weapon states plays a r6le in deterring third countries from procuring their
own nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction;
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(miii) Recognising that, particularly in the United States, the weight of nuclear deterrence as a means of
preventing war tends to diminish while extended nuclear deterrence is also losing credibility;
(xix) Noting that the 700 United States 8-61 nuclear gravity bombs remaining in Europe after NAIO's
October 1991 decision play a purely political and symbolic r6le;
(xx) Noting that, increasingly, nuclear deterrence in circumstances today is truly credible only if the vital
interests of a nation or group of nations are under direct threat from the power to be deterred;
(xxi) Noting that, in regard to the common security policy of the European Union and in the framework
of WEU, a study should be made on what France and the United Kingdom consider to be their vital inter-
ests which are protected by their nuclear means;
(xxii) Regretting that there is not sufficient cohesion in the defence policies of European countries and,
despite bold general declarations, there is not yet cohesion and understanding between our countries regar-
ding the development and future of their strategic relationship with Russia, although this would be indis-
pensable for introducing any lasting system of security in Europe;
(xxiii)Welcoming the granting of associate status to the Central European counffies of the Forum of
Consultation;
(xxiv) Emphasising, however, that WEU's policy of stronger security links with its Central European part-
ners will contribute little to Europe's security if it is not accompanied by frequent political and military
consultations with Russia and the other European republics of the CIS aiming at the establishment of a
strategic relationship based on a thorough understanding of, and respect for mutual interests;
(xru) Noting that it is of the greatest importance to intensify and further improve international co-opera-
tion in the struggle against proliferation, in particular by extending the non-proliferation treaty in 1995,
improving the missile technology control rdgime and establishing a follow-up organisation with extended
membership as a successor to Cocom;
(xmi) Aware that none of these existing or future non-proliferation r6gimes can guarantee that a country
with sufficient financial resources and zeal will not acquire ballistic missiles or weapons of mass destruc-
tion;
(xrvii)Noting that there is an urgent need for a coherent and co-ordinated policy among official nuclear
weapon states to cover contingencies in which a proliferant thfud country might threaten to use a nuclear
weapon;
(tcxviii) Recognising that there is a need to define a coherent European counter-proliferation policy,
drawing inspiration from the discussions which are already being held in the framework of the Atlantic
Alliance following the recent United States initiative;
(xxix) Recalling the results of the Assembly's Rome symposium on anti-missile defence for Europe (20th-
21st April 1993) and in particular the Assembly's recommendation that the Council decide on the basis of
a careful risk assessment whether and to what extent it will be necessary to mandate European industry to
conduct a feasibility study regarding the requirements for a cost-effective anti-missile protection system
for Europe;
(xxx) Taking note of the fact that the WEU Council, in its reply to Recommendation 540, has pointed out
that nuclear questions are not, at the present time, on its agenda;
(xxxl) Insisting, however, that the preceding considerations should be an incentive to redefine the r6le of
nuclear weapons for the security of Europe, realising that they cannot be disinvented and, if only for that
reason, they will continue to be deployed and will continue to play an important r6le in the foreseeable
future in international relations,
RecouuBNos rHAr rHE CouNCrL
1. Establish a strategic study group within WEU:
- 
to examine the rOle and future of nuclear weapons for European security including the different
aspects of intra-European extended nuclear deterrence;
- 
to examine the r6le all the WEU member states might play in defining a future European nuclear
strategy;
- 
then to study the possibility of creating a nuclear co-ordination body within WEU;
- 
to examine the military aspects of an active European counter-proliferation policy;
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- 
to examine the possibilities of Europe helping the CIS to dismantle its excess nuclear warheads
following the bilateral agreements and unilateral decisions reached between the United States
and the republics of the CIS which possess nuclear weapons;
2. Take steps to intensify relations with the European republics of the CIS, in particular Russia and
Ukraine, in particular to ensure that the definition of a European defence identity does not arouse new sus-
picion or prbvoke reactions which might run counter to the final goal of creating a collective European
security order;
3. Ensure that the abovementioned initiatives are pursued in an atmosphere of absolute transparency
with Western Europe's North American allies in order to make certain that they support the development
of a European security and defence identity.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submined by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
1. The cold war that arose from the confronta-
tion between hostile ideologies and the conse-
quent formation of two opposing power blocs
drew the world into a massive arms race. Rivalry
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the
nuclear sector led to mindless escalation with each
bloc having the ability to annihilate its potential
adversary many times over. Deterrence was based
on a balance of United States and Soviet forces
and the theory of mutual assured destruction
(aptly abbreviated in English to MAD).
2. In a context of such lunacy where each side
sought to terrorise the other, the United States and
the Soviet Union had each at one point over
30 000 nuclear warheads, with a total energy yield
at their highest levels of 30 000 megatons, the
equivalent of 2.5 million Hiroshima bombs!
3. Formnately, with the ending of the cold war
and the tearing down of the iron curtain, signature
of the INF, START I and START II treaties has
become possible, together with numerous unilateral
reductions in nuclear arsenals. These, ifratified and
implemented in good faith, could reduce stockpiles
to more reasonable proportions and open the way
for negotiation of further disarmament treaties. Or
is this perhaps too much to hope for?
4. Will the political evolution of Russia 
- 
in
the throes of political and social instability that
constantly threaten to erupt in violence 
- 
allow the
present disarmament process to continue? The
answer to this essential question will in any event
determine the attitude of all the other official
nuclear powers.
5. The present massive disarmament raises the
acutely sensitive issue of storage of nuclear
warheads and reprocessing of fissile material.
Should management of this issue not be the major
priority for the world at large and Europe in parti
cular?
6. The reduction of the arsenals of the official
nuclear powers does not however settle the diffrcult
issue of nuclear proliferation in other regions of the
world, often close to Europe. [s our current policy of
non- or counter-proliferation really effective?
7. It is in this context, characterised at one and
the same time by major hopes and risks that the
European Union has decided to develop a com-
mon foreign and security policy (CFSP) involving
definition in the longer term of a common defence
policy " which might in time lead to a common
defence ". Is definition of a European defence
identity possible without the European Union
defining a future European nuclear deterrence
strategy?
8. The present report, which does not claim to
be exhaustive, describes the recent evolution of
nuclear armaments policy and in particular the
extent to which European security is affected by
it. It goes without saying that the major players in
this area are the United States and Russia. The
present report makes no reference to the nuclear
forces and doctrine of China insofar as, for the
time being, they do not seem to influence Euro-
pean security other than through their possible
impact on Russian nuclear policy. Your Rappor-
teur wishes to thank the Belgian Ambassadors to
Washington and Moscow, His Excellency Juan
Cassiers and His Excellency Baron Thierry de
Gruben and their colleagues for kindly helping to
organise meetings in the two capitals.
9. The present report will draw some conclu-
sions and make certain recommendations.
10. Your Rapporteur does not claim to have a
definitive answer to these particularly complex
and sensitive problems. He is however convinced
that European governments, the European institu-
tions and WEU in particular cannot continue to
ignore the profound changes that have taken place
in nuclear deterrence and that it is incumbent
upon these institutions to have the courage to
delelop an active European policy to combat pro-
liferation and a policy for processing the very
large numbers of warheads now present on the
continent of Europe and western Asia. Your
Rapporteur is convinced that the European Union
and its military arm, WEIJ, must initiate discus-
sion on the definition of future European nuclear
deterrence, in the framework of the development
of the common foreign and security pblicy(cFSP).
II. The evolution of the United Stntes
and NATO's nuclear strategy
ll. After using its first nuclear bomb in Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki in 1945, the United States
took a long time in developing a strategic theory
related to nuclear weapons '. Initially, the admi-
l. M.t, ."*.* for this chapter have been: Lawrence Freed-
man, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Second Edition,
London 1989; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Contain-
ment, New York 1982.
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nistration was reluctant to make the bomb a cen-
trepiece of United States strategy because of the
unwillingness to see it as "just another weapon,
ready for use ". Rather, it considered the nuclear
bomb as a weapon of " last resort ".
12. Only when the Berlin crisis began in mid-
1948, did the National Security Council start dis-
cussing the advisability of formulating policies on
the use of nuclear weapons.
13. In any case, from the beginning, there was
certainly no taboo on the possible use of the bomb
and terror-bombing of cities was indeed consi-
dered the most appropriate use.
14. After the conclusion of the North Atlantic
Treaty in 1949, NATO first adopted a forward
strategy aimed at holding any Soviet offensive as
close to the original lines as possible. It was
thought that United States nuclear forces would
do little more than neutralise those of the other
side and that in a war the advantage would have to
be won with conventional arms.
15. In September 1950, President Truman
approved a document presented by the National
Security Council (NSC-68), on the objectives and
strategic plans of the United States, keeping
account of a Soviet nuclear capability. This docu-
ment concluded that until conventional forces had
been built up, the United States had no choice but
to rely on its nuclear arsenal. A policy of no-first-
use was rejected because that " would be interpre-
ted by the USSR as an admission of great weak-
ness and by our allies as a clear indication that we
intended to abandon them ".
16. In December of that same year, Under-
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, emphasised
that " the principal antagonist of the United States
was the Soviet Union " hence the consequent
necessity of defending Great Britain, Western
Europe and the Mediterranean for " if we did not
hold these parts of the world, we were likely to
have no platform from which to operate if we had
to against the Soviet Union and we would turn
great potential strength to the other side ".
17. It should be mentioned here that in the early
1950s, investigations were made into tactical
nuclear weapons with which it was claimed,
" battle could be brought back to the battlefield ".
Such weapons, however, were seen as supple-
ments rather than alternatives to strategic bom-
bing.
18. The Eisenhower administration, in January
1954, outlined the doctrine of " massive retalia-
tion ", which meant that the United States was to
" depend primarily upon a great capacity to reta-
liate, instantly, by means and at places of our own
choosing ". When this was wrongly assumed to be
an " undiscriminating threat to respond to any
communist-inspired aggression anywhere, how-
ever marginal the confrontation, by means of a
massive nuclear strike against the centres of the
Soviet Union and China ", the Secretary of State,
John Foster Dulles, repudiated the notion that the
United States " intended to rely wholly on large-
scale strategic bombing as the sole means to deter
and counter aggression ". It was only one of a
wide variety of means available for responding to
aggression. It should not be stated in advance pre-
cisely what would be the scope of military action
if new aggression occurred, a posture which later
became known as " brinkmanship ".
19. The principle on which this doctrine was
based was deterrence, meaning that the behaviour
of a potential enemy could be manipulated
through threats.
20. By this time, the United States had a vast
range of nuclear weapons at its disposal, from
strategic to tactical battlefield weapons. President
Eisenhower even declared in a press conference in
March 1955: " Where these things are used on
strictly military targets and for strictly military
purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn't be
used just exactly as you would use a bullet or any-
thing else. "
21. Earlier in a National Security Council
Paper (NSC -16212) on basic security policy, it had
been clearly been stated that: " In the event of
hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear
weapons to be as available for use as other muni-
tions. " Field Marshall Montgomery then Deputy
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (DSA-
CEUR), explained in late 1954: " I want to make
it absolutely clear that we at SHAPE are basing all
our planning on using atomic and thermonuclear
weapons in our defence. With us it is no longer:
'They may possibly be used.' It is very definite-
ly: ' They will be used, if we are attacked '. "
22. In practice, the war in Indo-China showed
that the United States did not decide easily on the
actual use of nuclear weapons.
23. Also, it was increasingly suggested that the
doctrine of massive retaliation was not always
credible and that it might lead to a choice between
" holocaust or humiliation " which did not really
seem to be realistic. Gradually, the notion was
sinking in that for a strategy of deterrence to be
credible, the means of deterrence should be pro-
portionate to the objectives at stake. At the same
time, the possibility of limited war in " grey "
areas (disputed territories between East and West)
had to be considered, since clearly the United
States no longer had a nuclear monopoly and
because nuclear parity with the Soviet Union
where it would no longer be possible to impose
unconditional surrender, at an acceptable cost,
was coming into sight.
24. As regards the employment of what were
called tactical nuclear weapons, it became clear
that they could not be used in such a discrimina-
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ting manner as to spare civilians. This meant that,
as a defensive weapon, they could only be used
early in a conflict before the invading forces had
captured much territory. Grave doubts were soon
cast on the notion that they could be considered to
be virtually tactical.
25. It was realised that the use of tactical
nuclear weapons would always be a strategic
decision to be taken at the highest level and if not
" weapons of last resort " they would be of
" penultimate resort ". Considerable efforts were
also made in order to establish convincing demar-
cation lines between tactical and strategic use of
nuclear weapons.
26. At the end of the 1950s, however, most
strategists understood that the idea of a limited
war with the use of tactical nuclear weapons was
virtually a contradiction in terms. The armed ser-
vices were not able to develop a coherent doctrine
for tactical nuclear weapons and also within
NATO there were disagreements over the use of
these weapons.
27 . In fact, the development and deployment of
tactical nuclear weapons was encouraged before
an appropriate doctrine had been evolved. NATO
could not ignore them once the Warsaw Pact had
acquired such weapons, but the contingencies in
which the West should initiate their use remained
unclear. It can be noted now that the final conse-
quences of the early arguments over the use of
tactical nuclear weapons were drawn only in the
1990s.
28. As Soviet nuclear power steadily grew
towards a level equal to that of the United States,
creating a balance of terror, calls for a preventive
war were heard but were immediately dismissed.
On the other hand, the possibility of a pre-emptive
war, of being the first to strike if there were posi-
tive evidence that an attack was being mounted
against the United States, was more seriously dis-
cussed, but it was never officially adopted as a
potential strategy.
29. In 1955, the United States Air Force Asso-
ciation argued that massive retaliation as a deter-
rent to war was steadily becoming obsolete. It
stated that there could be no practical retaliation
after an all-out surprise attack with thermonuclear
weapons which would destroy military bases
simultaneously with centres of industry and popu-
lation.
30. At an early stage (H. Kahn, 1960), it was
also suggested that credibility depended on being
willing to accept the other side's retaliatory blow.
31. Meanwhile, the Rand Corporation had
made it clear that air force bases were far more
vulnerable to a surprise enemy attack than had
previously been thought. They also introduced the
concept of first-strike force (the opening volley of
a nuclear war, directed against the nuclear capabi
lity of the enemy with the intention of crippling
his means of retaliation) and second strike force
(capable of ensuring effective retaliation even
after absorbing an enemy's first strike).
32. By 1956, the United States administration
had begun to come to terms with the balance of
terror and in August of that same year, a doctrine
of " sufficiency " was developed, which meant
that a force was required to perform the essential
retaliatory mission. War was called an " unthink-
able catastrophe " from which neither side could
hope to escape by a margin of superiority in deli-
very systems.
33. The launch of the first anificial earth satel-
lite, Sputnik I, by the Soviet Union in October
1957, a clear demonstration of Soviet long-range
missile capability, caused a defence crisis in the
United States because of the perceived " missile
gap ". The Gaither Committee, immediately estab-
lished to submit a study on defence and deter-
rence, advised: accelerate the production ofinter-
continental and submarine-launched ballistic mis-
siles; station intermediate-range ballistic missiles
in Europe; disperse air-bases; improve warning
systems; harden missile launch sites and construct
fallout shelters capable of safeguarding the entire
population of the United States should an attack
occur.
34. President Eisenhower and State Secretary
Dulles agreed to some of the abovementioned
recommendations but they rejected the recommen-
dation to build fallout shelters for the American
population because it suggested a reversion to the
" fortress America " concept, whereby the United
States would " write off (its) friends in Europe ".
35. In the late 1950s, strategists and military in
both the United States and the Soviet Union were
advocating the development of a capacity of pre-
emptive attacks. This would require the build-up
of large counter-force capabilities with an instant
readiness to fire, which in itself could provide an
incentive to pre-empt.
36. It was thought that missiles, whether inter-
mediate or long-range, should not displace bom-
bers. Many advantages were attributed to bom-
bers: not only could they carry a greater and more
differentiated payload, delivered with higher
accuracy, they were also far more flexible and
versatile. They could be put on alert and sent on a
mission, signalling resolve, and still be recalled
while on their way to the target, something which
could not be done with missiles once the button
had been pressed. On the otherhand, it was admit-
ted that bombers could not achieve surprise and
that they were vulnerable to air defences.
37. With the building of a large arsenal of mis-
siles by both the United States and the Soviet
Union, it was also realised that they caused pro-
found changes in the strategy of deterrence.
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38. In the 1960s, the United States and the
Soviet Union had reached a position where an
attack by either side would have resulted in
mutual destruction, a surprise attack no longer
producing dividends since each country had the
residual offensive power to break through the
defences of the other and to destroy it, regardless
of whether the other country did strike first. This
state of mutual assured destruction was conside-
red reassuringly stable.
39. Missiles, it was said, were not very good at
fighting each other, being too well-hidden and
protected to be caught on the ground and too fast
to be caught in the air. They were supposed to
create a state of stable deterrence, which would
work through the primitive threat of irresistible
harm to the enemy's social and economic sffuc-
ture rather than through the prospect of victory in
combat. Retaliation would be measured, not to
win, but to prove to the attacker that his losses are
likely to be incredibly large. It was hoped that
through acting in this way war would be stopped
before both sides were irreparably destroyed.
40. The strategy of massive retaliation, as it
had developed during the 1950s, provoked ever
more criticism when it became apparent that the
only retaliation available to the United States was
often so disproportionate to the immediate provo-
cation that its use risked unwanted escalation or
too serious political costs.
41. On coming to power, therefore, the Kennedy
administration accorded top priority to decreasing
reliance on nuclear weapons to deter limited
aggression, or, as was stated in a State Department
analysis in February 196l: " We attach the great-
est importance to raising the threshold beyond
which the President might have to decide to initi-
ate the use of nuclear weapons. "
42. [n a crisis or conflict, the administration
also wanted to preserve for as long as possible a
wide range of options, so that when a choice had
to be made, it could be tuned to the circumstances
of the moment. It should be mentioned that at this
juncture of reappraisal Western Europeans were
most concerned about nuclear options. They were
anxious about any sign of a waning United States
commitment to use nuclear weapons in the
defence of Europe.
43. The fust result of the reappraisal came in
1962, when Defence Secretary, McNamara,
announced that " principal military objectives in
the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major
attack on the alliance should be the destruction of
the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian
population ". Such behaviour was meant to pro-
vide a possible opponent with a strong incentive
to refrain from striking cities. McNamara thought
that this could keep nuclear exchanges limited and
controlled.
M. However, when it became clear that the
Soviet Union interpreted the " no-cities " and
" counter-force " option as the planning of a
United States first-strike capability, while the Uni-
ted States Air Force associated it with the capacity
to fight and win a nuclear war, McNamara Era-
dually played down this initiative.
45. Kennedy may seriously have considered a
no-first-use declaration, believing that a build-up
of conventional weapons might release NATO
from dependence on nuclear weapons. In the end,
this idea was given up because the allies did not
want to place any restrictions on what they saw as
their most effective military asset and because, in
a possible conflict, the western position in Berlin
could notbe maintained with conventional forces.
46. ln 1964 McNamara introduced the expres-
sion " assured destruction " to emphasise the
disastrous effects of a general nuclear war. The
strategy of assured destruction was intended to
deter a deliberate nuclear attack upon the United
States or its allies by maintaining at all times a
clear and unmistakable ability to inflict an unac-
ceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor, or
combination of aggressors, even after absorbing a
surprise frst strike.
47. At the same time, McNamara was not
bothered by the fact that the Soviet Union would
also attain an assured destruction capability and
he even refused to hinder this situation happen-
ing. He was aware that the consequence would
be mutual assured destruction (MAD), a situa-
tion earlier designated as a stable balance of
terror.
48. Meanwhile, in the United States, there was
growing irritation over the concept of mutual
assured destruction, in particular since it was dis-
couraging the development of operational nuclear
options which might be an alternative to an all-out
nuclear attack. There was a growing tendency to
make the United States deterrent more credible by
making it possible to fight a nuclear war in a non-
suicidal manner. It was thought therefore that a
greater capability had to be developed to use
nuclear forces in a rational and less apocalyptic
fashion.
49. Responding to the new strategic thinking in
the United States, and to strong criticism in Eur-
ope against the doctrine of massive retaliation
which was no longer considered credible, NATO,
at its December 1967 ministerial meeting, adop-
ted the strategy of flexible response which, accor-
ding to the official communiqu6, was " based
upon a flexible and balanced range of appropriate
responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels
of aggression or threats of aggression. These res-
ponses, subject to appropriate political control,
are designed, first to deter aggression and thus
preserve peace; but, should aggression unhappily
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occur, to maintain the security of the North Atlan-
tic Treaty area within the concept of forward
defence. "
50. It should be noted, however, that the inten-
ded significant enlargement of NATO's conven-
tional capabilities which was an integral pan of
the concept of flexible response was never really
implemented on a large scale, sufficient to make
the concept effective.
51. ln 1974, the on-going search for alternative
options resulted in the " Schlesinger doctrine ",
the cenffal objective of which was to have a very
wide range of options for the hypothetical
employment of central strategic forces with a bias
on the development of smaller strikes which were
to be counter-force rather than counter-city in
character. The objective was to limit the chances
of uncontrolled escalation and hit meaningful tar-
gets with a suffrcient accuracy-yield combination
to destroy only the intended target and to avoid
widespread collateral damage.
52. Stimulated by events in the Yom Kippur
war of October 1973, there was a growing convic-
tion that new technologies for conventional wea-
pons could raise the nuclear threshold (diminish
the threat of recourse to nuclear weapons).
53. During the sixties, even in Europe, there
had been growing doubts that the short-range so-
called tactical nuclear weapons, while forging a
welcome direct link between the defence of Wes-
tern Europe and the United States nuclear forces,
could be put to any good use in an actual conflict.
Their yield was disproportionate in relation to
their task and it was realised that their employ-
ment would lead to extensive collateral damage in
the territory to be defended.
54. Efforts to modernise these weapons and
make them more usable, led to the acrimonious
" neuffon bomb " debate, which remained unresol-
ved (1976-77). Even during the debate on theatre
nuclear forces, there was a determined will within
the alliance to reduce the total number of nuclear
warheads at its disposal to the lowest possible level
still consistent with the maintenance of credible
deterrence. At Montebello, NAIO ministers deci-
ded to withdraw 1 400 warheads from the Euro-
pean theatre during the coming years, which would
bring to 2 400 the total number of warheads remo-
ved from Europe since 1979. The Soviet focus on
development of intermediate-range systems which
could be employed against rear dchelons and cities
in the European theatre led to NAIO'S December
1979 decision to deploy 572Unted States interme-
diate-range ballistic and cruise missiles on Euro-
pean soil. As an integral part of the modernisation
decision, ministers also decided that 1 000 United
States nuclear warheads were to be withdrawn
from Europe as soon as possible. Even if Euro-
peans were aware that such European-based sys-
tems, which could strategically threaten the
Soviet Union, might weaken the link between
European security and the United States sffategic
forces, they had asked for it themselves to make
up for the growing NATO/TVarsaw Pact asymme-
tries in this field.
55. At the same time, however, it was decided
to seek arms conffol negotiations with the Soviet
Union involving theatre nuclear forces (TNF) in
order to achieve a more stable overall nuclear
balance at lower levels of armaments and to
advance d6tente.
56. After years of discussions and negotiations,
the United States and the Soviet Union signed the
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) reaty in
December 1987. This treaty involved the removal
of 470long-range INF missiles (SS-20s and SS-
4s) and 387 short-range INF missiles (SS-12-22s
and SS-23s) deployed by the Soviet Union, as
well as 429 United States Pershing IIs and
ground-launched cruise missiles. It was the first
disarmament agreement ever to reduce, rather
than just limit, nuclear weapons.
57. The conclusion of the START I (20th July
1991) and START II (January 1993) treaties is
dealt with elsewhere in this report.
58. At the NATO summit meeting in London in
July 1990, it was concluded that " the alliance
must maintain for the foreseeable future an appro-
priate mix of nuclear and conventional forces
based in Europe ". Negotiations on short-range
nuclear forces were expected to start soon.
59. It was also stated that the allies would reduce
their reliance on nuclear weapons. Finally, it was
said that nuclear weapons would " continue to ful-
fil an essential r6le in the overall strategy of the
alliance to prevent war by ensuring that there are no
circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in res-
ponse to military action might be discounted ". It
was added : " However, in the transformed Europe,
they will be able to adopt a new NATO strategy
making nuclear forces truly weapons of last reson ".
60. President Bush then took a number of uni-
lateral initiatives on nuclear arms reductions in
September 1991, while asking the Soviet Union to
act in the same way. He announced that the United
States would withdraw all its nuclear artillery
shells and all nuclear warheads for its short-range
ballistic missiles to the United States. These and
any similar warheads currently stored in the Uni-
ted States would be dismantled and destroyed.
61. Furthermore, the United States would
remove all tactical nuclear weapons, including
nuclear cruise missiles, from its surface ships and
attack submarines. It would also remove nuclear
weapons associated with land-based naval air-
craft. Many of these weapons would be dismant-
led and destroyed with the remainder being placed
in secure central storage areas.
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62. All strategic bombers would be removed
from day-to-day alert status and their weapons
returned to storage areas.
63. He also announced that development of the
Peacekeeper ICBM rail garrison system and the
mobile elements of the small ICBM prograrnme
had been terminated and that the small single
warhead ICBM would be the sole remaining Uni-
ted States ICBM modernisation progriunme.
&. The United States would immediately
stand down from alert all United States ICBMs
scheduled for deactivation under START. After
ratification of STAM, it would accelerate their
elimination.
65. Significantly, the hesident also proposed
discussions with the Soviet Union to explore co-
operation on nuclear command and control,
warhead security and safety, and safe and envi-
ronmentally responsible storage, transportation,
dismantling and destruction.
66. It is quite clear from all this, and especially
from the last proposals to the Soviet Union, that
there had been a shift in United States thinking
from deterrent strategies towards eliminating
and controlling as many nuclear weapons as
possible.
67. Following these proposals, NATO minis-
ters, meeting in Taormina in October 1991, asses-
sed that there was no longer any requirement for
nuclear ground-launched, short-range ballistic
missiles and artillery. They stated that " In addi-
tion to the elimination of ground-launched
nuclear systems, the number of air-delivered
weapons in NATO's European stockpile will be
greatly reduced. The total reduction in the current
NATO stockpile of sub-strategic weapons in
Europe will be roughly 8OVo."
68. Furthermore, it was said that " since
conventional forces alone could not ensure war
prevention they would continue to base effective
and up-to-date sub-strategic nuclear forces in
Europe, but these would consist solely of dual-
capable aircraft, with continued widespread parti-
cipation in nuclear r6les and peacetime basing by
allies. " Finally, almost out of an old habit, it was
stressed that " sub-strategic nuclear forces com-
mitted to NAIO continue to provide the neces-
sary political and military link to NATO's sftate-
gic nuclear forces and an important demonstration
of alliance solidarity. "
69. At the following summit meeting in Rome
in November 1991, the new sffategic concept of
NATO was adopted and again it was stressed as
usual that " the supreme guarantee of the security
of the allies is provided by the strategic nuclear
forces of the alliance, particularly those of the
United States. " Specific mention was made of
" the independent nuclear forces of the United
Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent r6le
of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence
and security of the allies ".
70. Then it was stated that through many recent
and radical changes in Europe's security situation
" NATO's ability to defuse a crisis through diplo-
matic and other means or, should it be necessary,
to mount a successful conventional defence
would significantly improve ".
7I. After this, there followed a sentence which
was agreed to only after some discussion, but
which in the end was swallowed by all the Euro-
pean allies: " The circumstances in which any use
of nuclear weapons might have to be contempla-
ted by them are therefore even more remote. " It
had been a long road from massive retaliation to
the new strategic concept.
III. The decision-making process in NATO
72. Since any use of nuclear weapons in the
framework of NATO's defence arrangements
might have serious consequences for all allies,
many of its non-nuclear member states have atta-
ched great importance to obtaining influence over
the decision-making process or being involved in
confrol over the alliance's joint nuclear forces.
73. Such wishes were met in different ways.
- 
From the late 1950s, Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey
and the United Kingdom have owned
nuclear-capable systems which in times
of war could f,eliver United States
nuclear devices.- It was stipulated, how-
ever, that both in peacetime and in war,
the United States retained control of
these nuclear weapons, including the
veto power over their use. All other Uni-
ted States nuclear weapons, even if assi-
gned to NAIO's SACEUR where their
use could be requested by both the Uni-
ted States and its NATO allies, also
remained under the United States deci-
sion-making authority.
- 
ln1962, the " Athens guidelines " stated
that the United States allies would be
consulted before a decision to resort to
the use of nuclear weapons " time and
circumstances permitting ".
- 
ln 1967, the Nuclear Planning Group
was established, in order to allow for
advance consultation of the principles on
which the use of nuclear weapons would
be decided.
- 
In the framework of semi-annual
WINTDVCIMEX exercises, crisis con-
2. France renounced these arrangements when it left
NATO's integrated military structure in 1966.
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sultation procedures were rehearsed with
participation of high level government
officials and ministers.
IV. The United States
(a) Uniled States nuclearforces
74. The annual report of the Secretary of
Defence submitted to the President and the
Congress in January 1994, provides the most
recent official overall statement on the defence
policy of the United States.
75. The report states that improving relations
with Russia has made the threat of a massive
nuclear attack on the United States less likely than
it was in the past. It adds, however, that even
under START II, Russia will retain a sizable
nuclear arsenal and that the future political situa-
tion in the country remains highly uncertain. The
two basic requirements to guide planning for Uni-
ted States strategic nuclear forces are said to be:
- 
the need to provide an effective deterrent
while remaining within the limits of
START I and II;
- 
the need to allow for additional forces to
be reconstituted in the event of a reversal
of the currently positive trends.
76. Pending the result of the current nuclear
posture review and START II ratification and
implementation, it is expected that by the year
2003 the United States strategic arsenal will
include at most:
- 
18 Trident submarines equipped with
C-4 and D-5 missiles;
- 
500 Minuteman Itr missiles, each carry-
ing a single warhead;
- 
48 B-52 H bombers equipped with air-
launched cruise missiles (ALCM-Bs and
advanced cruise missiles);
- 
20 B-2 stealth bombers carrying gravity
bombs.
77. With the enbry into force of START I and
II, all Minuteman III missiles will be downloaded
to a single warhead. Implementing START II, the
Peacekeeper system will be retired by the year
2003 or earlier, with the option to transfer its
Mark 21 highly-safe warhead to the Minuteman
ilI. With no new intercontinental ballistic missiles
under development, the Department of Defence is
exploring new ways of preserving key industrial
technologies.
78. The remaining seven pre-Ohio class
nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs) will be phased out of the sfrategic force
in 1994-95. After 1997, the 18 Ohio-class SSBNs
will then form the bulk of the United States
nuclear deterrent for the indefinite future. A deci-
sion to retrofit the Ohio-class SSBNs, already
commissioned and currently carrying the C-4
missile, with the more modern C-5 missile will be
made in 1995.
79. Presently, the United States long-range
bomber force includes 84 B-lBs and 64 B-52Hs.
The first B-2 stealth bomber was delivered in
December 1993. It has been decided that the B-1B
bomber will soon be reoriented to a purely
conventional r61e.
80. As regards the inventory of nuclear bomber
weapons, it has been decided to retire the short-
range attack missile (SRAM-A), while the pro-
curement objectives for the advanced cruise mis-
sile (ACM) have been scaled back from I 460
to 460. Some ALCM-Bs have been converted
to conventional cruise missiles while others,
together with some gravity bombs, have been
retired or placed in storage.
81. The Defence Secretary, William Perry, sta-
ted recently that the United States would maintain
the nuclear triad (land-based, sea-launched and
air-launched missiles) as long as elements from
all three forces remained active. On the other
hand, he saw no basis for expanding new funds to
build new systems. The fact that there are no pro-
curement funds for land-based ICBMs would, in
his view, eventually lead to their obsolescence
and to a situation where the United States nuclear
forces would consist only of sea-launched ballis-
tic missiles and bombers.
82. Atpresent, funds are available forthe safety-
related modernisation of the ICBMs, upgrading
them to make sure they are viable until the year
2020.The Defence Secretary argued that the new
generation of SLBMs would have an accuracy
very close to those of ICBMs, which might add
another reason for not maintaining the ICBMs.
He added that the principal argument for main-
taining a strong bomber force was the dual purpose
of bombers, which have both conventional and
strategic capabilities. The principal determining
factor on the size of the bomber force would be
the extent to which they could be used to support
conventional warfare purposes 3.
(b) United States nuclear puture review
83. In October 1993, the Defence Secretary,
Les Aspin, initiated a nuclear posture review, the
frst major overhaul of the United States nuclear
doctrine and policy for more than a decade, which
should lead to a presidential decision before the
end of 1994. Atthe same time, the National Secu-
rity Council under Presidential Review Directive
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34, has started to prepare a decision on the total
level of nuclear armaments that should be aimed
at in a new round of arms negotiations with other
nuclear powers. It will also examine the question
whether nuclear material removed from retired
weapons should be stored or desfroyed.
84. At present, nuclear weapons planning and
operations of the United States are formally
governed by National Security Decision Directive
13, signed by President Reagan in 1981, while the
nuclear arsenal has been reduced by more than
half since that year.
85. Work has been divided into six main areas
of interest, each of which is being studied and dis-
cussed in a specific working group.
- 
Working Group I 
- 
Rble of nuclear wea-
pons in United States security. This work-
ing group is dealing with fundamental
questions such as the purpose of nuclear
weapons, the strategy of deterrence and
the closely-related targeting of objec-
tives, and also questions connected with
possible no-first-use. Although Russia is
still considered to be the main determi-
ning factor, pariah states will also be
taken seriously into consideration.
- 
Working Group II 
- 
Force structure and
infrastructure. Among other things, this
working group is discussing the force
sizing rationale, the need for maintaining
the existing triad, the mix of strategic
and theatre forces and the relationship
between nuclear and conventional
forces. Another important issue here is
the conditions requiring a national mis-
sile defence.
- 
Working Group III 
- 
Force operations,is
going into the type and structure of res-
ponse options, operating practices and
command and control requirements. It
also investigates better control of hair
figger situations.
- 
Working Group N 
- 
Safety and Security,
is concerned with, among other things,
improvements to reduce the risk of acci-
dental or unauthorised use, physical
security improvements and the potential
for safety improvements after the
coming into force of a comprehensive
test ban treaty. Technology-sharing with
other nations is also considered an
important issue.
Working Group V 
- 
Alternative United
States nuclear postures and counter-pro-
liferation policy, is discussing the pos-
sible further integration and implementa-
tion of the earlier counter-proliferation
initiative in United States nuclear policy.
- 
Working Group VI 
- 
Alternative United
States nuclear postures and threat reduc-
tion policy, is discussing present and
future options for formal agreements,
possible reciprocal unilateral steps and
alternatives in case START I and START
II are not fully implemented. It is also
looking at the potential for mutual rein-
forcement between force posture and
threat reduction policy towards the for-
mer Soviet Union.
86. Officials involved in the nuclear posture
review are well aware of possible consequences
for the structure of NATO, which is one reason
why, in that framework, high-level group meet-
ings have been planned to ensure allied input.
They have also been eager to declare that commit-
ments towards the allies will not change and that
any possible changes in United States nuclear
posture will be evolutionary rather than revolu-
tionary.
87. Department of Defence officials have
emphasised that in the current discussions on the
nuclear posture review, no suggestion has been
made to eliminate the approximately 700 United
States tactical bombs that remain deployed with
United States and allied forces in Belgium, Ger-
many,Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and the Uni
ted Kingdom.
88. Although the issue of nuclear weapons
attracts little attention in the present public political
debate in the United States, a lively discussion is
taking place among defence specialists. Critics of
the present administration point out that in the
nuclear posture review, the Clinton administration
should in any case try to avoid implementing unila-
terally-declared cuts in United States nuclear forces
more rapidly than the Russians, or than it is obliged
to do according to its own fteaty obligations.
89. Second, doctrinal shifts should be avoided,
since they could do ireversible damage to the cre-
dibility of United States forces. In this framework,
a no-first-use declaration and abandonment of the
extended deterrence would be very undesirable
further stages which would result in making the
United States commitment to security in Europe
less credible.
90. Third, decisions to make further cuts in
essential elements of the nuclear forces and a fai-
lure to maintain the full nuclear infrastructure
could easily lead to an irreversible erosion of the
nuclear capability. A number of single warhead
ICBMs based on United States territory should
be maintained in any configuration of future
United States nuclear forces. Not only are they
less costly than SLBMs and highly accurate, but
since they are potential targets for an adversary,
they would enhance the credibility of extended
deterrence.
181
DOCUMENT 1420
9I. Apparently, no final conclusion can be
drawn from the debate whether nuclear weapons
have a deterrent r6le in regional conflicts where
proliferant nations possessing nuclear weapons or
other weapons of mass destruction are involved.
92. Some strategists suggest that during the
Gulf war, the presence in the Persian Gulf of air-
craft-carriers with nuclear weapons on board may
well have deterred Iraq from using weapons of
mass destruction.
93. Others say that the possible threat of the use
of nuclear weapons was not a significant factor in
the course of the war due to the presence of an
extremely real threat of the use of conventional
precision weapons with suffrciently devastating
effects, as events have shown.
94. It has also been argued that the possession
of an overwhelming arsenal of nuclear weapons
by the superpowers is not enough to deter other
smaller states from developing nuclear weapons
or other weapons of mass desffuction.
95. Although many political strategists enume-
rate the many advantages for the United States of
having a vast nuclear arsenal at its disposal, others
suggest that the United states military, confronted
with the necessity of making a choice in view of
important budget cuts, would prefer to have
conventional precision weapons rather than a
large arsenal of nuclear weapons which could
only be used, if at all, in extreme circumstances
and certainly not in the more likely contingencies
of the post-cold war world.
(c ) The c o unter-proliferation initiativ e
96. The United States considers nuclear proli-
feration as one of the most urgent and direct
threats to its own security and its interests abroad,
a perception which was confirmed once again in
the September 1993 bottom-up review of the
Department of Defence. In the government's opi-
nion, the risks of proliferation have greatly
increased with the break-up of the former Soviet
Union.
97. In the former Soviet Union, nuclear
weapons were deployed on the territory of four
different states which were going through a period
of profound political and economic transition.
lndeed, nuclear disarmament agreements have
been concluded, but there is a risk that nuclear
weapons, material or technology may find their
way to a black market or that expertise in the field
of nuclear weapons would come into the hands of
would-be proliferators. It is also observed that any
possible influence which the former Soviet Union
has exercised over its former client states has
diminished.
98. Another important factor increasing
non-proliferation risks is the large-scale diffusion
of modern technology through an increased
volume of world trade.
99. Considering that a policy of non-prolifera-
tion, where prevention is the leading objective,
would not be enough, former Defence Secretary,
Les Aspin, on 7th December 1993, presented a
counter-proliferation initiative aimed at protec-
tion.
100. With prevention on the one hand and pro-
tection on the other as the two fundamental goals,
the initiative intends:
- 
to strengthen the Departrnent of Defence's
conffibution to the government's efforts
to prevent the acquisition of weapons of
mass destruction or reverse it diplomati-
cally where it has occurred. In particular,
it contributes to these efforts through
marshalling its technical, military and
intelligence experience to improve
such activities as arms control com-
pliance, export controls, inspection and
monitoring;
- 
to protect United States interests and
forces and those of its allies from the
effects of weapons of mass destnrction in
the hands of hostile forces through assu-
ring that equipment, docnine and intelli-
gence are available to confront an oppo-
nent in possession of such mass destruc-
tion weapons.
101. An essential element of this initiative is the
procurement of new weapons systems and mili-
tary equipment. Among these are improved non-
nuclear penetrating munitions to destroy under-
ground installations, better systems to hunt
mobile missile systems and the development of an
improved theatre ballistic missile defence system
without undermining the ABM Treaty. A military
planning process is being developed for dealing
with adversaries who have weapons of mass des-
ffuction.
lO2. Efforts are being made to improve, in
particular, the military counter-proliferation intel-
ligence in the development of nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction.
(d) The Uni*d States nuclear posture 
-
can an! conclusians be dmwntor thefunre?
103. The current debate in the United States on
the rdle and utility of its nuclear weapons is rather
confusing for any European trying to relate it to
Europe's security. Many different proposals are
being made, ranging from the suggestion to deve-
lop " smart ", low-yield nuclear weapons which
could be used in third-world contingencies, espe-
cially when the third-world possessors of
weapons of mass destruction are involved in the
proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons from the
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United States arsenal because they will never be
used anyway.
104. Both political and military strategists are
stressing the importance of nuclear weapons
because of their deterrent r6le. On the other hand,
it seems that the military are reluctant to attach
too much importance to nuclear weapons because
of their rapidly-diminishing r6le in the new inter-
national environment.
105. For the time being, ttre United States will
certainly retain a riad of nuclear weapons suffi-
cient to provide a secure retaliatory capability to
deter the use of nuclear weapons by " hostile and
irresponsible countries ". It is also ffue that after
the implementation of START II at the beginning
of the next century, the United States will still
have a formidable arsenal of around 3 000 nuclear
warheads.
106. On the other hand, the paradoxical cha-
racter of nuclear weapons has increased. The sud-
den elevation of third world countries to the status
of ruthless enemies on a par with the Soviet Union
during the cold war is becoming a principal ratio-
nale for retaining a United States nuclear deter-
rent. Former Defence Secretary, Les Aspin,
indeed argued that the only remaining nuclear
threat to the United States, except for the loss of
control over former Soviet nuclear assets, is a
handful of nuclear-armed rogue states bent on
aggression or terrorism.
107. The concept of nuclear deterrence may be
redefined to include its possible use against terro-
rist states or rogue leaders who threaten to use
their own weapons of mass destruction but mili-
tary planners have also indicated that the chances
are remote that the United States would use
nuclear weapons in such circumstances a.
108. New nuclear threats may come from third-
world countries whose leaders are called irratio-
nal and therefore undeterrable, because they may
not follow the same logic as was applied by the
United States and the Soviet Union in their
nuclear deterrence relationship during the cold
war.
109. The main reason why third world country
leaders are considered to be undeterrable may
well be that the threat to use nuclear weapons in a
regional conflict has lost its credibility.
110. There is no reason to have any doubts over
the credibility of United States extended deter-
rence insofar as it concerns deterrence against the
resurgence of a threat from Russia with renewed
imperialist intentions.
111. Over the years, the old adversaries had lear-
ned the rules of the nuclear weapons game.
Nuclear deterrence has worked well in relations
4, Irt.*.ti"*l Herald Tribune,26th February 1993.
between West and East and there is no, or little,
reason to believe that the present or even a possi-
bly different future leadership in Russia will not
act in accordance with the many tacit understan-
dings that have become part and parcel of the
deterrence between the faditional nuclear powers
which has been exfremely effective.
ll2. There is a feeling, however, that the United
States is feeling increasingly uneasy with nuclear
weapons and that in fact it would prefer to elimi-
nate them altogether. This would raise it to the
level of the only superpower in the world with by
far the largest effective conventional armed
forces. The actual proliferation which might result
in the acquisition of a limited number of nuclear
weapons by smaller regional states could put the
United States in an awkward position. The proli-
ferant nation could indeed use its small or very
small arsenal as a deterrence of the weak against
the strong and considerably reduce United
States possibilities of intervening in third world
conflicts.
113. Indeed, there are many signs that the Uni-
ted States is trying to diminish nuclear arsenals. It
has recently concluded a number of spectacular
bilateral nuclear weapons reduction treaties,
announced a unilateral reduction initiative, and is
also pursuing a very active policy of non-prolife-
ration and counter-proliferation.
II4. It stopped producing special nuclear mate-
rials and new nuclear warheads in 1991 and
announced an initiative for an international fissile
material production cut-off for weapons use in
1993. All major modernisation prograrnmes for
nuclear weapons except the Trident II SLBM
have been cancelled and a comprehensive test ban
treaty is being promoted.
V Russia
115. During the cold war, the main form of the
combat use of strategic nuclear forces in case of
conflict was the delivery of a retaliatory strike,
launching missiles before enemy warheads hit the
territory of the USSR.
116. The option of a surprise attack was rejec-
ted. On the other hand, recent research in former
East German archives has made it clear that there
were plans for pre-emptive nuclear counterforce
strikes in response to observation of NATO prepa-
rations for nuclear launches 5. The former Soviet
Union had a nuclear war fighting doctrine and
strategy and, as one official declared in 1988,
" while rejecting nuclear war and waging a
struggle to avert it, [it] nonetheless proceeded
5. Beatrice Heuser, Comparative Saategy, volume 12, pages
437-457.
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from the possibility of winning it 6 ". It should,
however, be noted that great care was also taken
not to proceed to a nuclearisation of the conflict
unless the enemy was about to do so.
Il7. In November 1993, Russia's new military
doctrine was made public. Contrary to Soviet tra-
dition, it was not the product of a long-term deli-
beration by the state's political leadership in
consultation with military experts from the armed
forces. The new doctrine, even if it took account
of policy requirements of various groups involved
in Russian policy-making, was entirely produced
within the Ministry of Defence by a team estab-
lished by Defence Minister Pavel Grachev. The
(national) Security Council was told to approve it
without discussion. On the other hand, western
experts also consider the new doctrine as a key
element in the Russian leadership's attempts to
regain control of the armed forces and ensure the
cohesion of the Russian Federation.
1 18. A number of Russian analysts have pointed
out that there is a lack of political control over the
military since the collapse of the raditional insti-
tutions controlling the entire machinery of the
Soviet state. They argue that in military affairs,
the military are almost controlling politics. This is
not reflected only in the ongoing battle over ratifi-
cation of START II, to be mentioned later in the
present report, but also in the negotiations on the
defence budget for 1994. In the budget for 1994,
the Finance Ministry had proposed a sum of
37 trillion roubles for defence. The military have
now asked for 80 trillion roubles, but negotiations
might result in an allocation of 53 trillion roubles
to defence, causing either a drain on the budgets
of other minisffies or a huge extra state deficit.
The armed forces have argued that, since defence
spending started to decrease in 1989, savings on
the defence budget were achieved entirely at the
expense of the armed forces' combat-readiness.
Because of fuel shortages, many routine combat
training plans were scrapped, flight training pro-
grammes were curtailed, naval vessels had to
remain in the docks or at anchor, equipment was
not repaired, housing construction all but stopped
and fuel reserves were not replenished, to give
only a few examples.
119. It is also argued that without an appropriate
budget it will not be possible to carry out the
Defence Minister's proposals to gradually trans-
form the existing Russian armed forces into smal-
ler, but also more effective, mobile and flexible
forces without socio-political perturbations. It
should be noted that the new doctrine avoids cold
war rhetoric and does not rebuild confrontation
with the West.
120. As regards the use of ntrclear weapons, the
document states that Russia:
" will not use nuclear weapons against any
state that is a signatory to the lst July 1968
treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons and does not possess nuclear
weapons, except in the following instances:(a) an armed attack against the Russian
Federation, its territory armed forces and
other troops, or its allies, by such a state
that is linked by an alliance agreement with
a state that do6s possess nocT"a. weapons;
(D) joint actions by such a state with an-
other state that possesses nuclear weapons
that result in or support an invasion or
armed attack on the Russian Federation, its
territory armed forces and other ftoops, or
on its allies; "
l2l. Western analysts have interpreted the ins-
tances mentioned under (a) and (b) as clear
signals to Eastern and Central European states
that they turn themselves into potential nuclear
targets once they join NAIO.
122. In fact, the new doctrine, without stating it
explicitly, has dropped the Soviet pledge of no-
first-use, made in June 1982. It should be noted,
however, that in the West the earlier no-frst-use
declaration was regarded as more a propaganda
gambit in the INF debate than an element of a cre-
dible policy. In that respect, the new doctrine is
seen as a down-to-earth confirmation of earlier
policy. Obviously, the absence of a no-first-use
declaration does not necessarily imply that Russia
is developing a frst-strike or pre-emptive strike
nuclear sftategy.
123. It should be emphasised, however, that in
view of the considerable physical and psychologi-
cal deterioration of its conventional forces in
recent years, Russia has come to consider its
nuclear forces as the only viable and credible ele-
ment of its armed forces. In the near and maybe
even more distant future, Russia's nuclear forces
will therefore have to take on the entire burden of
strategic deterrence, a policy which is indeed
confirmed in the new military doctrine.
124. Russian experts have pointed out that,
even after implementation of the agreed START
treaties, the United States strategic nuclear
forces will be able to fulfil a whole range of
combat operations, including an effective first-
strike, retaliatory strike and other specific res-
ponsive actions. They consider even Russia's
new mobile land-based single warhead SS-25
missiles to be extremely vulnerable to destruc-
tion by a potential adversary possessing state-of-
the-art satellite intelligence facilities and crea-
ting_manoeuvrable warheads, whose trajectory
can be corrected by commands from reconnais-
sance satellites.
6. W.T. tre, US-USSR strategic arms control agreements:
expectations are reality. Comparative Strategy, page 417,
volume 12.
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125. Taking this into account, there can be little
surprise that Russian military experts argue that
the action concept of Russia's strategic nuclear
forces should provide for many scenarios, be
flexible and based on geostrategic reality rather
than on scholastic deliberations.
126. Another consequence of the abovemen-
tioned arguments, combined with growing nation-
alism, various right-wing sentiments and com-
plaints by the military on financial and technical
problems in the implementation of START II, is
that the ratification of the START II treaty in its
present form is facing considerable resistance in
the new Russian Parliament, as confirmed by
recent hearings held by the Duma's defence com-
mittee.
127. It should, on the other hand, be noted that,
as regards disarmament and non-proliferation, the
Russian Government has emphasised the follow-
ing main objectives of its policy:
- 
implementation of all existing arms
conftol and disarmament agreements;
- 
conclusion of a comprehensive test ban
treaty in the near futureT;
- 
indefrnite extension of the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty, while increasing the
number of panicipants;
- 
support for all efforts to increase the effi-
ciency of an international non-prolifera-
tion r6gime concerning weapons of mass
destruction, ballistic missiles and dual-
use technology;
- 
improving the frarnework of confidence-
building measures.
128. Regarding its relations with Western Eur-
ope, Russia is aware of the important changes
taking place in the framework of the WEU mem-
ber states' objective to develop this organisation
as a vehicle of Europe's defence identity.
I29. There is a strong feeling in Russia that it
should not be excluded from developments in
Europe. Even if it is understood that at present it
would not be realistic to create an associate part-
nership between Russia and WEU, the Russian
Government argues that steps should be taken to
establish a pragmatic relationship which should
include systematic political consultations at
ministerial level, regular contacts at the level of
defence experts and co-operation in such fields as
satellite monitoring. It is understood that this
might require formal decisions by the WEU
7. The new military doctrine is using a slightly different
wording and speaks of the establishment of a dialogue bet-
ween states possessing nuclear weapons on the problems of
nuclear testing, for the purpose ofreducing them to a mini-
mum necessary to maintain nuclear security, but not permit-
ting the improvment of nuclear weapons, leading later to
their complete prohibition.
Council, but such steps, it is emphasised, might
help to take away or diminish a growing feeling of
isolation in Russian society. Russia considers a
good working relationship between Russia and
the European Unior/Western European Union to
be extremely important for the maintenance of
peace and security in Europe.
Russia's nuclear forces
130. Notwithstanding recent reductions in its
nuclear forces, the Russian leadership, strongly
supported by the military, is determined to main-
tain Russia as a nuclear superpower. In that
framework, modernisation of the nuclear forces is
being continued. A new underground command
post is under construction in the Ural mountains.
131. As regards ICBMs, new SS-18s and single
warhead SS-25s are being deployed. A successor
to the SS-25, now under development, is expected
to be flight tested and deployed before the year
2000. Under the START tr treaty terms, up to 90
of the SS-25 missiles may be deployed in conver-
ted SS-18 silos.
132. The production of SSBNs (nuclear-pow-
ered ballistic missile submarines) has been halted
and it is believed that of a total of 27 only one to
six are on patrol at any given time. Russia has
started to modify its Typhoon Class submarines to
carry the more accurate SS-N-20 follow-on
SLBM.
133. The future of the air force component of
Russia's strategic nuclear forces is rather vague.
A large number of heavy bombers was deployed
on the territories of Ukraine and Kazakhstan
which have claimed them as their property. As a
result, Russia has only 27 heavy bombers capable
of carrying cruise missiles, and52 bombers armed
with nuclear bombs. The relatively low cost-
effectiveness of heavy bombers, which is virtu-
ally unsustainable during an economic crisis, has
contributed to Russia's present policy not to
sffengthen this component of the nuclear triad.
134. Further production of strategic bombers 
-
Blackjack and Bear-H 
- 
has been halted after a
January 1992 announcement by President Yeltsin
in which he also announced that no further long-
range ALCMs would be produced.Later in 1992,
President Yeltsin said that Russia would unilater-
ally halt the production of medium-sized bombers.
135. On the other hand, for the time being, stra-
tegic bombers will remain part of the nuclear
forces because of certain well-known advantages
which contribute to the flexibility of such forces.
As already noted elsewhere in the present report,
they are armed with various nuclear weapons, can
attack unplanned targets and return to base in case
of changes in the situation or a false alarm.
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136. On 29th January 1992, Pres\dent Yeltsin
also announced that Russia would destroy all the
nuclear warheads associated with tactical ground-
launched weapon systems and that it would not
produce any new ones to replace them. In Febru-
ary 1993, it was announced that all tactical
nuclear weapons had been withdrawn from ships
and submarines.
VI. The START treaties
(a) START I
137. The first START treaty (START I)8 was
signed in Moscow on 30th July 1991 by Presi-
dents Bush and Gorbachev after more than six
years of negotiations. The freaty calls for reduc-
tions in nuclear force levels to I 600 delivery
vehicles (SNDVs) and 6 000 strategic nuclear
warheads. The number of warheads would actually
be closer to 7 000-9 000 per side owing to the spe-
cific nature of counting rules. START I counts
launchers rather than the missiles themselves, nor
does it call for the destruction of warheads or mis-
siles. It establishes significantly-reduced limits
for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
and their associated launchers and warheads, for
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs),
their launchers and warheads and for heavy bom-
bers and their armaments, including long-range
nuclear airlaunched cruise missiles.
138. Verification of the START I treaty depends
on three basic elements: (i) National technical
means of verffication (NTM). Under the treaty, the
parties undertake not to interfere with NTM and
provide for co-operative measures to enhance
NTM. Specific provisions require the transmis-
sion of telemetric information from each ballistic
missile during flight test and ban any technique
denying full access to telemetric information.(ii) Exchange of data on treaty-limited systems
and related facilities. These exchanges include
numbers, locations, technical data, site diagrams
and photographs. (iii) On-site inspections. There
are 12 different types of inspections.
I39. The break-up of the USSR at the end of
1991 prevented ratification by the Supreme
Soviet (which dissolved itself on 26th December
1991). After some hesitation about how to treat
the four newly-independent former Soviet repu-
blics which retained strategic nuclear weapons,
the Foreign Ministers of the five countries now
involved signed the Lisbon Protocol on 23rd May
1992, which provided that Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Russia and Ukraine would become parties to
START I and assume the responsibilities which
8. Treaty between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the reduction and
limitation of strategic offensive arms.
the former Soviet Union had taken in signing the
START I treaty. Under the protocol and attached
letters, all nuclear weapons would be withdrawn
from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine by the end
of the seven-year implementation period, and
Russia would become the sole nuclear weapon
state (NWS) on the territory of the former Soviet
Union. The protocol required the four republics to
allocate responsibility among themselves.
140. The United States Senate consented to rati-
fication on lst October 1992 pending completion
of implementation arrangements among the four
republics. Like Russia, the United States condi-
tioned its ratification of the START I treaty on the
ratification of START I and nuclear non-prolifera-
tion treaties (NPT).
I4l. Russia ratified the START I treaty on 4th
November 1992but delayed the exchange of ins-
truments of ratification until Belarus, Ukraine and
Kazakhstan had joined the NPT and made arran-
gements for implementing the treaty. Russia suc-
ceeded to the position of the USSR in the NPT as
a NWS.
142. In Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine the
situation regarding ratification and implementa-
tion of START I was more complicated. Each
of these republics had its own specific reasons
for hesitating to take the final step and ratify
START I.
(i) Kazakhstan
143. Kazakhstan initially remained aloof but was
the first republic to ratify START I as early as 2nd
Ju.ly 1992. NPT ratification was approved ina238
to 1 vote by the parliament of Kazakhstan on 13th
December 1993 and instruments of accession
were deposited with the United States in February
1994.
14/. When the Soviet Union disintegrated,
Kazakhstan inherited 370 nuclear bombs and
1 040 warheads on 104 SS-18 ICBMs. According
to the Lisbon protocol, these bombs and warheads
were to be transferred to Russian territory and dis-
mantled, leaving a nuclear-free Kazakhstan pro-
tected by a Russian nuclear umbrella. Not surpri-
singly, Kazakhstan had two nagging concerns
about this plan: first, it was concerned over its
national security because it occupies a large terri-
tory, does not have a large population and is geo-
graphically situated between Russia and China,
where the possibility of cataclysm cannot be com-
pletely ruled out; second, Kazakhstan needed sub-
stantial financial aid to complete its nuclear disar-
mament given the country's economic problems.
I45. In February 1993, President Nazarbayev
listed, among others, the following conditions that
could accelerate the process of nuclear disarma-
ment in his country: security guarantees; the pos-
sibility of recycling the ballistic missiles for com-
mercial launching; a share of the hard currency
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given by the West to facilitate nuclear disarma-
ment in the former Soviet Union; ownership of
the uranium and plutonium recovered from
warheads taken from Kazakh soil.
146. Under Kazakh law, the nuclear warheads
and bombs which it inherited from the former
Soviet Union are Kazakh property. It should be
noted, however, that Kazakh leaders have never
had control over these nuclear weapons.
147. At present, Kazakhstan is behind schedule
in ransferring nuclear weapons to Russia. Asked
why it was taking so long to move nuclear
weapons out of Kazakhstan, President Nazarbayev
replied that dismantlement and destruction of the
silo-based multiple-warhead missiles was a
labour-intensive process which required compli-
cated technical decisions and considerable finan-
cial means not available in the republic at this
time.
148. However, President Nazarbayev is strongly
oriented towards his country's integration into the
world economy and into the " civilised " interna-
tional community. He is therefore unlikely to dis-
regard treaty obligations.
149. On 13th December 1993, President Nazar-
bayev signed the umbrella and implementing
agreements for United States aid to dismantle
nuclear weapons on its territory.
150. On 25th December 1993, Russia agreed to
take responsibility for dismantling and removing
nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan. The latter would
receive a portion of the proceeds generated by the
sale of nuclear weapons components removed
from its territory.
151. On22nd January 1994, President Nazar-
bayev stated that Kazakhstan would seek com-
pensation for the nuclear weapons on its territory
as part of a deal similar to the trilateral statement
made by Russia, Ukraine and the United States on
14th January 1994.
152. After many requests for more money than
had been offered and various threats to keep the
nuclear weapons, President Nazarbayev finally
deposited Kazakhstan's instruments of accession
to the NPT with the United States, formally join-
ing the treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state(NNWS) during his visit to Washington in
February 1994. At the sanrc time, a number of co-
operation agreements were signed, including a
memorandum of understanding on defence co-
operation. In addition, the United States promised
to provide about $396 million in aid to Kazakhs-
tan including $85 million designated as Nunn-
Lugar assistance for dismantling nuclear weapons
in Kazakhstan. In 1993, Kazakhstan actually had
received $91 million in aid. Sources in Russia's
Defence Ministry have stated that at the end of
1993, Kazakhstan had deactivated 12 of the 104
SS-18s on its soil.
153. On 28th March 1994, President Yeltsin and
President Nazarbayev signed various agreements,
one of which concerns the disposition of nuclear
forces in Kazakhstan. According to Russia's Inde-
pendent Television, the agreement provides for
Russia's assumption of jurisdiction over the
nuclear forces in Kazakhstan, with all warheads to
be removed within 14 months. Silos and missiles
in Kazakhstan would be dismantled within three
years. Complete details of the dismantling process
have not been revealed, nor is there any informa-
tion on whether, or how, Kazakhstan might be
compensated for the highly-enriched uranium in
the warheads.
(ii) Belarus
154. Belarus ratified the START treaty on 4th
February 1993 and joined the NPT on 22nd July
1993. lt intends to become a nuclear-free zone.
Originally, Belarus stated its objective to remain
neutral and stay out of the CIS security system.
However, this proved not to be immediately pos-
sible. Belarus was not in a position to declare an
independent security policy and it had no choice
but to sign the CIS agreement on coflrmon security
on 9th April 1993. Article X, part 3, of this agree-
ment allows the temitory of Belarus, with permis-
sion of its parliament, to be used as a site for other
countries' military bases and installations.
155. In January 1992, therc were 8l single-
warhead SS-25s on the territory of Belarus. Of
these,21 were taken off alert in October 1992 and
transferred to Russia in 1993. Meanwhile, the
jurisdiction and control of all these weapons had
been turned over to Russia. Their transfer to Rus-
sia and destruction was originally planned for
1993 and 1994.
156. Later, on 24th September 1993, the Bela-
russian and Russian Prime Ministers signed an
agreement on the withdrawal schedule for Rus-
sian strategic nuclear forces, setting completion
for the end of 1996. The Belarussian Supreme
Soviet ratified this agreement on 25th November
1993. The United States praised Belarus for its
willingness to remove nuclear weapons from its
soil.
157. By the end of 1993, officials of the Bela-
russian Defence Ministry disclosed that Belarus
had transfened 27 of the 8l SS-25s to Russia.
Belarus has dismantled 9 of the remaining SS-25s
deployed on its territory. Russia planned to rede-
ploy the single warhead ICBMs rather than dis-
mantle them.
158. On 15th January 1994, President Clinton
promised Belarus $50 million in additional aid,
including $25 million in assistance for transfer-
ring nuclear weapons to Russia.
159. According to the most recent reports, the
approximately 54 remaining missiles in Belarus
are to be removed by the end of 1994.
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(iii) Ukraine
160. Ukraine's initial reaction after the break-up
of the Soviet Union was essentially anti-nuclear.
In 1990, the Rada, Ukraine's parliament, solemnly
proclaimed its intention for Ukraine to become a
pennanently neutral state, taking no part in milita-
ry blocs and abiding by three non-nuclear prin-
ciples of not accepting, producing or acquiring
nuclear weapons. The radical non-nuclear policy
of the declaration can be explained by the circum-
stances in which it was conceived. It was hoped
that radical denuclearisation would favourably
impress the West and thus secure international
recognition. Apart from that, the legacy of Cher-
nobyl was playing an important r61e and the non-
nuclear policy was conceived without military
input.
161. In conformity with the declaration and
agreements made earlier with Russia, Ukraine
began to transfer all its tactical nuclear weapons
to Russia for destruction by May 1992. This left
Ukraine in possession of only 176 ICBMs (130
SS-19s and46 SS-24s) with 1 240 warheads, and
41 strategic bombers (Tu-95 Bears and Tu-160
Blackjacks) carrying 328 air-launched cruise mis-
siles. However, even before the transfer of tactical
nuclear weapons was completed, Ukrainians
began to debate the wisdom of abandoning their
nuclear arsenal and Ukraine's Rada blocked
moves to transfer the missiles to Russia for dis-
mantling.
162. Ukraine delayed ratification of START I
and accession to the NPT for several reasons:
- 
fear of Russia and growing tensions bet-
ween the two countries. Ukraine was
seeking security guarantees from Russia,
the United States and the United King-
dom (as depositories of the NPT);
- 
as a bargaining chip to obtain more eco-
nomic aid under the guise of meeting the
costs of dismantling and eliminating the
nuclear weapons based on its territory
and to be guaranteed its share of the
money raised by the sale of fissile mate-
rial recovered from nuclear warheads
after dismantling;
- 
a belief that the possession of nuclear
weapons adds to security, provides a
powerful deterrent and increases influ-
ence and prestige in the intemational field;
- 
a belief that its continued possession of
nuclear weapons was a means of streng-
thening its hand in the negotiation on the
division of the Black Sea fleet between
Ukraine and Russia and on potential bor-
. 
der problems.
163. On 3rd July 1993, the Rada proclaimed its
ownership of all nuclear weapons on its territory.
However, it also declared its intention not to use
or threaten to use them and its intention to become
a non-nuclear weapon state.
164. On 16th July 1993, Ulraine's Minister of
Defence announced that 10 SS-19 ICBMs were
being dismantled.
165. On 4th September 1993, the Massandra
nuclear weapons agreements were signed, turan-
ging for the removal of nuclear warheads from
Ukraine. Russian officials indicated that l7
months would be needed to dismantle and remove
the warheads. Within one year after the removal,
Ukraine would receive the uranium fuel or the
profit from the sale of uranium. The Rada said,
however, that the withdrawal schedule required
further negotiation.
166. On the other hand, in November 1993, the
Rada did at last ratify START I but with so many
conditions that progress on implementation was
still blocked.
167. In January 1994, a trilateral agreement was
signed by the United States, Russia and Ukraine
in Moscow, which provided Ukraine with com-
pensation for transferring all nuclear weapons on
its territory to Russia. Ukraine agreed to disman-
tle all of the nuclear weapons on its territory " in
accordance with the relevant agreements and
during the seven-year period as provided by the
START I treaty and within the context of the
Rada's statement on the non-nuclear status of
Ukraine ".
168. Ukraine would begin the process by remo-
ving the warheads from all46 SS-24s within 10
months. Russia would ensure the safety of the
warheads in Ukraine and Ukraine would provide
the " conditions for Russia to carry out these ope-
rations ".
169. The agreement did not establish a formal
timetable for removing warheads to Russia (call-
ing for completion within " the shortest possible
time "), but one official said Ukraine would
become nuclear-weapon-free within three years.
Ukraine had asked to omit the three-year time-
table from the statement to avoid antagonising the
Rada, which had called for a slower pace. The
accord also provided Ukraine with monitoring
rights to verify that Russia actually dismantled the
warheads.
170. The Presidents recognised the importance
of compensation to Ukraine for the value of the
highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in nuclear
warheads located on its territory. In retum for the
transfer of " at least 200 " warheads from SS-l9s
and SS-24s to Russia over the next 10 months and
if Ukraine reached a safeguards agreement with
the IAEA, it would receive 100 tons of nuclear
fuel over the same time period. The uranium from
warheads in Ukraine, valued by some officials at
$1 billion, would be mostly returned to Ukraine in
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the form of fuel rods. Ukraine would also receive
a portion of the proceeds from Russian uranium
sales to the United States. To fund the initial 100-
ton transfer, the United States would advance $60
million to Russia under the HEU sales contracte.
Compensation for the tactical nuclear weapons
S.udy withdrawn apparently remained an open
lSSUe.
l7l. Russia and the United States also offered a
series of security guarantees to Ukraine once
START entered into force and Ukraine joined the
NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. The two
nations, joined by the United Kingdom, would:
- 
respect Ukraine's borders in accordance
with the principles of the CSCE final act;
- 
refrain from threatening to use force;
- 
seek United Nations Security Council
action to assist Ukraine if it were
attacked by, or threatened with, nuclear
weapons;
- 
not use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against Ukraine.
I72. Ukraine had soughtbroaderguarantees but
nonetheless saw it as " critical " to have a docu-
ment signed by both Russia and the United
States.
173. On 20th January, the Rada opened its 1994
session and started to discuss the agreement. It
appeared that many Ukrainian nationalists still
wished to retain the newer SS-24s for self-
defence, especially after the ultra-nationalist vic-
tory in last December's parliamentary elections in
Russia. However, there seems to be a consensus in
Kiev that ageing SS-19s should be dismantled
because they pose enormous dangers.
174. On 3rd February 1994, the Rada dropped
its conditions for ratifying START I by passing
the resolution proposed by President Kravchuk,
with the exception of NPT accession.
175. Some issues remain ambiguous despite the
passing of the resolution. Although President
Kravchuk implied that Ukraine would eliminate
all the nuclear weapons on its territory, it is
unclear whether that is the intent of the Rada or
whether it still views only a portion of the
weapons as falling under START.
176. On 8th-9th February 1994, Russia and
Ukraine held the first round of talks on implemen-
ting the trilateral agreement. Two days later, Rus-
sia stopped supplying nuclear fuel to Ukraine to
pressure it into acceding to the NPT.
9. Russia and the United States signed a 2D-year, $ I 1.9 bil-
lion contract for the United States to purchase 5(X) tons of
uranium salvaged from former Soviet warheads. 500 tons
represent about 20 000 nuclear warheads and a three-year
supply of the world's nuclear fuel demand.
177. At the beginning of March 1994, President
Leonid Kravchuk, in stating that " fulfilment of
agreements, including agreements on nuclear
commitments, is possible only if the economy
works ", again cast doubt on whether Ukraine
would continue to honour its nuclear disarmament
commitments.
178. The President's statement came after Rus-
sia's Gazprom company, a state-owned mono-
poly, threatened to reduce supplies to Ukraine for
the second time in a week. Ukraine is likely to
remain dependent on Russia for energy supplies
for many years to come because of the financial
hurdles involved in building pipelines from other
states.
179. On 5th March 1994, the Clinton adminis-
tration announced it would double its financial aid
to Ukraine to some $700 million a year: $350 mil-
lion in economic aid and $350 million to,|relp the
weapons denuclearisation programme -. How-
ever, the United States would urge the IMF to
withhold $1 billion in loans for Ukraine unless it
took more positive steps to privatise industry and
curb inflation, currently running at a rate of
approximately 90Vo a month.
180. On 2lst March 1994, the Defence Secre-
tary, William J. Perry, said the United States
would add $100 million to its $135 million alloca-
tion to Ukraine's nuclear missile dismantlement
programme. Mr. Perry signed aid agreements for
dismantling nuclear missiles sited in ukraine ($50
million), the conversion of military industries to
civilian production ($40 million) and tighter secu-
rity in the shipment and storage of nuclear
weapons in Ukraine ($10 million) ".
181. The first session of the new Rada, elected
in March 1994, was scheduled for llth May. Its
position on the START treaty's implementation
remains to be seen.
I82. President Kravchuk stated on 14th May
1994 that 180 nuclear warheads had been remo-
ved from Ukraine to Russia. He added that, as the
process of disarmament is proceeding according
to plan, by the end of May all United States mis-
siles aimed at Ukraine will be recoded and
Ukraine will cease being targeted by American
warheads.
183. Several reports in the Russian and western
press have provided information on the Ulaainian
disarmament process. Colonel General Igor
Sergeyev, the Commander of the Russian Strategic
Rocket Forces, stated on 4th May 1994 that all SS-
10. It slro,rld b. noted that the Nunn-Lugar amendment had
earmarked $175 million in aid to Ukraine, $135 million for
missile dismantlement and $40 million for the creation of a
research centre for nuclear scientists, forming a nuclear
emergency response team.
I l. Financial Tmes, 22nd March 1994.
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24s in Ukraine had been deactivated and their
warheads removed. He also noted that some 302
launchers in Russia had been " liquidated " as called
for under START I. Also on 4th May 1994, a Ukrai-
nian Defence Ministry spokesman said ttrat there
were only a few SS-24 missiles left to deactivate.
Some 180 nuclear warheads have now been remo-
ved from Ulaaine.
***
184. Finally, it should be noted that the START I
treaty has not yet legally entered into force as instu-
ments of ratification have not been exchanged. The
parties are, however, implementing its provisions.
(b) START II
185. On 3rd January 1993, President Bush and
President Yeltsin signed the START II agreement,
which is to be considered as a prolongation of the
earlier START I.
186. START II, if implemented, will eliminate
the most destabilising sfrategic weapons, heavy
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and all
other multiple-warhead ICBMs, also called
MIRVed (multiple re-entry vehicle) ICBMs. It
will also reduce dramatically the total number of
strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both coun-
tries. The treaty includes a protocol on elimina-
tion or conversion concerning heavy ICBMs and
heavy ICBM silos, a protocol on exhibition and
inspection concerning heavy bombers, and a
memorandum on attribution. The reduction to the
ceilings set will take place in two phases.
187. By the end of the first phase, that is seven
years after the entry into force of START I, each
side must have reduced its total deployed strategic
nuclear warheads to 3 800-4 250 warheads. Those
include the number of warheads on deployed
ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) as well as the number of warheads for
which heavy bombers with nuclear missions are
equipped. Of this total, no more than 1 200 may
be on deployed MIRVed ICBMs, no more than
2160 on deployed SLBMs, and no more than 650
on deployed heavy ICBMs.
I 8 8. On 1 st January 2003 , by the end of the final
and second phase, each side must have reduced its
total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to
3 000-3 500. Of those, none may be on MIRVed
ICBMs, including heavy ICBMs.Thus all MIR-
Ved ICBMs must be eliminated from each side's
deployed forces; only ICBMs carrying a single-
warhead will be allowed. No more than I 700-I 750 deployed warheads may be on SLBMs.
There will be no prohibition on MIRVed SLBMs.
189. According to START II, the Americans will
have to dismantle about half of their Trident I and
Trident II missiles with eight warheads. By the
same date, most of the MIRVed missiles will be
adapted to missiles with a single warhead. This
last provision is one of the concessions made to
the Russians who wish to transform 90launching
pads for their SS-18 missiles to house the SS-25.
In exchange, the Russians have agreed to Ameri-
can inspections being carried out during the adap-
tation of SS-25 silos. Russia and the United States
will be authorised to transform 105 of their mul-
tiple-head land missiles into single-headed mis-
siles. This also was a claim lodged by Russia
which wanted to transform 105 of its 170 SS-19
missiles, equipped with six warheads, into single-
headed missiles. As far as nuclear bombers are
concerned, the number of warheads on each plane
will be specified in a memorandum in annex to
the fteaty. The Americans made a concession to
the Russians on this by accepting to give them
information on the number of nuclear warheads
fransported by their bombers, including the new
B-2 stealth bombers.
VII. The United Kingdom
(a) The Uniled Kingdom's nuclearforces
190. When the United Kingdom established its
nuclear forces in the 1950s, one of the main rea-
sons was to deter aggressive action by the Soviet
Union, partly compensating for the relative weak-
ness of the nation's conventional forces as com-
pared to those of the Warsaw Pact.
191. From the beginning, British nuclear forces
were meant to be part of a collective allied effort
and, since the Nassau agreement of December
1962, have been committed to NATO '2. They
were also intended to operate as a second centre
of decision-making within the alliance in case a
potential adversary would think that the United
States would hold back'3. It was thought that a
United Kingdom decision to use nuclear weapons
could trigger a United States nuclear response, an
arrangement thought to be the more effective
because of the presence of United States military
facilities on United Kingdom territory.
192. The United Kingdom has always main-
tained a twofold nucleardoctine according to which
its nuclear forces were on the one hand part of
NATO's spectrum of deterrence, operating underthe
single integrated operational plan (SIOP), while able
on the other to provide massive retaliation against
any aggressor attacking the nation.
12. In the Nassau statement of 21st December 1962, it was
said that: " ...except where Her Majesty's Govemment may
decide that supreme national interests are at stake, these Bri-
tish forces will be used for the purposes of international
defence of the westem alliance in all circumstances. "
13. The future United Kingdom strategic nuclear deterrent
force (DOGD 80/23, July 1980).
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193. Within the framework of both NATO and
WEU, the United Kingdom has always conside-
red its nuclear forces as being fully committed to
the defence of the territory of its allies. This has
been confirmed recently by the United Kingdom
Secretary of State for Defence, Malcolm Rifkind,
when he said that " Britain would regard her own
vital interests as at stake in any attack upon an
alliance member. " 
'o
194. The United Kingdom's position as regards
the r6le and future of its nuclear weapons was
recently made clear in a major address in London
by the Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind on
16th November 1993.
195. Mr. Rifkind stated that although complete
and general nuclear disarmament remained a desi-
rable ultimate goal, it would be neither practical
nor realistic to give up nuclear weapons in the
present circumstances, where the potential still
exists for serious risk to British and allied inter-
ests.
196. At present, there is a broad consensus
among the main political actors of both govern-
ment and opposition for retaining nuclear wea-
pons in their r6le of minimum deterrent, under-
stood as " posing a threat of unacceptable damage
to any aggressor ". Officially, this deterrent is not
directed at any country in panicular, but the exis-
tence of Russia as a pre-eminent military power
and nuclear superpow-er in Europe continuei to be
a determining factor in decisions on the United
Kingdom's future force structures and postures.
Nevertheless, it is recognised that Russia must be
included as part of the solution to Europe's secu-
rity. It is stressed that the value of nuclear
weapons does not lie in classical concepts of war-
fighting or war-winning, or even in mere deter-
rence of the use of nuclear weapons by an adver-
sary, but in actually preventing war. The United
Kingdom is not in favour of a no-first-use decla-
ration, because this might imply that conventional
war is a safe option.
197. The United Kingdom will continue to build
on its new relationship wittr its partners in the North
Atlantic Co-operation Council through bilateral
and multilateral efforts in cooperative threat reduc-
tion and attaches great importance to the prompt
and full implementation of the START process.
198. Meanwhile, it considers the American
nuclear guarantee of fundamental importance to
the collective security of the alliance.
199. The British attitude towards nuclear co-
operation with France will be dealt with in a sepa-
rate chapter.
200. In general, the United Kingdom does not
regard its nuclear weapons as playing an impor-
f +:aa."* in paris, 30th September 1992.
tant rOle in deterring proliferation. One of the rea-
sons is that the motivation for a country wanting
to acquire nuclear weapons is likely to be regional
and such decisions will most probably not be
affected by the United Kingdom's possession of
nuclear weapons. It is also noted that it is ques-
tionable whether an intended deterrent will work
in the absence of an established nuclear deterrent
relationship.
201. The United Kingdom Defence Minister sta-
ted his thorough opposition to the development of
more " usable " low-yield " smart " nuclear
weapons, which according to some would allow
nuclear deterrence to be effective in circum-
stances where existing weapons would be self-
deterring. Indeed, this would run counter to the
British opinion that nuclear weapons cannot be
used to fight a war.
(b) The Uniled Kingdom's nuclearforce structuru
and weapons programmes
202. Of the United Kingdom's four Polaris bal-
listic missile submarines, the first, HMS Revenge,
was decommissioned in May 1992 as part of a
programme to replace them by Trident subma-
rines around the year 2000.
203. The frst Trident SSBN, HMS Vanguard, is
due to become fully operational by early 1995 at
the latest. Each vessel can carry 16 Trident D-5
SLBMs with a range of 12 000 kilomeftes and an
accuracy to within 100 metres of the target. The
eight warheads on each missile can be indepen-
dently targeted. The present Polaris missiles have
a range of 4 630 kilometres, 900-meffe accuracy
and the three warheads are directed at the same
target.
204. The United Kingdom Government recently
stated that it would not deploy more than 96 Tri-
dent D-5 missile warheads, and possibly signifi-
cantly fewer, instead of the 128 warheads on each
of the four Vanguard class SSBNs, as announced
earlier, when the latter came into service'5. It
should be noted here that under the START II
Treaty, United States Trident II missiles can carry
only four warheads each and that the United
Kingdom will certainly be under international
political pressure to follow suit.
205. It is reported that a total of 67 Trident D-5
missiles are to be bought from the United States.
206. Given the government's announcement
cancelling its participation in a British-French
development programme for a tactical air-to-sur-
face missile to replace the WE-177 free-fall
nuclear bombs by the year 2005, Trident will now
also be used in a sub-strategic r6le, eventually
becoming the United Kingdom's only nuclear
system.
l5J*"'. D"frnce Weekly, 27th November 1993.
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207. Once the four Trident SSBNs are in service,
the explosive power of the United Kingdom's
operational nuclear inventory will have fallen by
over 257o as compared with the 1990 figure.
208. As a result of important reductions in the
number of tactical bomber squadrons in both the
Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, the number
of WE-177 A./B gravity bombs will be reduced by
over a half by the end of 1994. Meanwhile, all the
WE-177 C nuclear strike/depth bombs carried by
Royal Navy helicopters and aircraft have been
taken out of service and destroyed.
209. Altogether, the United Kingdom has now
phased out most of its tactical nuclear weapons:
namely the Lance surface-to-surface missile,
nuclear artillery shells and nuclear depth charges.
210. On 15th February 1994, the United King-
dom and Russia signed an agreement to detarget
nuclear missiles directed at their respective coun-
tries as part of a larger framework of confidence-
building measures.
2Il. The United Kingdom Government has
launched a national programme of studies to
assess the technical options, costs and perform-
ance of ballistic missile defence systems (BMD)
that are available. It will decide on the basis of the
f3 million study, to be presented to ministers in
late 1996, whether the United Kingdom needs a
BMD capability.
212. A contract for developing and manufac-
turing BMD weapons systems would run to seve-
ral billions of pounds and, in the light of the seve-
re cutbacks now being made in all services, it is
doubtful whether the armed forces could afford
such a system if priorities need to be established.
213. It should be noted that in 1989, the United
Kingdom Government scrapped the surface-to-air
Bloodhound missile without replacing it 
'6.
VIII. France
(a) Nuclear doctrine
214. Until the end of the cold war and, more spe-
cifically, before the collapse of the Soviet Union,
France's nuclear doctrine was designed mainly on
the assumption of the existence of a Soviet threat.
Even today, it can be assumed that the continued
presence of a formidable nuclear arsenal in Russia
and in certain other republics of the former Soviet
Union, still constitutes an important rationale for
maintaining French nuclear deterrence, even
though the government has always been very
reluctant to admit this objective publicly.
2I5. Indeed, France has professed rather that it
has no specific enemies and claims that its nuclear
deterrent is not directed againsf anyone in particu-
lar. Its recent revival of the.phrase " fous azi-
muts " (all-round defence) indicates that its
nuclear deterrence is directedragainst any power
which might attempt coercion or aggression
against France.
216. Other reasons for France's maintaining its
nuclear arsenal are the proliferation of nuclear
weapons technology and the fact that such tech-
nology, having once been invented, is likely to
remain an important tool in power politics.
217. Even though France has both tactical and
sffategic nuclear weapons, it has never really had a
sffategy that included the possibility of fighting a
war with nuclear weapons. What is now termed a
pre-sfrategic use of nuclear weapons is meant to be
the " final warning " before France decides on
full-scale nuclear retaliation against an aggressor.
2I8. France's strategy has always been to main-
tain a credible deterrence to prevent war, not win
it. If a limited " final warning " did not succeed in
halting the aggressor, the logical next step could
only be full-scale nuclear retaliation. In principle,
a second warning would be impossible since such
behaviour would cast doubt on the credibility of
nuclear deterrence as an effective means of pre-
venting aggression.
219. It is also understood that France's nuclear
weapons will play a r6le only in the defence of
national territory in Europe.
220. As recently as February 1991, during the
Gulf war, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs
declared "... nuclear weapons cannot be battle-
field weapons and cannot be used except as the
ultimate recourse when the national territory is
threatened ".
22I. It should be noted that France's nuclear
forces are not assigned to NAT0. In 1986, France
committed itself, under certain conditions, to
informing the Germans in advance in the event of
nuclear weapons being used against German terri-
tory with qualifications resembling those in the
1962 Athens guidelines. Successive French
governments, however, have always claimed that
they cannot define their vital interests with any
precision in relation to the area they would
defend, if necessary, with nuclear weapons.
222. The most recent statement on the official
French nuclear docffine was made in the white
paper on defence, which the government pub-
lished on 23rd February 1994.
223. Confirming the main objective of France's
nuclear forces, this states:
"The French nuclear concept will continue
to be defined by the will and capability to
make any aggressor 
- 
irrespective of who
such aggressors mlty be or their capabili-
ties 
-fear unacceptable damnge, out of all16. Financial Times, l6th February 1994.
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proportion to the advantage to be gained
from conflict, if they seek to attack
France's vital interests. In this day and
age, nuclear weapons alone have this
kind of capability, owing to their unas-
sailable power of destruction. For this
reason they also have the advantage of
preventing generalised warfare... "
224. The nuclear deterrent is meant to protect
the country's vital interests, but these have not
been defined very specifically, leaving the highest
authorities of the state a certain freedom of action.
225. It is also necessary to have the " capability
to define the extent of such vital interests in
various situations, at the required moment, and
issue an unequivocal reminder of our determina-
tion: such is the function of the final warning... a
limited strike on military targets. "
226. It should be noted, however, that with the
changes that are taking place in intemational rela-
tions, a number of French strategiss are considering
the possible need to " develop more flexible
weapons systems that promote deterrence more
through the precision with which they srike than
through the threat of a general nuclear exchange " ''.
227. While the French " anti-cities " concept has
not been discarded, strategists in France are increa-
singly interested in the options offered by greater
flexibility, precision and controlled effects. These
latter capabilities might prove more relevant in
future contingencies which are likely to be diffe-
rent from massive East-West confrontation.
228. There are those in France who recommend
that the country should give up its old policy of
deterrence of the strong by the weak which is
based on making one's territory inviolable, and
the principle of non-use of nuclear force.
229. Arguing that nuclear weapons will continue
to play a r6le in the world, they maintain that
France should develop a dual deterrence. It should
keep its capacity for massive retaliation, but,
taking account of the risks of proliferation, it
should develop an anti-site deterrence consisting
of smaller " smart " nuclear weapons, enabling it
to inflict a decisive 
- 
and as necessary nuclear 
-
strike on enemy strategic centres.
230. However, the debate has only just started
and no decisions have yet been made translating
these new ideas into a new doctrine, new capabi-
lities and new operational concepts.
231. In a major address on 5th May 1994, Presi-
dent Mitterrand unequivocally stated his position
on the subject, and this is official policy:
" I have firrnly resisted the confusion over
pre-strategic or tactical weapons. If there
were to be a succession of nuclear warnings
we would be reverting to the concept of a
graduated response. The warning is final;
there are no more stages 
- 
the next is war ...
I shall oppose the new risks of drift 
- 
for
example when.I hear talk of the use of ato-
mic power against the weak or the insane to
settle problems outside our national terri-
tory or vital interests. Do we have to rally to
the term surgical strike 
- 
decapitation is
also used 
- 
which might go as far as the
nuclear gun? "
232. It is not to be expected that any changes in
France's policy regarding its nuclear forces will
be made before the next presidential elections in
1995.
(b) French nuclear forces
233. France had developed and produced 30
Hades ground-launched missiles with a maximum
range of 500 kilometres when this programme
was suspended in the summer of 1991 and then
abandoned in 1992. These thirty missiles have
now been stored, but this part of France's nuclear
force can " be made operational within time-
limits commensurate with developments in the
international situation ". Meanwhile, the nuclear
warheads are held by the airforce.
234. There are 45 Mirage 2000 N aircraft, each
equipped with an air-to-ground medium-range
missile with a range of 100 to 300 kilometres. The
nuclear AN 52 munition for a total of 75 Mirage
III and Jaguar aircraft was withdrawn from opera-
tional service in 1991 and dismantled in the
framework of a unilateral nuclear disarmament
policy.
235. Meanwhile, 15 Mirage IV P aircraft, equip-
ped with the air-to-ground medium-range missile
(ASMP), will remain in service until 1996. The
new Rafale aircraft should take over their task at
the end of the century. The replacement of the
ASMP by a long-range air-to-ground missile
(ASLP) is at present not considered urgent 
'E.
236. The present 18 S-3D ballistic missiles at the
plateau d'Albion could be obsolete by the begin-
ning of the next century, when they would very
likely no longer be capable of frustrating an attack
from an enemy anti-ballistic missile defence system.
237. If France wishes to maintain an effective
system of land-based ballistic missiles, it will
have to take decisions on developing a successor
to the S-3D missile within the next two years at
the latest.
238. In January 1994, President Mitterrand sug-
gested that the MS-5 (a multiple warhead missile
with a range of 8 000 kilometres), now being
developed to equip the new submarines by 2fi)5,
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could also be installed at the plateau d'Albion'e.
A decision to begin developing these missiles was
taken in l992,but this programme, at a total cost
of 40 billion francs for 3 batches of 16 missiles,
was slowed down by the present government at
the beginning of 1994.
239. Finalising the programme law 1995-2000
for defence procurement, the French National
Defence Council decided on 6th April 1994 that
the entry into service of the M-5 missile should be
delayed from 2005 to 2010. At the same time, a
study has been commissioned to examine how the
interim 6000 kilomefte-range M-45 missile, now
scheduled to be fitted to the new nuclear subma-
rines in 1996-1997, can be deployed in the silos of
the plateau d'Albion'0.
240. It is thought that these decisions will reduce
the need for nuclear testing as the warhead for the
M-45 missile has already been tested. Further
tests may be required for development of the TN-
100 warhead, originally envisaged for the M-5
missile, but it has been suggested that the present
TN-75 warhead could be used for these new mis-
siles without additional testing 2r.
24I. When the government was criticised
recently by Jacques Chirac for its " no nuclear
tests " policy, the Defence Ministet Frangois L6o-
tard, replied that the suspension of nuclear testing
did not affect the efficiency of the strike force. It
was also stated that the decision had been taken
after " in-depth study and in agreement with the
Chiefs of Defence staff " ".
242. Recently, however, the public debate in
France on nuclear testing has intensified. On 5th
May 1994, President Mitterrand again clearly
confrmed his position regarding nuclear testing,
making the following statement:
" There will be no further tests before May
1995. I have taken this decision and this
situation will remain as long as I continue in
offrce. There will be none under my succes-
sor either 
- 
unless the other powers resume
testing 
- 
as France has no wish to offend the
whole world by triggering nuclear escala-
tion and nuclear war and treating all poor
countries with contempt. " 23
243. The President also recalled that in the pro-
gramme law for the years 1995-2000, 10 billion
francs have been allocated to a nuclear test simu-
lation programme.
244. The day before, Defence Minister Frangois
L6otard stated that " the modernisation and minia-
turisation of nuclear weapons make it absolutely
19. LeMonde, llthJanuary 1994.
20. Financial Times, 8th April 1994.
21. Le Monde,Z5thFebruary 1994.
22. Le Monde, 24th February 1994.
23. Le Monde,TthMay 1994.
necessary to continue testing" ildding that " France
should carry out a minimum of tests before rati
fying the test ban treaty " 2o.
245. It should be recalled that, on l5th October
1993, the Committee on Defence and Armed
Forces of the French National Assembly pub-
lished an information report on the simulation of
nuclear testing which concluded that " all the
information collected and compiled ... demon-
strates conclusively that France should be able to
carry out nuclear tests " and that " without further
nuclear tests France cannot be sure it is capable of
acquiring a simulation system that guarantees it
full control over its weaponry thus assuring the
country's security and independence ".
246. The new programme law has clearly discar-
ded the development of smart nuclear weapons
for the time being, and the question remains whe-
ther France will be able to maintain its three sepa-
rate nuclear systems 
- 
ground-based, sea-based
and air-launched 
- 
in the longer term.
IX. Nuclear weapons co-operatian in Europe;
tow ards European nuclear deterre nc e ?
247. Even if it does not sound attractive to many
in Europe and the United States, the credibility of
the United States strategy of extended deterrence
is subject to erosion. Certainly, at present no
American government is prepared to say or even
imply that it will withdraw the remaining tactical
nuclear warheads from European territory. The
withdrawal of all battlefield theatre nuclear wea-
pons because they had indeed become less appro-
priate in the new NATO strategy, militarily unne-
cessary and politically unacceptable was a first
step, agreed upon wholeheartedly by all allies.
But what will happen in the long term to the 700
8-61 tactical nuclear gravity bombs, that remain
on European soil after the 5O7o reduction decided
by NATO in October l99l?
248. The new NATO policy of nuclear weapons
of last resort, with the even more remote chance
of their being used, does not fit very well with
the European concept of real deterrence to all
types of war. It tends to imply a preference on
the part of the United States for doing away with
nuclear weapons with which neither politicians
nor the military feel comfortable because they
cannot be used easily and are a disadvantage to
the strong in a world where proliferation is on
the increase.
249. It goes without saying that, given the Maas-
tricht Treaty's declared intention of developing a
common European foreign and security policy
and European defence identity, the r6le of
France's and the United Kingdom's nuclear wea-
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pons in this framework cannot be ignored. Sooner
or later this issue will have to be considered
thoroughly.
250. There have been modest efforts in the past
to discuss different possibilities for co-operation
or consultation with Europcan allies. French offr-
cials have made various suggestions which should
be mentioned here.
251. In July 1990, the then French Defence
Minister, Jean-Pierre ChevEnement, suggested
that a Western European defence partnership offe-
ring Germany nuclear protection was the only
possible choice, given that United States protec-
tion might become less certain, and Germany's
developing its own nuclear deterrent would not be
an attractive option 25. In January 1992, President
Mitterrand raised the question of whether it might
be possible to develop a " European doctrine "
within the European Community for the French
and British nuclear forces. He argued that this
would " very rapidly become one of the major
questions in the construction of a joint European
defence " 26.
252. In September 1992, the then French Defence
Minister, Pierre Joxe, was more forthcoming on
the conditions of such co-operation when he sta-
ted: " Agreement among Europeans on a single
doctrine, and the establishment of an appropriate
political structure, seem to me to be essential pre-
conditions for the development of a European
nuclear deterrent. However, we can already envi-
sage multilateral consultation on conditions for
the implementation of nuclear weapons and a
broadening of the nuclear guarantee. There is a
need for dialogue among Europeans on this sub-
ject. " 21
253. The British Defence Minister has also sta-
ted that he sees great benefit in closer co-opera-
tion and cohesion in nuclear matters between the
United Kingdom and France, albeit " within the
overall framework of the alliance" ".
254. Obviously, in the initial stage, there is a
need for co-operation between France and the
United Kingdom and steps have been taken in this
direction.
255. On 26th July 1993, France and the United
Kingdom decided that the Anglo-French Joint
Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine
which had been established on a provisional basis
in autumn 1992 should acquire a permanent sta-
tus. The commission, which brings together
senior officials from the British and French
Foreign and Defence Ministries, has now underta-
25. Le Monde, l3th July 1990.
26. President Mitterrand, speech on l0th January 1992.
27. Piene Joxe,29th September 1992.
28. Address by the Defence Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind,
autumn 1993.
ken a comparison of the approaches of the two
countries to the r6le of deterrence, nuclear doc-
trines and concepts, anti-missile defences, arms
confiol and non-proliferation. Measures to improve
safety and security are also being discussed but
clearly practical co-operation, such as co-ordina-
tion of SSBN paffols and the avoidance of dupli-
cation in targeting, is ruled out for the time being.
256. United Kingdom officials have stressed
that there are almost no differences between
France and the United Kingdom on fundamental
nuclear issues, the only important one being that,
according to the British, there is a follow-on use
after sub-strategic employment of nuclear
weapons, while the French do not allow for a
follow-on use between sub-strategic employment,
which they understand to be the final warning and
the holocaust. Both countries, however, consider
their nuclear weapons an insurance policy against
any possible threat to their vital interests, i.e. the
security of Europe. In developing the Franco-
British dialogue and co-operation, the United
Kingdom does not explicitly attempt to create an
alternative to the existing transatlantic relation-
ship. It aims rather to strengthen the specific
European contribution to the deterrence underpin-
ning the collective security of the whole alliance.
257. According to the British Defence Minister
" it is very difficult today to identify any area
where (the United Kingdom and France) are likely
to have a fundamental difference of national secu-
rity interest as members of the European Union ".
However, he also added that " it is equally diffi-
cult to conceive within the Atlantic Alliance of a
substantial threat to one country which would not
also be a threat to the other " 
'e.
258. It should be noted nevertheless, that in
October 1993 the United Kingdom withdrew its
participation in the development of a common air-
to-surface long-range missile. This can hardly be
interpreted as a positive sign in terms of practical
co-operation.
259. The French defence white paper of Febru-
ary 1994 rightly stated that the problem of a Euro-
pean nuclear doctrine would become one of the
major questions in developing a common Euro-
pean defence. The issue would become the more
urgent as the European Union created its political
identity alongside its security and defence iden-
tity. The dialogue with the United Kingdom would
need to be continued and deepened, but this would
not exclude exchanges with other partners.
260. However, there would not be a European
nuclear doctrine unless there were vital European
interests, considered as such by Europeans and
understood as such by others.
29. Address by the Defence Secretary, Malcolm Rikfind,
autumn 1993.
195
DOCUMENT I42O
261. France, which is not a member of NATO's
Nuclear Planning Group, has never been fonh-
coming in sharing information with its non-
nuclear allies.
262. It should also be noted that President Mir
terrand's 1986 declaration of intent on consulta-
tion with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic
of Germany before any French use of nuclear
weapons on German soil has never led to a Franco-
German understanding on the basis of operational
and strategic principles. Nevertheless, it is a major
concern of France's foreign policy to ensure that
reunified Germany is solidly anchored in a Euro-
pean Union with a European defence identity as a
rational component. In this framework, Germany
must be provided with a credible nuclear deter-
rent, on the one hand to protect it from any pos-
sible Russian nuclear coercion and on the other to
avoid its being compelled to develop its own
nuclear deterrent.
263. In the past, France has stressed the inde-
pendence of its nuclear deterrent and the r6le of
the latter in the protection of its national territory.
It could be argued that France's commitment to
building a European defence identity might be
called into question unless France were prepared
to discuss the r6le of its nuclear forces within a
wider European framework.
264. The maintenance of maximum uncertainty
over the possible use of French nuclear weapons,
which is an essential aspect of any nuclear
weapons doctrine, would certainly not satisfy
those European allies who had come a long way
towards agreement with the earlier French objec-
tive of building a European defence identity.
265. Recently, it has been argued that technical
and doctrinal rapprochements within Western
Europe would consolidate the political legitimacy
of nuclear deterrence. It might not be compatible
with the political and strategic solidarity that
Europe is seeking if nuclear weapons were based
only on the territory of nuclear states. A French
strategist has suggested closer links between
France, the United Kingdom and Germany in the
development of doctrine and nuclear delivery sys-
tems as ways of building this solidarity 
'0.
266. One might question whether such co-ope-
ration should be restricted to these three nations,
while in NATO it is occurring in a much wider
framework in accordance with the Nassau and
Athens agreements.
267. Various options can be considered for Uni-
ted Kingdom/French nuclear protection of their
non-nuclear European allies.
30. Jean-Marie Gu6henno, " L'avenir de la dissuasion
nucldaire ", in Ministdre de la D6fense, Un nouveau d6bat
stratdgique : Actes du colloque de Paris, 29th-30th Septem-
ber, lst October 1992 (Paris: Documentation Frangaise,
1993).
268. One is that both nations consider the secu-
rity of the other member states of Western Euro-
pean Union to be a vital interest.
269. A second, seemingly logical option, is the
application of Article V of the modified Brussels
Treaty which stipulates that " ...the other high
contracting parties will (...) afford the party so
attacked all the military and other aid and assis-
tance in their power ".
270. A thfud would be for the European Union
completely to absorb the existing national auto-
nomy and sovereignty of the member states.
However, at present this seems a somewhat
utopian idea.
271. The French Defence Minister, Frangois
L6otard, may have been hinting at this possibility
when he stated in a recent interview 3'.
" I believe Europe is one of the fundamen-
tal issues of the late 20th century. Howeveq
I also believe that conftol over nuclear wea-
ponry should stay in the hands ofnations. It
is essentially management of fear and as
such cannot be on a shared basis, even ifits
use is not intended ... At present there are
only national powers. Who knows if the
day will come when there will be a single,
legitimate political power in Europe? I
hope so but I cannot see it happening in the
near future ... Use, or even management, of
nuclear weapons can only be through a
highly centralised system, under the res-
ponsibility of a single leadership. "
272. On the subject of the possible extension of
deterrence to other countries, the minister obser-
ved:
" The major lesson I learned from General
de Gaulle is that a nation's leaders alone are
able to evaluate where their country's
highest interest lies and when that interest
is threatened. In the last resort a nation has
no friends. "
273. In the light of this reversion to the old Gaul-
list views, as though no developments at all had
occurred in European integration since the 1960s,
one might wonder what are the alternatives: co-
operation in NATO, supported by American
extended deterrence, avowedly losing credibility
on account ofthe increasing reluctance on the part
of United States political and military authorities
to use such weapons, or the tenuous hope that, at
the moment of truth, France will regard you as a
friend.
274. It should be observed that individual
nations, even if closely linked in the framework of
the Maastricht Treaty, can only really share a cre-
dible declared policy ofnuclear deterrence ifthere
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is a homogeneous political union and a common
political authority. In which case, it would appear
inevitable that all participating nations should
share financial responsibility for the maintenance
of the nuclear forces required for deterrence.
275. As to Anglo-French nuclear co-operation:
when, in October 1993, the United Kingdom deci-
ded to cancel its participation in the development
of air-to-surface long-range missile, arguing that
the new Trident SLBM could be used in a secon-
dary sub-strategic r6le, it was stated that tentative
work would continue on designs for a possible
future missile system that could result in an
Anglo-French strategic weapon.
276. It should also be borne in mind that the
French concept of the development of a European
defence identity is not fully shared by the United
Kingdom. Although France may be developing
the idea of a joint Western European deterrent in
that framework based on French and British
nuclear forces, it should not be forgotten that at
this juncture the British have a radical Atlanticist
view of nuclear deterrence which does not in fact
allow for any decoupling of their nuclear forces or
strategies from those of the United States.
277. In the British view, NATO's Nuclear Plan-
ning Group already provides the appropriate mul-
tilateral consultation forum for nuclear deterrence
protecting Western Europe.
278. There are indeed some major differences
between the positions of British and French
nuclear forces. Both nations sfess the independent
character of these nuclear forces, but the United
Kingdom has committed them to NATO, which
means that they are in the framework of the single
integrated operational plan, providing an automa-
tic deterrent for all non-nuclear allies. The United
Kingdom " would regard her own vital interests at
stake in any attack upon an alliance member " 32.
France does not participate in ttre work of NAIO's
Nuclear Planning Group and, notwithstanding
recent suggestions made by President Mitterrand
and former Defence Minister Pierre Joxe, official
policy is that France's nuclear forces remain under
national command, at the disposal only of the Head
of State and intended to protect France's national
territory and vital interests.
279. It has been rightly said that, political consi-
derations apart, it will not be easy for the United
Kingdom to establish close practical co-operation
with France in nuclear matters because its nuclear
forces, soon to consist exclusively of four Trident
submarines, are almost completely dependent on
the United States. Until now, therefore, British
nuclear forces came relatively cheap.
280. Any co-operative Franco-British programme
to develop a new nuclear weapon will be very
expensive and it is debatable whether it could be
achieved without testing.
281. In other words it can be argued that the
United States' agreements with the former Soviet
Union and its moves towards a comprehensive
test-ban treaty are in practice blocking the deve-
lopment of an effective European nuclear force.
282. No European nuclear co-operation would
be feasible without close German involvement.
Purely Franco-British nuclear co-operation might
be experienced by Germany as a force that had to
be counter-balanced, and there would be strong
pressure against such co-operation unless the Ger-
mans were invited to participate in one way or
another.
283. There is no other way of establishing such
co-operation than by small incremental steps. One
of these might be to create a nuclear co-ordination
body, operating at European level, with the Ger-
mans participating and possibly in contact with
the United States.
X, Third country proffirators
284. As is well known, there are a number of
states which are not official nuclear weapon states
and are either possessors of nuclear weapons or
have the ability to assemble them quickly. Of
these states, only Israel is believed to possess a
nuclear arsenal of any size (between 50 and 300
nuclear weapons) including ballistic missile capa-
bilities. India and Pakistan are both believed to
have the ability to assemble nuclear weapons
quickly in a crisis. India has a well-advanced bal-
listic missile development programme and has
performed test launches of intermediate- and
short-range ballistic missiles. Pakistan is believed
to have acquired missile technologies and mate-
rials from China.
285. Iran has been accused ofhaving a clandes-
tine nuclear weapon prograrnme. After the Gulf
war, Iraq's nuclear weapon design and testing
facilities, as well as its key missile production
equipment, were destroyed in accordance with
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 687
and 715.
286. At present, the problems with North
Korea over its secret nuclear weapons pro-
gramme have not yet been solved. This country
is also a manufacturer of ballistic missiles and a
major supplier of such to countries in the deve-
loping world.
287. Apart from the countries mentioned above,
a number of other states may feel tempted to
develop or acquire their own nuclear weapons
capability and the appropriate means of delivery.
As is argued elsewhere in this report, it is gener-
ally admitted that none of the existing non-proli-
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feration r6gimes will be able to prevent them from
attaining their objective from the moment they
devote sufficient financial resources and zeal to
this task.
XI. N on-proliferation rd gime s
288. Of the existing non-proliferation r6gimes
which are of particular importance for nuclear non-
proliferation, the following should be mentioned: 33
(a) Treaty on the non-proffiration
of nuchar weapons (NPT)
289. In the 1960s, it was becoming increasingly
clear that the spread of nuclear technology for
peaceful purposes could also easily lead to a pro-
liferation of nuclear weapon capabilities which
could not be controlled adequately by the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), estab-
lished in 1956.
290. In order to check this technology prolifera-
tion, a large number of countries signed the treaty
on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, estab-
lished in 1968, which came into effect in 1970 and
according to which:
" the nuclear' have-nots ' promised to forgo
the acquisition of nuclear weapons in return
for a commitment by the nuclear ' haves ' to
make available nuclear-related technology
which would help them to develop peaceful
nuclear energy (Article IV). The non-
nuclear weapon states fuither had to conclu-
de an arrangement with the IAEA for the
employment of safeguards on all sources of
fissionable material in their peaceful-use
nuclear plants. These obligatioris are laid
down in Articles I-III of the treaty, which
limit the so-called ' horizontal ' proliferation
of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapon states,
in turn, were obliged to pursue negotiations
'in good faith' to put a halt to the nuclear
arms race, and to achieve complete nuclear
disarmament (so-called 'vertical ' non-pro-
liferation, see Article VI). " '
291. A review conference has since been held
every five years in order to reassess the effective-
ness of the treaty's safeguard system. France and
China, two of the five declared nuclear weapons
states, which for different reasons refused to sign
the NPT for many years, finally acceded to the
treaty on 3rd August and 9th March 1992,respec-
tively.
33-F". . rr..inct review of all existing non-proliferation
regimes, see Peter van ham, Managing non-proliferation
r6gimes in the 1990s, Royal Institute of International Affairs,
1993.
34. Peter van Ham, Managing non-proliferation r6gimes in
the 1990s, page 13.
292. On the other hand, serious questions have
been raised about the NPT colnpliance of China,
Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and South Africa.
In March 1993 North Korea became the first
country to announce its intention to withdraw
from the NPT 3s.
293. The NPT system of IAEA safeguards has
been essential to deter potential proliferators by
increasing the risk of detection of the diversion of
nuclear-related material and it remains a sine qua
non for commercial nuclear trade since it estab-
lishes confidence in the recipient state's peaceful
intentions with its nuclear prograrnme.
294. In 1970, a special non-proliferation treaty
exports committee was established (the so-called
Zangger Committee) and a register was agreed,
specifying items which should be regarded as
equipment and material designed or prepared for
manufacturing nuclear weapons (" trigger list ").
In this framework, exporters must insist upon a
non-explosive use assurance given by the reci-
pient state, the material must be subject to IAEA
safeguards and be re-exported only under similar
conditions.
295. Recent events in Iraq and North Korea,
both signatory states to the NPT and IAEA, have
clearly demonstrated that the existing internatio-
nal r6gime does not prevent clandestine nuclear
weapon activities.
296. In accordance with Article X.2 of the NPT,
a conference will be convened in 1995 in order to
decide whether the NPT will be extended for an
additional period of time, whether it will be conti-
nued indefinitely, or whether it will simply expire.
This conference will also review the treaty's
implementation.
297. The 1995 conference is considered to be of
the greatest importance since the NPT is the key-
stone of the whole non-proliferation r6gime in
existence. Negotiations on an extension of the
treaty will be complicated because of the fact that
many issues are involved. Many third world coun-
tries are not satisfied with their share of the politi-
cal bargain upon which the NPT was based:
peaceful nuclear technology in exchange for a
pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons. They
argue that nuclear technology transfer has to be
restricted and that the nuclear weapon states
should stop modernising their nuclear weapons
arsenals. They may make an extension of the NPT
conditional upon the conclusion of a comprehen-
sive test ban treaty.
298 Connected with the debate on a compre-
hensive test ban treaty is the demand by many
countries for a commitment by the nuclear
weapon states to a timetable for their nuclear
disarmament. For obvious reasons, this demand
198
35. SIPRI yearbook 1992,page 56.
DOCUMENT 1420
may come from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, other CIS
republics and the Baltic states, but both Japan and
Germany may also be interested.
299. It should further be noted that many non-
nuclear states will seek security assurances from
the nuclear weapons states either of a negative
character (commitments not to use, or threaten to
use their nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
states) or a positive character (commitments to
come to the aid of a non-nuclear weapon state
threatened by nuclear weapons or against which
nuclear weapons have been used).
300. Although in February 1992 the IAEA
Board of Governors significantly improved the
operation of the IAEA safeguards system, new
attempts will be made to introduce new safe-
guarding concepts.
301. With the United States now having worked
out a docffine for the use of military force against
the nuclear facilities of proliferant states, this
issue will certainly be discussed in connection
with the implementation of Article IV.
302. The 1995 NPT extension and review confe-
rence takes place in an era with more opportuni-
ties than ever before for greater international col-
laboration to prevent nuclear proliferation.
Nuclear arms conffol and non-proliferation activi-
ties are so closely linked that they can hardly be
dedt with separately. The r6le of the IAEA could
be enhanced, not only in controlling an extended
safeguard system, but also in safeguarding fissile
materials recovered from dismantled nuclear
warheads and maybe even in providing secreta-
riat, verification and inspection services for state
parties to a comprehensive test ban ffeaty.
(b) Missile technologlt control rdgime (MTCR)
303. The MTCR is an informal agreement, estab-
lished in 1987 by the G-7 countries in order to
control the exportation of missile technologies
and major sub-systems 36. Later a number of other
industrialised countries joined this agreement
while others pledged to observe its spirit and
guidelines. The main reasons for setting up the
MTCR was that the acquisition of missile systems
or the technology to develop them will greatly
enhance the military power and effectiveness of
proliferant nations since it provides them with a
means to deliver their weapons of mass desffuc-
tion.
304. It is recognised that the MTCR, as other
existing export control r6gimes, does not provide
a leak-proofprotection against the proliferation of
missile technology. The r6gime has several weak
points such as its limited membership, the fact
that missile technology is an issue much less tain-
ted than nuclear technology, and the divergent
export control legislations of those states adhering
to it.
305. It should also be mentioned that many
third-world countries are perceiving the lack of
access to modern missile technologies as another
symptom of paternalism by the developed world,
which is denying them a means of further econo-
mic and industrial development.
(c) Comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT)
306. In October 1992, a law came into force in
the United States mandating a pernanent ban on
all United States nuclear tests after 30th Septem-
ber 1996, " unless a foreign state conducts a
nuclear test after that date ". The same legislation
required the suspension of all United States
nuclear tests from 1st October 1992 antll at least
1st July 1993, a suspension which has since been
prolonged. The Clinton administration has deci-
ded not to resume testing and is now actively pur-
suing the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban
treaty.
307. The administration was directed to submit
to Congress a schedule for the resumption of test
talks with Russia and a " plan for achieving a mul-
tilateral ban on the testing of nuclear weapons by
30th September 1996 ". A worldwide test ban
could be an important instrument to thwart the
development of new sophisticated nuclear arse-
nals by proliferant nations.
308. It is noted that a first generation, relatively
low-yield nuclear weapon can be developed
without testing, provided that the combination of
a certain technological level, the necessary
nuclear material and the determination to succeed
are united. The development of more sophistica-
ted nuclear weapons, however, does require a
high or very high technological level and testing.
309. After a first commitment made by Presi-
dent Gorbachev in October 1991 not to conduct
nuclear tests for one year, this Russian morato-
rium has been extended by President Yeltsin.
310. In France, President Mitterrand had
announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear
testing in April 1992 which was confirmed by
Prime Minister Balladur on l4th February 1994.
Although this decision has often since been criti-
cised, in particular by those who support the righr
wing government now in power, France has pled-
ged to continue its moratorium for as long as the
United States and Russia refrain from testing.
France is certainly prepared to co-operate in the
establishment of a CTBT which it considers to be
an important tool in non-proliferation efforts. It
has emphasised that such a treaty should then be
both universal and verifiable. Advocates of resu-
med testing argue that it would allow improve-
ments to be made in safety, security and reliabi-36. Document 1305, paragraph 7l et seq.
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lity and new warheads for future delivery systems
and a broader specffum of nuclear weapons to be
developed, including high-precision lower-yield
weapons which some consider to be essential for
a more selective and discriminate approach in
France's nuclear doctrine. It is also argued that
France does not yet have the extensive computer
simulation programmes which enabled the United
States to renounce testing. It is highly unlikely,
however, that France will resume testing before
the presidential elections in 1995 and even after
that date such a decision would be difficult to
defend for any of President Mitterrand's possible
successors 3'.
311. China conducted several nuclear tests in
1992 and 1993, but it has stated that it was willing
to discuss nuclear test issues with all the members
of the Conference on Disarmament. On the other
hand, one of the conditions for its participation in
a comprehensive test ban treaty is that states with
the largest nuclear arsenals should take the lead in
" halting testing, production and deployment and
drastically reducing those weapons 38 ". Beijing
would be prepared to participate after " tangible
progress " by those states.
(d) Cocom
312. In the autumn of 1993, it was decided that
Cocom would cease to exist on 3lst March 1994,
being succeeded by an organisation with a broa-
der membership and a changed mandate. Cocom
had become the target of increased criticism, even
among its own members, who in the absence of
the former cold war consensus were not prepared
to maintain its complicated and laborious export
control system while many new and important
export markets were developing in formerly pros-
cribed countries.
313. The objective is now to create a new organ-
isation before the end of 1994, with an extended
membership and concentrating on a proliferation
control agenda. Efforts are being made to regula-
te the transfer to proliferant nations of dual-use
technologies, which contribute greatly to the
spread of weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems. Cocom's old and somewhat
extensive proscribed item list will very probably
be replaced by an enhanced " super-core " list of
8 to 10 technologies, transfer of which will be
prohibited to an agreed list of countries. Apart
from the old Cocom member states, the new
organisation might include Austria, Finland, Ire-
land, Sweden, Switzerland and New Zealand.
Efforts are being made also to include China, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia and
Slovakia.
37. See also Chapter VIll (b) of the present report.
38. SIPRI year book 1992, page 564.
314. Even if the efforts to transform the former
Cocom into a new non-proliferation organisation
are welcomed, there can be little doubt that the
new r6gime will be far less effective for many
obvious reasons, some of which are mentioned
below.
315. If the objective is to include all the leading
suppliers, it will be difficult to reach agreement on
the list of proscribed counffies.
316. Abandoning the Cocom consensus rule on
approving technology transfers will considerably
weaken the control system. In the future, national
discretion will determine whether an item not on
the very limited " super-core " list is to be trans-
ferred. The new organisation will not be able to
exercise a veto over intended export activities of
its members; there will only be prior consulta-
tion.
317. One of the criteria for membership of the
new organisation is that national export-control
systems must meet a minimum standard similar to
that required for Cocom member states. It should
be noted, however, that many of the former War-
saw Pact countries which ought and are willing to
be members of the new organisation in fact do not
meet its requirements for a snict export-control
system. Even though the Cocom co-ordination
forum and NACC have been helpful in improving
their export-conftol administration, it is likely that
some of these states will constitute a weak link in
the new framework.
318. It should also be noted that developing
countries are criticising the establishment of a
new multilateral control rdgime because it might
limit their access to dual-use technologies. This is
considered to be one of the issues in North-South
relations that will complicate negotiations in the
1995 NPT review and extension conference.
319. Moreover, the new independent republics
of the former Soviet Union consider the export of
dual-use technologies, in particular to developing
countries, as one of the few methods available for
converting their defence industries and improving
their economies.
XII. Conclusions
(a) Do we still need nuclear weapons?
320. With the development of the nuclear
weapons policies of the four nuclear weapons
powers involved in Europe's security, what
should be the conclusions as regards the r6le and
future of these weapons in Europe?
321. Even if some argue to the contrary, one
can but recall that during the many years of the
cold war nuclear weapons played an important
r6le in maintaining a balance in Europe. It may
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have been a balance of terror, but, because of the
risk of degeneration into a nuclear exchange, it
prevented any of the parties involved from
embarking upon a military adventure in order to
change the status quo. Mass destruction was
considered to be a real possibility and therefore
the risk was unacceptable. Over the years, the old
adversaries had learned the rules of the nuclear
weapons game and in the later years of the cold
war they felt confident and comfortable enough
to agree on the withdrawal of tactical nuclear
weapons and the limitation of strategic arms.
Nuclear deterrence worked well in relations bet-
ween East and West and there is no reason to
believe that the present or possibly even a future
leadership in Russia with different views will not
act in accordance with the many tacit understan-
dings that have become part and parcel of deter-
rence between the traditional nuclear powers and
which have been extremely effective.
322. Indeed, this alone is good reason to
argue that the members of the Atlantic Alliance
will have to maintain their nuclear forces as an
insurance policy to protect them against any pos-
sible resurgence of aggressive imperialism. Like-
wise, Russia will want to maintain its nuclear
forces as tangible proof of its status in the world
and as a hedge against any possible feeling of
being blackmailed by other nuclear states, such as
China for example.
323. Another reason for nuclear weapon states
to keep a nuclear arsenal is that they do not have
the option of returning to a condition of pre-
nuclear innocence. It should be emphasised here
that none of the existing non-proliferation
r6gimes nor even a comprehensive test ban treaty
can prevent the acquisition by third countries of
ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons or other
weapons of mass destruction.
324. The possession of somewhat reduced but
still relatively large arsenals of nuclear weapons
by the official nuclear weapon states would at
least prevent a situation where the acquisition of a
small number of nuclear weapons would provide
a nation with a disproportionate influence in its
region or even in the world.
325. Does the possession of nuclear weapons
protect against proliferation to third countries?
326. The answer cannot be a straightforward
" yes " or " no ". As stated above, the possession
of a reasonably large number of nuclear weapons
can deter a third country from the acquisition of a
substantial nuclear arsenal be it only for reasons
of cost. A third country which has acquired
nuclear weapons could be deterred from using
them in a crisis or conflict because, in accordance
with the classical docffine of deterrence, it would
be threatened with such destructive retaliation
that the risk of unacceptable losses would be grea-
ter than the advantages it might gain from aggres-
sion. There is no guarantee, however, that third
countries will react according to the rules of the
game established between the superpowers. Alto-
gether, however, it may be concluded that the pos-
session of a nuclear arsenal may play a positive
r6le in protection against third country prolifera-
tors.
327. On the other hand, the question arises of
whether nuclear weapons should be used against
third countries if they threaten to resort to
weapons of mass destruction. Most strategists
argue that modern, highly-sophisticated conven-
tional precision weapons could do whatever is
necessary in such circumstances. It is thought
here that the development of low-yield, high-pre-
cision nuclear weapons for such purposes is not
desirable, particularly since it would lower the
nuclear threshold in the event of a conflict.
328. It is essential that Europe draw the conse-
quences of the changes wrought in the world
nuclear landscape 3e which can be described as
follows:
(i) all nuclear weapons come into the
strategic 6chelon;
(ii) tactical and infra-strategic nuclear
weapons disappear. in favour of high-
precision, high-yield conventional
weapons (c.f. the Gulf war);
(iii) remaining nuclear weapons will no
longer be deployed in any large num-
bers in external theatres of operations.
The trend is for nuclear arms, other
than easily-deployable nuclear subma-
rine missile-launchers and airborne
systems, to be returned to their natio-
nal territories;
(iv) the evolution of doctrines is towards
minimal nuclear deterrence; this evo-
lution could be slowed down by the
politically unstable and conservative
position of Russia;
(v) for reasons of cost and strategic uncer-
tainty, all nuclear weapons countries
are tending to suspend development
and production of new nuclear wea-
pons systems.
(b) Towards a Earopean nuclear deterrent
329. Europe cannot remain indifferent to these
fundamental changes in the nuclear landscape,
although it seems to have little interest in the
matter for the present. Is this because it is
playing for time in order first to analyse the evo-
39. See also: Memento, L'Europe et la s6curit6 nationale
1993, GRIP, Brussels.
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lution of geostrategic balances, because it is
seeking to maintain the status quo, resting on its
laurels, reluctant to jeopardise a minimal
consensus achieved only with difficulty - or
perhaps for a mixture of all these reasons?
However, Europe must of necessity reach a
decision in this matter. It would be unimagi-
nable for the European Union to define a com-
mon foreign and security policy and at the same
time for France and Britain to continue to insist
on defining their vital interests as they perceive
them, in isolation, protected by their strike
forces. Can one claim that the will exists to
create a political Europe if the component states
are to be denied the right to participate in the
development of the doctrine of deterrence which
is supposed to assure their common protection?
330. The debate on the European nuclear deter-
rent will be the moment of trurth in the consffuc-
tion of a European political union.
33I. Apart from France and Great Britain which
are nuclear powers in their own right, Belgium,
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands have for
decades undertaken nuclear missions on behalf of
the Atlantic Alliance. For this reason your Rap-
porteur is convinced that the progressive develop-
ment of a European nuclear strategy by a WEU
strategic studies group can and must succeed. The
task will be a long, awkward and arduous one, but
what was possible in the Nuclear Planning Group
of the Atlantic Alliance should also be possible
within WEU for on it depend the security and
external credibility of the European Union.
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APPENDIX I
Status of non-US aidforformer Soviet weapon complex
30th December 1993
International
International Science and Technology Center
Britain
250 weapon containers, 20 transport vehicles
Finland
International Science and Technology Center
France
nuclear safety aid
Germany
offer to Ukraine: dispose of liquid fuel
Italy
safety equipment for Russia
Japan
Framework agreement
- Assist in destruction of liquid fuel
- Plan for plutonium disposal
- Joint research with Russia on a breeder reactor
- Breeder reactor to use excess plutonium
- Use new plutonium reactor
- Demilitarise plutonium
Amount
(in millions)
$70
f30
N/A
FFI60
DM20
s6
$100
N/A
(Source: The Arms Control Reporter 1993-1994).
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Soviet
September 1990
CN
January 1994
Projected
Russian
START
Projected
Russian
START II
ICBMs
ss-l I
SS-13
SS.17
SS-18
ss-19
SS-24 Silo
SS-24 Rail
SS-25 Road-mobile
SS-25 Mod 2 Road mobile
SS-25 Mod 2 Silo
Total
SLBMs
SS-N-6
ss-N-8
SS-N-I7
ss-N-18
SS-N.20
ss-N-23
Total
Bombers
Bear-A/B
Bear-G
Bear-H (6)
Bear-H (16)
Blackjack
Total
Total
326
40
188
3 080
1 800
560
330
288
0
0
0
0
160
2900
r 680
560
360
405
0
0
0
0
0
1 540
630
100
330
500
50
50
0
0
0
0
105
0
0
500
100
300
6 6t2
t92
280
t2
672| 200
448
6 06s
0
64
0
672
I 200
448
3200
0
0
0
528
720
448
l 005
0
0
0
528
'720
448
2804
t7
92
t62
912
180
2384
0
0
t62
9t2
300
t 696
0
0
162
576
60
696
0
0
162
576
60
t 363
t0 779
I 374
9 823
798
5 694
798
3 499
United States strategic forces - warheads by weapons system
APPENDIX II
SovietlRussian strategic forces - warheads by weapons system
September 1990 January 1994 START(Projected)
START II
(Projected)
ICBMs
MX/Peacekeeper
Minuteman III
Minuteman II
Total
SLBMs
Poseidon (C-3)
Trident I (C-4)
Trident II (D-5)
Total
Bombers
B-1B
B-2
B-52H
B-52G
Total
Total
500
r 500
450
500
l 500
200
500
900
0
0
500
0
2 450
t 920
3 072
768
2200
0
t920| 152
1 400
0
I 536
I 920
500
0
768
960
5 760
I 520
0
l 860
l 056
3 072
r 504
t6
r 860
0
3 456
1 504
320
940
0
t'128
0
320
940
0
4 436
t2u6
3 380
8 652
2764
7 620
t 260
3 488
(Source: Arms Control AssociatiorL Washington D.C.)
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Preface
In preparing the present report, your Rapporteur has been extremely fortunate to receive much kind
help and assistance from all the authorities consulted and she would like to take this opportunity publicly
to thank all concerned for their co-operation.
The Rapporteur met or received evidence from the following:
3rd February 1994 
-WEU, Brussels
Mr. Willem van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU;
Lieutenant-General Marcello Caltabiano, Director of the WEU Planning Cell;
Brigadier-General Roux, Deputy Director of the WEU Planning Cell;
Group Captain Rimmer, Co-ordination section, WEU Planning Cell;
Colonel De Jaeger, Executive Officer;
and the heads of the different sections of the Planning Cell:
Captain Figueiredo;
Colonel Oliver;
Captain Poesze;
Colonel Wolters;
4th February 1994 
- 
SHAPE, Mons
General Waters, United Kingdom Army, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(DSACEUR);
Ambassador Vernon D. Penner, Minister-Counsellor, International Affairs Advisor to
SACEUR;
Vice Admiral Spinozzi, Italian Navy, Deputy Chief of Staff;
Major General Kehoe, United States Airforce, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and
Logistics Division;
Brigadier General Schott, German Army, Chief Policy Branch;
Brigadier General Lange, Danish Army, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Allied Command
Europe Resources;
Mr. Harry Brown, Special Assistant for Politico-Military affairs;
25th March 1994 
-The Hague
Mr. Bert Kwast, Ministry of Defence;
Mr. Pieter de Savornin Lohman, Ministry for Foreign Affairs;
5th May 1994 
- 
Brussels
Mr. Julian Miller, United Kingdom permanent representation at NATO;
Group Captain Rimmer, Co-ordination section, WEU Planning Cell;
Colonel Wolters, Chief of section, Logistics, Movement and Finance Section, WEU Planning
Cell.
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Draft Recommendation
on the WEU Planning Cell 
- 
reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council
The Assembly,
(i) Considering Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty and the decision contained in the declaration of the
member states of WEU at Maastricht on 10th December l99l to develop WEU as the defence component
of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance;
(ii) Considering the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992 on strengthening WEU's operational r6le
through the establishment of a Planning Cell with a number of operational tasks;
(iii) Welcoming the fact that, in the Kirchberg declaration of 9th May 1994, the Council of Ministers of
WEU has confirmed the importance which it attaches to the continued operational development of WEU;
(iv) Welcoming the decisions taken at the NATO summit meeting in Brussels on 10th-11th January
1994 giving full support to the development of a European security and defence identity and to the streng-
thening of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance through Western European Union as the defence
component of the European Union;
(v) Welcoming the NATO summit meeting's decision to endorse the concept of combined joint task
forces (CJTF) which will provide separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed
by NATO orWEU;
(vi) Considering that the abovementioned decisions will make sense only if the Council attaches the
highest priority to strengthening WEU's operational r6le;
(vii) Noting, however, that a clear definition of WEU's requirements for the implementation of the CJTF
concept will have to be accompanied by the establishment of a clear command and control structure pro-
viding the indispensable political-military interface for WEU operations in view of the vital importance of
the CJTF concept for the relevance and effectiveness of future WEU activities and operations;
(viii) Considering that in order to be able to operate in a satisfactory way, WEU will have to benefit from
NATO and national intelligence;
(ix) Stressing that the Planning Cell should have appropriate infrastructure and communication links
with NATO which would allow WEU to perform its tasks as stated in the final communiqu6 of NAIO's
January 1994 Brussels summit meeting,
RpcourrreNos rHAT THE Cor.lNCrL
L Attach the highest priority to the formulation of a common European defence policy in order to pro-
vide a clear reference framework for the activities of the Planning Cell and all other organs of WEU;
2. For the time being, allow the Planning Cell to concentrate on the three main tasks as formulated in
the Petersberg declaration:
- 
keeping an updated list of units and combination of units which would be allocated to WEU for
specific operations;
- 
preparing contingency plans for employment of forces under WEU auspices;
- 
preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication ilrange-
ments, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected;
while ensuring that it can fully participate in, and furthermore work on, the implementation process of the
CJTF concept which is vital for WEU's operational r6le;
3. Ensure that national capitals provide full co-operation with the Planning Cell and urgently settle the
remaining shortcomings in relations between the Planning Cell and NATO in order to help the Planning
Cell implement its basic tasks;
4. Further promote the extension of existing contacts and exchanges of information between WEU and
the United Nations and, in particular, between the WEU Planning Cell and the United Nations Secretary-
General's Military Adviser in New York;
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5. For the planning and possible implementation of peace support operations, adopt the terminology
employed in the United Nations Agenda for Peace;
6. Avoid the multiplication of mandates given to the Planning Cell, if this is not accompanied by a cor-
responding enlargement of its staff;
7. After assessing the Planning Cell's activities and its internal organisation by 1st October 1994,
make the basic choice between maintaining the present military liaison group with limited capability or
establishing a military planning cenffe which should be able to carry out the numerous planning tasks and
other activities which the Council may have in mind;
8. Ensure that the rotation of Planning Cell personnel will be achieved with a minimum of
discontinuity;
9. Promote the internal coherence of the Planning Cell by ensuring that all staff members are remune-
rated in accordance with standards similar to those used for all other WEU staff.
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I. Introduction
1. It is about ayear ago now that the Planning
Cell was officially granted its full operational
capability. According to the Secretary-General's
initial timetable, a full review of the internal orga-
nisation and activities of the Planning Cell should
be made by 1st October 1994.
2. In the past year, the Assembly, which has
welcomed and supported the establishment of a
Planning Cell as a valuable contribution to
WEU's operational capability, has closely fol-
lowed its activities.
3. At this juncture, it seems useful to present a
first succinct evaluation of the Planning Cell's
activities as seen by the Assembly and to offer
some indications and recommendations for the
way ahead. The present report does not, and can-
not, claim to be exhaustive. It is therefore focused
on a number of issues which are considered to be
of primordial importance for the development of
WEU's operational capabilities and the proper
functioning of the Planning Cell in that frame-
work.
II. Establishment and tasks
4. On 19th June 1992, the Council of WEU
meeting in Petersberg decided that on lst October
of that same year, a planning cell would be estab-
lished under the authority of the Council.
5. According to the Petersberg declaration,
the Planning Cell would be responsible for:
- 
preparing contingency plans for the
employment of forces under WEU aus-
plces;
- 
preparing recommendations for the
necessary command, control and com-
munication arrangements, including
standing operating procedures for head-
quarters which might be selected;
- 
keeping an updated list of units and com-
binations of units which would be alloca-
ted to WEU for specific operations.
6. In the terms of reference for the Planning
Cell, the following additional tasks and responsi-
bilities are mentioned:
- 
compile an inventory of rules of engage-
ment;
- 
prepare standard operating procedures
for the selected headquarters;
Explanatory Memorandum
(submilted by Mn. BaameW-Schlaman, Rapporteur)
- 
prepare exercise plans and evaluate the
results of exercises for future planning;
- 
conffibute its expertise to wider reflec-
tions on the development of a military
capability for WEU.
7. In an emergency crisis, it would further
have to:
- 
provide advice to the WEU authorities
on the practicability and nature of any
WEU involvement;
- 
co-ordinate the preparation of deploy-
ment of forces under WEU auspices until
this function is assumed by a nominatedjoint headquarters.
8. The Planning Cell is responsible to the
Council which, in peacetime, will issue overall
directives on planning options and priorities to the
Planning Cell. The Director reports to the Council
following prior examination of the work by the
WEU Chiefs of Defence staff or by the represen-
tatives of member countries' military authorities.
9. According to its terms of reference, the
Planning Cell needs to ensurE, through liaison
with the appropriate authorities, that it is able to
monitor the situation in potential trouble-spots
and follow is development.
10. Since the Planning Cell was considered to
be the focus for contingency planning involving
WEU forces, it would have to ensure that it had
satisfactory contacts and communications with
nations and national headquarters staffs, head-
quarters nominated for military operations under
WEU auspices, as well as with other international
bodies and organisations which might have a r6le
in possible contingencies.
11. The Planning Cell would also have to fiaise
as necessary with the Secretariat-General, the
Defence Representatives Group and other appro-
priate sub-groups of the Council and with the
WEU Satellite Centre.
12. The work of the Planning Cell was distribu-
ted among the following five sections, each of
which has a number of main tasks:
(i) Co-ordination section
Responsible for the internal co-ordination,
as well as the external co-ordination of
military matters with nations, the European
Union, NATO and other international
organisations and conferences.
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(ii) Planning section
The main tasks of this section are:
- 
to develop operational concepts for the
employment of military forces answer-
able to WEU;
- 
to prepare and update broad operational
plans for contingencies which may be
undenaken by forces under WEU;
- 
to maintain details of forces which
nations may be prepared to make avail-
able for WEU operations on a case-by-
case basis;
- 
to develop forces packages which will
relate available forces to planned contin-
gencies;
- 
to conffibute its expertise to wider reflec-
tions on the development of a military
capability for WEU;
- 
to prepare in crises, the directive to the
chosen commander of WEU forces, for
approval by the WEU Council.
(iii) Operations and exercises section
This section must develop the more
detailed application of the broad operatio-
nal plans for contingencies prepared by the
planning section.
It also formulates WEU exercise require-
ments and co-ordinates multinational exer-
cise plans and schedules, as necessary, to
meet possible WEU contingencies.
Finally, it is expected to consult with respec-
tive NAIO bodies and member nations in
monitoring areas of possible crisis or
conflict and in the formulation of intelli-
gence and information requirements which
need to be met for each specific contingency.
(iv) lngistics and movements section
This section is supposed to contribute to all
contingency plans for "forces answerable
to WEU" and define the appropriate arran-
gements on manpower, supplies, move-
ments, medical support and financial
aspects.
It has to develop logistics plans for ensuring
an adequate logistics posture of forces ans-
werable to WEU and at the same time to
monitor developments in the fields of strate-
gic transport for deployment and resupply.
Furthermore, it has to hold consultations on
logistics and movement with respective
NATO bodies and facilities of member
nations and formulate the requirements
which need to be met for each specific
contingency.
(v) Communications section
It must contribute to all contingency plans
for "forces answerable to WEU", define
appropriate arrangements for command,
control, information systems, interoper-
ability and requirements for communication
and electronics for respective contingency
plans.
As well as this, it is supposed to consider
developments in communications within
the alliance and nations to ensure the best
possible awareness of available installa-
tions and formations, consult with respec-
tive national and NAIO bodies to co-ordin-
ate the defined requirements for contin-
gency plans and support the Planning Cell
in all matters of computer security and long
lines (PTT) leasing policy and practices.
13. For this rather ambitious programme of
tasks, a total number of 40 staff members was
allocated to the Planning Cell.
14. In October 1992, the Director, with a limi-
ted number of staff members, started to prepare
the work of the Planning Cell in a temporary loca-
tion. While full operational capability was initi-
ally envisaged for lst April 1993, the Planning
Cell moved to its final location within the WEU
headquarters on 22nd June 1993, where certain
material and other working conditions have not
yet been introduced.
15. Meanwhile, it should be noted that, at its
Luxembourg meeting on 9th May 1994, the
Council decided that the new Central European
associate partners of WEU may have a liaison
arrangement with the Planning Cell.
16. At the same time, it was made known that
the associate members of Iceland, Norway and
Turkey "may nominate officers to the Planning
Cell in order to increase WEU's planning capabili-
ties and to enable WEU to draw more easily on the
associate members' expemise and resources for the
tasks identified in the Petersberg declaration".
III. An early vision of Planning Cell activities
17. The description of the Planning Cell's
main tasks as set out in the Petersberg declaration
had necessarily been rather general, but the
newly-appointed Director, Lieutenant-General
Marcello Caltabiano, when taking up his respon-
sibilities in October 1992, had to concentrate on
reality and work out what should be the initial
priority tasks.
18. At the invitation of the WEU Assembly's
Defence Committee, the Director of the Planning
Cell addressed the committee for the first time at
its meeting on 25th January 1993, providing his
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first opinion on what could be done and how.
General Caltabiano thought it was difficult to
define precisely WEU's geographical area of
interest, but he assumed that it would primarily be
in areas fairly close to Europe.
19. Interaction of the Planning Cell with equi-
valent sffuctures such as NATO and the United
Nations would be paramount for achieving mili-
tary efficiency and all possible steps should be
taken to establish clear relationships and to co-
ordinate with such bodies to avoid duplication.
20. He emphasised that the Planning Cell's first
task should focus on the creation and mainten-
ance of an updated list of units and combinations
of units which nations might, on an ad hoc basis,
make available for operations under the aegis of
WEU.
21. The second task would be to prepare
recommendations for the necessary command and
control arrangements required for any WEU oper-
ation.
22. Another priority was the preparation of
rules of engagement for use in military operations
which should have commonality with NATO
rules of engagement in order to avoid the dangers
of ambiguity and unnecessary duplication of
effort. On the other hand, further work was requi-
red in order to ensure that WEU rules of engage-
ment would be sufficiently flexible to take
account of possible specific WEU missions.
23. An exercise policy would have to be for-
mulated in the longer term, given the need for
extensive consultation between nations and the
need for co-ordination with existing national and
multinational exercises. The Director's aim was
to mount a modest command-post exercise by the
beginning of 1994 and full field training exercises
by the middle of the 1990s.
24. At that moment, the Director found it diffi-
cult to foresee full operational capability for the
Planning Cell by lst April l994.He also saw pro-
blems in the field of budgetary calculations since
it was virtually impossible to see what the costs
would be.
25. He finally stressed that the Planning Cell
would include representatives from all armies
which should allow it to respond to any request
for military advice, but he also pointed out that
the military needed political guidelines which he
hoped would be forthcoming. A first necessity
for WEU might be to define a "common inter-
vention policy" to serve "common European
interests".
26. In the conclusions to this report, an assess-
ment will be made of the implementation of these
priority tasks.
IV Forces answerable to WEU (FAWEA)
27. When Europeans started to talk seriously
about WEU as a European defence organisation,
the ultimate argument of the opponents time and
again was that WEU did not have a military
organisation or an integrated military structure
and that it had no troops.
28. It is no surprise, therefore, that after the
signature of the Maastricht Treaty with Article J.4
on the development of a common foreign and
security policy "including the eventual framing of
a common defence policy, which might in time
lead to a common defence", the Council of Minis-
ters had to take a closer look at this flaw.
29. The first steps were taken in the Petersberg
declaration of 19th June 1992 which set the gen-
eral framework for military units answerable to
WEU in order to sftengthen its operational r6le in
the following paragraphs from Chapter II of the
declaration:
" 2. WEU member states declare that they
are prepared to make available military
units from the whole spectrum of their
conventional armed forces for military
tasks conducted under the authority of
WEU.
3. Decisions to use military units answer-
able to WEU will be taken by the WEU
Council in accordance with the provisions
of the United Nations Charter. Participation
in specific operations will remain a sover-
eign decision of member states in accor-
dance with national constitutions.
4. Apart from contributing to the common
defence in accordance with Anicle 5 of the
Washington Treaty and Article V of the
modified Brussels Treaty respectively,
military units of WEU member states,
acting under the authority of WEU, could
be employed for:
- 
humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- 
peace-keeping tasks;
- 
tasks of combat forces in crisis-manage-
ment, including peace-making.
5. The planning and execution of these
tasks will be fully compatible with the mili-
tary dispositions necessary to ensure the
collective defence of all allies.
6. Military units will be drawn from the
forces of WEU member states, including
forces with NATO missions 
- 
in this case
after consultation with NATO 
- 
and will be
organised on a multinational and multi-
service basis.
7. All WEU member states will soon
designate which of their military units and
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headquarters they wouldbe willing to make
available to WEU for its various possible
tasks. Where multinational formations
drawn from the forces of WEU nations
already exist or are planned, these units
could be made available for use under the
authority of WEU, with agreement of all
participating nations.
8. WEU member states intend to develop
and exercise the appropriate capabilities to
enable the deployment of WEU military
units by land, sea or air to accomplish these
tasks."
30. In fact, however, the designation of such
forces answerable to WEU appeared to be more
complicated than was thought initially. At its
meeting in Rome on 19th May 1993 the WEU
Council of Ministers "took note of the report of
the Defence Representatives Group and mandated
the Permanent Council to reach timely conclu-
sions and to present a progress report to the next
ministerial meeting on the forces answerable to
WEU, in particular for the conduct of humanita-
rian and peace-keeping operations."
31. The third task of such forces as mentioned
in the Petersberg declaration 
- 
to act as combat
forces in crisis-management, including peace-
making 
- 
was no longer mentioned in the mand-
ate for the Permanent Council because the new
mandate was understood to connect with the
dynamic concept of peace-keeping as used in the
United Nations Agenda for Peace.
32. As is known, the United Nations Agenda
for Peace makes a distinction between the follow-
ing different activities in United Nations sponso-
red peace-support operations: peace-making,
peace-building, peace-enforcement and peace-
keeping. In this concept, peace-making is a politi-
cal and diplomatic process which does not imply
the projection of military force. Peace-building is
defined as an "action to identify and support
structures which will tend to strengthen and
solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into
conflict". A following phase, peace-keeping,
includes "the deployment of a United Nations pre-
sence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all
the parties concerned, normally involving United
Nations military and/or police personnel and fre-
quently civilians as well".
33. It is recommended here that organisations
such as WEU, which might take action under the
aegis of a United Nations mandate, adopt the ter-
minology of the United Nations Agenda for Peace
for the various peace suppon operations to pre-
vent misunderstandings as regards the different
possible activities.
34. In this framework of relations between
WEU and the United Nations, Recommendation
542 is recalled, in which the WEU Assembly
asked the Council to instruct the Planning Cell to
offer advice for the United Nations Secretary-
General's Military Adviser in New York, espe-
cially with a view to facilitating the creation of a
similar Planning Cell for the United Nations.
35. In its reply to this recommendation, the
Council recognised the importance of increased
contacts and exchanges of information between
the United Nations and WEU. It recognised that
WEU contributions in the field of planning and
periodic contacts between the Planning Cell
representatives and the responsible United
Nations staff could be of real value. In a letter
addressed to his united Nations counterpart,
dated 25th June 1993, the WEU Secretary-
General proposed to step up contacts and
exchanges of information between both organisa-
tions.
36. Since the Council's reply of 14th October
1993, no further details have been made known
officially, and it seems that contacts between the
WEU Planning Cell and relevant United Nations
staff are more ad hoc than periodic.
37. At the ministerial meeting of 22nd Novem-
ber 1993, it was made clear that the European
corps, the multinational division (central) and the
Anglo-Dutch amphibious force had already been
declared as multinational forces answerable to
wEU (FAWEU).
38. As regards national forces which could be
put under the authority of WEU, there were prob-
lems which had not yet been solved.
39. At that same meeting, ministers endorsed
the'Joint declaration stating the conditions for the
use of the European corps in the framework of
Western European Union" which had earlier been
adopted by the three states participating in the
European corps (Belgium, France and Germany).
Recently, similar joint declarations have been
adopted setting the conditions for the use of the
B elgian/German/Netherlands/United Kingdom
multinational division (central) and the United
Kingdom/ Netherlands amphibious force in the
framework of WEU and the understandings regar-
ding these matters.
40. In the joint declaration.regarding the Euro-
pean corps, a prominent rdle is given to the WEU
Planning Cell, which should formulate plans for
the use of the European corps within WEU. The
r61e of the Planning Cell is specified in a number
of paragraphs creating the impression of an extre-
mely narrow co-operation with the European
corps. It should be noted, however, that a number
of clarifications given by the military delegates
of the three countries participating in the Euro-
pean corps providing an interpretation of the
declaration to which they are attached severely
limit the active involvement of WEU and its
Planning Cell.
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41. The joint declaration stipulates that the
Commander of the European corps will keep the
Planning Cell regularly informed on such issues
as manpower, equipment and weapons of the
corps units which may act in WEU operations, the
assets and infrastructure to be used for logistic
support, training objectives and exercise pro-
grarnmes and operational capability. It is further
stipulated that the Planning Cell Director will
inform the states participating in the European
corps of his assessments and proposals regarding
the training of units, preparation and conduct of
exercises, organisation of communications and
logistic support and interoperability.
42. The Planning Cell's planning in this frame-
work should take the practical form of generic
plans and contingency plans. These ambitious
objectives are far less impressive if it is known
that, according to the interpretation attached to the
declaration, the Director of the Planning Cell will
provide his assessments and proposals "on the
basis of the current terms of reference and
resources of the Planning Cell" which, as is well
known and also admitted by the Planning Cell
itself, are not sufficient by far for performing
these tasks. The same attached interpretation sti-
pulates that for the purpose of generic planning,
no direct links are necessary between the Planning
Cell and the European corps.
43. While the joint declaration states that the
European corps, in order to maintain relations bet-
ween WEU and the corps, will be in permanent
liaison with the WEU Planning Cell, the defini-
tion of and arrangements for this permanent liai-
son, to be approved by the Council, still remain to
be agreed more than six months after the adoption
of the joint declaration.
44. One may wonder whether such working
methods actually contribute to efficiency. Was the
establishment of the European corps really inten-
ded to be the first step towards a European army
or just another public relations exercise without
intrinsic value? It is noted here that the mere addi
tion of the prefix "Euro" or attributive "Euro-
pean" is not enough to make armed units an inte-
gral part of a European defence identity.
45. On the other hand, it can be well under-
stood that member states are reluctant to transfer
full command over their armed units to an organi-
sation which does not have a proper general staff.
46. Also on 22nd November 1993, the WEU
Council approved a report on relations between
forces answerable to WEU (EAWEU). It was estab-
lished that two different categories of FAWEU
could be distinguished:
- 
national FAWEU, military units and
headquarters designated by states which
can be made available to carry out tasks
conducted under the authority of WEU;
- 
multinational FAWEU, established mul-
tinational military units and headquar-
ters, existing and futute,jointly designa-
ted for the same purpose by the partici-
pating states.
47 . For the use of EAWEU, three categories of
plans should be developed: generic plans, contin-
gency plans and operation plans. In this planning
process, an important r6le was attributed to the
Planning Cell.
48. The Planning Cell is to develop generic
plans for possible operations where some of the
planning factors have not yet been fully identified
or cannot be assumed. In this framework, illustra-
tive force packages should be identified. For this
kind of planning, direct links with units were not
thought to be necessary.
49. The Council can ask the Planning Cell to
develop contingency plans for possible operations
where the planning factors have been identifred or
can be assumed. These plans are more detailed
and include the forces needed and options for
deployment. At this stage of the planning process,
those nations interested may provide details
regarding their possible or intended contributions.
Logically, it is thought that while developing
contingency plans, the Planning Cell will have to
be able to communicate directly with those units
earmarked for possible deployment.
50. When the Council has decided to mount a
specific operation, it will designate an Operation
Commander, who is responsible for drawing up an
operation plan normally based on earlier generic
and contingency plans. Once the Council has
approved the operation plan, contributing member
states will fransfer their designated military units
under command of the Operation Commander.
51. As regards the command and control of
WEU operations, it has been established that the
overall political control will rest with the WEU
Council, while the full command of a WEU force
deployed in an operation is retained by the nations
to whom the forces belong.
52. It should be noted here that, in accordance
with the abovementioned arrangements, FAWEU
are forces available to WEU rather than forces
answerable to WEU, which is the misleading ter-
minology used by the Council.
53. While, in general, the Planning Cell should
have contact with FAWEU through the national
capitals, it can, subject to the agreement of the
relevant nations, consult national staffs and the
staffs of FAWEU in preparing plans. It has also
been decided that, when developing contingency
plans, the Planning Cell can be supported by
national and multinational headquarters.
54. One of the Planning Cell's important
resources for generic planning, contingency plan-
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ning and the identification offorce packages is the
defence planning questionnaire, a document
which is periodically updated by all NATO mem-
ber states and which is supposed to provide a
reliable and detailed survey of each nation's
armed forces.
55. It was therefore agreed that each member
state should present its list of FAWEU as replies
to the defence planning qr:estionnaire (DPQ) or, if
need be, as replies to a specific questionnaire for-
mulated by the Planning Cell. The Planning Cell
should then make its assessment of the informa-
tion gathered, collect further information if nee-
ded and then produce the list of FAWEU. The list
of FAWEU should then be the basis for the deve-
lopment of force packages.
56. At present, most of the preparatory work
has been completed, an initial list has been pro-
duced and it is expected that the complete list of
FAWEU will be presented to the Ministerial
Council at the end of 1994.
57. There has been criticism that, twelve
months after the mandate given in Rome, a list of
FAWEU is still not available. Ithas indeed taken a
long time, but at least part of the criticism of the
Planning Cell is unfair for a number of reasons.
58. Initially, member states replied in different
way3 to the Planning Cell's questions. Some said
that all conventional forces were potentially avail-
able while others preferred to provide a list with spe-
cific unis. There were questions as to whether spe-
cific units and their equipment should be made avai-
lable at a given time. On the other hand, nations
which were prepared to provide units were hesita-
ting to be too specific because they wanted to retain
a certain flexibility in case units would be needed for
other tasks. France, not participating in NAIO's
military structures, took longer to provide the
replies. Furthermore, there were ffiering opinions
on the question whether forces especially suited for
humanitarian operations could be distinguished
from others while the activity called "peace-keep-
ing" turned out to be subject to change due to recent
experiences all overthe world. Meanwhile, the Plan-
ning Cell itself had only just started is work. Is staff
had to settle into the new environment" and- need-
less to say 
- 
there was also some infighting in sfuc-
tures which were accustomed to work only with
NATO as the co-ordinating organisation.
V Combined joint tak forces (CITF )
59. A major step forward on the road towards
the creation of operational capabilities for WEU
was taken at the NAIO summit meeting in Brus-
sels on 10th-11th January 1994.
60. At this summit meeting, it was decided that
the alliance's organisation and resources would be
adjusted so as to facilitate the development of
WEU as the defence component of the European
Union. It was also stated that the alliance stood
ready to make collective assets available, on the
basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Coun-
cil, for WEU operations.
61. In their declaration, the heads of state and
government further said: "We also will need to
sffengthen the European pillar of the alliance by
facilitating the use of our military capabilities for
NATO and European/WEU operations ...." To
improve, among other things, co-operation with
WEU and to reflect the emerging European secu-
rity and defence identity, they endorsed "the
concept of combined joint task forces as a means
to facilitate contingency operations, including
operations with panicipating nations outside the
alliance".
62. The North Atlantic Council, with the
advice of the NATO military authorities, was
directed to develop this concept and establish the
necessary capabilities. In co-ordination with
WEU, it would work on implementation in a man-
ner that would provide "separable but not separ-
ate" military capabilities that could be employed
by NATO or WEU.
63. Work on the implementation of the CJTF
concept started immediately after the summit
meeting. As could have been expected, there was
no immediate agreement over the interpretation of
the wording in the summit declaration. [n an early
working definition, however, military authorities
at NATO defined a CJTF headquarters as a
deployable, multinational, multiservice headquar-
ters of variable size, formed to command joint
forces of NATO and, possibly, non-NATO
nations, for the purpose of conducting peace ope-
rations outside the territory of NATO. A NATO
CJTF headquarters could also be detached for
European-led (WEU) operations. It is assumed
that for the composition of a CJTF headquarters,
elements will be drawn from CINCENT,
AFSOUTH and AFNORTHWEST. At the
moment, work on the CJTF concept is continuing
and it is hoped that the final conclusions can be
presented in December 1994.
64. Implementation of the CJTF concept will
enable WEU to mount out-of-area operations in
circumstances where the United States prefers not
to deploy its armed forces and will finally do
away with the argument that WEU does not have
a proper military command sffucture.
65. At WEU, it is emphasised that in such pos-
sible WEU operations, a CJTF headquarters can
only be effective if essential collective alliance
assets such as satellite intelligence and AWACS
are available at the same time.
66. Evidently, the Planning Cell has an impor-
tant r6le to play in the CJTF implementation pro-
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cess. Upon request from the WEU Council, it
made a preliminary analysis of the consequences
of CJTF on the WEU operational concept which
was submitted to it a few weeks after the NATO
summit meeting. The Council then established a
specific CJTF political-military working group to
prepare the WEU response to the NATO summit
meeting and authorised the Planning Cell to take
part in the working group's meetings and support
its work.
67. At the same time, the Planning Cell was
authorised to be an observer in the NAIO military
transitional issues working group which is now
making an assessment of the military aspects of
the last NATO summit's decision to adapt the
alliance's structures and procedures.
68. It should be noted that the military authori-
ties of NATO at SHAPE headquarters, working at
the implementation of the CJTF concept, have
been doing this until now without any support or
guidance from NATO's political structures.
Seemingly, one nation, notably in favour of the
development of a European defence identity, is
blocking positive progress on the CJTF issue in
the political structure.
69. It should be emphasised here that CJTF
will make little sense for WEU if it does not
create the appropriate political-military infra-
structure to deal with it effectively. Even if some
progress has been made, the existing infrastructu-
re is still largely ad hoc.
70. For command and control of operations as
envisaged in the CJTF concept, a strategic inter-
face is required between political and military
sffuctures, an element still missing in WEU. The
prevailing command and control regulations in
WEU operations have been agreed on an ad hoc
basis, lacking universality.
71. The Planning Cell has now produced a frst
analysis of command and confrol of WEU opera-
tions for discussion by the relevant WEU bodies.
It seems that this subject needs high priority atten-
tion if WEU takes its r6le seriously.
VI. WEU strategic mobility study
72. After the Gulf war, in Recommendation
501, the WEU Assembly having established that
there were important shortcomings in Western
European strategic transport capabilities, had
asked the Council to study the possibility of setting
up a European strategic airlift command equipped
with a military version of the Airbus A 340 and
operating in a WEU framework. In its reply, the
Council made it known that the Defence Repre-
sentatives Group in liaison with the Special Work-
ing Group would spell out and assess, as it was
said: "proposals to make co-operation more ope-
rational both in the politico-military field as well
as in the military field prope4 covering among
other things tasks and the requirements for co-
ordination and planning structures. In this frame-
work, the stuctures and the lessons of the Gulf
war will be considered."
73. In Recommendation 515, the Assembly
then recommended that the Council: "Urge the
Defence Representatives Group to proceed ener-
getically with its study of a European sea- and air-
lift capability and include in this study the possi-
bility of establishing a European sfrategic airlift
command in the WEU framework."
74. The Council replied on 26th March 1992:
"The desirability and feasibility of setting up new
bodies in the WEU framework, such as a Euro-
pean strategic airlift command, will have to be
examined taking into account the discussion by
the DRG of the conclusions of a bilateral study
undertaken by France and Germany in the frame-
work of the appraisal of the lessons to be drawn
from the Gulf conflict."
75. This Franco-German study on European
requirements for strategic mobility initially
remained without follow-up. The establishment
of the Planning Cell apparently opened new pers-
pectives to examine problems of this nature and
after a proposal of the Chiefs of Defence Staffs(CHODs), the Council decided on 27th April
1993 that under the aegis of the Planning Cell, a
WEU strategic mobility study (WSMS) should be
initiated. For this study, the Planning Cell would
be assisted by national movements experts of the
member states while the Franco-German study
was used for further analysis.
76. It should be acknowledged that here also in
the beginning linle progress was made due to a
number of reasons. Since there were no WEU
operational guidelines nor contingency plans
available, the Planning Cell had the feeling that
there was no sound basis for a strategic mobility
concept in a WEU framework. Some member
states on the other hand argued that the original
working hypotheses, partly based on the Franco-
German study, were far too ambitious in that they
put too much emphasis on massive air transport of
heavy equipment.
77. A convergence of ideas has now taken
place, which has resulted in a more realistic
approach. The study will now be conducted in
two different phases. Phase l, to be concluded at
the end of 1994, will provide an evaluation of the
existing strategic mobility capabilities in WEU
through simulation of the deployment of force
packages up to the size of a division over short,
medium and long range. Here, one of the prob-
lems faced by the Planning Cell experts was that,
due to national restrictions, not all national
experts were able to provide estimates of the avai-
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lability of military and civil sea and air transport
assets to support WEU force deployments.
78. Phase 2,tobe concluded in 1995, will pro-
vide a WEU strategic mobility concept. In this
framework, an analysis will be given of co-ordi-
nation measures and procedures for the pooling
of national transport assets and for circum-
stances where WEU would have to make an
appeal to the civil transport market, in particular
to protect competitive bidding. With the support
of Euroflag, an additional analysis will be given
based on the assumption that the future large air-
craft (FLA) would be available for WEU deploy-
ments. The possible acquisition of dedicated
strategic transport assets will also be subject to
analysis.
79. In order to ensure that the WEU strategic
mobility capability will be complementary to and
compatible with that of NAIO, the work of the
Planning Cell on WSMS will have to be co-ordin-
ated with NAIO's movement, ffansportation and
mobility management advisory group.
80. With most probably the final result of
WSMS to be expected by the end of 1995, it will
indeed have taken a long time. On the other hand,
it should be admitted that here again, as men-
tioned above, many different factors have contri-
buted to a slow start.
VII. Other aspects of planning activities
( a ) M aritime c o - op e rati on : C omb ine d Ende av o ur
81. Based on an initiative of France, Italy and
Spain to examine the possibility of promoting
forms of aero-maritime co-operation among
WEU member countries, the Planning Cell was
tasked to pursue this idea in October 1992. This
was implemented by developing an operational
plan, providing a mechanism for the generation
and initial deployment of maritime forces, inclu-
ding maritime air forces in close co-operation and
consultation with the Military Delegates and the
Defence Representatives Group. These activities
now have resulted in WEU operational plan Com-
bined Endeavour. At its meeting on 9th May
l994,the WEU Council approved this operational
plan and agreed that such an initiative should be
developed further in accordance with the initial
mandate. Combined Endeavour enables WEU to
generate and initially deploy maritime forces and
to identify maritime force packages for certain
tasks.
82. It can also be used in combination with any
other plan for which maritime forces would be
required and as the starting mechanism for and the
initial phase of a maritime exercise involving the
WEU crisis-management organisation and mari-
time forces.
(b) Humanitarian missions including generic
evacuation planning
83. At its meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd
November 1993, the Council tasked the Planning
Cell "in completing the list of FAWEU incorpora-
ting national inputs, to identify forces especially
suited for humanitarian tasks". In parallel with its
work on the list of FAWEU, it is now developing
a data base for contingency planning in the field
of humanitarian missions. In this framework,
links are being developed with the United Nations
Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA)
and with the European Community Humanitarian
Organisation (ECHO).
84. In the specific field of generic evacuation
planning, a report has now been drafted in order to
examine whether and how WEU can make a
contribution to work already being done else-
where, in particular within the European Union. A
generic plan for WEU evacuation operations has
been drafted. Moreover, a study is being made of
lessons learned from the recent evacuation opera-
tions in Rwanda.
85. More recently, the Permanent Council dis-
cussed the possibility of a WEU contribution to
the evacuation of citizens who might be forced to
leave Yemen because of the civil war. The Plan-
ning Cell has contacted the authorities of the
countries concerned.
( c) Peace-keeping missions
86. A document on WEU involvement in
peace-keeping missions is now almost completed.
This document includes a description of basic
principles, the conditions for any WEU involve-
ment, the missions and tasks of peace-keeping
forces, generic planning considerations and the
characteristics and composition of forces.
(d) Exercise activity
87. The Planning Cell has been in close liaison
with United Kingdom planning authorities for the
command post exercise Purple Nova 1994 on eva-
cuation, which is the first exercise of this kind to
be planned and conducted within a WEU frame-
work. Among the Planning Cell's objectives for
this exercise are the rehearsal of WEU crisis-
management procedures, and the provision of
experience for its staff in planning, co-ordinating
and conducting command post exercises within
the context of WEU.
88. The Planning Cell is also involved in pre-
parations for the tri-national (Italy, France and
Spain) major exercise Tramontana, with Spain as
the host nation, and the possible participation of
other WEU member states.
89. At the Planning Cell, it is hoped that both
exercises will help to analyse command, control
and communications structures for WEU evacua-
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tion operations and also to study standard opera-
ting procedures and rules of engagement.
V I I I. C o ntinge ncy plannin g
90. On some occasions, the Planning Cell has
been involved in contingency planning for speci-
fic operations.
(a) Safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina
91. In July 1993, the Planning Cell was asked
to examine the possibility for WEU member
states to participate in the protection of safe areas
in Bosnia-Herzegovina designated by the United
Nations Security Council. The Planning Cell's
questions as to which forces could be provided by
member states mostly met with negative replies
and further planning had to be given up.
(b) Administration of the Mostar district and
othe r activitie s re garding the forme r Republic
of Yugoslavia
92. Upon request by the Council in September
1993, the Planning Cell prepared a study on the
problems which the European Union might face
in a possible administration r6le in the Mostar dis-
trict. This study was made in close contact with
NAIO, the United Nations, the European Com-
munity monitoring mission and other organisa-
tions involved in activities in the Mostar district.
After submission of a detailed report, the Plan-
ning Cell was asked to develop a general plan for
any support from WEU in the medical field for
the possible European Community administration
in the Mostar district. This general plan was sub-
mitted to the Council in December 1993, but will
have to be updated as the situation changes.
Recently, after a fact-finding mission, the Plan-
ning Cell made an assessment of the security
environment for the possible European Union
administration.
93. The staff of the Planning Cell remained
involved in WEU's commitment to operation
Sharp Guard in the Adriatic. Moreover, the Plan-
ning Cell presents a weekly written report to the
Permanent Council with the aim of informing the
Council about developments in the situation in the
former republic of Yugoslavia and current opera-
tions such as Deny Flight, Sharp Guard and the
embargo enforcement on the Danube.
( c ) Multinational formations
94. In the framework of the planning for pro-
tection of safe areas, the Planning Cell was also
asked to prepare a study on the possibility for the
establishment of multinational formations. Mem-
ber states provided widely diverging replies on
the Planning Cell's questions regarding this sub-
ject. After the NATO summit's decision to deve-
lop the CJTF concept, it was decided to stop work
on this issue for the time being.
IX. Op erational capability
and infrastructure
95. Although it is admitted that progress has
been made since the Planning Cell first started its
work in temporary premises in Brussels, several
issues of vital importance for the work of the
Planning Cell and even for WEU as an organisa-
tion in general, have not yet been solved.
96. Firstly, there is still no satisfactory solution
for the communication links. The WEUCOM sys-
tem, developed some years ago for communica-
tions between the WEU Secretariat-General and
the national capitals of the member states, is
considered to be too slow and its performance
insufficient. For its secure linls with the capitals,
the Planning Cell has now a secure telephon-e link
borrowed from Italy and a secure fax borrowed
from France.
97. One year after its offrcial establishment, the
Planning Cell does not yet have the possibility to
use NATO's Initial Voice Switch Network and
Telegraphic Automatic Relay Equipment, while
the completion of internal security standards com-
patible with those of NATO is still pending.
lndeed, the secretariats of both WEU and NATO
are working on memoranda of understanding in
these areas, but it seems that the main hurdle is the
funding problem. With the essential CJTF
concept now having to be implemented in co-
ordination between NATO and WEU, a solution
for these communication problems can no longer
be delayed.
98. Secondly, the Planning Cell needs to have
access to NAIO and national intelligence inclu-
ding secret material if its work is to be taken
seriously. An intelligence agreement between
WEU and NATO is urgently needed, and it is
thought that discussions to prepare its conclusion
should start without delay. Meanwhile, it seems
that work has started already on a separate agree-
ment between the two organisations regarding
the exchange of information on a day-by-day
basis.
X. The Kirchberg declaration
and the Planning Cell
99. Time and again, the Assembly wonders
how seriously the WEU Council takes its r6le of
strengthening the European security and defence
identity and, in particular, WEU's operational
capabilities. In fact, it cannot get away from the
impression thatthe Council is indulging in solemn
declarations without paying due attention to their
follow-up.
100. The Council's Kirchberg declaration is a
point in case, to be considered here as related to
the Planning Cell's activities.
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101. In the Kirchberg declaration, the Council
stated among other things:
"They welcomed the [January 1994 Atlan-
tic Alliancel summit's endorsement of the
principle that collective assets and capabili-
ties of the alliance can be made available
for WEU operations in order to strengthen
WEU as the defence component of the
European Union and as the means to
strengthen the European pillar of the Atlan-
tic Alliance. They underlined that the
modalities for making these available
should preserve WEU's own planning pro-
cedures and capabilities.
Ministers sffessed the importance of work
under way in WEU on the WEU-related
aspects of the adaptation of the alliance
structures. In order to enhance WEU's abi-
lity to carry out the tasks defined in the
Petersberg declaration, Ministers endorsed
the approach to identify the assets and
capabilities required to perform the neces-
sary military functions."
lO2. These statements should be welcomed, but
the Council may have ignored the fact that they
may result in additional work for a WEU Planning
Cell which in its present limited size has conside-
rable problems in implementing its basic tasks.
103. Ministers further said that they "underlined
the importance of co-ordination with the alliance
on the implementation of the CJTF concept and
the definition of separable but not separate mili-
tary capabilities so as to ensure their effective use
where appropriate by WEU, and in that case under
its command."
lM. If the Council justly considers the imple-
mentation of the CJTF concept in co-ordinaiion
with the alliance to be of such great importance,
why then are the problems of secure communica-
tion links between the Planning Cell and NATO,
NAlO-compatible internal security standards for
the Planning Cell and an intelligence agreement
between NATO and WEU still pending?
105. As regards relations with the European
Union, the Ministers:
"... welcomed the fact that working rela-
tions with the European Union were now
being developed. They also recalled their
endorsement at their last meeting of the
measures to ensure close co-operation bet-
ween the European Union and WEU
contained in the conclusions of the General
Affairs Council of 26th October 1993 and
approved by the European Council onZ9th
October 1993. Ministers emphasised in this
context the need to improve co-operation,
particularly in the management of crises,
and looked forward to close co-operation
between the two organisations in order to
respond rapidly and efficiently in the event
of crises. In this context, Ministers welco-
med the request by the European Union to
make a contribution to a future European
Union administration of Mostar and confir-
med that WEU was ready to offer its sup-
port. This constituted a promising example
of the close co-operation between WEU
and the European Union foreseen by the
Maasricht Treaty."
106. The Assembly fully agrees with the Minis-
ters' opinion that co-operation between the Euro-
pean Union and WEU needs to be improved, par-
ticularly in crisis-management.
107. It does not understand, however, the Minis-
ters' enthusiasm over WEU's possible contribu-
tion to a future European Union administration of
Mostar. After an internal discussion, the Council,
due to some member states' reluctance to act,
could not offer more than "support that WEU
might provide in the medical field". After submis-
sion of a general plan to this end, the Planning
Cell has now made an assessment of the security
environment. There is no reason to blame the
Planning Cell, which did what it was asked to do,
but in view of the situation in former Yugoslavia,
the Council could have considered more substan-
tial contributions.
108. In the Kirchberg declaration "Ministers
recalled the importance they attached to the conti-
nued operational development of WEU, as the
defence component of the European Union and as
the means to strengthen the European pillar of the
alliance". In view of the astonishing lack of mate-
rial support and political guidance which has until
now characterised the relation between the Coun-
cil and the Planning Cell, this can only be called
an excellent example of cynicism.
109. As mentioned earlier in the present report,
the Council decided at its Kirchberg meeting that
the Central European associate partners may have
a liaison arrangement with the Planning Cell,
while the associate members may nominate offi-
cers to the Planning Cell. The Assembly wel-
comes this development, since it is an inherent
recognition of the important rdle of the Planning
Cell in the WEU structure. On the other hand, it
remains to be seen what the consequences of the
practical iurangements made in implementation
of the Council's decision will be for the work of
the Planning Cell
XI. Conclusions
110. What can be concluded after one year of
Planning Cell activities?
1 I 1. Starting on the positive side, some achieve-
ments should be pointed out.
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ll2. First, it should be noted that, with the Plan-
ning Cell, WEU now has a military staff and
expertise at its disposal which enables the Council
and its Secretariat-General to have an appropriate
or quick response to questions regarding basic
military aspects of issues within its purview.
113. Second, with the Planning Cell, WEU has a
permanent and organic structure which can pro-
vide short-, medium- and long-term planning for
the many different areas of possible WEU activi-
ties.
lI4. Third, the Planning Cell can provide close
professional links with national military authori-
ties and international military organisations such
as NAIO headquarters and the international mili-
tary staffat NAIO and SHAPE.
115. On the other hand, to the Assembly's
regret, there is some disappointment due to expec-
tations not being met.
116. The name Planning Cell is slightly mislead-
ing and may have created expectations too great
for such a small group of experts. In fact, it is
more of a military liaison group which can work
only in close permanent contact with the appro-
priate authorities in military planning and other
areas of military interest in the national capitals.
Moreover, the word "planning" does not cover the
many other activities in which the Planning Cell is
involved according to its terms of reference.
lI7. With its 40 staff members, the Planning
Cell should in no way be compared to the huge
950 military staff at NATO. The Planning Cell'sjust over 20 staff members involved in planning
and related activities cannot be expected to per-
form miracles as the Council erroneously seems
to believe.
118. As mentioned in Chapter IX, one year after
reaching operational capability, the question of
secure communications with capitals and NATO
has not yet been solved in a satisfactory manner, a
situation which is seriously hampering the Plan-
ning Cell's work. An intelligence agreement bet-
ween WEU and NAIO and, in particular, for the
exchange of information and documents between
the two organisations is also badly needed.
119. A problem, mostly of a practical nature, is
also that the limits, as defined in the financial
regulations of the Secretariat-General, provide no
flexibility for the Planning Cell's Director in
managing his budget.
120. Even more alarming is the lack of basic deci-
sions creating well-defined references for the Plan-
ning Cell's activities. At present the Planning Cell
is therefore working in a political vacuum, lacking
clear political guidelines and instructions which are
specific enough to work efficiently. Until now, the
Council has not formulated a common European
defence policy, which is the ultimate frame-
work of the Planning Cell's activities. The Kirchberg
declaration offers a f,irst perspective on the future
work on this issue, but it could apparently still take
time before final conclusions are reached. The
Assembly thinks that the highest priority should be
attached to the formulation of a common European
defence policy. It is looking forward to the results of
the Council's work in this area
l2l. The Planning Cell is positively determined
to perform the tasks set out in its terms of refer-
ence, but it should be noted that the multiplication
of mandates given by the Council, combined with
the lack of clear political guidelines and a clear
political framework does not allow it to concen-
ffate on the main tasks formulated in the Peters-
berg declaration and the corresponding priorities
indicated by its Director at the beginning of 1993.
122. One might reproach the Planning Cell's
leadership for not exerting enough control over
progress in implementing the priority tasks, but at
the same time it should be admitted that it had to
navigate between the Scylla of concentrating on
priority tasks and the Charybdis of meeting all the
new and urgent demands of the Council.
123. It is advocated here that the original main
tasks, in particular the completion of the list of
FAWEU, are essential. Without this list, the Plan-
ning Cell cannot develop appropriate force pack-
ages for use in future planning.
I24. It is also thought that the important WEU
strategic mobility study (WSMS) should be com-
pleted in the near future so as to provide the Coun-
cil with a sound basis for decisions on this essen-
tial issue.
125. As explained in a parallel Defence Com-
mittee report', the Planning Cell lacks appropri-
ate means in naval matters. This may become
increasingly important for Europe in view of
developments in the southern Mediterranean.
126. Relations with NATO are developing satis-
factorily, but, as mentioned earlier, a number of
shortcomings need to be settled urgently. Consi-
derable progress can still be made in relations
with other organisations such as the United
Nations and, in particular, with the European
Union and with multinational units which have
been declared FAWEU.
1. An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime
co-operation, Document 1415, 10th May 1994, Rapporteur:
Sir Keith Speed.
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Amendments l and 2
13th June 1994
The WEU Planning Cell- reply to the
thifi-ninth annual report of the Council
AMENDMENTS I and 2'
tahled by Mn Baumel
1. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
" Provide the Planning Cell with more equipment and technical resources for data processing and
communications; "
2. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
" Assign to the Planning Cell more important and specific tasks so that it can play a wider and more
important operational r6le than hitherto, in particular by strengthening its co-operation with other
politicaVmilitary organisations of WEU members; "
Signed: Baumel
1. See 5th sitting, l5th June 1994 (amendment I agreed to; amendment 2 withdrawn).
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Texts transmitted by the Council to the Assemhly
at the close of the ministerial meeting on 9th May 1994
Kirchberg, Inxembourg
Kirchberg declaration
I. Communiqu6
II. Document on a status of association with WEU for the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Repu-
p!ic, the Republic of Estolia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the RepubliC of
Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic
III. Declaration following on from the document on associate membership of 20th November 1994
Document on the modalities
WEU mission on the Danube
Presidency report on Operation Sharp Guatd
Presidency report on Mostar
Kirchberg decbratian
%h May 1994
The WEU Council of Ministers met in Luxembourg on 9th May 1994 and issued the Kirchberg
declaration consisting of the following three parts:
I. Communiqu6
II. Document on a status of association with WEU for the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Repu-
blic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the RepubliC of
Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic
Itr. Declaration following on from the document on associate membership of 20th November 1992
Part II of this declaration was adopted at the ministerial meeting of the Forum of Consultation held
in the afternoon of 9th May 1994.
I
Communiqud
WEU Council of Ministers, Luxernbourg,
%h May 1994
Ministers devoted a substantial part of their discussions to the strengthening of relations with the
nine Central European partners and to the adoption of a status of association with WEU, which represents
the culmination of the initiative extended to them at the meeting in Luxembourg last November. -
Other topics addressed at this meeting were the enhanced status offered to the future associate mem-
pep aryl. the strengthening of the Eurgpean security and defence identity and WEU's operational capabi-
lities. Given the political and operational importance for WEU of the results of the alliance sumniit of
January 1994. n4gisterg discussed the significant possibilities these offered for the further development of
WEU. They finally addressed the development of the dialogue with the Mediterranean states andcontacts
with Russia and Ukraine.
1. Further to the reflection by the Permanent Council on the basis of the mandate given in Luxem-
bourg on 22th November 1993, ministers warmly welcomed the agreement reached on the content and
modalities of a status of association with WEU offered to the consultation partners. They agreed on a
document on a status of association which figures as Part II of this declaration.
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WEU is launching this major political initiative in the context of the developing links between these
states and European institutions, notably through Europe Agreements. This will constitute a concrete
conribution by WEU towards preparing these states for their integration and eventual accession to the
European Union, opening up in turn the perspective of membership of WEU. This initiative is fully com-
plementary to co-operation within the alliance framework, in particular to the partnership for peace pro-
grafllme, and to that taking place within the framework of the stability pact, these processes being mutual-
ly reinforcing. Ministers considered that greater participation by these states in WEU activities, together
with the closer consultation on security questions that will ensue, will contribute significantly to greater
stability in Europe.
In this context, ministers welcomed the positive conffibution made by the WEU Assembly to the
reinforcement of European security.
2. Recognising the highly valuable contribution that the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway
and the Republic of Turkey are already making to WEU's activities as future associate members, minis-
ters agreed on a declaration which figures in Part III of the present document. By enabling WEU to draw
fully on these countries' expertise and resources, this package of measures will enhance WEU's r6le as the
defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the
Atlantic Alliance.
3. On the occasion of their first meeting following the January 1994 summit of the Atlantic Alliance,
ministers warmly welcomed the full support expressed by the alliance for the development of a European
security and defence identity. They expressed satisfaction that the relevant parts of the Luxembourg decla-
ration of 22nd November 1993, intended as a European contribution to the alliance summit, had been duly
taken into account. In this context, they acknowledged the importance of the decision of the alliance to
examine how to further develop and adapt its structures and procedures.
They welcomed the summit's endorsement of the principle that collective assets and capabilities of
the alliance can be made available for WEU operations in order to strengthen WEU as the defence com-
ponent of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alli-
ance. They underlined that the modalities for making these available should preserve WEU's own plan-
ning procedures and capabilities.
Ministers stressed the importance of work under way in WEU on the WEU-related aspects of the
adaptation of the alliance structures. In order to enhance WEU's ability to carry out the tasks defined in
the Petersberg declaration, ministers endorsed the approach to identify the assets and capabilities required
to perform the necessary military functions.
Ministers underlined the importance of co-ordination with the alliance on the implementation of the
CJTF concept and the definition of separable but not separate military capabilities so as to ensure their
effective use where appropriate by WEU, and in that case under its command.
While recalling their commitment to strengthen the operational capabilities of WEU, they also
agreed that WEU would benefit from careful management of resources as well as existing standardised
procedures.
Ministers requested the Permanent Council to take discussions on these matters forward as fast as
possible with a view to the timely presentation of joint positions into the process of consultation in the
alliance.
4. Ministers recalled that WEU was fully prepared to play its r6le in accordance with the Treaty on
European Union and the Maastricht declaration and to respond to requests from the European Union
concerning its decisions and actions having defence implications. They welcomed the fact that working
relations with the European Union were now being developed. They also recalled their endorsement at
their last meeting of the measures to ensure close co-operation between the European Union and WEU
contained in the conclusions of the General Affairs Council of 26th October 1993 and approved by the
European Council on 29th October 1993. Ministers emphasised in this context the need to improve co-
operation particularly in the management of crises and looked forward to close co-operation between the
two organisations in order to respond rapidly and efficiently in the event of crises. In this context, minis-
ters welcomed the request by the European Union to make a contribution to a future European Union
administration of Mostar and confirmed that WEU was ready to offer its support. This constituted a pro-
mising example of the close co-operation between WEU and the European Union foreseen by the Maas-
tricht Treaty.
Ministers also welcomed the successful conclusion of the negotiations on the accession of Austria,
Finland, Norway and Sweden to the European Union whereby those countries undertook, inter alia, to
accept the community " acquis " in the field of corlmon foreign and security policy. They expressed the
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hope that their accession could become effective by 1st January 1995 and recalled that WEU was prepa-
red, in the period leading up to that accession, to strengthen contacts. 
i
5. Ministers recalled the longer term perspective of a coflrmon defence policy within the European
Union, which might lead in time to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. In
this spirit, they tasked the Permanent Council to begin work on the formulation of a common European
defence policy with a view to presenting preliminary conclusions at their next ministerial meeting in the
Netherlands.
6. Ministers recalled the importance they attached to the continued operational development of WEU,
as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the
alliance.
Ministers noted the work of the Planning Cell on the forces answerable to WEU, and requested it to
develop further an inventory of force packages which will enable WEU to carry out the tasks conferred to
it, particularly in the field of humanitarian missions, peace-keeping and crisis-management. They also
took note of the report of the r6le of WEU in peace-keeping.
Ministers warmly welcomed and endorsed the adoption of the joint declarations setting the condi-
tions for the use of the Belgian/German/ Netherlands/United Kingdom Multinational Division (Cenral)
and the United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force in the framework of WEU and the understan-
dings in these regards.
Ministers noted with satisfaction Luxembourg's decision to join the European corps.
Ministers approved a WEU operation plan Combined Endeavour for the generation of a WEU mari-
time force as presented by the Planning Cell and agreed that such an initiative should be further develo-
ped in accordance with the initial mandate.
In the same framework, ministers looked forward to the further development of the Italian propo-
sals currently under consideration with France and Spain, envisaging a multinational ground force answe-
rable to WEU.
They are confident that these initiatives will significantly contribute to European capabilities for
crisis-management and to the development of the European security and defence identity.
Ministers confirmed the aim of further developing WEU's capability to use satellite imagery for
security purposes. In this context, they envisaged establishing the WEU Satellite Centre at Torrej6n as a
pennanent body of the organisation and would take a decision on this point in the light of the evaluation
of the work undertaken by the Centre during its experimental period. They recognised the need to take
appropriate decisions in November 1994 to ensure the continuity of the Centre's work until that evalua-
tion was completed.
Ministers reaffirmed their will to set up an independent European satellite system. A decision would
be taken subject to evaluation of the costs and merits of the proposed system and of other WEU alterna-
tives and affordability. To prepare a possible decision of a launch of such a programme, ministers tasked
the Space Group to prepare, for their spring 1995 meeting, a proposal for decision, including the prepara-
tion of a draft memorandum of understanding containing the detailed specifications, to be concluded
between the present WEU member states.
7. Ministers also reviewed the latest developments in the situation in former Yugoslavia.
They expressed their satisfaction at the conduct, as part of the implementation of United Nations
sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, of the joint WEU-NATO operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic
and the police and customs operations on the Danube undertaken in close co-operation with Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania.
Ministers expressed their satisfaction with the initial planning so far undertaken on a WEU contri-
bution in the police field to a future European Union administration of Mostar. They welcomed the initial
results obtained by the European Union's advance party in which WEU representatives had taken part.
They approved WEU's continued involvement, through senior police officers, in the advance party.
8. Ministers reviewed the developments in the Mediterranean region and welcomed in particular the
recent breakthrough in the Middle-East peace process. Stressing the importance of security and stability
in the Mediterranean basin for the security of Europe, they agreed further to develop the dialogue already
initiated with the Maghreb countries and to expand it to Egypt and gradually to other non-WEU Mediter-
ranean states.
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9. Ministers, in the conExt of the growing r6le of WEU for promoting peace, security and stability in
Europe, agreed on the importance of developing dialogue and exchanges of information on issues of com-
mon concern between WEU and Russia.
Ministers welcomed the Moscow trilateral statement on 14th January 1994 on the elimination of
nuclear arms from Ukraine as an important contribution to security and stability in Europe. They agreed
that the fulfilment of these commitments widens the basis for the development of dialogue and exchanges
of information with Ukraine on issues of common concern.
Ministers insffucted the Permanent Council to examine appropriate ways in order to achieve this
objective.
10. Ministers agreed that the CSCE, as the only European and transatlantic forum covering all of
Europe, must be strengthened to avoid the emergence of new divisions. To this end, they reaffirmed their
governments' resolution to commit the necessary resources and to continue working for a reasonable divi-
sion of labour with the CSCE giving effect to the concept of mutually reinforcing institutions developed
inthe 1992 Helsinki declaration.
11. Ministers welcomed the progress made in the preparation of the stability pact in Europe. They
underlined the importance they attached to the inaugural conference to be held in Paris on 26th and 27th
May next, which should pave the way to improving relations of good neighbourliness in Europe.
12. Underlining the political significance which the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of
Baltic states represents for stability in Europe, ministers welcomed the recent Russian-Latvian agreements
and expressed their support for the early conclusion of the talks between Russia and Estonia.
---
Following on from the meeting of the WEU Council, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence
of the Republic of Bulgaria the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Hungary, the
Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic
met the WEU Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers in Luxembourg on 9th May 1994 for the annual mee-
ting of the WEU Forum of Consultation and associated themselves with the relevant passages of this com-
muniqu6.
Ministers adopted solemnly the document on a status of association with WEU which constitutes
Part II of the Kirchberg declaration, and underlined the major importance of this agreement.
In the light of the creation of this new status and noting that the Forum of Consultation has fulfilled
its initial mandate to the satisfaction of its panicipants, ministers decided to suspend its meetings.
II
Document on a status of association with WEU for the Republic of Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Hungary,
the Republic of Lania, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland,
Romania and the Slovak Republic
The WEU Council of Ministers and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Republic
of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Lat-
via, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic met in Luxem-
bourg on 9th May 1994.
RrceLLrNc:
- 
the declaration of the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Cen-
tral Europe in Bonn on 19th June 1992 and
- 
the communiqu6 of the meeting of the WEU Forum of Consultation at ministerial level in Rome
on 20th May 1993;
RncalLnqc more particularly the declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers in Luxembourg on
22nd November 1993 which:
-underlined the need, in the interest of increased stability in Europe, for closer consultation on
security issues;
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- 
considered, particularly in the light of the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, that
these relations should be broadened and deepened in parallel to the closer do-operation of these
states with the European Union;
- 
initiated a reflection on an enhanced status for those consultation partners who had already
concluded or would conclude a Europe Agteement with the European Union in order to allow
those countries to participate to alarger extent in the activities of WEU and to be involved in ini-
tiatives and missions as envisaged in the Petersberg declaration;
RECALLI.Ic also the declaration of the European Council in Copenhagen of 22nd-23rd June 1993,
which underlined the vocation of countries of Central and Eastern Europe to enter the European Union,
and taking into account the developing links of these states with European institutions notably through the
Europe Agreements and the desirability of preparing those states for their integration and eventual acces-
sion to the European Union;
BeanNc IN MIND that the development of closer relations with the nine Central European nations
through an enhanced status within WEU and through co-operation within the alliance framework, in par-
ticular the partnership for peace prograrnme, will be mutually reinforcing and contribute significantly to
security and stability in Europe;
Euprmslsnqc that such an enhanced status based on stability of institutions, guaranteeing demo-
cracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities, should contribute to secu-
rity and stability in Europe, and welcoming in this regard the forthcoming conference on stability to be
held in Paris;
RECoGMSNG that the relations among WEU countries and consultation partners are based on the
following criteria:
- 
settlement of differences by peaceful means, in accordance with the obligations from the United
Nations Charter, the commitments entered into under the terms of the Helsinki Final Act and the
Paris Charter and the generally recognised principles and rules of international law;
- 
refraining from resorting to the threat or use of force, in accordance with the United Nations
Charter,
The WEU Council of Ministers and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence of Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lawia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia have agreed on the
present status whereby the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Repu-
blic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, Romania and
the Slovak Republic will become associate partners of WEU; this status will comprise the following ele-
ments:
This status does not entail any changes to the modified Brussels Treaty.
1. They may participate in the meetings of the Council subject to the following provisions:
- 
they may take part in discussions but may not block a decision that is the subject of consensus
among the member states;
- 
to enable WEU to perform to the full its r6le as the defence component of the European Union and
as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and also to address any
other questions in an appropriate configuration, meetings of the Council according to present
arrangements will be convened on the basis of the provisions agreed in Rorne on 20th November
1992 in the document on associate membership of WEU and the declaration on WEU observers.
They will be regularly informed at the Council of the activities of its working groups and may be
invited to participate in working groups on a case-by case-basis.
They may have a liaison arrangement with the Planning Cell.
They may associate themselves with decisions taken by member states concerning the following
tasks envisaged in paragraph II.4 of the Petersberg declaration, i.e.: " humanitarian and rescue tasks,
peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis-management, including peace-making ".
They will be able to participate in their implementation as well as in relevant exercises and planning
unless a majority of the member states, or half of the member states including the presidency, deci-
de otherwise. They will be invited to provide information on forces. They will also be able to offer
forces for specific operations.
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When it is agreed that they join such WEU operations by committing forces, they will have the
same obligations as other participants, as well as the right of involvement in the command struc-
tures and in the Council's subsequent decision-making process. The precise modalities of their par-
ticipation, including their rights and obligations, in each such WEU operation will be agreed on a
case-by-case basis.
m
Dechrationfollowing onfrom the document on
associate membership of 20th November 1992
The WEU Council of Ministers met in Luxembourg on 9th May 1994.
Rncalr-rNc:
- 
the WEU Maastricht declaration of 10th December 1991 whereby other European member states
of NATO were invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which would give them
the possibility to participate fully in the activities of WEU, taking into account its r6le as the
defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of
the Atlantic Alliance;
- 
the Petersberg declaration on relations between WEU and the other European member states of
the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance of 19th June 1992;
- 
the document on associate membership agreed at the WEU Ministerial Council in Rome on 20th
November 1992;
Recognising the significant contribution of the associate members of WEU to European security
and stability;
Underlining the need to reinforce the relationship of the associate members with WEU in a way that
would enable them to make an even stronger contribution to WEU as it faces new challenges and oppor-
tunities,
MINTSTBRS
- 
reaffirmed the Council's commitment fully to take into consideration associak members' security
interests;
- 
reiterated that the security guarantees and defence commitments binding the member states
within WEU and the Atlantic Alliance are mutually reinforcing and recalled that, as members of
the Atlantic Alliance, the WEU associate members fully enjoy the provisions of Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty;
MnIrsrERs further
- 
recalled that under the document on associate membership, associate members may associate
themselves with decisions taken by member states;
- 
emphasised that associate members, by committing forces to WEU military operations, will,
under conditions laid down by the Rome document of 20th November 1992, participate on the
same basis as full members in these operations, as well as in relevant exercises and planning;
- 
confirmed that in all questions concerning the security of forces committed for such operations,
there will be no distinction between the forces of associate members and the forces of full mem-
bers.
The present declaration does not entail any changes to the document on associate membership
adopted in Rome on 20th November 1992.
The WEU Council of Ministers agreed that:
- 
associate members have full rights to nominate forces answerable to WEU;
- 
the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey may nominate offi-
cers to the Planning Cell in order to increase WEU's planning capabilities and to enable WEU to
draw more easily on the associate members' expertise and resources for the tasks identified in the
Petersberg declaration;
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- 
the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey should be connec-
ted as soon as possible to the WEUCOM network for all communications concerning meetings
and activities in which associate members participate.
Ministers confrmed that the arrangements contained in the present declaration cannot be modified
without the consent of the associate members.
Finally, the Council, while recognising the autonomy of the WEU Assembly invited the Assembly
through its national delegations, to examine further the present iurangements for the participation of par-
liamentarians from associate member countries.
Docament on the modalities
3rd May 1994
Together with the document on a status of association, the present document forms an integral part
of the uurangements for and understandings concerning the implementation of this status, agreed on the
occasion of the Forum of Consultation ministerial meeting in Luxembourg on 9th May 1994.
In implementing this status, due regard will be paid to the effectiveness of WEU's work, particu-
larly as concerns the tasks assigned to it by the modified Brussels Treaty and its relations with the Euro-
pean Union and the Atlantic Alliance.
Nothing in this document is intended to restrict the right of full members to meet as often as is
appropriate on the basis of the ilrangements agreed in Rome on 20th November 1992inthe document on
associate membership of WEU and the declaration on WEU observers.
This status does not prejudice the provisions laid down in Article VItr of the modified Brussels
Treaty.
The provisions of this document apply as from today. The status will formally be achieved when:
- 
the Hellenic Republic, currently an active observer, becomes a member of WEU and the Republic
of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey, currently active observers, beco-
me associate members of WEU;
- 
the associate partner has signed a Europe Agreement with the European Union.
In the meantime, the associate partners will be considered as active observers to WEU with respect
to the provisions of their new status.
1. The Council
1.1. The Permanent Council will continue to meet as many times as necessary in relation to the volume
of work and the tasks to be performed. It is understood that, in principle, half the meetings of the Perma-
nent Council will take place with the participation of the associate partners. The Permanent Council will
in any case meet at least twice a month according to the abovementioned arrangements agreed in Rome on
20th November 1992.
1.2. Transferred activities at 13 ne not affected by these provisions. Any arrangements for the possible
participation of the associate partners in these activities would be decided upon at 13.
1.3. The questions relating to internal institutional aspects of WEU, to WEU's links with the Atlantic
Alliance and the European Union and to the application of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty will
be dealt with as a rule by the Council in an appropriate configuration on the basis of the provisions agreed
in Rome on 20th November 1992in the document on associate membership and the declaration on WEU
observers.
2. Participation in working groups
2.1. The participation of associate partners in working groups of the Council will be determined on an
ad hoc basis taking account of the restrictions regarding space activities set out in CM (92) 30 Final.
2.2. The associate partners will participate in the CWG when it is preparing for Council meetings which
they are to attend. They may propose items for discussion at Council meetings through the presidency and
secretariat.
2.3. The CWG will draw up a medium-term timetable of Council meetings in the interests of promoting
the effective management of those meetings.
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3. Provision of information to associate partners
3.1. The associate partners will be given as much information as possible on WEU's activities. This
information will mainly be provided in meetings of the Council when working group reports and other
documents are submitted. If, for reasons of classification or subject matter, documents cannot be made
available, unclassified summaries may be envisaged.
3.2. The Council will give its approval for an initial list of categories of document which could be com-
municated by the secretariat without specific Council authorisation.
3.3. The procedures to be followed for the communication to the associate partners of WEU classified
documents and the security regulations to be applied by them for the protection of WEU documents which
they have received will be dealt with in a specific WEU document and in agreements with the associate
partners.
3.4. As a rule, exchanges of documents shall take place between the Secretariat-General and the mis-
sions concerned.
3.5. In principle, the information provided will not normally however include documents relating to
subjects dealt with in conf,rgurations referred to in paragraph 1.3.
3.6. It is understood that, unless authorised by the alliance or the European Union, classified documents
of these two organisations will not be made available to associate partners.
4. Petersberg missions
4.1. In order to facilitate their participation in operations in the framework of the tasks set out in para-
graph2 of the document on a status of association, the associate partners are invited to provide details- of
forces which they consider suitable for such operations which will be held by the Planning Cell alongside
the FAWEU lists.
4.2. If the associate partners participate in operations in the framework of the Petersberg declaration ari-
sing from decisions taken by member states, the practical modalities for the conduct of those operations
will be established by the participating states on a case-by-case basis.
4.3. It is understood that the term " by committing forces " may also cover substantial logistic and other
assets.
5. Liaisonwith the Plnnning Cell
5.1. Initial contact with the Planning Celt will be organised through the Co-ordination Section, which
will then give relevant details. Thereafter ad hoc arrangements can be established at working level. Spe-
cial security arrangements will be worked out for access and retrieval of documents and messages (see
para. 3.3).
5.2. Meetings between the Director of the Planning Cell and the military representatives of the associ-
ate partners, to which Military Delegates will be invited, will be arranged in order to discuss matters of
mutual interest.
5.3. When participating in a mission, representatives of the associate partners involved will work along-
side the Planning C-ell in order to draft relevant operational documents (e.g. contingency plans) in accor-
dance with a mandate from the Council. If participating in exercises, they will be invited to join the parti-
cular exercise working group on an equal basis with other participant nations.
6. Institute for Security Studies
6.1. The Institute will pursue its policy of openness towards the associate partlers, by continuing to
involve the nationals of those countries in its work and seminars. In the same way, it will pursue joint pro-
jects with Central European research institutes. Details of enhanced relations with the Institute will be exa-
mined by the Council.
7. Miscellaneous
7.1. On implementation of the new status, meetings within the Forum of Consultation will be suspen-
ded.
7.2. While its autonomy is acknowledged, the parliamentary Assembly is encouraged to reflect on a
possible participation of the associate partners in its work.
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7.3. The associate partners will be asked to contribute, when appropriate, to the costs incurred by their
participation in WEU activities. The modalities of their contribution will be established at a later stage.
WEU mission on the Danube
Presidency reporl
The mission currently comprises some 240 agents from seven member states, personnel being rota-
ted on a regular basis. The confrol points have seven patrol vessels at their disposal. Since the start of the
mission, over 2 000 checks have been carried out.
During its meetings with representatives of the riparian states and its visits to the co-ordination and
support centre, the presidency has been sffuck by the professionalism demonsfrated by our agents. Co-
operation with the riparian states is exemplary, as is the co-ordination with the sanctions assistance mis-
srons.
There has been only one major and regrettable incident, namely that involving the " Han Kubrat "
convoy carrying some 5 000 tonnes of fuel which, on 5th March 1994, refused to stop when challenged.
The provisional findings of the inquiry carried out by the Bulgarian authorities show that this was quite
clearly a criminal act in which the threat of environmental terrorism prevented any intervention by force.
Following this incident, Bulgaria and Romania have taken additional adminisfrative and legal measures to
prevent any recurrence.
In the absence of an agreement among all the warring parties in former Yugoslavia, it is likely that
the sanctions rdgime will be maintained, at least in the short term. Consequently, there are no plans at pre-
sent to bring the Danube mission to an end. A panial r6gime would require a different approach to the
conffols and complicate the work of our agents; for this reason, the mission should continue in its present
form.
Presidency report on Operatian Shnrp Guard
4th May 1994
l. Background
The operation in the Adriatic was launched on 15th June 1993 under the name of Sharp Guard, the
concept of operations having been approved by the joint NATO/IVEU Council on 8th June 1993.
2. Mission
NATO and WEU naval forces, under the operational control of the Combined Task Force Com-
mander (CCTF 440, who is also the Commander of the NATO Naval Forces Southern Europe), conduct
maritime support operations to enforce the naval embargo and United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tions 713, 757,787 and 820.
3. Forces deployed
The WEU force consists of the following naval elements:
- 
five ships under the command of the Commander of WEU maritime forces, i.e. two ltalian ves-
sels, two French vessels and one Spanish vessel;
- 
one French AV/ACS aircraft operating from French bases;
- 
six maritime patrol aircraft: three German, two Netherlands and one French aircraft;
- 
Italian aircraft and helicopters.
Italy also provides, at national level, two vessels for surveillance operations in the Adriatic, one fri-
gate for the surveillance of fishing vessels, coastal patrol boats and vessel inspection teams; eight frghter
aircraft are also available on standby.
United Kingdom and United States forces provide round-the-clock support to these forces.
A WEU staff element of three officers operates in the Headquarters Naval Forces Southern Europe(COMNAVSOUTH) under command of a French Rear Admiral, who took over from a Spanish Rear
Admiral on 6th December 1993.
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4. Conduct of the operation
(a) The WEU Force Commander is currently responsible for the Otranto Strait. To date, some 20 000
vessels have been challenged, about 1 500 vessels inspected and 400 diverted to Italian ports for more tho-
rough inspection. This surveillance operation has also revealed a significant level of contraband traffic-
king, especially of cigarettes; speedboats have in fact been intercepted some 2 300 times and handed over
to the Italian authorities. About 3(X) vessels have infringed the embargo rules in one way or another since
the start of the operation. Some of them were carrying fuel, others arms and ammunition.
(b) Since the last meeting in November 1993, a number of events and incidents have occurred:
- 
In January 1994, tJrcre was an incident between Albanian patrol boats and Italian fishing boats
which, it was claimed, had ventured into Albanian territorial waters; a few warning shots were
flred.
- 
A number of rescue operations were carried out to save Albanian refugees.
- 
The latest reported incident was on lst May between a Maltese vessel and Sharp Guard naval and
air forces.
There have been no fatal casualties among WEU forces as a result of these incidents.
Presidency report on Mostar
Sth May 1994
In October 1993, the Council of the European Union asked WEU to study a possible contribution it
might make, particularly as regards policy, to a European Union administration of the town of Mostar. At
the WEU Ministerial Council on22nd November 1993, the presidency reported on the preliminary work
ca:ried out within WEU on the basis of the " Invincible " agreement between the three Bosnian parties
concerned.
Following the Washington agreement between the Croats and Bosnians, WEU was again approa-
ched for a possible contribution to the EU administration of Mostar, as envisaged by this agteement. WEU
has, in particular, drawn up a list of options for a police contribution. These options ranged from merely
supervising a specific agreement among the parties on the policing of Mostar to the possibility of WEU
establishing a police force proper, carrying out its duties directly on the ground.
At the request of the EU, however, WEU has focused on the possibility of a contribution to the
supervision of the local police forces, their future organisation as a single, unified force and some of the
ways in which WEU could conffibute to the discharge of police duties.
Whilst not discounting any of the options envisaged by the member states' police experts, WEU has
concentrated on drawing up two possible organisational plans in this field, one envisaging full participa-
tion on the ground by WEU contributing forces, the other limiting WEU's participation to the discharge of
central policing functions and restricting WEU's presence on the ground to the organisation and supervi-
sion of the local forces in their daily policing tasks.
In terms of the member states' personnel placed under WEU auspices to be made available to the
EU administrator, it is likely that this would have to be a fairly substantial contribution, panicularly if the
option of a direct panicipation in policing functions were to be chosen.
WEU's work is contingent upon the negotiations on Mostar between the European Union's troika
and the parties on the spot. Throughout the negotiations, the presidency has kept in close touch with the
EU bodies and has been involved in the negotiations with the parties on the ground. Likewise, WEU has
taken pan in the preparatory mission decided on by the European Union. At this mission's request, WEU
is proposing to send two senior police experts to Mostar to act as advisers to this mission, to examine the
condiiions under which WEU might conffibute police forces and to promote confidence-building mea-
sures between the local forces to help create those conditions. In this respect, it is pointed out that under
the auspices of the preparatory mission and with WEU participation, the local police chiefs have held their
first joint meeting for over ayear
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Replies of the Councilto Recommendatians 547 to 556
RECOMMENDATION 547'
on WEU Assernbly proposals for the forthcoming NATO summit meeting'
The Assembly,
(i) Convinced that one of the main aims of the NATO summit meeting to be held on lfth January
1994 is to put an end to the uncertainty over the manner in which the security of hrope will be guar-
anteed in future decades 
- 
a matter of concern both for the nations of the Atlantic Alliance and foi the
peoples of the countries that have regained their freedom;(it) Stressing the crucial importance for European security of maintaining NATO's credibility as
major guarantor of the defence of Europe and of keeping an adequate American military presence on
the continent of Europe particularly after the recent announcement by the Russian authorities of a new
military doctrine;
(iiil Disturbed by the differences that have recently emerged between Americans and Europeans on
economic matters and world trade and also on questions of security policy and crisis management
throughout the world;(iv) Convinced of the need to establish a new credible and stable transatlantic partnership based on:
(a) an American pillar which leaves no doubt about the importance it still attaches to main-
taining peace in Europe and the security of the members of the Atlantic Alliance;
(b) aEtropean pillar strengthened by a WEU that has achieved full operational status;(v) Convinced that the NATO summit meeting must examine the feasibility of a new allocation of
r6les, risks and responsibilities between American and European members;(vil Understanding that all Central and Eastern European countries wish to obtain reliable security
guarantees;
(viil Convinced nonetheless that the definition of future relations between NATO and the nations of
Central and Eastern Europe depends on:
(a) defrning a priori new goals for the alliance;
(b) contiuting the evolution towards democracy within the countries concerned;
(c) the peaceful settlement of problems of coexistence between the countries concerned, particu-
larly with regard to minorities and border disputes;
(d) a closer definition of relations between NATO and a Russia which is still in internal
upheaval and must not be placed in a position which it might believe to be a threat to its own
security, but without there being any question of Russia being granted a right of inspection in
Central Europe;
(e) the evolution of policy in Ukraine and the other countries of the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States and their relations with Russia;
(viil 
_ Qgysidering therefore that it is too soon to extend to other countries the security guarantees
which full membership of NATO implies, but believing that any increase in the threat to ihe countries
of Central and Eastern Europe would at the same time constiiute a danger for Western,.Europe;
(ix) 
_ _Convinced however that it is necessary initially to use the framework of NACC to strengthen
confidence between Russia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and to examine whether
thF American proposal for a partnership for peace and the French proposals for developing bilateral
relations can contribute to this aim;
(x) 
_ 
Welcomin_g_\ATOls decision to participate if necessary in peace-keeping operations under the
mandate. of the United Nations and of the CSCE in areas ouiside the North Aflantic Treaty area andparticularly in the conflict in former Yugoslavia;
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1993 during the second part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (7th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1388).
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(xil Deploring nevertheless the difliculties encountered in implementing a concerted approach both
inside NATO and between NATO and the United Nations on ways and means of interaction between
the two oryanisations, with particular regard to operational command;
(xii) Recalling the urgency of determining procedures governing interaction between WEU and
NATO in peace-keeping matters, in accordance with the Petersberg Declaration,
RrcouueNos rHAT rns CouNcrr-
Present joint proposals to the NATO summit meeting on l0th January 1994 for a new Atlantic
partnership on the following basis:
l. In joint defence matters:
(a) study attentively, in consultation with representatives of Russia, the significance of recent
Russian statements on the use of nuclear weapons and examine their consequences for
NATO's defence concept;
(b) conftm the commitment of substantial American forces on the continent of Europe as an
essential factor of European security and reassurance for the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe;
(c) conftm the attribution to the United States of supreme command of NATO allied forces;
(d) strengfhen the process of consultation under Anicles 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;
(e) wge NATO to acknowledge the efforts made by European countries within the framework of
WEU to strengthen their defence contributions, specifically;
- 
the inauguration of the European Corps;
- 
the work of the WEU Planning Cell;
- 
the work of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG);
- 
the importance of the work undertaken by the WEU Satellite Centre at Torrej6n;
2. Within the context of the interest shown by the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe,
and other applicants for membership of the Council of Europe, to join NATO:
(a) gle uryent consideration as to how a closer relationship between WEU and the member
states of the Council of Europe who have expressed an interest in joining NATO can be
achieved;
(b) encourage all measures likely to strengthen confidence between Russia, Ukraine and the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the framework of NACC based on the American
proposals for creating a partnership for peace;
(c) at the same time intensify WEU's relations with the countries involved in the work of the
WEU Forum of Consultation, by seeking to achieve greater cohesion with the work of the
European Communities in Central and Eastern Europe;
3. In peace-keeping throughout the world:
(a) put the present consensus among the members of the Atlantic Alliance on a sound legal
footing;
(b) make proposals on ways and means of interaction between NATO, WEU and the United
Nations, particularly as reg;ards operational command;
(c) rcachan agreement with NATO for the latter to make NATO facilities available to WEU, as
necessary;
(d) promote the formation in the framework of NATO of a special force capable of providing
WEU commands and NATO commands with the appropriate means for their tasks;
4. In disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation:
propose a formula for task- and responsibility-sharing between WEU and NATO based on the
past experience of the two organisations.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1
to Recommendation 547
1. The Council has taken due note of Assembly Recommendation 547. Through its preparatory and
follow-up work on the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg, it sought to make a strong, positive European
contribution to the preparations for the alliance summit, in accordance with the principles of transparency
and complementarity.
In forcefully reaffirming its commitment to the transatlantic partnership, whose sfiength is of vital
importance to European stability and security, the Ministerial Council pointed out that the pertinent pas-
sages of the frst part of the declaration adopted in Luxembourg represented a WEU contribution to the
preparations for the Atlantic Alliance summit.
In the declaration published at the NATO summit, heads of states and government:
(a) conftmed that " ... the continued substantial presence of United States forces in Europe is a fun-
damentally important aspect of that (transatlantic) link ";
(b) welcomed " ... the close and growing co-operation between NATO and WEU that has been
achieved on the basis of agreed principles of transparency and complementarity. In future
contingencies, NATO and WEU will consult, including as necessary through joint Council mee-
tings, on how to address such contingencies ";
(c) acknowledged that " integrated and multinational European structures, as they are further deve-
loped in the context of an emerging European security and defence identity, will also increas-
ingly have a similarly important r6le to play in enhancing the allies' ability to work together in
the common defence and other tasks ".
As to the study of the significance of recent Russian statements on the use of nuclear weapons and
the examination of the consequences of those statements for NATO's defence concept, and confirmation
of the attribution to the United States of supreme command of NAIO allied forces, both these subjects are
on the agenda of the appropriate NATO bodies and could be covered by a concerted joint position within
WEU with a view to its introduction into the alliance consultation process, if such an action proves oppor-
tune.
2. The Council attaches great importance to the interest expressed by the consultation partners in a
more intensive dialogue on security and defence.
At the Ministerial Council in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993, WEU ministers welcomed
" ... the Europe Agreements recently concluded which provided the basis for increased co-operation gea-
red to the objective of membership of the European Union opening, in turn, the perspective of member-
ship of WEU. In this context, ministers requested the Permanent Council to reflect on an enhanced status
and its content, including the Franco-German proposal of 12th November, for those consultation partners
who had already concluded or would conclude a Europe Agreement with the European Union. The Per-
manent Council should thus identify ways and modalities to allow those countries to participate to a lar-
ger extent in the activities of WEU and to be involved in initiatives and missions as envisaged in the
Petersberg declaration ".
The Council is aware of the importance of bringing both an ambitious and realistic approach to this
reflective process, and ofthe constant concern to keep abreast ofprogress with European integration and
with the changing relations between WEU and NAT0, as defined by this summit.
Having regard to the European criterion adopted for the new status of the consultation partners, it
will be easy to secure complementarity with the forms of co-operation that will develop under the part-
nership for peace.
3. On the subject of NATO making available to WEU its collective assets and infrastructure, and the
formation in the NATO framework of a special force capable of providing WEU and NATO commands
with the appropriate means for their tasks, the Council draws the Assembly's attention to the NAIO sum-
mit declaration which stated that heads of state and government stood ready to " ... make collective assets
of the alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations
l. Communicated to the Assembly on24th March 1994.
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undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their common foreign and security policy (...) Therefore
we direct the North Atlantic Council in permanent session, with the advice of the NATO military authori-
ties, to examine how the alliance's political and military structures and procedures might be developed and
adapted to conduct more effrciently and flexibly the alliance's missions, including peace-keeping, as well
as to improve co-operation with WEU and to reflect the emerging European security and defence
identity.
As part of this process, we endorse the concept of combined joint task forces (CJTF) as a means to
facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the alliance. "
With regard to propmals on ways and means of interaction among NAIO, WEU and the United
Nations, the Council reminds the honourable parliamentarians of its reply to Recommendation 542 on
United Nations operations 
- 
interaction with WEU, which is still valid. In its contacts with the United
Nations, the Council will ensure that the competent NATO bodies are kept informed, in the spirit of trans-
parency and complementarity which applies to its relations with NATO.
4. In the field of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, the Council is careful to avoid
duplication between WEU and NATO on the one hand, and between the European Union and WEU on the
other, ensuring that a tacit sharing of tasks and responsibilities becomes a reality.
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RECOMMENDATION 548'
on WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries2
The Assembly,
O Reiterating its constant commitment to the establishment of a new order of security and stability
throughout Europe as attested by the many reports it has prepared on this problem since the fall of the
Berlin wall;
(ii) Recalling in particular its Recommendations 511, 516, 526 and 528;
(iiil Welcoming the creation of the WEU Forum of Consultation in which nine countries of Central
Europe are participating;
(iv) Noting, nevertheless, that the great majority of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe still
consider that they have no firm security guarantees;
(v) Aware of the risk of division of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into two gtroups of
states, one of which would have the benefit of membership of western institutions, the other remaining
outside;
(vil Deploring the inadequacy of information provided by the Council on specific cooperation
implemented in the framework of the forum and on the political aims it is pursuing in that body;
(viil But welcoming the operational cooperation between WEU and Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria
for implementing the blockade on the Danube;
(viiil Fearing, nevertheless, that fighting on the territory of former Yugoslavia might spread to neigh-
bouring areas;
(ix) Dismayed at the refusal of the Greek Government to recognise the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia;
(x) Disturbed also by the unstable situation in several regions of the CIS and the uncertainty sur-
rounding the foreign policy of Russia;
(xil Concerned by the ambiguity of Ukraine's policy, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons
and its hesitation about ratiffing the START I Treaty and the nuclear non-prolifcration treaty;
(xiil Inviting all the Central European countries in the Forum of Consultation to settle their problems
of neighbourliness by peaceful means using the good oflices of the appropriate European, Atlantic and
worldwide institutions for crisis-management and peace-keeping;
(xiii) Emphasising the importance of the forthcoming NATO summit meeting insofar as it must
redefine the transatlantic partnership between allies and also establish a partnership of a new type with
the countries taking part in NACC;
(xiv) Stressing the importance of parallelism between the approach of the European Union and of
WEU to the development of their relation with the Central and Eastern European countries after the
entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty;
(xv) Consequently endorsing the Franco-German proposal of l2th November 1993 for creating a
status of association with WEU for the parties of the Forum of Consultation which have already
reached an agreement of association with the European Union and, when appropriate, for those which
will reach such agreement, but regretting that the Ministerial Council of WEU, at its meeting in Lux-
embourg on 22nd November 1993, did not adopt this proposal,
Rrcouuexos rHAT rnr Councrr.
l. Adopt before the NATO summit meeting a specific proposal to improve qualitatively its rela-
tions with its partners in the Forum of Consultation on the basis of the Franco-German proposal of
l2th November 1993 so as to be able to start negotiations with the countries concerned in January
1994;
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1993 during the second part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (9th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Wintgens on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1387).
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2. Define without delay the nature of its future relations with Austria (taking into account its rela-
tions with the Visegrad countries) and with Finland and Sweden (in view of their r6le in the Baltic
region), these countries being candidates for membership of the European Union, offering them means
of co-operation corresponding to the specific situation of each one;
3. Study forthwith whether and to what extent circumstances allow Slovenia to be associated with
the work of the Forum of Consultation;
4. Inform the Assembly of the conclusions it reaches on the two questions mentioned above;
5. Remind the countries of the European Community of their decision to recognise the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
6. Intensify the work of the Forum of Consultation by giving it a specific programme of work
including, inter alia, the joint elaboration of risk and threat assessment;
7. Offer the Central European countries which are partners in the Forum of Consultation the possi-
bility of taking part in the work of the Western European Armaments Group and all forms of European
armaments co-operation;
8. Determine:
- 
the areas in which these countries can be associated with the activities of the WEU satellite
centre;
- 
the conditions in which they can take part in meetings of WEU chiefs of staff and the work of
the planning cell;
9. Examine what security guarantees it can give Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in face of the risks
these countries are running because of the blockade on the Danube and study the possibility of granting
them appropriate financial compensation;
10. Intensify its political dialogue with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Albania.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL'
to Recommendation 548
1. At their meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1994, ministers reaffirmed the importance they
attached to WEU's relations with Central European consultation partners. The Council has taken note of
the conclusions of the NATO summit. In this context, ministers requested the Permanent Council to reflect
on an enhanced status and its content, including the Franco-Gerrnan proposal of 12th November 1993, for
those consultation partners who had already concluded or would conclude a Europe Agreement wittr the
European Union. The Permanent Council has undertaken to define the precise modalities by which its
relations with its consultation partners can be qualitatively enhanced. On lTth January, the Counsellors'
Group of the Forum of Consultation met to prepare for a meeting at ambassadorial level on 25th January;
that meeting provided an opportunity for a detailed exchange of views on their preferences as regards the
content of the enhanced status likely to be offered to them.
2. The nature of WEU's future relations with Austria, Finland and Sweden depends on the decisions
which these countries will take regarding their relations with WEU. Under the terms of the declaration by
ministers on 19th May 1993, and at these countries' request, WEU has established the appropriate contacts
with them in order to inform them about WEU's r6le.
3. In the wake of the ministerial meeting held in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993, and pursuant
to paragraph 5 of Part I of the declaration published on this occasion, ministers welcomed the interest
shown by other countries in WEU's activities; the Presidency and the Secretary-General of the organisa-
tion will continue to brief the representatives of those countries on these activities. It is in this perspective
that the WEU Council understands point 3 of the Assembly's recommendation.
4. The WEU Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General, is prepared to keep the competent bodies
of the Assembly informed on how WEU's thinking on its relations with third countries evolves. The Pre-
sidency's Permanent Representative had an exchange of information to this end on 3rd February 1994
with the Assembly's Political Committee.
5. Several WEU member states have decided to cement formal diplomatic relations with the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Moreover, the WEU Council cannot allude to the decisions of European
Community countries regarding their relations with the successor states to the former Yugoslav Federa-
tion.
6. The Council informs the Assembly that the Counsellors' Group of the Forum of Consultation is
now meeting monthly. One of its tasks is to hold detailed exchanges of views on security and defence
questions of common interest.
With this in mind, the group must:
- 
at each meeting hold an exchange of information on topical questions affecting European
security;
- 
identify questions of common concern;
- 
task one delegation or the Secretariat to prepare a short background document to guide the dis-
cussions;
- 
report on the outcome of its exchanges of views to the Forum at ambassadorial level.
The Secretariat, in consultation with the WEU Presidency, prepares the agendas of the Counsellors'
Group meetings. Any Forum delegation may put forward a question for inclusion on the agenda of these
meetings.
The Council duly notes the Assembly's suggestions and reserves the possibility of placing " thejoint elaboration of risk and threat assessment " on the agenda of the Counsellors' Group.
7. The Council would remind the Assembly of the terms of the Luxembourg declaration, which states:
" The Permanent Council should thus identify ways and modalities to allow those countries to participate
to a larger extent in the activities of WEU and to be involved in initiatives and missions as envisaged in
the Petersberg declaration ". It is examining the various possible institutional options.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 3lst March 1994.
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8. At the meeting of the WEU Forum of Consultation at ministerial level on 20th May 1993 in Rome,
and on the occasion of the signing of the three memoranda of understanding concerning WEU's contribu-
tion to the implementation of the Danube embargo, ministers made clear that " were any counEry to suffer
from aggressive action as a consequence of their support for United Nations-mandated operations, this
would be a matter of direct concern to the international community ".
On the question of possible financial compensation for the riparian countries implementing the
Danube embargo, the Council would inform the Assembly that this issue does not come within the com-
petence of the WEU Permanent Council.
9. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's proposal and informs it ttrat the WEU Presidency and
Secretariat are prepared to hold exchanges of view with representatives of the countries concerned. The
Council has been regularly informed of the talks which have taken place.
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RECOMMENDATION 549'
on political relations between the United Natians and WEU
and their consequences for the development of WEU'z
The Assembly,
(i) Considering that, with the end of the cold war, the East-West confrontation has been replaced by
a series of different conflicts of a new type that have broken out in several areas of the world;(ii) Considering that it is now crucial to determine whether the United Nations can henceforth
become the essential instrument for ensuring the prevention and settlement of conflicts and safe-
guarding peace in the world;(ii, Recalling that the year 1995, which will be the fiftieth anniversary of the creation of the United
Nations, will be of particular importance for the prospect of reforming the organisation;(iv) Recalling the importance of the United Nations and the special responsibility of the permanent
members of the Security Council for disarmament and non-proliferation with particular regard to the
extension of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in 1995;(v) Welcoming the success achieved so far by the opening of the register of conventional arms kept
by the United Nations enabling better supervision of exports of armements at world level;(vil Noting the considerable increase in requests to the United Nations in the last five years for
peace-keeping operations;
(vii) Noting that it lacks adequate financial, organisational, technical, military and political means for
the effective conduct of these operations;
(viii) Concerned at the alarming financial position of the United Nations, due to the late payment of
contributions by the majority of the member countries;(ix) Noting, on the one hand, the desire of the United Nations to seek greater co.operation with
" regional arrangements or agencies " in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter and, on the other
hand, the exchange of letters between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-
General of WEU in this respect;(x) Noting, however, that, contrary to the United Nations, WEU is subjected to parliamentary
supervision and, consequently, should consult its Assembly prior to any exchange of views with the
United Nations;(xil Recalling that all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty are based on the right of legit-
imate self-defence guaranteed by Article 5l of the Charter of the United Nations and not on the provi-
sions of Chapter VIII of that Charter;
(xii) Consequently, convinced that WEU is an independent organisation, whose decisions are not
subject to Security Council authorisation;
(xiii) Conuinced, nevertheless, that the fundamental political interest of WEU is to strengthen the
vocation of the United Nations in playing the rOle of primordial instrument for maintaining peace in
the world and to submit its activities to the views expressed by the United Nations;
(xiv) Recalling the Petersberg Declaration, according to which WEU affrrmed that it was prepared to
support " the effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures,
including peace-keeping activities, of the United Nations Security Council ";(n) Recalling also that the resolutions of the Security Council concerning the maintenance of peace
in ex-Yugoslavia and particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina are addressed to * states, acting nationally or
through regional agencies or arrangements ";
(xvil Consequently, dismayed that WEU does not consider it has been called upon to take coercive
action on the pretext that the United Nations has made a specific request only to NATO;
(xvii) Emphasising that any constructive evolution in relations between WEU and the United Nations
depends on solving the problems that may arise from the fact that WEU represents the start of a pre
gressive integration of Europe in defence and security matters, whereas the United Nations and its
Security Council are based exclusively on the principle of the sovereignty of member states;
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3fth November 1993 during the second part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (9th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Soell on behalf of the Political Comminee (Document 1389).
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(xviiil Noting, further, that the United Nations is intervening increasingly in the internal affairs of
member states, whereas the Charter does not provide suffrcient legal bases for doing so, but
emphasising nevertheless that in practice the Security Council has introduced, since 1991, the possi-
biliiy of intervening in internal hbstilities when they constitute a threat to the peace and security of
other states;
(xix) Convinced that WEU and the bodies concerned with the common foreign and security policy
(CFSP) of the European Union must co-operate and further co-ordinate their activities in preventive
diplomacy and crisis-management and, possibly, place their means at the disposal of other regional
organisations,
Rrcouunuos rHAT rnB CouNcrL
l. Work out forthwith a new platform of European security interests on the basis of an assessment
of the new threats and risks in the world and their consequences;
2. Deflrne WEU's vocation in relation to the United Nations and the specific areas in which it can
offer its assistance to the United Nations while retaining its independence;
3. Without waiting for the United Nations to make a specific request to WEU:
- 
establish contact with the bodies concerned with the common foreign and security policy
(CFSP) of the European Union in order to reach agreement on the areas of joint activity and
the sharing of responsibilities in peace-keeping, with particular regard to preventive
diplomacy and the consolidation of peace at the end of hostilities;
- 
co-ordinate with NATO ways and means of sharing peace-keeping responsibilities between the
two organisations;
- 
instruct its planning cell to have a report prepared by experts on the requirements and time
necessary for implementing coercive measures in former Yugoslavia with particular regard to
available resources and necessary personnel;
- 
instruct the Torrej6n satellite centre to present a report on the capabilities and experience it
can offer for peace-keeping, particularly in establishing facts, monitoring and early
warning;
- 
inform the Assembly of the results of these studies;
4. Study in detail the proposals made in the meantime with regard to reforming the United Nations
and its Security Council with a view to strengthening its effectiveness in peace-keeping and improving
WEU's participation in the decision-making process in the United Nations;
5. Give a new mandate to the representatives of the member countries of WEU at the United
Nations headquarters in New York to hold regular consultations in order to co-ordinate their positions,
particularly inthe committees and working goups of the United Nations whose activities come within
the framework of the responsibilities of WEU.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL'
to Recommendation 549
1. The Council informs the Assembly that the Chiefs of Defence Staff, basing themselves on an initial
report by the Defence Representatives Group on the European security implications of military changes in
the former Soviet Union, have proposed that the scope of this study be extended.
The DRG has had an exchange of views on a French contribution entitled " Study of crisis areas on
Europe's periphery ", the main conilusions being that to take into account those factois of more specific
concern to the security of Europe 
- 
and in particular the r6le of WEU 
- 
WEU must now analyse in detail:
- 
the risks of a crisis in the area of the member countries of the Forum of Consultation;
- 
the instability and risks existing in the countries bordering the member, associate or observer
states;
- 
the overall problem of security in the Mediterranean.
The practicalities and appropriate methodology for this work is on the DRG's agenda.
2. The Council reminds the Assembly of its reply to Assembly Recommendation 542 on United
Nations operations 
- 
interaction with WEU, which, in paragraph 1, defines WEU's r6[e vis-d-vis the Uni-
ted Nations and, in the subsequent paragraphs, highlights the specific fields in which it may offer the Uni-
ted Nations its help whilst retaining its independence.
3. Since WEU is an integral part of the development of the European Union, the establishment of close
co-operation between the two organisations is of vital importance for the development of a common
foreign and security policy. The Union may, through its Council, requestWEU to elaborate and implement
decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications in the situations described below.
Such situations, whilst normally requiring the use of military personnel, may involve recourse to other
means. The following examples should be considered solely as indicative and are not exhaustive.
- 
when the security interests of the Union are directly affected;
- 
when the Union is politically and economically faced with a crisis or a specific conflict and
recognises that additional support from WEU is necessary (military observers, ceasefire, peace-
keeping, sanctions-monitoring and peace-compliance);
- 
if the Union is invited by the United Nations or the CSCE to make a contribution and it concludes
that WEU could, as part of a coherent divison of work, make a specific contribution;
- 
when the humanitarian efforts require logistic support.
If the European Union has asked WEU to elaborate and implement its decisions and actions which
have defence implications, WEU will accept this request in accordance with its decision-making proce-
dures and will take all the action necessary concerning such a request in a way which is fully compatible
with the general policy established by the European Union.
This is also the case, as regards the possible administration of Mostar by the European Union, of the
support which WEU might give to the organisation of a police force and for the improvement of certain
vital logistic functions, particularly in the medical field.
To ensure close co-operation between WEU and the European Union, measures to promote co-
operation and information between the two organisations have already been planned.
- 
As regards co-ordination with NATO on ways and means of sharing peace-keeping responsibili-
ties between the two organisations, the Council would refer to the declaration made by the heads
9f slale and government at the NATO summit which stipulates that " in future contingencies,
NATO and WEU will consult, including as necessary through joint Council meetings, on how to
address such contingencies ".
- 
The Council informs the Assembly that the Presidency of the European Union reports regularly to
the Council on developments in the situation in former Yugoslavia. For the timebeing, the Coun-
cil is not planning on an experts' report for implementing coercive measures othei than those
already in place in the Adriatic and on the Danube.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l8th April 1994.
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- 
In accordance with its mission, the WEU Satellite Centre is organised in such a way that it is able,
in the first instance, to supply preliminary operational image-interpretation products for use in
verifying the implementation of treaties, crisis-monitoring and environmental surveillance. The
centre regularly reports to the Council, through the Space Group, on the capabilities and expe-
rience it has acquired in these fields which, moreover, also have a preventive diplomacy and
peace-keeping dimension. At the end of its experimental phase, it will be possible to take stock of
all the centre's potential capabilities.
- 
The Council will inform the Assembly in good time of any developments in the abovementioned
fields.
4. This issue is solely a matter for the member states as members of the United Nations. The WEU
Presidency, through its mission to the United Nations, will inform the Council of developments in this
field.
5. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's recommendation. The mission to the United Nations
of the counffy holding the WEU Presidency acts as a contact point at the United Nations. It is responsible
for presenting WEU's contributions to the competent United Nations bodies. The WEU Council fully
recognises the importance of regular consultations with a view to co-ordinating the positions of the repre-
sentatives of the WEU member countries at United Nations headquarters and reserves the possibility of
determining whether such co-ordination would be more effective if it were carried out at WEU and if
WEU's contribution would be presented by the Presidency's mission to the United Nations.
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RECOMMENDATION 550'
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Unbn
for the financial year 1993'
The Assembly,(i) Considering that:
(a) the Council has communicated to the Assembly the budget relating to the transfer of the
Secretariat-General from London to Brussels and the budgets of the ministerial organs for
the financial year 1993;
(b) the installation of the Secretariat-General and the Planning Cell in Brussels was acoom-
panied by an increase of eleven in the number of staff of the Secretariat-General and the
creation of three grade B posts in the Planning Cell;
(c) the operating budget of the Planning Cell is included in the budget of the Secretariat-General
as Section E;
(d) the Director of the WEU Planning Cell, unlike the other subsidiary organs, does not have full
responsibility for managing the budget of the Cell;
(e) the Torrej6n Satellite Centre is still in the organisational stage and is not fully opera-
tional;
(/) the Director of the Centre has asked for authorisation to enter into multi-annual expenditure
commitments to complete this organisational stage;
(g) the study of financing the pension scheme for permanent staff has not yet been com-
pleted;
(h) the afliliation of permanent staffof the_P€riq orgqls with the French social segurity system is
proving very expensive, whereas the OECD has already adopted a private sickness insurance
scheme that costs far less and the study conducted by the Council of Europe on the subject at
first sight confirms the interest of this private insurance scheme;
(t/ furthermore, such a private insurance scheme has been adopted by the Secretariat-General
for staff in Brussels as it had done for staff in London,
Rscor\rilrcNps rHAT rnr CouNcp
l. Inform the Assembly of any subsequent changes in the organograms of the WEU ministerial
organs;
2. Ask the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee to examine, in the framework of its responsi-
bilities and as it did for the ministerial organs, the changes to the organogram of the Oflice of the Clerk
of the Assembly proposed in the 1994 budget;
3. Consider the expediency of separating the budget of the Planning Cell from that of the
Secretariat-General and make its Director responsible for managing it;
4. Take every possible step to make the Torrej6n Satellite Centre fully operational and, in this
context, authorise the Director of the Centre to enter into multi-annual expenditure commitments
where necessary;
5. Inform the Assembly of the conclusions of the study of the financing of the pension scheme;
6. Study the possibility of adopting a private sickness insurance scheme for WEU stalf in Paris as it
did for staff in Brussels.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1993 during the second part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (9th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admi-
nistration (Document I 399).
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL'
to Recommendation 550
1. The Council reminds the Assembly of its reply to Written Question 316 and confirms that, once
finally approved, the establishment table will be formally forwarded to the Assembly. The same proced-
ure will apply to any further changes that may be made.
2. The Council informs the Assembly that the budget of the ministerial organs for the year 1994 is still
under consideration by the Budget and Organisation Committee, including the staff management aspects.
The Council is not therefore in a position to give a reply on this point at this stage.
3. The Council feels that the expediency of separating the Planning Cell budget from that of the Secre-
tariat does not need to be considered, in that the credits assigned to the Planning Cell are covered in a sepa-
rate section of the Secretariat-General's budget.
The Council takes note of the Assembly's useful suggestion and informs it that the Director of the
WEU Planning Cell has, since taking up his appointment, been given tlre respollsibility for managing his
budget withirithe limits defined by the organisation's financial regulations.Ig reduce administrative
costi, the implementation of his deiisions has been made the responsibility of the Secretariat's Finance
Section.
4. The Council informs the Assembly that the WEU Satellite Centre will be fully operational by the
end of the first half of 1994. With regard io multi-annual expenditure commitments, the Budget and Orga-
nisation Committee recognises the principle, when it is shown that such commitments produce savings. In
the case of the SatellitJCentre, hbwever, the decision that ministers propose to take on its future in
November 1994, at the end of its experimental phase, should not be prejudged.
5. With regard to WEU, the actuarial experts of the Co-ordinating Committee on Remuneration (CCR)
considered thit, given the size of this organisation, the findings of any actuarial study would 
-huy" 94y_t
negligible effect on the aggregated findings of the studies on the other organisations-. As a result, the WEU
Bu?glt and Organisation Committee has decided to accept the recommendation of the CCR Chairman and
not to carry out an actuarial study on pensions.
6. This question should be considered in the general context of relations with host counffies, and the
Council couid ask the Director of the WEU Institute for Security Studies to consider the question in grea-
ter detail.
1. Communicated to the Assembly on24th March 1994.
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RECOMMENDATION 551'
on an operational organisation for WEU: naval co-operatian -
Part One: Adriatic operations2
The Assembly,
(t) Considering that the meeting of the WEU Council on 22nd November 1993 and the NATO
s-ummit meeting on lQth January 1994 provide excellent opportunities to establish WEU's position as
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance;
(it) 
- 
Conscious of the effortq made by WEU and NATO to ensure a coherent arrangement for naval
and maritime air operations in the Adriatic;
(iir) 
_[e!ggm!ng. the Atlantic Alliance's willingness to accommodate a WEU presence in the previ-
ously NATO-dedicated headquarters in Naples;(iu) Muclq appreciating NATO's readiness to make its infrastructure available to WEU, at least on an
ad hoc basis;(v) Regr_etting the WEU Council's failure to agree an appropriate budget for WEU's participation in
operation Sharp Guard,
Rrcourrlrxns rHAT rnn Couxcr
l. 
- 
Agtivglv prepar.e and promote WEU's position as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance,
and make this explicit at the forthcoming NATO summit meeting;
2. Negotiate a formal agreement with the North Atlantic Council for WEU's use of NATO infra-
structure as appropriate for specific operations;
3_,_ Urge4lly make available an adequate working budget for the WEU element on the staff of
COMNAVSOUTH in Naples and for the WEU CONMARFOR at sea in the Adriatic;
4. Review its lines of communication with those involved under the aegis of WEU in the command
and control of specific operations, notably in the Adriatic area and restruCture links between itself and
such subsidiary bodies, giving clear mandates and specific terms of reference to all concerned;
5. Ensure that the r6les of the Planning Cell, of the WEU Military Delegates and the WEU Chiefs
of Defence Staff in relation to those involved in operations on behalflof WEU are clarified, redefining
tasks and responsibilities as a matter of priority;
6. 
- 
. 
Encourage member states to support Adriatic operations in all ways possible and publicise the
achievements of operation Sharp Guard;
7. 
. 
Pay tribute to the thousands of men and women from WEU and other alliance nations takingpart in 
-operations in the Adriatic area who, both at sea and ashore, are carrying out an almost thanklesltask,. often in trying and frustrating conditions and ensure that such breiches of the embargo as are
continuing elsewhere receive additional attention so that the efforts of the sailors of the allieii nations
are rendered worthwhile;
q. EIPI9I", w-ith the other member states of the WEU Forum of Consultation with maritime assets,
the possibility of such assets being made available in support of operations in the Adriatic.
1. Adopted by the Assembly on lst December 1993 during the second part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session ( l0th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Keith Speed and Mr. Marten on behalf of the Defence Committee(Document 1396).
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL'
to Recommendation 551
1. At the meeting of the Council of Ministers in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993, ministers
agreed that the relevant statements in Part I of their declaration were intended as a Europeqn contribution
to the alliance summit. The NATO summit gave its full support to the development of the European secu-
rity and defence identity which, as envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty, in the longer term perspective of_a
common defence policy within the European Union, might in time lead to a common defence, compatible
with that of the Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly, the European allies will take greater responsibility for their
cofirmon security and defence.
2. The NATO summit made clear that the Sixteen stood ready to make collective assets of the allian-
ce available to WEU, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for operations underta-
ken by the European allies within the framework of joint actions under the common foreign and security
policy of the Euiopean Union. Better European co-ordination and planning will strengthen the European
pillar and the alliance itself.
Translated into military terms, this will mean in particular the setting-up of Combined Joint Task
Forces (CJTF) able to serve underboth WEU and NATO commands for specific peace-keeping operations
for example, including operations with countries outside the alliance such as the countries of the WEU
Forum of Consultation or the countries signatory to the partnership for peace.
The WEU Council is considering the practical arrangements for the use of these combined joint task
forces as part of its own operations, and also the procedure under which they might be made available.
3. An appropriate working budget for the two WEU staff elements working with COMNAVSOUTH
staffin Naples and for the COMWEUMARFOR in the Adriatic is under consideration.
4. The Council notes with satisfaction that operation Sharp Guard is proceeding well. It does not think
it useful to " review its lines of communication ", particularly in the Adriatic area, and " restructure its
links " with the Council's subsidiary bodies nor to " redefine as a matter of priority " the respective tasks
and responsibilities of the Planning Cell, the WEU Military Delegates and the WEU Chiefs of Defence
Staff. Ifgoes without saying that the Ministerial Council and the Permanent Councilgive plegigg mandates
and clearly defined terms bf reference for the missions which they entrust to WEU's subsidiary bodies
and, more generally, to all those exercising particular responsibilities in the performance of tasks ger-
mane to the development of the organisation's operational r6le.
5. The Council confirms that WEU member states support the Adriatic operations with all the means
at their disposal. The Council pursues an active public information policy to ensure the transparency of the
combined NefO and WEU operations, thereby contributing to a better understanding of WEU's action.
6. The Council duly notes the Assembly's recommendation and informs it that the Presidency makes
every effort to pay tribute to the men and women involved in the Adriatic operations, whose excellent
work is particularly appreciated by the WEU Council.
In a Christmas message, the Presidency expressed its great appreciation to WEU personnel engaged
in the Danube and Sharp Guard operations for their dedication and achievement.
As regards greater attention to the embargo violations continuing elsewhere, the Council would
recall the terms of paragraph 4 of its reply to Recommendation 541 on the situation in former Yugoslavia:
" The Council reminds the Assembly of the member states' contribution to the WEUAIIATO com-
bined operation Shrp Guard in the Adriatic and the police and customs operation on the Danube,
both of which aim to strengthen the application of economic sanctions against Serbia and Monte-
negro in accordance with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. The Council is
aw-are of the need to " help to strengthen measures to apply economic sanctions against Serbia and
Montenegro and to maintain the embargo on arms for all belligerent parties, including Croatia ".
7 . The Council has placed on its agenda consideration of the possibility of using the naval assets of the
member states of the WEU Forum of Consultation as part of the operations in the Adriatic. Such partici-
pation is to be seen in the context of the enhanced status which the Council plans to propose to the.consul-
- 
-tation partners. Co-operation of this kind between WEU and its consultation partners is among the mea-
sures c-urrently being studied as part of the work on the enhanced status, soon to be proposed to the consul-
tation partner countries.
1. Communicated to the Assembly on24th March 1994.
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RECOMMENDATION 552'
on lessons drawn from the Yugoslav contlict'
The Assembly,
(i) Noting that all the efforts of the international community to solve the conflict in former Yugo
slavia have failed;(ii) Noting that the conflict in former Yugoslavia has shown clearly that in future there will be no
possibility for EC member states to act independently in matters concerning peace and stability on the
European continent;(iit) Convinced that Europe will have to develop an independent capability to act in defence of its
own specific security interests, while recognising the continuing vital contribution of the United States
to European defence;(iu/ Considering that the EC, having realised that it had to give up its original mistaken objective of
kegping former Yugoslavia together in a federative structure, has not yet managed to identi-fy a clear
political strategy towards the Balkans;(v) Noting that similarly international organisations such as NATO, the CSCE, the United Nations
and even powerful countries like the United States have been unable to identify a clear and effective
political strategy towards the Balkans;(vil Noting that a peace agreement coming to grips with all conflicts in the region is the only viable
way to deal with the dissolution of former Yugoslavia;(viil Noting that in conflict-prevention apart from diplomatic and economic action, consideration
must also be given to the possibility of preventive military presence through the deployment of peace-
keeping forces;
(viii) Considering that the seemingly hurried restructuring of armed forces in WEU member states in
recent years may have to be reviewed in the light of Europe's inability to provide forces for long-term
peace-keeping operations in its area of responsibility;(ix) Recognising at the same time that political will is naturally the first requirement for any oper-
ation involving military forces;(x) Noting that any peace agreement for the region must include rigorous provision for arms control,
the reduction of armed forces and adequate enforcement provisioni;(li) Considering that the EC's regrettable difliculty in identifying its aims clearly has caused much
fatal hesitation and many changes in its policy towards the conflict in former Yugoslavia;
@i! Noting that foreign and security policy are of little avail if they are not complemented by a
defence policy;
(xiiy' Noting-with satisfaction the creation of the Eurocorps and stressing the need for a European
rapid action force;
(xiv) Noting that, within Europe, recognition of new states requires a new approach which includes
due appraisal of its security and the nature of the collective commitment to its integrity;(n) Noling that recognition.of a new state cannot be an end in itself and that the new state's ability
to meet the criteria for recognition and the responsibilities resulting from this recognition must conse-quently be examined in depth;
(ni) Noting that the problems created by large movements of refugees clearly shorr that it is in the
interests 
^of European countries to have an agreed reception policy and, moie important, to find ameans of averting the conflicts which cause such movements,
1. Adopted by the Assembly on lst December 1993 during the second part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (lOth sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Russell Johnston on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document
r 395).
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1. Consider the establishment of a European rapid action force to which the member countries of
WEU should make commitments including greater integration of training and equipment;
2. Implement the chapter of the Maastricht Treaty concerned with the joint foreign and security
policy of the European Union as soon as possible, determine the r6le of WEU and set out terms for
better integtration of the foreign and defence policies of Europe;
3. Further develop the military contingency planning capability of the WEU Planning Cell, while at
the same time including the widening of its intelligence access and powers of initiation;
4. Clearly identify threats to Europe's security and suggest preventive action at diplomatic, eco-
nomic and military levels in part to provide practical assistance to the transition process in new
democracies in order to avoid a reversion to past policies;
5. Emphasise to Greece the interest of its recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-
donia in the framework of a wider agreement intended to reduce the tension in that region with the
express declaration by all concerned to renounce any expansionist policies and respect existing borders;
6. Re-examine the respective tasks and r6les of the United States and its European allies in the
maintenance of peace and security on the European continent and take the appropriate measures to
ensure that under no circumstances will it be possible for a security vacuum to develop for lack of
appropriate preparation, oo-operation and co-ordination;
7. Provide the UNPROFOR command with the ways and means it is seeking to ensure compliance
with all the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council;
8. Suggest to the appropriate authorities that they should intensify low-level flights over Bosnia,
particularly Sarajevo, as an effective deterrent to the repeated shelling of the civilian population, which
results in daily slaughter.
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1. The Council informs the Assembly that consideration of the question of the establishment of a
European rapid action force is not on the agenda for the time being. The Council is continuing its work on
the development of WEU's operational capabilities. In this context, the implementation of measures adop-
ted by the NAIO summit is at present high on the agenda. The ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, for example,
might be involved in collective assets of the alliance made available to WEU as a result of consultations
within the North Atlantic Council. It should be pointed out that the conditions for the use of the European
corps in the framework of Western European Union were laid down in November 1993 in a document
approved by ministers at the ministerial meeting on22nd November. WEU will, moreover, consider the
proposals for combined joint task forces (CJTF) once the alliance has formulated this concept. WEU will
put forward its view on this question in exchanges with the NAIO Politico-Military Group, which is about
to be set up. A concerted joint proposal will be formulated within WEU for introduction into the alliance
discussions on the implementation of CJTF.
2. The Council would remind the Assembly of the wording of paragraph 2 of Article J.4 of the Treaty
on European Union, which came into force on lst November 1993:
" The Union requests Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral pan of the development
of the European Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have
defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of WEU, adopt the
necessary practical arrangements. "
According to the declaration on the r6le of Western European Union and on its relations with the
European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance, the objective is " to build up WEU in successive phases
as the defence component of the European Union. To this end, WEU is prepared, at the request of the
European Union, to formulate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence
implications. "
To this end, WEU will establish close working relations with the European Union, in particular
adopting the following measures: co-operation between the WEU Council and Secretariat-General, on the
one hand, and the Council of the European Union and the General Secretariat of the Council on the other;
and arranging for appropriate modalities so as to ensure that the Commission is regularly informed and, as
appropriate, consulted on WEU activities.
At the WEU Council meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993, WEU foreign and defence
ministers acknowledged " the importance for WEU of the conclusions reached by the heads of state and
government at the European Council in Brussels on29th October on the implementation of the common
foreign and security policy of the European Union.
In this context, ministers:
- 
reaffirmed that WEU was fully prepared to play its r6le in accordance with the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union and the Maastricht declaration of WEU member states and to respond to requests
from the Union concerning its decisions and actions having defence implications;
- 
recalled the effort already initiated to develop WEU's operational capabilities and stressed the
importance of actively pursuing this objective. This would enable European partners and allies
more effectively to shoulder their defence responsibilities;
- 
endorsed the measures to ensure close co-operation between the European Union and WEU set
out in Annex IV of Chapter IV of the conclusions of the General Affairs Council of 26th October
on the implementation of the Treaty on European Union, which had been approved by the Euro-
pean Council on 29th October;
- 
reaffirmed their commitment to pursuing and completing the implementation of these measures.
Ministers agreed to reduce the period of the WEU Presidency to six months from lst July 1994, as
suggested by the European Council. They requested the Permanent Council to consider further the ques-
tion of harmonising the Presidencies of the European Union and WEU and to report back. "
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3. The Council confirms that the Planning Cell is operating effectively and is performing an active r6le
in WEU's cuffent work. Its activities may be broken down into two categories: long-term planning, which
concerns the organisation's future " modus operandi ", and " contingency " activities, a field of particular
interest to WEU in view of the situation in former Yugoslavia.
Regarding intelligence support for the Planning Cell, the Defence Representatives Group ltgs pro-
duced a similar ieport, which was endorsed by the CHODs and approved by the Council on22nd Novem-
ber. This progress report defines the line of action to be adopted on intelligence as well as the level and
extent of the support that the Planning Cell needs in order to:
- 
monitor the probable areas of crisis within the areas of interest to WEU as defined by the
Council;
- 
formulate intelligence assessments to assist with contingency planning;
- 
establish intelligence evaluations before and during WEU operations.
4. On22nd November 1993, ministers asked the Permanent Council to reflect on an enhanced status
and its content, including the Franco-Gennan proposal of lZth November, for those consultatio:t partners
who had already concluded or would conclude a Europe Agreement with the European Union. The Coun-
cil is drafting this status with a view to its submission to ministers for adoption at the spring ministerial
meetings. This initiative complements the partnership for peace.
Since diplomatic and economic measures are the responsibility of the European Union, the Union
has, in the context of the common foreign and security policy, defined a draft stability pact that pursues the
objective of preventive diplomacy. The aim is to contribute towards stability by preventing tension and
poiential conhict in Europb, creating good neighbour relationships and elgouraging countries to set aside
^their 
border claims and to settle the problems of national minorities. WEU will be invited to participate in
the inaugural conference, to be held in Paris in April 1994.
In the economic field, the Council draws the Assembly's attention to the importance of the first two
Europe Agreements with Hungary and Poland, which came into force on 1st February._{.s so-on 1s thP
parliimentary ratification procedures have been completed, Bulgaril the Slovak Republic, the Czech
itepublic and Romania may also benefit from such agreements, which lay down a framework for free trade
and regular political consultations.
5. The WEU Council is not competent to intervene with its members regarding their relations with
successor states to the former Yugoslav Federation.
- 
On the question of co-operation and co-ordination with NATO on the respective tasks and r6les of
the United Statei and its European allies in the maintenance of peace and security on the European conti-
nent, the Council draws the attention of parliamentarians to the declaration of the heads of state and
government at the NATO summit to the effect that " in future contingencies, NAIO and WEU will consult,
including as necessary through joint Council meetings, on how to address such contingencies ".
- 
The Council points out that the WEU member states which have placed contingents under the
command of UNPROFOR take constant care to comply with all the resolutions adopted by the United
Nations Security Council.
8. The Council takes due note of point 8 of the Assembly's recommendation, and fully shares the
Assembly's concern to make every effbrt to prevent suffering of the civilian population. The Council is
monitoring developments in the situation in former Yugoslavia with the utmost attention and is kept regu-
larly informed of the results of Operation Deny Flight being conducted by NATO.
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RECOMMENDATION 5531
onthe European corps'
The Assembly,
(t) Welcoming the recent inauguration of the Strasbourg headquarters of the European corps;
(ii) Aware that the European corps will not be able to carry out its three missions in full until the
constitutional restrictions on the deployment of German troops outside national tcrritory have been
lifted;
(iit) Noting that, in January 1993, the French and German Chiefs-of-Staff concluded an agreement
with SACEUR on the use and tasks of the European corps;(iv) Noting the existence of the joint declaration setting out the conditions for the use of the
European corps in the framework of WEU and the understandings in this regard, although no details
have been released;(v) Welcoming Spain's decision and Luxembourg's intention to join the European corps and noting
that both Italy and the Netherlands have shown their interest in developments;(vi) Noting that Poland has made it known that it would like to be associated with the European
corps;
(vii) Considering that, for practical reasons, only a small number of different national forces could
actively participate in an army @rps, and that, as a consequence, more than one European corps may
have to be established if more nations wish to contribute troops;
(viii) Recognising the importance of the French-Italian-Spanish initiative to contribute to a pre-
planned, ad-hoc, joint European air and naval force which would have an air and ground force
deployment capability, ready to respond to WEU requirements and comple,rnentary to their
deployment within the framework of NATO;(ix) Aware of the recent Italian initiative envisaging a multinational ground force intended to
enhance the operational significance of the abovementioned tripartite air and naval force;(x) Noting the urgent need for a full list of forces answerable to WEU;(xi) Noting the success of the joint military exercise Ardente 93 in October 1993, a good example of
an exercise designed to prepare for the missions which will be assigned to WEU;
(xii) Aware that, as conlirmed at the EC's extraordinary summit meeting on 29th October 1993,
Western European Union will have to implement the various provisions embodied in the Maastricht
Treaty and the annexed statements of WEU member states;
(xiiy' Stressing the need for WEU, as the European Union's defence organisation and as the European
pillar of NATO, to have full operational status in order to be effective;
(xiv) Convinced that the concept of 'separable but not separate forces ", which would enable WEU to
act with the backing of NATO assets and infrastructure in the event of the United States not wishing to
participate in a given mission, is the only reasonable and feasible solution to accommodate Europe's
new security requirements;
(xv) Noting that a new balance must be established in the Atlantic Alliance so that Europe will be
able to assume a grcater share of responsibilities for security in Europe and beyond;(ni) Stressing the need to maintain the defence budgets of WEU member states at an adequate level
in order to ensure the maintenance of meaningful European military capabilities,
l. Adopted by the Assembly on lst December 1993 during the second part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (llth sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Zierer on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1400).
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l. Provide itself with the means of action and draw up guidelines for any operation under WEU
responsibility by concluding agreements with member states and NATO regarding the European corps
and other forces which could be placed at WEU's disposal;
2. Urgently establish a full list of forces from member states which could be placed at WEU's dis-
posal;
3. Communicate to the Assembly the text of the joint declaration setting out the conditions for the
use of the European corps in the framework of WEU and the understandings in this regard and the text
of the report on relations between WEU and forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU);
4. Promote the early establishment of a European air and naval force in the southern area, enabling
Europe to deploy military forces rapidly in that region in case of emergency;
5. Seek any solution allowing links between WEU and SACEUR to be strengthened;
6. In cooperation with NATO, agree on a joint staff concept in order to ensure a proper command
structure in the event of specific WEU operations;
7. Provide the material means and necessary guidelines for the effective functioning of all WEU
bodies which have been established to implement the Maastricht Treaty for WEU to become, in
co-operation with NATO, the instrument of European security policy;
8. Enhance military co-operation with its partners in the Forum of Consultation in order to extend
security towards Central Europe.
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to Recommendation 553
1. At the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers in Rome on 19th May 1993, the states participa-
ting in the European corps confirmed that they would be prepared to make this unit available to WEU.
The Council of Ministers requested the Permanent Council to define, in co-ordination with the
states participating in the multinational formations designated as forces answerable to WEU, the relations
between these forces and WEU.
On this basis, the joint declaration stating the conditions for the use of the European corps in the
framework of Western European Union and the understandings in this regard, sets out the principles
governing relations between the European corps and WEU.
It takes into account the r6les and missions that the corps may be assigned, sets out the arrange-
ments for the planning process, specifies the command and control procedures and defines the relations
existing between WEU on the one hand and, on the other, the European corps and the states participating
in the corps.
It takes as its basis the agreement which the states participating in the European corps concluded
with the SACEUR.
2. In accordance with its mandate, the Planning Cell has been tasked with drawing up the list of forces
answerable to WEU (FAWEU). A specific questionnaire has been prepared and forwarded to the countries
asking them for certain information with a view to establishing a list of FAWEU, on the basis of which
force packages could be constituted and appropriate planning developed.
The Cell has specialised software for compiling the information received. Work on drawing up the
full list of FAWEU is in hand.
3. The WEU Council is aware of the Assembly's information requirements. It is investigating the pos-
sible declassification of the text of the joint declaration stating the conditions for the use of the European
corps in the framework of WEU, and of the report on relations between WEU and EAWEU. In the mean-
time, the Council could brief the Assembly on certain aspects of the contents of the abovementioned docu-
ments by means of hearings of representatives of the Presidency or the Secretary-General.
4. At their meeting on 7th September 1992, the defence ministers of France, Italy and Spain exami-
ned the possibility of promoting forms of air-maritime co-operation between the WEU member countries
in order that the tasks assigned to WEU could be more effectively carried out. This initiative was taken up
at the WEU ministerial meeting in Rome in November 1992 at which the Planning Cell was asked,
through the intermediary of the Chiefs of Defence Staffs, to study ways of giving practical expression to
the proposal.
In accordance with the mandate given by ministers to promote air-maritime co-operation with
WEU, the Planning Cell has drawn up a draft operation plan known as Combined Endeavour.
This plan provides for:
- 
the generation and initial deployment of air-maritime forces;
- 
the designation of air-maritime groups of forces necessary for carrying out certain tasks.
Furthermore, it could be implemented at the same time as any other plan envisaging the interven-
tion of air-maritime forces and thus serve as a starting point and initial phase for any air-maritime exer-
cise in which the crisis-management machinery and WEU air-maritime forces are involved at the same time.
At the meeting of the Council of Ministers in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993, ministers wel-
comed and agreed to study the Italian initiative in envisaging a multinational ground force aimed at enhan-
cing the operational significance of the air-maritime initiative.
5. The Council duly notes point 5 of the Assembly's recommendation, to which it pays the utmost
attention as it looks ahead to the implementation of the decisions set out in the summit declaration of the
Atlantic Alliance.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on24th April 1994.
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6. The Council reminds the Assembly of the text of the NATO summit declaration, which stipulates
that the heads of state and government stand ready to " ...make collective assets of the alliance available,
on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the Euro-
pean allies in pursuit of their cofirmon foreign and security policy ". In developing and adapting the alli-
ance's structures and political and military procedures, the question of defining, in co-operation with
NATO, a CJTF (combined joint task force) staff concept to ensure a proper command structure in the event
of specific WEU operations, will undoubtedly be discussed.
7. The Council would remind the Assembly of the declaration by the WEU Council of Ministers at its
meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993 in which:
" WEU foreign and defence ministers warmly welcomed the entry into force of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, a decisive new stage in the process of European construction and in the establishment
of a European security and defence identity. They reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen
WEU's contribution in this connection ". Implementation of ttre Maastricht and Petersberg declara-
tions, by providing the material means and necessary guidelines for the effective functioning of all
WEU bodies which have been established under the Maastricht Treaty, contributes to these objec-
tives.
8. The Council draws the Assembly's attention to the terms of the Luxembourg declaration, which
states: " The Permanent Council should thus identify ways and modalities to allow those countries to par-
ticipate to a larger extent in the activities of WEU and to be involved in initiatives and missions as envi-
saged in the Petersberg declaration ". It was in this context that ministers requested the Permanent Coun-
cil to reflect on an enhanced status and its content, including the Franco-Geflnan proposal of 12th Novem-
ber 1993, for those consultation partners who had already concluded or would conclude a Europe Agree-
ment with the European Union.
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RECOMMENDATION 554'
on the evolution of advanced technology in
the Commonveahh of Independant States (CIS)
and the consequences for Europe2
The Assembly,
(i) Noting the process of change now taking place in the republics of the CIS, in particular in the
economic, industrial and technological sectors;
(ii) 
. 
Noting that, while some problems have already been solved, a great many difficulties still
remarn;
(iit) Noting that stability inside these countries depends largely on bringing up to date industrial and
commercial structures and adapting them to the criteria of a market economy;(iv) Noting the particular importance of help from the West with advanced technology in CIS coun-
tries;(v) Taking into account the variety of initiatives which have proved to be successful and those other
international progxammes now being carried out or planned;
(vt) Believing it is possible and desirable to improve and develop western assistance and
co-operation in all these areas;
(vii) Noting a number of further ways in which these areas can beneflrt from the West;
(viifl Noting the obvious mutual advantages which arise between the West and CIS countries over
advanced technology;
(ix) Welcoming the recent ratification of the START I Treaty by the parliament of Ukraine;(x) Noting that Kazakhstan and Ukraine have not yet acceded to the nuclear non-proliferation
treaty,
RrcouunNos rHAT rnr CouNcu.
1. Ask member governments to strengthen further their contacts with the member states of the CIS.
This should be done not only at bilateral and multilateral level but also at regional and plant level
where direct guidance can be given;
2. Urge the creation of a European data centre. At present, initiatives and endeavours often overlap
and, even when they do not, the exchange of information is not as well-managed as it should be;
3. Encourage co-operation with the republics of the CIS in advanced technology to promote trans-
parency in the transfer of equipment for civilian and military use;
4. Call upon Ukraine and Kazakhstan to accede to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty;
5. Invite member governments to give their full backing to the International Centre for Science and
Technology. It would be short-sighted to do otherwise, since the aim of this body is to prevent the
growth of technologies of widespread destruction.
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1993 during the second part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (12th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Lord Dundee on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee
(Document 1394).
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1. Relations between the member states of WEU and those of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) do not come within the competence of the WEU Permanent Council. As regards the streng-
thening of contacts at regional and plant level, the Council considers that it should not prejudge the results
of specific initiatives taken by the United Nations, the World Bank, the EBRD, the OECD and the Euro-
pean Union in this context nor the effects of government incentives to promote bilateral co-operation
agleements.
2. It is not within the competence of the WEU Council to recommend the creation of a European data
centre nor even to discuss it.
3. The Council is aware of the need to promote transparency in the transfer of equipment for civilian
and military use. Nevertheless, advanced technologies are outside the WEU Council's field of compet-
ence. It is therefore up to other bodies as and when necessary to encourage co-operation in this field with
the CIS Republics.
4. The Council can confirm that WEU member states are stepping up their bilateral d6marches to
secure the accession of Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
5. The Council understands the Assembly's concern that the important r6le of the International Centre
for Science and Technology should be recognised and developed in the future. However, the WEU Coun-
cil has no authority to invite member governments to give their political and financial backing to the Inter-
national Centre for Science and Technology.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 14th March 1994.
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RECOMMENDATION 555'
on the development of a European space-based
obsertation system 
- 
Part II'z
The Assembly,
(t) Welcoming the inauguration of the Torrej6n satellite centre and the start of the experimental
stage of its activities;(it) Considering, nevertheless, that this is a first step towards the final goal of implementing a
brlropean space-b-ased observation system which would contribute to the maintenance of international
peace and security;(iir) Satisfied that the memorandurr of understanding between WEU and the French, Italian 3ld
Spinisn Governments has been signed concerning the iupply of Helios space images to the satellite
centre;(iv) Welcoming the work done by the industrial consortium, i.e. the feasibility studies of the main
system and the follow-up and analysis of this work achieved by the study managpment team;(v) Regretting that the Council has not taken into account Recommendation 523 of the Assembly
with particular iegard to the invitation to inform the Assembly regularly:
' (a) aboyt each stage of the entry into service of the satellite centre, its organogram and the
progress of the feasibility studies;
(b) about criteria governing the choice of space industries to equip the centre and establish the
observation system;'(vt) Regretting that the software used for the equipment of the centre is not of Europealr-o4lin, that,
iuitherm5re, it ii diflicult to obtain more sophisticated versions of the software that would allow oper-
ational activities and, finally, that this software is not suitable for receiving Helios images;
(vii) Believing, moreover, that the feasibility study confirms that the system is viable and corresponds
to the specifications given;
(viii) Strongly regretting that the ad hoc Sub-Group oq Spacg, at its lneeting on 27th October 1993,
bbj6cteO to tn-e Ufdgetary provisions regarding the activities of the study management team and of the
industrial consortium in 1994;(ix) Believing that this decision in fact runs counter to the pursuit of the work of the team and of the
consortium;(x) Considering further that co-operation in space matters with the CIS countries can be of very
gfeat interest for the two parties concerned and offer reciprocal advantages;(xt) Taking account of the fact that the aim of this co-operation would be to seek to use the technical
and human iesources of these countries for peaceful and preventive purposes;
(xit) Considering that the European Space Agency has shown that it was^prepared to provide tectr-
iricil assistance for WEU's programmes and activities in the framework of cooperation between the
two organisations,
RscolrdlvlrNos rHAT rne CouNclL
l. Inform the Assembly of the criteria leading to its choice of equip_ment for the Torrej6n satellite
centre;
2. Keep the Assembly informed of the steps it expects to take to ensure compatibility between the
software now in service witn that to be introduced, in particular when the Helios system is operational;
3. Take appropriate decisions to avoid the slowing-down or paralysis of activities planned in 1994
for the study management team and the industrial consortium;
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1993 during the second part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (l2th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee
(Document 1393).
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4. Foster co-operation with the CIS countries in space matters to the advantage of the parties con-
cerned with the main aim of using for peaceful and preventive purposes the technical and human
resources of these countries;
5. Contact the Europcan Space Agency without delay in order to promote close co-operation
between the two organisations in space matters.
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to Recommendation 555
1. The Council informs the Assembly that the following criteria were adopted for the selection of
equipment for the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrej6n :
(a) Understanding of the objectives and of the technical requirements/statement of work.
(b)Depth of analysis and quality of the proposed technical solution.
(c) Compliance with the requirements of statement of work, adequacy of management, planning
and execution of the work.
(d) Compliance with the financial and time frames.
(e) Experience and qualification of tenderer (space based sensor data exploitation).
(f) Suitability of proposed management and control of the work.
(g) Completeness and correctness of manpower and cost information.
(h) Account of geographical distribution.
2. A number of commercial software packages, such as ERDAS and OCAPI have already been inte-
grated successfully with new custom software which has been written by the industrial members of the
Falcon Consortium. This total system has been used to interpret examples of high resolution imagery.
WEU has chosen the software best suited for the processing of IIELIOS imagery that is available.
A programme to make any modifications that are necessary so that images from IIELIOS can be
interpreted in addition to the existence sources has been a planned activity for 1993194. WEU will initi-
ate a suitable programme of work when the required information is made available.
3. The Council informs the Assembly that the Space Group is discussing the development of a study
management team workplan including the follow-up of the second phase of the main system feasibility
study, in order to investigate to the fullest all the possibilities at hand.
4. The Council informs the Assembly that the Space Group is investigating the possibilities and moda-
lities for the eventual supply of imagery from CIS countries to the WEU Satellite Cenffe. As soon as this
preliminary investigation by the Space Group is concluded, the Council will give guidance on whether and
how WEU should proceed with any given country.
5. The WEU Satellite Centre has established a working arrangement with ESA and now purchases
images from the successful ERS-I satellite on a coflrmercial basis.
1. Communicated to the Assembly on24th March 1994.
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RECOMMENDATION 556'
on the evolution of NATO and its consequences for WEa'
The Assembly,
(i) Emphasising the importance of the NATO summit meeting reaffirming its attachment to transatlan-
tic links on the basis of a substantial presence of United States forces in Europe and the direct engagement
of the North Atlantic allies in the security of Europe.
(ii) Welcoming the WEU Council's readiness to offer an enhanced status of association to those mem-
ber states of the WEU Forum of Consultation which have or are likely to have " Europe Agreements " with
the European Union, but regretting that the term " associate pannership " may be used for this :urange-
ment.
(iii) Endorsing the partnership for peace programme offered by NATO to the countries taking part in the
work of NACC and other interested CSCE countries.
(iv) Noting nevertheless that the Atlantic Alliance has not yet managed to define in a coherent manner
the nature of its relations with Russia and the CIS, nor the shape of a security system including the coun-
tries of Central Europe that will satisfy the aspirations and appease the concerns of all sides.
(v) Emphasising consequently the importance of WEU's r6le with a view to helping to maintain stabi-
lity and security in the East.
(vi) Also emphasising the importance of the greater r6le played by WEU in the framework of its co-ope-
ration with NATO with regard to peace-keeping and crisis-management missions.
(vii) Strongly welcoming the decision of the heads of state and of government of the Atlantic Alliance to
uphold the strengthening of the European pillar of that alliance through WEU and their readiness to make
the collective assets of the alliance available to WEU.
(uiii) Recalling at the same time that since the entry into force of the Maastricht Tleaty WEU has become
an integral part of the development of the European Union and is required to work out and implement the
decisions of the Union that have defence and security implications.
(ix) Consequently recalling that the Council has to take as a matter of urgency a series of important
decisions to make WEU a truly operational organisation and to respond to expectations and the increased
responsibilities entrusted to it.
(x) Convinced nevertheless that the WEU Council now needs special political impetus to overcome its
difficulties in reaching the necessary decisions.
(xi) Considering that the intention of the ministers to reduce to six months the duration of the Chair-
manship-in-Office of WEU in order to facilitate the harmonisation of the presidencies of the European
Union and of WEU calls for new measures to ensure the continuity of WEU's political planning in order
to accelerate the process of decision-taking and to ensure a better hearing for WEU's voice in alliance and
European Union bodies.
(xii) Insisting on the need to associate the Assembly to a greater extent in the Council's thinking before
the latter takes decisions or decides not to take them in the absence of the necessary unanimity.
(xiii) Hoping that the new European Parliament to be elected on 12th June next will refrain from adop-
ting resolutions that seek 
- 
contrary to the spirit and the letter of Maastricht 
- 
to hinder WEU efforts to
contribute to the definition of a European defence policy.
Recouuexos rHAr rHE CoLJNCIL
l. At its next ministerial meeting, grant simultaneously to all the member countries of the Forum of
Consultation an associate status in WEU enabling them to participate to the greatest possible extent in the
work of the Council and of its subsidiary bodies without prejudice to the status of associate member accor-
ded to Iceland, Norway and Turkey as members of NATO.
1. Adopted by the Standing Committee on 3rd May 1994.
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the repon tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1410).
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2. Employ the term " associate member " for the relationship already being established with Iceland,
Norway and Turkey and choose " associate " to describe the new status of the Cenftal European and Bal-
tic states which are members of the WEU Forum of Consultation and which have or are likely to have
" Europe Agreements " with the European Union.
3. Conclude its work on sffategic mobility and inform the Assembly of its conclusions.
4. Decide before the end of this year:
- 
to establish a European system of space-based observation in accordance with the results of the
feasibility study;
- 
to move from the feasibility study phase to the conclusion of a conract with European indusbry
for building the European military transport aircraft;
- 
to create a European air-maritime force reinforced by ground components;
- 
to agree on the conditions for the use and command of the European corps which is to be placed
under the political direction of WEU in conformity with the agreements already concluded with
SACEUR;
- 
to make arrangements for associating with the European corps the other forces answerable to
WEU so as to allow a European rapid action force to be created;
- 
to create a European aJanaments agency with effective responsibilities and powers in order to
achieve true co-operation between member states and their indusmies on questions of mat6riel.
5. Increase the means and enlarge the field of action of the Planning Cell by giving it a true r6le of ope-
rational co-ordination betrveen WEU and NATO based on overall guidelines, including contingency plans
and the planning of joint manoeuvres of forces answerable to WEU.
6. Harmonise with NAIO the concept of combined joint task forces (CffF) with its own concept of
forces answerable to WEU (EAWEU).
7. Harmonise its working relationship with the European Union in matters that might have repercus-
sions on its co-operation with NATO.
8. Show greater determination in its relations with the United Nations and the CSCE with a view to
possible missions by offering them its operational capabilities in peace-keeping and crisis-management
questions.
9. Draw up political guidelines for meetings of chiefs of defence staff and specify forthwith a struc-
ture of relations and the sharing of responsibilities between:
- 
chiefs of defence staff;
- 
military delegates belonging to national delegations;
- 
the Planning Cell and
- 
the WEU Secretariat-General.
10. Ensure the continuity of its political planning by giving the WEU Secretary-General political
powers including:
- 
the right of initiative;
- 
the right to convene and to chair meetings of the Council of Ministers;
- 
primordial responsibility for making WEU's voice heard in alliance and European Union bodies.
11. Take the appropriate measures to transform the Planning Cell into a powerfrrl operational centre for
WEU co-ordination and planning, with all the resources in equipment and staffing required to achieve this.
12. Ensure in particular the participation of the Secretary-General of WEU in meetings of the common
foreign and security policy (CFSP) authorities of the European Union in the same spirit of transparency,
complementarity and reciprocity that already exists between WEU and NATO.
13. Ratify the decisions set out in paragraph 4 above and give the political impetus necessary for WEU
to take its place as the European defence organisation and as a credible player in its areas of responsibil-
ity by convening before the end of the year an extraordinary meeting of heads of state and of government
of the member countries.
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REPLY OF TIIE COUNCIL
tn Recommendation 556
No reply has yet been received from the Council.
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QTTESTTON 322
put to the Council by Mn De Decker
on 14th June 1993
Answering a question put by Sir John Hunt,
Mr. Archie Hamilton, United Kingdom Minister
of State for the Armed Forces, said in the House
of Commons on l9th March 1993:
" There is already discussion on and co-
ordination of policy towards reserve servi-
cemen between the United Kingdom and its
allies, including the member states of Wes-
tern European Union, the National Reserve
Forces Committee, and the Interallied
Confederation of Reserve Officers. "
Can the Council say:
1. how its reply to Recommendation 535 can
be reconciled with this statement;
2. to what this discussion and co-ordination
relate;
3. whether the reply to Recommendation 535
means that the Council no longer feels bound by
the undertakings it has given on several occa-
sions, in particular in its replies to Recommenda-
tions 298, 3I9,330,420,472 and 509, to report to
the Assembly on the application of the modified
Brussels Treaty even when this is done in frame-
works other than WEU?
REPLY OF TIIE COUNCIL
communbaled to the Assembly on
16th March 1994
Having made enquiries with the competent
United Kingdom authorities and having checked
with the Hansard Record Department, it emerged
that the written reply by Mr. Archie Hamilton to
the question put by Sir John Hunt, reproduced in
Hansard of 19th March 1993, had to be rectified
as regards the mention of a rdle for WEU in the
co-ordination of policies towards reserve service-
men in the WEU member countries.
The Council communicates to the Honour-
able Parliamentarian below the text of the letter of
4th August 1993 to Sir John Hunt in which Mr.
Jeremy Hanley, MP, corrected his predecessor's
statement.
Wrinen qaestions 322 to 326 and replics of the Council
8th June 1994
Text of the leuer dated 4th August 1993 from
Mn Jeremy Hanley, MP,
Minister of State for the Armed Forces
of the United Kingdom,
to Sir John Hunt, MP
" On l9th March 1993 my predecessor,
Archie Hamilton, answered a question from you
about discussions between the United Kingdom
and its allies on policy towards reserve service-
men. I attach a copy of the relevant Hansard for
ease of reference.
It has been brought to my attention that the
answer contained an incorrect statement. The
second sentence incorrectly stated that discus-
sions take place under the auspices of, among
other organisations, Western European Union(WEU).Although discussions do take place bet-
ween member states, and in the other fora men-
tioned in the answer, they do not, in fact, do so
under the auspices of WEU.
I am sorry for this mistake 
- 
which was due
to some over-simplification introduced into the
drafting of the answer during the incorporation of
contributions received from various sources 
- 
and
for any inconvenience it may have caused you.
I am placing a copy of this letter in the
Library of the House. "
[Extractfrom Hansard]
Fridny, 19th March 1993
Column 392
WEU reserve forces
Sir John Hunt: To ask the Secretary of State
for Defence if he will make it his policy to co-
ordinate policy towards improving conditions for
reserve servicemen among the member states of
Western European Union.
Mn Archie Hamilton: There is already dis-
cussion on and co-ordination of policy towards
reserve servicemen between the United Kingdom
and its allies, including the member states of Wes-
tern European Union. This takes place under the
auspices of Western European Union. The Natio-
nal Reserve Forces Committee and the Interallied
Confederation of Reserve Offrcers.
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QUESTTON 323
put to the Council by Mr. De Decker
on 15th Octfrer 1993
On 6th October 1993, the French weekly
information letter, TTU, gave the following infor-
mation:
" Six Romanian barges transporting oil vio-
lated the international embargo on Serbia
under the nose of WEU observers in Cala-
fat (Romanian-Serb frontier).
Officially destined for the Romanian port
of Turnu-Severin, 80 km upstream on the
Danube, the barges transporting 4 415
tonnes of petrol and 1 334 tonnes of fuel oil
were unloaded at the port of Prahovo, on
the Serbian bank, near the Iron Gates lock.
Similar violations had already occurred last
January when barges from Ukraine repelled
by Serb vessels had unloaded at Prahovo ".
1. Can the Council confirm the truth of this
violation of the embargo? Can it confirm the
Romanian nationality of the barges?
2. If so, why was the WEU unit on the Dan-
ube not able to prevent this violation?
3. Why does the Council continue to refuse to
publish the list of violations noted on the Danube
and in the Adriatic whereas, in the absence of
coercive means, such publication would be the
only democratic means of pressure to deter these
violations?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 23rd Much 1994
1. The Council did indeed receive informa-
tion to the effect that a convoy of six barges
which, in early September, were heading for the
Romanian port of Turnu-Severin, did not arrive at
their destination.
This was a Romanian convoy known as
Giurgiu 18 belonging to the Navrom company.
2. The WEU Danube mission is carried out on
the basis of memoranda of understanding conclu-
ded between WEU and each of the three riparian
states concerned. The memoranda are bas-ed on
the relevant resolutions of the United Nations
Security Council. They set out the mandate for the
mission and the tasks needed to accomplish it.
The memoranda are substantially the same, the
one concluded with Romania being the most
significant as regards the incident referred to by
the reference question. It contains the following
stipulations:
" Article 1
3. (...) In fulfilling their tasks, WEU per-
sonnel will act under the general authority
of Romania, which has the main responsi-
bility for ensuring strict implementation of
the relevant United Nations Security Coun-
cil resolutions, and on a basis of mutual
agreement.
4. The support given to Romania by WEU
member states will consist of patrol boats,
appropriate personnel and the necessary
equipment (...).
Article III
3. A control area will be established on the
territory of Romania at Calafat, and an
additional checking point will be estab-
lished in Galati (...) ".
The memorandum indicates that WEU is
providing technical assistance to Romania in the
form of personnel and equipment and that its mis-
sion is being carried out on the Danube down-
stream ofCalafat. The checks carried out are desi-
gned to deter and, if necessary,.to detect or even
thwart any attempt at violation on this section of
the Danube. On the section upstream of Calafat,
which is much shorter than the downstream sec-
tion, there is a certain amount of cabotage traffic.
WEU has no authority over this traffic since it is
not covered by the relevant resolutions.
3. Only the United Nations is competent to
publish information on the violation of an embargo
imposed on the basis of United Nations resolutions.
QUESTTON 324
put to the Council by Mn Stoffelen
on &th November 1993
Is the Council prepared to communicate to
the Assembly " Appendix IV, relating to the links
between the Union and WEU, of Chapter IV of
the document concerning the implementation of
the'Maastricht Treaty " which whs approved on
26th October 1993, as announced in a press com-
muniqu6 dated 27 th October?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 23rd March 1994
The Council has duly noted the request
made by Mr. Stoffelen on behalf of the parliamen-
tary Assembly on 8th November 1993 that it be
sent Annex IY on relations between the Union
and WEU, to Chapter IV of the document on the
implementation of the Maastricht Treaty.
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This annex was formally approved by the
Permanent Council on26thOctober 1993 and that
approval endorsed by the Ministerial Council on
22nd November last. This text is a joint European
Union and WEU working document.
The Council invites the Secretary-General
to forward Annex IV to the parliamentary Assem-
blv.
QIIESTTON 32s
put to the Council hy Mr. Pdcriaux
on 6th April1994
Has WEU played a r6le so far on the terri-
tory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and more particularly
in Sarajevo? Does it intend to play a r6le there in
the near future and, if so, what r6le?
REPLY OF TIIE COIINCIL
No reply has yet been received from the
Council.
QIIESTION 326
put to the Council by Mr. Goerens
on 25th April 1994
Article VIII, paragraph 3 of the modified
Brussels Treaty confers the power " to consult
with regard to any situation which may constitute
a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat
should arise, or a danger to economic stability ".
Moreover, paragraph 2 of the same article stipu-
lates that the Council " shall be so organised as to
be able to exercise its functions continuously "
and paragraph 1 states that it is empowered to
" consider matters concerning the execution of
this Treaty ".
What is the basis of the Council's statement
to the effect that:
1. It " cannot allude to the decisions of Euro-
pean Community countries regarding their rela-
tions with the successor states to the former Yugo-
slav Federation ", or to " relations between the
member states of WEU and those of the Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS) ", in view
of the threat to international peace from the situa-
tion in certain of these countries (Replies to
Recommendations 548, 552 and 554)? Under
such circumstances, what are 
'the " topical ques-
tions " that the Council regards itself competent to
consider and deals with, as we are led to believe
from Chapter II of the second part of the thirty-
ninth annual report? Has the Council not for many
years essentially devoted its meetings to bilateral
relations between member countries and non-
member countries of the organisation? Does the
Council consider that its competences have been
modified since reactivation of WEU and, if so, by
what acts?
2. The issue of possible financial compensa-
tion for the riparian countries implementing the
Danube embargo " does not come within the com-
petence of the WEU Permanent Council " even
though WEU is participating in the implementa-
tion of this embargo (Reply to Recommendation
s48)?
3. " Advanced technologies are outside the
WEU Council's field of competence " when these
concern the security ofEurope, and that neither is
it " within the competence of the WEU Council to
recommend the creation of a European data centre
nor even to discuss it " when it is " aware of the
need to promote transparency in the transfer of
equipment for civilian and military use " (Reply
to Recommendation 554)?
4. The Permanent Council has separate com-
petences from those attributed to the Council by
the modified Brussels Treaty and that the Council
need not reply to recommendations from the
Assembly if the Permanent Council does not dis-
cuss the questions addressed by such recommen-
dations (Reply to Recommendations 548 and
554\?
Does the Council no longer admit it should
reply to Assembly recommendations dealing with
the application of the modified Brussels Treaty,
even if certain WEU competences are entrusted to
other organisations? What is the point of
exchanges between WEU and NATO or the Euro-
pean Union if they do not permit the Council to
make such reply, despite the fact that it undertook
to do so before such exchanges were organised?
REPLY OF TIIE COUNCIL
No reply has yet been received from the
Council.
266
Document 1425 14th June 1994
OPINION ON THE BUDGETS OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1994'
submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairc and Administration2
by Mr. Covi, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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2. Members of the committee: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman); MM. Covi, Redmond (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alvarez (Alternate:
Roman), Antretter, Biefnot, Branger, Biichler, Curto, Daniel, Dimmer, Mrs. Durrieu, Mr. Eversdijk, Dame Pegg Fenner,Nt/|.
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N.B. 7he namcs of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Westem European Union
tor the financial year 194
The Assembly,
(i) Considering that:
(a) the Council has communicated to the Assembly the budgets of the ministerial organs for the
financial year 1994;
(b) the budget of the Secretariat-General comprises five sections, of which section D relates to the
study on medium- and long-term studies on space and section E to the Planning Cell;
(c) the Torrej6n Satellite Centre has entered its second experimental phase and the Ministerial
Council is proposing to discuss the future of the Centre towards the end of 1994;
(d) the Council has allocated WEAG an operating budget for the financial year t994 under a spe-
cial procedure and that this budget is financed by thineen countries;
(e) the Council still has not undertaken the study recommended earlier by the Assembly leading to
possible approval of a private health insurance scheme instead of the French social security sys-
tem,
Rrcovrprnxos rHAT rrm CouNcn
1. Communicate to it any decisions that are taken on the operation of the Torrej6n Satellite Centre
after completion of the experimental phase at the end of 1994;
2. Communicate to it the final arrangements for the preparation and management of WEAG's budget;
3. Take the necessary measures for WEU staff in Paris to be affiliated to a private health insurance
scheme upon termination of the current agreement with the health insurance branch of the French natio-
nal social security scheme.
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I. General
1. According to Article VIII (c) of the Charter
of the Assembly, " the Assembly shall express its
views in the form of an opinion or recommenda-
tion on the annual budget of Western European
Union as soon as it has been communicated. "
2. The present report, prepared in application
of this provision, relates to the five sections of the
budget of the Secretariat-General for the financial
year 1994 and to the budgets of the subsidiary
organs of WEU which have administrative auto-
nomy: the Institute for Security Studies and the
Satellite Cenfte.
3. The analysis of these budgets is complica-
ted by the fact that WEU is still undergoing a per-
iod of adjustment to the new political situation
created by the coming into effect of the
Maastricht Treaty and the strengthening of rela-
tions with NATO, the European Union and the
countries of the Forum of Consultation.
4. It would not be reasonable, in this changing
political context, to embark on a cost/efficiency
assessment of the means made available to WEU
by governments in relation to the objectives to be
achieved. Your Rapporteur will, as last year,
therefore confine himself to an analysis of those
budgets that might provide a basis for reflection
for the political bodies.
II. The budget of the Seuetafiat-Genemlfor 1994
Section A
5. The budget of the Secretariat-General for
the financial year 1994 has five sections:
Section A 
- 
Secretariat-General
Section B 
- 
Pensions budget of the former
ministerial organs in Paris
Section C 
- 
Agency for the Control of
Armaments
Section D 
- 
Space studies in the medium
and longer term
Section E 
- 
Planning Cell
6. In presenting its 1994 budget, the
Secretariat-General did not fail to point out that:
" In 1993 the WEU Secretariat-General's
budget had to take into consideration the
move to Brussels, the changed working
conditions in a new environment resulting
from the transfer and the occupation of a
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Covi, Rapporleur)
new building, additional staffing require-
ments, the co-location with the Planning
Cell and the increasing involvement of
WEU in European as well as international
affairs.
The major refurbishment of the building
has been carried out, additional staff has
been recruited, new tasks assigned to WEU
taken up.
Compared to the 1993 budget, the 1994
budget is the frst normal " Brussels " bud-
get for the Secretariat and the Planning Cell
based upon the experience gained after one
year in Brussels.
The 1994 budget still shows an increase
related to the new physical environment as
well as the operational activity:
- 
the growing volume of WEU-communi-
cations and the need for secure lines
requires substantially increased credits;
- 
the security aspects, still under considera-
tion, will also entail some additional per-
sonnel costs and some further adaptation
to the building;
- 
credits for computer updating and net-
working, foreseen in the transfer budget,
might have to be increased. "
7. Indeed, as the recapitulatory table (Appen-
dix I.1) shows, the total operating budget of the
Secretariat-General stands atBF 242157 469, a
reduction of 6.17o as compared with the 1993
budget after the half-yearly adjustment. However,
if account is taken of the fact that this budget
represents an increase of 76.83Vo over that of the
previous year, it must be concluded that the ove-
rall running costs of the Secretariat-General in
Brussels are approximately 70Vo higher than those
incurred by that body when in London.
8. Aware of the difficulties of certain coun-
tries in accepting the proposed increase in the
budget of the Secretariat-General, while recogni-
sing, however, the legitimate need for such
increase, the Budget and Organisation Committee
decided to use 1993 surplus funds (BF 8 700 000)
to reduce the overall contribution from the mem-
ber countries to that budget.
9. It should also be noted that the Secretariat-
General, at the request of the Budget and Organi-
sation Committee, has arrived at a cost-sharing
arrangement with the Planning Cell both in res-
pect of the premises and administrative support.
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10. Under this arrangement the Secretariat-
General meetsTOVo and the Planning Cell30Vo of
costs as follows:
(a) premises (the Planning Cell is accom-
modated on one floor of a five-storey
building and uses the common areas:
garage and two basement levels). Costs
include: rent, " pr6compte immobilier "(property withholding tax), general
maintenance, gas, electricity, water and
office cleaning;
(b) " secure " electronic transmissions
15. Subsequent to the creation of the various
posts referred to above, the Secretariat-General(see Appendix II.1) now has a staff complement
of 71 officials, whose duties are set out in the
organogram (see Appendix II.2).
16. Provisions in the budget under " A.II -
Travel " show a slight increase in respect ofnavel
by offrcials as compared with the previous finan-
cial year (BF 4 2& WO as against BF 4 140 000
in 1993). To these must be added the sums reques-
ted to meet the travel costs of the auditors (one
French, one German and one Italian) appointed to
audit the accounts of the WEU organs in Brussels,
Paris and Tonej6n.
17. It will be noted that with the agreement of
the Budget and Organisation Committee, the
Secretariat-General has undertaken to submit a
quarterly statement of anticipated journeys and
the corresponding financial position. Moreover
the travel allowances of the Secretary-General
and the Deputy Secretary-General will be restric-
ted to 25Eo of the total travel allowance.
18. Although the cost-saving measures taken
by the Secretariat-General in response to the
request from the Budget and Organisation
Committee are substantial, it is nevertheless desi-
rable that political work, in particular that of the
Secretary-General, is not adversely affected at a
time of developing relations with a number of
Central and Eastern European countries.
19. " A.III 
- 
Other operating costs " shows
various sums (see Appendix I.2) the most impor-
tant of which relate to management of the
Brussels premises. These account for 7O7o of total
estimated expenditure, the remaining 30Vo being
allocated to the Planning Cell budget as explained
iir paragraph 10 above.
20. It should be noted that the former WEU
fiemises in London are still held under a lease
which expires in 1998. Meantime WEU is com-
rhifted to annual payments of f,10 000 under the
old contract to which are added porterage, general
supervision and management and insurance costs
giving a total of f 15 350.
21. In order save on these costs the Secretariat-
General, after contacting three estate agencies,
commissioned Jones Lang Wootton to explore the
possibility of assigning the lease for the rest of rhe
term. Action is therefore in progress.
22. A.IV 
- 
A.V[ call for no special comment.
It should be noted that amounts necessary for the
purchase of certain office and computer equip-
ment have been written into the 1994 budget;also
for a service vehicle needed for transferring clas-
sified WEU documents to the venues of ministe-
rial and other external meetings and for taking
documents to NATO headquarters to be des-
troyed.
equipment 
-(nodal cenfte);
WEUCOM network
(c) administrative support consisting of
staffing expenditure for the registry,
telephone exchange, security and mes-
senger services, finance section and
translation departments ;
(d) expenditure on postal and courier ser-
vrces;
(e) uniforms for guards and messengers;
(fl insurance.
11. A different (50/50) percentage cost-sharing
basis has been adopted for telephone charges
other than for direct lines. The 1994 budget also
includes provision for financing software
enabling costs to be apportioned accurately bet-
ween the Secretariat, Planning Cell and the natio-
nal delegations accommodated in the Brussels
premises that all share the same network.
12. Finally it should be noted that the few
national delegations which have been allocated
offices in the Brussels premises will be required
to contribute to the Secretariat's budget in propor-
tion to the area they occupy at a cost of BF 8 825
per m2.
13. Close examination of the various heads of
the budget of the Secretariat-General, estimates of
which are contained in the recapitulatory tables in
Appendix I.2, shows first of all, under " A.I -
Personnel Costs ", a net increaie in staffdue to the
phased introduction over the year of the following
posts in order to reduce costs:
lst April LT2l3
1st April B3l4
1st October C3l4
lst October C2/3
1st April A3l4
Engli sh/French Translator
Archivist/Crypto custodian
responsible for the CentralOffice, FOCAL TOP
SECRET and NAIO classi-
fied documents
Handyman
T\vo security guards
Head of Security Bureau
14. Additionally, the post of terminologist has
been regraded from 84 to B5.
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23. The budget of the Secretariat-General for
1994 also includes estimates in relation to the
pensions of 27 retired employees and provision
for two leaving allowances payable in 1994.
Taking account of receipts of staff contributions
to the pension scheme the net total amount under
the pensions budget stands at BF 34 104 710 (See
Appendix I.3)
III. The budget of the Setetarial-Generalfor 1994
Sectians B, C and D
24. Sections B, C and D of the budget of the
Secretariat-General call for no special comment.
Section B sets out the implication of the
Secretariat-General assuming responsibility for
the payment of pensions to 74 retired staff of the
former ministerial organs in Paris. These pensions
account for BF ll 974 650 (See Appendix III),
and represent an increase of 4.36Vo over the pre-
vrous year.
25. Section C contains the operating budget for
the Agency for the Control of Armaments whose
seat is still in Paris. The sum of FF 863 536 provi-
ded under this head covers the salary of a perma-
nent A grade official with control duties, the cost
of his official journeys and expenditure on infor-
mation.
26. Section D represents a budget of 3.3 m.
ecus for medium- and long-term space studies,
which breaks down as follows:
- 
0.5 m. ecus for the running costs of the
study management team (as in the past,
costs are met proportionally from natio-
nal budgets);
- 
supplementary financing of up to 0.3 m.
ecus will be considered by the Space
Group on the basis of supporting docu-
ments from the study management team,
any call for funds is subject to authorisa-
tion from the Space Group;
-2.5 m. ecus for industrial and consultancy
work. This sum has been included subject
to approval by the Ministerial Council at
its spring meeting. In the meantime it will
stay frozen, subject to approval by the
Space Group on the basis of supporting
documents from the study management
team.
21. Presenting estimates for this section, the
Secretariat-General recalled that:
" The 1993 budget implemented the 20th
November 1992 decision of the ministers
tCM (92) 191 to carry forward to 1993 the
balance of funds authorised for 1992 space
studies and to allocate 2 505 000 ecus(f.l 754 597) for Phase II of the feasibility
studies. Thus the additional funds required
in 1993 for the feasibility studies Phase II
were f,l 754 597.
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Section E
28. For the second time the budget of the
Secretariat-General includes a Section E, showing
the sums necessary for running the Planning Cell.
29. The 1994 budget does not provide for any
change to the organogram of the Cell.It shows the
Cell's 3OVo contribution to the rent and manage-
ment costs of the building and its contribution to
administrative support services, as described in
paragraph 10 above.
30. Total expenditure under this section thus
stands at BF 62 260 100 (see the table in
Appendix IV). This section does not show any
income in respect of staffcontributions to the pen-
sion scheme as this amount has been set against
the pensions budget of the Secretariat-General.
31. The Council has taken note of the
Assembly's suggestion regarding management
procedures for the Planning Cell's budget. This
matter was discussed by the Budget and
Organisation Committee on 28th June 1994,
which clarifred that:
" with the exception of Chapter Itr, which
remains the responsibility of the Head of
Administration, the responsibility and the
decision-making of the Planning Cell bud-
get lay with the Director of the Planning
Cell, who has to comply with the existing
financial regulations, remaining within the
approved budget. The r6le of the
Secretariat-General consists in the financial
control of the execution of the budget in
respecting the existing regulations, main-
taining the bank accounts and ordering the
payments as well as keeping of the finan-
cial records. Article 6 of the Financial
Regulations would have to be amended
accordingly. (ROle of the Director,
Planning Cell). Finance Section will circu-
late a proposal. "
32. The Assembly has not yet been informed of
the procedural changes adopted to give the
Director of the Planning Cell greater administrati-
ve responsibilities.
V. The bud.get of the Institute for Security
Studies for 1994
33. The Institute for Security Studies has
consolidated its work over the first years of its
existence. Hence the 1994 budget estimates in
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general terms update those for the previous year
to take account of the rise in the cost of living.
34. The one exception is the creation of a post
graded 83 and a part-time B3tB4 grade post. This
type of contract represents an innovation in WEU
staffing policy. The Staff Rules will be duly
amended to take account of part-time contracts.
35. Appendix V contains a recapitulatory table
of the budget estimates of the Institute.
VI. The budget of the WEU Satellite Centre
for 1994
36. Forabetter understanding ofthe nature and
importance of the Satellite Centre budget, refer-
ence may be made to the inftoductory remarks that
preface the present document. Emphasis is placed
first upon the fact that in early 1994 the Satellite
Cenre enters its second experimental stage. All the
preparatory stages will then be complete and the
Centre will be in a position to undertake the tasks
the ministers have agreed to allocate to it.
37. The ministers propose to discuss the future
of the Centre in November 1994 and the budget
for the Cenfie has been prepared with this meeting
specifically in view, so that the bulk of the infor-
mation essential for decision-making will be avai-
lable.
38. The table in Appendix VI summarises the
1994 budget estimates according to the classifica-
tion adopted by all the ministerial organs. This
shows a total operating budget of
Ptas 1 619 620 000. By deducting the amount of
staff contributions to the pension scheme from
this total, a net total of Ptas 1 603 360 000 is obtai-
ned.
39. Comparison of the figures for 1994 with
those approved for 1993 show that the main
changes relate to " Chapter IV - Mission
Purchases ". This difference is explained by the
fact that provision has been made for regular
maintenance and support of the technical equip-
ment that has been purchased. Also the Centre has
from time to time to purchase data, including ima-
gery, (in increasing large quantities) for the speci-
fic missions assigned to it.
40. Lastly the establishment of the Centre
remains unchanged. The 50 posts were filled
during the course of 1993.
VII. The budget of the Western European
Armaments Group (WEAG)for 1994
41. The WEAG budget constitutes an addition
to the traditional budgets of the other WEU minis-
terial organs and must be examined apart from
them as it is financed separately from the contri-
butions of thirteen countries, whereas the WEU
budgets are financed by nine oountries.
42. Appendix VII shows the cost-sharing for-
mulae for the 9 and the 13.
43. It should be recalled that WEAG was crea-
ted when the functions of the Independent
European Programme Group (IEPG) were ffans-
ferred to WEU following a decision taken by the
Council at the ministerial meeting held in Rome
on 4th December 1992.
44. As this decision was implemented in 1993,
a separate 1994 budget has been prepared to make
the WEAG Secretariat operational. This docu-
ment was approved by the Council under an acce-
lerated procedure which 
- 
according to the budget
submission note drafted by the Secretariat-
General 
- 
does not prejudge procedure to be
applied in the future.
45. The relevant estimates, totalling FB
15 500 000, are contained in Appendix VIII. They
call for no particular comment.
VIII. Action taken on Assembly
Recommendalion 550
46. In approving Recommendation 550(Appendix IX) the Assembly recommended that
the Council:
" 1. Inform the Assembly of any subsequent
changes in the organograms of the WEU
ministerial organs;
2. Ask the WEU Budget and Organisation
Committee to examine in the framework
of its responsibilities and as it did for the
ministerial organs, the changes to the
organogram of the Office of the Clerk of
the Assembly proposed in the 1994 bud-
get;
3. Consider the expediency of separating
the budget of the Planning Cell from that
of the Secretariat-General and make its
Director responsible for managing it;
4. Take every possible step to make the
Torrej6n Satellite Centre fully operatio-
nal and, in this context, authorise the
Director of the Centre to enter into multi-
annual expenditure commitments where
necessary;
5. Inform the Assembly of the conclusions
of the study of the financing of the pen-
sion scheme;
6. Study the possibility of adopting a priva-
te health insurance scheme for WEU staff
in Paris as it did for staff in Brussels. "
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47. The reply has recently been given to this
recommendation (See Appendix IX). Also the
budget documents analysed in the present rePort
already reflect the changes in the establishment of
the WEU ministerial organs. Additionally deci-
sions relating to changes in the organogram of the
Office of the Clerk were taken when its 1994 bud-
get was approved.
48. The Assembly can only take note of the fact
that the Courrcil, while recognising the principle of
multi-annual expenditure commitments by the
Satellite CenEe, reserves the right to take any deci
sion it sees fit at the end of the Cenre's experimen-
tal phase. It will be possible therefore to reconsider
this matter when the next report is drafted.
49. The Assembly also notes with approval the
decision by the Budget and Organisation
Committee not to proceed with the actuarial study
on pensions as the effect of the actuarial data on
WEU would be negligible in regard to the aggte-
gated frndings of the studies on the other co-ordi-
nated organisations.
50. With regard to point 3, as stated in paragra-
ph 31 above, the Director of the Planning Cell has
been given increased responsibility for managing
his budget, although this remains an integral part
of the budget of the Secretariat-General.
51. The reply to the question raised under point
6 cannot, however, be considered satisfactory as
the study on the possible adoption of a private
health insurance scheme for Paris staff to replace
the arrangements under the French social security
scheme is of major interest to staff.
52. The issue this raises cannot be considered
within the general context of relations with the host
country. Hence as paragraph 49 of the previous
report states, the OECD has already cancelled its
agreement with the French Government to extend
arangements under the French social security sys-
tem to its staff and ttre Council of Europe has car-
ried out a conclusive study on the matter. There is
no reason for affiliating WEU staff in Paris to a
health insurance scheme, the cost of which is more
than double that of a private health insurance sche-
me for the same benefits. The Council is aware of
this and has, moreover, adopted the private scheme
for the staffof the Secretariat-General.
53. The Assembly recommends that the
Council place the matter on is agenda for discus-
sion so that the move to the new rdgime may be
made as quickly as possible.
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APPENDD( I
1. Recapitulatory tuhh of S e cretariat-Ge neral funds
2. Recapifitlotory tablo of the budget of the Secretafiat-General, Scction A
Secretariat-General Section A 
- 
Secretariat, recoruncndcd budget, in BEF
Chaper heads and sub-heads
Chapter A.I - Personnel costs
1. Basic salary
2. Salary-related
2.A. Expaftiation
2.8. Household
3. Special allowances
3.A. Dependants
3.B. Education
3.C. Rent
3.D. Language
3.E. Representation
3.F. Home leave
3.G. Termination
3.H. Unexpended
3.I. Secretariat allow.
3.J. C-grades spec.
4. Provident Fund
5. Social charges
6. Overtime
7. Temporary staff
7.A. Temporary staff
7.B. Experts, consultants
8. Recruitment
8.A. Travel costs
8.B. Removal
8.C. Installation
9. Staff association
9.A. Travel
9.B. NATO facilities
10. Medical examinations
I 1. Interorganisational charges
11.A. rOS
11.B. JPAS
190 87t 848
t9 656 732
t4 580297
5W6435
14 572 753
4 280 000
800 000
4 570 000
26t 300
I 339 453
I 200 000
0
0
562 000
I 560 000
377 offi
I 3M 4004NM
5ONMO
5 000 000
0
2 0000N
200 000
I s00 000
300 000
261 000
161 000
100 000
310 w
3ONOM
l 250 000
I 750 000
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1993 Budgets
BEF
1993 Funds
BEF
1994 Budget
credits BEF
1994 credits
to call BEF (3):(l) (4):(l)
Secret.-General (1) (2) (3) (4) (s) (6)
A. Secret.-General 259745W0 8 700 000 242 157 469 233 457 M9 (6.7) (10.1)
A.I.A. Pensions 26 865 000 9 000 000 34 t0/'7tO 25 tM7tO 26.95 (6.5)
E. Planning Cell 26516250 62260100 622ffi tW t34 134
Torers 3131263q 17 700 000 338 522279 320822279 8.11 2.45
APPENDD(I DocUi/fiNI1425
2. Recapitu.latory table otthe budget of the Secreta,riat-General Section A
Secretariat-General Section A 
- 
Secretariat, recommcnded budget, in BEF (continued)
Chapter hcads and sub-heads
Clwpter A.I - Personnel costs
12. Training costs
12.A. Computer
12.B. Terminology
12.C. Language (conribution)
670 000
350 000
50 000
270000
Total Chapter A.I 245 423733
Clwpter A.II - Travel
1. Official journeys
2. Auditors
426/'0N
457 470
Total Chapter A.tr 4721 470
Clnpter A.III - Other operating Costs
1. Premises
1.A. Rent (pr6c. imm. incl.)
1.B. Maintenance, repair
1.C. Gas, elect. water
l.D. Daily office cleaning
1.E. l,ondon premises
2. Furniture and equipment
2.A. Rent
2.B. Maintenance
3. Ofhce supplies and printing
3.A. Stationery
3.B. hinting
4. Communications
4.A. Telecom
4.8. WEUCOM
4.C. TARE, IVSN
4.D. Postage
5. Hospitality
6. IVlotor vehicles
6.,{. Maintenance
6.8. Peuol
T.Information
7.A. Newspapers
7.8. Books
7.C. CD-Rom.
7.D. Reuters
8. Tnsurances
8.A. Premises and furninre
E.B. Motor vehicles
9. Uniforms
10. Appeals board
11. Gher costs
11.A. Bank charges
11.B. Miscellaneous
12. Contingencies
99 289 418
74 490 668
9 828750
8 343 000
4 575 000
2 052 0N
3614M
2 560 000
I 054 000
2 318000
2 060 000
258 000
t2 0590N
2 884 000
6 500 000
975 000
1 700 000
665 W
335 000
120 000
215 000
787 5N
515 000
200 000
72 500
2 749 N0
2549 W
200 000
288 000
202 M0
215 000
115 000
100 000
0
(1)
(2)
Total Chapter A.Itr 122 521 918
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2. Recapitulatory table of the budget of the Secretafiat-Genera\ Sectbn A
Secretariat-General Section A 
- 
Secretariat, recommended budget, in BEF (vontinued)
Chapter heads and sub-heads
Clnpter A.N - Purclases
l. Furniture and equipment
2. Motor vehicles
3. Informatics
458 900
275 W0
0
Total ChapterA.IV 733 9N
Clnpter A.V
l. Fire protection
2. Security improvement
3. Dilapidation London premices
60 000
t 473000
p.m.
Total Chapter A.V I 533 000
INcolre
ClwpterA.Vl -WEU tax
l. Article 2 WEU tax regulations
2. Article 6 WEU tax regulations
80 035 552
165 000
Total ChapterA.VI 80 200 552
Clwpter A.VII - Other receipts
1. Bank interest
2. Planning Cell administrative support
3. Delegations rent
4. Miscellaneous
l m0un
50 870 000
706 000
0
Total ChapterA.VII 52s76WO
NerrorAl v42ts7 469
(l) Of which BEF 5fi) 000 frozen.
(2) Frozen pending communications exp€rts advice.
Note: The 7% staffcontribution to pensions is to be found as a receipt in the Secretariat's AIA pensions budget.
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3. Recapitulatory table of the budget of the Secretariat-General, Section B
Secretariat-General Section B PMO pensions, 1994 recommended budget in FF
Expenditure
1. Pensions 10 9r3 500
2. Allowances 705 000
3. Iraving allowance
4. Supplementary insurance premium paid
by WEU 390 000
5. Bank charges 5 000
Totet- EXPENDTTURE l2 013 500
INcoNre
1.a. ACA StaffContributions (77o) 38 850
2. Reimbursement of hovident fund with-
drawals
3. Other receipts
Torar RECEIPTS 38 850
NEr rorer tt 974 650
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APPENDIX II
1. Establishment table of the Secretariat-General
Post no. Title Grade of post
1.
2.
3.
4.
L
10.
11.
12.
A.
15.
16.
II.
30.
31.
32.
il1.
40.
V
70.
71,
72.
76.
B.
t9.
20.
C.
23.
24.
ru
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
80.
81.
Secretary-General
Deputy Secretary-General
Personal Assistant to SG
Personal Assistant to DSG
Political Division
Director for Political Affairs
Secretary to the Director
Division Assistant
Security Policy Section
Head of Section
Assistant
Defence Policy Section
Head of Section
Assistant
General Affairs and Planning Section
Head of Section
Research assistant
Council Secretariat
Head
Deputy Head
Assistant
Press and Informntian
Head
Trans lation D e partme nt
Head (Revier E/F)
Reviser/Translator F/E
Translator
Translator
Translator
Assistant/Terminologi st
Secretary
Secretary
Secretary
Translator
Adminis tratia n Div is in n
Head of Administration/Legal Adviser
Assistant for Personnel
Secretary
Stock Manager
General Services Section
Head of Section
Head of Registry
HG
HG
8.4
8.4
A.4t5
A.3t4
A.2t3
A.6
8.3t4
8.4
4.3t4
4.2t3
A.3t4
4.2t3
A.3t4
A.2t3
A.4
LT.5
t:t.4
Lr.3
LT.3
LT.3
8.4t5
8.3t4
8.3t4
8.3t4
LT.2/3
A.5
8.4t5
8.3t4
8.4t5
A.2t3
8.4t5
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APPENDIX II
1. Establishment table of the Secretariat-General (continued)
(*) Only one post can be upgraded to C.4 (Head of Security Guards).
Post no. Title Grade of post
V
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
100.
101.
t02.
103.
r04.
105.
106.
t20.
tzt.
t22.
123.
t24.
128.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
r38.
139.
140.
t4t.
r42.
143.
144.
130.
131.
Administration Divisia n
Reproduction Clerk
Reproduction Clerk
TelephonisUShorthand Typist
Telephonist/Registry Clerk
Messenger
Messenger
Driver
Driver
Maintenance/general handyman
M aint e nanc e/ g e ne r al handy man
Archivist/Crypto Clerk
Secretarial Services
Secretary/Shorthand Tlpist
Secretary/Shorthand Typist
Secretary/Shorthand Typist
Secretary/Shorthand Tlpist
Secretary/Shorthand Typist
Secretary/Shorthand Tlpist
Secretary/Shorthand Typist
Finance and Budget Section
Head of Section
Deputy Head of Section
Chief Accountant
Finance Assistant
Secretary
Stock Manager
Security Bureau
Head of Bureau
Deputy Head/Head of Communications
as of lst Jan 95)
Communications Officer
Head of Security Guards
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
8.2t3
B.A3
8.2t3
B.A3
c.2t3
c.2t3
c.3t4
c.3t4
c.3l415
c.3/4
8.3/4
8.3t4
8.3t4
8.3t4
8.3t4
8.3t4
8.314
8.314
A.3t4
A.213
4.2t3
8.4
8.3t4
8.4t5
A.3/4
A.2/3
8.3t4
c.2t4t4 (*)
c.2t3t4 (*)
c.2t3t4 (*)
c.2l3l4 (*)
c.2t3t4 (*)
c.2t3t4 (*)
c.2l3l4 (*)
c.2t3t4 (*)
c.2t3t4 (*)
c.2l3l4 (*)
c.2t3t4 (*)
c.2/3/4 (*)
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Secretary-General
Deputy Secretary-General
Eead-sfDivisien A5 (*)
Secretary B2l3l4
Finance Section
Head of Finance Section A3l4
Deputy Head of Finance Section A2l3
Chief Accountant A2l3
Accountant B4
Secretary/shortland typist B2l3l4
Telephonists
282t3
Registry
I B4t5
Arc hiv is t/enc ryption key holde rI B3/4
Maintenance
1 Gen. purpose man C 3/4/5
1 Gen. purpose manC3l4
Reproduction
282t3
General Services
2 Messengers C2l3
ZDiversC3l4
Storekeeper,
Inventory Bookkeeper B4l5
Security Guards
I Head C4
ll Guards C2/C3
2. Organogram of the Secretariat-General
(*) And lrgal Adviser.
(1) The Security Bureau is administratively attached to the Administration Division. It depends operatively from the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General.
UooC
lr,z
-l
stJUl
tsFU
lnz
U
X
t.J@
Secretary-General
Deputy Secreta{v General
Security Bureau
(see page 2)
Director A6S-ecretarv B 314
Division Assistant 84
Council Secretariat
o=tgry rlgeg A3t4
Assistant AZl3 Head LT5
English Section
Reviser LT4
1 Translator LT3
French Section I
2 Translators LT3
I Translator LT2/3
I Sec. Ass. Termin. B4/5
3 Secretaries B2l3l4
1 to be promoted
LT4 when need arises
Assistant
tlilelc t.*l itlL------------J
r------------ii Militarv i
i ex-pert 1*.; I
L-------_----J
(**) The incumbents are paid nationally and are with WEU on a temporary basis, without altering the establishment plan.
>E
'!
Lllz
U
X
o
fr,z
-l
5tJ9r
A3l4
Azt3
Head A3l4Rssistant A2l3
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APPENDIX I[
Recapinlanry tuble of the budget of the Secretariat-General,
Section B, ex-PMO pensions
Secretariat-General Section B PMO pensions, 1994 recommended budget in FF
Expenditure
1. Pensions 10 913 500
2. Allowances 705 000
3. Leaving allowance
4. Supplementary insurance premium paid
by WEU 390 000
5. Bank charges 5 000
Torer EXPENDITURE 12 013 500
INcour
l.a. ACA StaffContributions (77o) 38 850
2. Reimbursement of Provident fund with-
drawals
3. Other receipts
Tornr RECETPTS 38 850
Nrr rorer rt 974 650
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APPENDIX IV
Recapitulatory table of the budget of the Secretariat-General Section E, Planning Cell
Secretariat-General Section E- Planning Cell 1994, recommended budget in BF
1994 credits
E.I. Personnel costs
1. Basic salary
2. Salary-related costs
2.A. Expatriation allowance
3. Special allowances
3.A. Dependants
3.B. Education
3.C. Rent
3.D. Language
3.E. Representation
3.F. Home leave
3.G. Termination of contract
3.H. Unexpended leave
3.I. Secretariat allow.
3.J. C-grades special allow.
4. Provident Fund
5. Social charges
6. Overtime
7. Temporary staff
8. Recruit., arriv., depart.
9. Staff association
10. Medical examination
11. IOSS, JPAS
12. Training costs
5 480 000
190 000
190 000
429 100
0
0
300 000
30 100
0
,0
0
0
99 000
0
0
190 000
0
0
0
0
15 000
0
0
Total Chapter E.I 6 304 100
E.II. Travel
1. Official journeys
2. Auditors
2 750 000
0
(1)
Total Chapter E.II 2 750 000 (1)
E.III. Other operating costs
1. Premises (rent etc.)
2. Furniture and equipment
2.A. Rental
2.B. Maintenance
3. Office supplies and printing
3.A. Stationery
3.B. Printing
4. Communications
4.A. Telephone
4.B. WEUCOM
4.C. TARE
4.D. Postage
5. Hospitality
6. Motor vehicles
6.,4.. Maintenance
6.8. Petrol
A.S.
341 000
341 000
0
930 000
890 000
40 000
2 100 000
2 100 000(A.s.)
(A.S.)
(A.S.)
400 000
250 000
120 000
130 000
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APPENDIX IV
Recapitulatory table of the hudget of the Secretariat-General, Section E, Plbnning Cell
Secretariat-General Section E- Planning Cell, recommended budget in BEF (continued)
1994 credits
E.III. Other operating costs
T.Information
7.A. Newspapers
7.B. Books
8. Insurance
8.A. Car
9. Uniforms
10. Appeals board
11. Other costs
12. Contingencies
13. Administrative support (*)
300 000
280 000
20 000
100 000
100 000(A.s.)
0
50 000
0
50 734 000
Total Chapter E.III 55 341 000
Chapter E.IV. Purchases
1. Furniture and equipment 300 000
Total Chapter E.IV 300 000
Chapter E.V
1. Fire protection
2. Security improvement
0
p.m.
Total Chapter E.V 0
INcopre
Chapter E.VI WEU tax
1. Regulations Art. 2 2290000
Total Chapter E.VI 22900[0
Chapter E.VII Other receipts
1. Bank interest
2. Miscellaneous
r45 000
0
Total Chapter E.VII 145 000
Chapter E.VUI
Staff contribution to pensions (*)
Total Chapter E.VII (*)
Ner Torel 62260 t00
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(*) Income for Secretariat-General AIA pensions budget.
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APPENDIX V
Recapitulatory table of the budget of the WEU Institute for Security Studies
WEU Institute for Security Studies, recommended budget, in FF
Chapter heads and sub-heads 1994 credits
Chapter I - Personnel costs
1. Basic salary
2. Salary-related
2.A. Expatriation
2.B. Household
3. Special allowances
3.A. Dependants
3.B. Education
3.C. Rent
3.D. Language
3.8. Representation
3.F. Home leave
3.G. Termination
3.H. Unexpended
3.I. Secretarial allow.
4. Provident Fund
5. Social charges
6. Overtime
7. Temporary staff
7.A. Temporary staff
7.B. Expens, consultants
8. Recruitment
8.A. Travel costs
8.B. Removal
E.C. Installation
9. Staff association
10. Medical examinations
1 1. Interorganisational charges
t3 623 500
1 028 350
375 000
t 456700
7 500
130 000
170 000
0
5 000
0
Total Chapter I t6 796 050
Chapter II - Travel
1. Official journeys
2. Auditors
380 000
0
Total Chapter II 380 000
Chapter III
l. Ad hoc studies
2. Study grants
3. hrblications
4. Colloquia
5. WEU prize
400 000
650 000
350 000
750 000
s0 000
Total Chapter III 2200 000
Chapter IV - Other operating costs
1. Rent and maintenance of furniture and
equipment
2. Offrce supplies
3. Postage and telephone
300 000
145 000
90 000
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APPENDIX V
Recapitulntory table of the budget of the WEU Institute for Security Studies
WEU Institute for Security Studies, recommended budget, in FF (continued)
Chapter heads and sub-heads 1994 credits
Chnpter IV - Other operating costs
4. Hospitality
5. Official car
6. Information and documentation
7. Uniforms
8. Contingencies
9. Appeals board
10. Non-recoverable taxes
56 000
2s 000
190 000
20 000
3 000
0
12 000
Total Chapter IV 841 000
Chapter V - Purchases
1. Furniture and equipment
2. Motor vehicle
100 000
0
(1)
Total Chapter V 100 000
Chnpter VI - Contrtbufion by the Institute
to the joint charges of the building
l. Building maintenance, etc.
2. Miscellaneous expenditure
3. Telephone
4. Insurance
5. Other costs
6. Major building work
t t72w
30 000
300 000
39 000
45 000
0
Total Chapter VI I 586 000
Toter ESTIMATED EXPENDmURE 21 903 050
Iwcotvm
ChapterVII - WEU tax
1. WEU tax regulations 6 117 000
Total Chapter VII 6 117 000
Chapter VIII - Other receipts
1. Bank interest
2. Miscellaneous
r00 000
10 000
Total Chapter VIII 110 000
Torer TNCoME 6227 W
Ner rorel 15 676 050
(*) Of which FF 50 000 frozen.
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APPENDIX VI
Recapitulatary table of the hudget of the Satellite Centre
WEU Satellite Centre, recommended budget, in ESP
Chapter heads and sub-heads 1994 credits
Chapter I - Personnel costs
1. Basic salary
2. Salary-related
2.A. Expatriation
2.B. Household
3. Special allowances
3.A. Dependants
3.B. Education
3.C. Rent
3.D. Language
3.E. Representation
3.F. Home leave
3.G. Termination
3.H. Unexpended
3.I. Secretarial allow.
4. Provident Fund
5. Social charges
6. Overtime
7. Temporary staff
7.A. Temporary staff
7.B. Experts, consultants
8. Recruitment
8.A. Travel costs
8.B. Removal
8.C. Installation
9. Staffassociation
10. Medical examinations
11. Personnel costs, miscellaneous
471 130000
56 900 000
53 150 000
0
21 880 000
3 000 000
6 000 000
25 250 000
0
200 000
8 000 000
(1)
(2)
Total Chapter I 645 510 000
Chapter II - Travel
1. Official journeys
2. Auditors
30 000 000
0
Total Chapter [I 30 000 000
Chapter III - Other operating costs
1. Premises
2. General services
3. Office supplies and printing
4. Telecom
5. Hospitality
6. Motor vehicles
7. Information
8. Uniforms
9. Insurance, uniforms
10. Building maintenance
11. Tools/spares for the building
12. Appeals Board
1 3. Non-recoverable taxes
15 400 000
23 050 000
4 000 000
9 390 000
1 100000
14270000
4 s00 000
240 000
1 520 000
6 130 000
1 500 000
200 000
340 000
(3)
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APPENDIX VI
Recapitulatory table of the budget of the Satellite Centre
WEU Satellite Centre, recommended budget, in ESP (continued)
Chapter heads and sub-heads 1994 credits
Chnpter III - Other operating costs
14. Bank charges
15. Maint. off. equip. and S/W
16. Miscellaneous
20 000
3 000 000
300 000
Total Chapter III 84 760 000
Clnpter IV - Mission purchnses
1. Purchase of data, incl. imagery
2. Consumables
3. Maintenance of ops equipment
4. Training
5. Publications
6. Colloquia
176 000 000
19 0m 000
124 000 000
24 000 000
1 600 000
2 500 000
Total Chapter IV 347 100000
ChapterV - Capital expenditure
and investments
1. Building, Modifications and Plant
2. Furniture and office equipment
3. Operational Equipment and SAM
4. Motor vehicles
5. Scientific support
6. Special and Secure Communications
7. Incorporation of Future Applications
8. Product Assurance
40 000 000
15 000 000
138 000 000
0
100 000 000
11 000 000
400 000 000
40 000 000
(4)
Total Chapter V 7,{4 000 000
ToTeT ESTIMAIED EXPENDITURE 1 851 370 000
INcow
ChapterVI - WEU tax
1. WEU tax regulations 206 000 000
Total Chapter VI 206 000 000
Chnpter VII - Other receipts 24940 W
Total Chapter VII 27 750m0
Ner openarntc cosrs 1 619 620 000
PeNsroNs
1. Expenditure
2. Net receipts
1 050 000
17 310 000
Net pension income 16 260 000
Npr rorer l 603 360 000
(l) Of which ESP I 500 000 frozen.
(2) See Secretariat-General's budget.
(3) Ofwhich ESP 13 750 000 frozen.
(4) Of which ESP 5 000 000 frozen.
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APPENDIX VII
W E U c os t- sharin g formulae
WEU organs
(vo)
WEAG
(vo)
Germany
Belgium
Denmark
Spain
France
Greece
Italy
Luxembourg
Norway
Netherlands
Portugal
Turkey
United Kingdom
Torel
17.00
8.35
0.00
13.00
17.00
0.00
17.00
0.30
0.00
8.35
2.00
0.00
17.00
16.35
5.70
3.00
12.t0
16.35
1.50
16.35
0.30
3.00
5.90
1.30
1.80
16.35
100.00 r00.00
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APPENDIX VIU
Recapitulatory table of the budget of the Western European Armaments Group
Year 1994 credits BEF
Chapter I. Personnel costs (1)
I.1. Basic salary 9 800 000
Total Chapter I 9 800 m0
Chapter II. Travel
II.1. Official journeys 1 200 000
Total Chapter II l 200 000
Chapter III. Other operating costs
1I.1. Premises
1.A. Rent (2)
III.2. Administrative support (3)
III.3. Offrce supplies
3.A. Stationary
III.4. Communications
trI.5. Hospitality
III.6. Information
trI.7. Other costs
7.A. Support high-level meeting (4)
7.B. Bank charges
7.C. EUCLID symposium
800 000
1 700 000
200 000
700 000
100 000
50 000
220 N0
30 000
4 000 000
Total Chapter trI 7 800 000
Chapter IV. Purchases
IV.1. Furniture and equipment (5)
(non-recurrent)
IV.2. Informatics (6)
(non-recurrent)
100 000
400 000
Total Chapter IV s00 000 s00 000
Chapter V. WEU tax
V.l. Regulations Art 2
V.2. Regulations Art 6
- 
3 800 000
0
Total Chapter V
-38000m
Ner rorAl- 15 500 000
(l) Details of chapter (e.g. expatriation allowances, rent allowance, etc.) to be inserted after appointment of the recruited
personnel.
(2) Including furniture, electricity and cleaning.
(3) Including accounting, translation, printing, photocopying, and other general services.
(4) To support one NADs and one ministerial meeting.
(5) To buy a fax machine and a safe cupboard.
(6) To buy 3 personal computers, I portable computer and related printers.
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RECOMMEI\DATION 550'
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial year 19932
The Assembly,
(t) Considering that:
(a) the Council has communicated to the Assembly the budget relating to the transfer of the
Secretariat-General from London to Brussels and the budgets of the ministerial organs for
the financial year 1993;
(b) the installation of the Secretariat-General and the Planning Cell in Brussels was accom-
panied by an increase of eleven in the number of staff of the Secretariat-General and the
creation of three grade B posts in the Planning Cell;
(c) the operating budget of the Planning Cell is included in the budget of the Secretariat-General
as Section E;
(d) the Director of the WEU Planning Cell, unlike the other subsidiary organs, does not have full
responsibility for managing the budget of the Cell;
(e) the Torrej6n Satellite Centre is still in the organisational stage and is not fully opera-
tional;
0 he Director of the Centre has asked for authorisation to enter into multi-annual expenditure
commitments to complete this organisational stage;
(g) the study of financing the pension scheme for permanent staff has not yet been com-
pleted;
(h) the affrliation of permanent staffof tle_P3lis organs with the French social sepurity.system is
proving very expensive, whereas the OECD has already adopted a private sickness insurance
scheme that costs far less and the study conducted by the Council of Europe on the subject at
first sight confirms the interest of this private insurance scheme;(/ furthermore, such a private insurance scheme has been adopted by the Secretariat-General
for staff in Brussels as it had done for staff in London,
RrcouueNos rHAT rsr CouNcrr-
l. Inform the Assembly of any subsequent changes in the organograms of the WEU ministerial
organs;
2. Ask the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee to examine, in the framework of its responsi-
bilities and as it did for the ministerial organs, the changes to the organogram of the Office of the Clerk
of the Assembly proposed in the 1994 budget;
3. Consider the expediency of separating the budget of the Planning Cell from that of the
Secretariat-General and make its Director responsible for managing it;
4. Take every possible step to make the Torrej6n Satellite Centre fully operational and, in this
context, authorise the Director of the Centre to enter into multi-annual expenditure commitments
where necessary;
5. Inform the Assembly of the conclusions of the study of the financing of the pension scheme;
6. Study the possibility of adopting a private sickness insurance scheme for WEU staffin Paris as it
did for staff in Brussels.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1993 during the second part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (9th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and
Administration (Document 1399).
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1. The Council reminds the Assembly of its reply to Written Question 316 and confirms that, once
finally approved, the establishment table will be formally forwarded to the Assembly. The same proce-
dure will apply to any further changes that may be made.
2. The Council informs the Assembly that the budget of the ministerial organs for the year 1994 is still
under consideration by the Budget and Organisation Committee, including the staff management aspects.
The Council is not therefore in a position to give a reply on this point at this stage.
3. The Council feels that the expediency of separating the Planning Cell budget from that of the
Secretariat does not need to be considered, in that the credits assigned to the Planning Cell are covered in
a separate section of the Secretariat-General's budget.
The Council takes note of the Assembly's useful suggestion and informs it that the Director of the
WEU Planning Cell has, since taking up his appointment, been given the responsibility for managing his
budget within the limits defined by the organisation's financial regulations.Ig reduce administrative
costi, the implementation of his decisions has been made the responsibility of the Secretariat's Finance
Section.
4. The Council informs the Assembly that the WEU Satellite Cenfte will be fully operational by the
end of the first half of 1994. With regard to multi-annual expenditure commitments, the Budget and
Organisation Committee recognises the principle, when it is shown that such commitments-produce
saiings. In the case of the Satailite Centre, however, the decision that ministers propose to take on its
future in November 1994, atthe end of its experimental phase, should not be prejudged.
5. With regard to WEU, the actuarial experts of the Co-ordinating Committee on Remuneration (CCR)
considered that, given the size of this organisation, the findings of any actuarial study would,huy" q4y_e
negligible effect on the aggregated findings of the studies on the other organisatiols_. As a result, the WEU
Budget and Organisationtommittee has decided to accept the recommendation of the CCR Chairman and
not to carry out an actuarial study on pensions.
6. This question should be considered in the general context of relations with host countries, and the
Council could ask the Director of the WEU Instinrte for Security Studies to consider the question in grea-
ter detail.
TMPBTMERTE cl ar-nNqOrWerse
Rue Edouard-Belin : 3'trimestre 1994
No d'ordre :29917
REPLY OF TIIE COUNCIL'
to Recommendation 550
PRINTEDINFRANCE
l. Communicated to the Assembly on24th March 1994.
292
